obvert wrote: Huh. So why the working torpedoes then if that 's a factor that wouldn't have been able to be changed regardless of political direction during
that period? Just curious.
jmalter wrote: 'Reliable USN torps' ON is an 'orrid advantage to the US, I would've thought that this pref-choice is not justified by the stated context of
this game. 'Allied Damage Control Advantage' ON is far more acceptable, when playing in 'historic' context. Reliable USN torps? I don't think so. One might as
well turn FOW OFF as well, ain't the intel working even better than the torps are?
Note to Leandros, pref-settings can be changed 'mid-game', hotkey 'P'.
It beggars belief that one of Adm. Hart's submarine captains had the torp prob 'solved' in 12/41. The USN Mk14 torps were screwed up 3 ways:
- unreliable depth control
- unreliable contact fuse
- unreliable magnetic fuse
These problems did not affect the Mk10 torps used by USN S-boats.
Relax, guys, I’m still only playing with the game to learn how it works. I wouldn’t dream of using “reliable USN torpedoes” when I start in earnest. Well, I might,
but first I need to study a little more this allegation by obvert:
“Torpedoes just didn't work no matter what the political situation was in 41-42 or how aggressive the commanders were.”
Such a statement is worthy of a thread in itself. For all I know it may have been discussed on the Forum. In a way it implies that (fighting) “morale” does not
influence on combat performance. The USN Asiatic Fleet submarine problem is usually described as a dual one, that of the torpedoes proper, and that of the crews,
mainly the boat commanders. To that could be added doctrine, as mentioned here.
That said, if the mk.10 torpedoes were reliable (they weren’t) there is little in the game that show this (my game, anyway) as the S-boats perform no better than
the others – on the contrary (I’ve tried both adjustments). Yes, I know, they were fewer.
This question arose when I remarked on the better than real performance of the USN boats in general. I was asked whether I’d tinkered with the submarine commanders.
I replied I hadn’t, but I have used the boats in a way that is equally unrealistic (as opposed to RL), with higher than normal concentrations – wolfpack-like. I
suspect this has yielded as good results as “reliable torpedoes”. However, operating like that would be change of “doctrine”. Leaders change doctrine.
OTH, the game does not seem to follow Japanese doctrine, at least I do not perceive it as it does, that of prioritizing naval vessels and not squander their
torpedoes on transports. Strange that there is no adjustment for this….That particular I-17 commander in the Torres Strait is a real PITA. He only goes after the
unescorted transports – and succeeds wholesale….
A question: The “December 8: The Full Campaign” – does it start up with the exact RL losses of both parties on 7/8 December?
Fred