10 Best Civil War Generals

[Nimrod 9th]

Had to jump in. Before my current job I spent 10+ years with the Nat'l Park Service. Worked 3 Civil War parks (among other historical themed sites). Yes, National Park Service rangers can be, shall we say, stubborn concerning their options. Anyway I'm getting off track. Note almost all of the top Union generals are mid to late war generals. The early war guys (McClellan, Fremont, Sumner, McDowell, etc.) are usually seen as poor. Not really disagreeing BUT a couple important things usually don't get considered and should be. McDowell lead what at 1st Bull Run? 36,000 men (exact number doesn't matter). This was the largest US force in one place in the history of the US up to that point. No US Army general had EVER commanded so many in the field at one place. No doctrine for formations at that level. No experience. The largest up to this point were the armies during the War with Mexico. Say 15,000-20,000? So McDowell was discovering new territory for the US Army. Now in less than a year, that 36,000 becomes OVER 100,000 for McClellan. Almost overnight McClellan goes from commanding a small army in West Virginia to commanding over 100,000. WOW! No training at such a level. No experience. And these guys had to go on the offensive with these large armies. No wonder they "had the slows." Now look at the top Union generals. Started as early war brigade commanders. Then progressed to mid war division commands. Then late war corps and army commands. They had a chance to learn and grow. McDowell and McClellan (and others) didn't have that. Now don't misunderstand me. McClellan is no Grant. McDowell is no Sherman. I just get frustrated with all the early war Union commanders trash talk. Please folks. Next time be a little more considerate to the very difficult position those early war guys were in.

[ezzler]

But the reverse is also true.
The CSA generals ALSO had to command huge numbers of troops. With much inferior supplies and equipment and weapons. Far, far less logistical support and far fewer replacements.

And they did, in the main, do that far better than the early was federal generals.

Lee , who should definitely be rated above Jackson, failed to get his large army properly into position for any of the seven days battles.
Yet he defeated McClellan and forced him from a war winning position too retreat from the peninsular.

And Lee rated McClellan the best union commander of all.

So just because it was a tough job, doesn't really mean it couldn't be done.

Other early war generals managed it.

[Nimrod 9th]

EZZZ,
We're not that far apart but we a little. I completely agree. McClellan and his summer 62 corps commanders are not Lee, Jackson, J Johnston, and others. But I will slightly disagree or maybe I should fine tune your comments concerning Southern generals being able to command and control huge forces early. Lee and his better division and corps commanders only did limited operational level offensive actions until fall 62. Seven Days was outside Richard. After McClellan dug-in Lee turned to face Pope but Lee had internal lines. From Lee's point of view, Pope wasn't far away. Plus Lee didn't have to command control the entire force. Jackson had already left to slow Pope (South Mountain ... no got that wrong ... Cedar Mountain ... no, that doesn't sound right either ... or is it ... oh this old brain). So Lee was only maneuvering part of his army through interior lines. It isn't until after 2nd Bull Run (late summer early fall 62) Lee takes on his first major operational level offensive. And even it didn't get very far north of the Potomac. Lee is a great general. I'm not trying to belittle him. His operational offensive frame of mind is completely different than the Northern generals operational offensive mind set. Remember I'm not talking tactical. I'm discussing large numbers at the operational level. No Southern general had to command/control/supply the huge numbers Northern generals did. Southern generals had no where near the 100,000 to 120,000 McClellan had to command/control/supply. Again, I'm NOT claiming McClellan and his 62 corps commands are as good as the Southern counter parts. I'm just not sure its fair to compare the early war McClellan (McDowell and others)to the 64/65 Grant Sherman Thomas Logan Meade Hancock etc. Seems like comparing two different types of apples (note I didn't say apple and oranges, they arent' that far apart). How about this. Let's agree to disagree and ponder our points of view. That's what makes this so fun and enlighting. No more long editors from me. I've spoken my piece.

[cpdeyoung]

@Nimrod 9th, @ezz

And a couple of thoughtful and thought provoking pieces they were. I had never thought about it quite that way before and I appreciate your points of view.

What a pleasure to see well considered and polite commentary on an internet forum.

Chuck

[Orm]

I find that cautious and defensive generals often get a lot of criticism. If they didn't attack when there was the slightest opportunity then they get labelled as bad generals. But what if it was the right call to make. What if the alternative attack would have ended in disaster?

General Lee seems to be getting some criticism for his battle plan for the third day of Gettysburg. What if General Lee had decided to use the plan suggested by General Longstreet instead and that had failed badly? Would General Lee then be criticised for not attacking Cemetery Ridge "when there was a opportunity". Would people have said that the Union centre was weak and a concentrated attack on Cemetery Ridge would have won the battle for the Confederate Army. Especially since General Pickett had a fresh division that would surely have been able to break through...

Could it be that a General more aggressive than General Meade would have lost the Gettysburg Campaign?

[DerTroof]

ORIGINAL: Nimrod 9th

Had to jump in. Before my current job I spent 10+ years with the Nat'l Park Service. Worked 3 Civil War parks (among other historical themed sites). Yes, National Park Service rangers can be, shall we say, stubborn concerning their options. Anyway I'm getting off track. Note almost all of the top Union generals are mid to late war generals. The early war guys (McClellan, Fremont, Sumner, McDowell, etc.) are usually seen as poor. Not really disagreeing BUT a couple important things usually don't get considered and should be. McDowell lead what at 1st Bull Run? 36,000 men (exact number doesn't matter). This was the largest US force in one place in the history of the US up to that point. No US Army general had EVER commanded so many in the field at one place. No doctrine for formations at that level. No experience. The largest up to this point were the armies during the War with Mexico. Say 15,000-20,000? So McDowell was discovering new territory for the US Army. Now in less than a year, that 36,000 becomes OVER 100,000 for McClellan. Almost overnight McClellan goes from commanding a small army in West Virginia to commanding over 100,000. WOW! No training at such a level. No experience. And these guys had to go on the offensive with these large armies. No wonder they "had the slows." Now look at the top Union generals. Started as early war brigade commanders. Then progressed to mid war division commands. Then late war corps and army commands. They had a chance to learn and grow. McDowell and McClellan (and others) didn't have that. Now don't misunderstand me. McClellan is no Grant. McDowell is no Sherman. I just get frustrated with all the early war Union commanders trash talk. Please folks. Next time be a little more considerate to the very difficult position those early war guys were in.

"Please folks"? I don't see Little Mac or McDowell mentioned anywhere in this thread before you did. That said, I agree with you and you make excellent points regarding the crucible early war generals were thrust into, commanding unprecedentedly large bodies of troops, most of whom had little or no military background (including, crucially, their NCOs and junior officers).

One thing McClellan is frequently credited for, and properly in my view, is training and to a certain extent "professionalizing" the Army of the Potomac. In the process he gave it an identity and a sense of esprit that would allow it to survive and overcome all the early-war disappointments. I believe Lee's respect for him was genuine.

[Capt. Harlock]

Could it be that a General more aggressive than General Meade would have lost the Gettysburg Campaign?

An argument can be made -- and Lee did in fact make it -- that Meade *did* lose the Gettysburg campaign. (Note "campaign" rather than "battle".) The Southerners achieved their objective of re-locating the fighting and its devastation to Northern territory, and postponed any advance on Richmond for months. They also collected foodstuffs without which their army would have been badly weakened, while inflicting about as many casualties as they received.

[Orm]

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

Could it be that a General more aggressive than General Meade would have lost the Gettysburg Campaign?

An argument can be made -- and Lee did in fact make it -- that Meade *did* lose the Gettysburg campaign. (Note "campaign" rather than "battle".) The Southerners achieved their objective of re-locating the fighting and its devastation to Northern territory, and postponed any advance on Richmond for months. They also collected foodstuffs without which their army would have been badly weakened, while inflicting about as many casualties as they received.

Yes. An argument can be made and I am not wise enough to really argue against it.

The point I was after, that a more aggressive General than Meade, could perhaps have resulted in a worse result, for the Union, than the historical one.

[Curtis Lemay]

I think it’s hard to ascertain who the best Civil War commanders were because the Minie Rifle wiped out most of the tactical options that commanders previously had at their disposal.

Just remember the elaborate tactics available to Napoleonic commanders just a few years before:

Infantry had a weapon with an effective range of only about 100 yards. Artillery could deploy within canister range without coming in range of the infantry. The same applies for cavalry deploying within charging range. So the infantry had to use formations to survive these two threats. Facing cavalry, it could form square. Facing artillery, it could form skirmishers. But facing a combined arms attack by all three arms, it had no options. If it formed square, the artillery – unlimbered at canister range but still beyond musket range – would decimate it. If it formed skirmishers, the cavalry would decimate it.

Thus, the side with a significant artillery and cavalry edge could drive off the defender’s artillery and cavalry arms, leaving the defending infantry in a hopeless state. Really significant victories were attainable.

In contrast, Civil War infantry carried the most effective weapon on the battlefield. With an effective range of 500 yards, cavalry and artillery couldn’t deploy within effective range. Cavalry had to fight dismounted and artillery was only effective in defense. Infantry could never be put into a hopeless situation. Even heavily outnumbered by attacking infantry, it could still extract a cost equal to their own loss.

As a result, Civil War combat was fundamentally attritional. Field engagements tended to produce about the same losses for both sides. The only factor that could cause deviation from that was defenders in prepared positions and attackers that got on the flanks of the defenders.

For this reason, the most important commander characteristic tended to be Initiative. That’s what got you on the enemy’s flank and kept him off of yours. For that reason, I do favor Lee and Jackson as the best Southern commanders. But for huge armies, getting on the flank only got you so much before they repositioned and the attrition kicked back in. So, it’s a lukewarm endorsement.

Note that attrition was not the South’s friend. Trading man for man was a formula for defeat for the South. For that reason, the best Union commanders were the ones that had figured out that brutal logic. That does make Grant the best of the North, in my opinion.

Note that combined arms tactics didn’t return until HE and armor – WW II in other words.

[sullafelix]

Little Mac was not trying to conquer the south, he was trying to defend the Union.

Much like Howe in the revolution, little Mac gets a bad rap.

He was trying to " gentlemanly " slap around the southern forces until they came to their senses.

What people don't realize is that no one for hundreds of years had thought of trying to conquer a country as large as the Confederacy.

The sheer size of the South and the audacity of thinking that they could do it is kind of amazing.

I believe when Lee said that about Mac the " lost order " of Antietam wasn't known about. Lee always thought he had Mac's number and was completely taken aback by South Mountain etc..

[ezzler]

A point well made. And in the earlier posts about huge armies and poor control and anyone managing anything at all was kind of miraculous.

in fact, though you mention combined arms in WW2, you have skipped a whole bloodbath, much more closely related to the civil war.

WW1 generals have an indifferent to poor standing in history, precisely because of the problems that have been outlined so far. The main issues being far too large million men conscript armies. With 20th century weaponry and 19th century communications and transportation. And none of those WW1 generals comes close to any of the civil war generals top ten in reputation.