Naval War Day-by-Day

[warspite1]

North Sea (Submarine War)

On the 20th November the Royal Navy finally recorded a successful attack with a submarine when HMS Sturgeon sank the German patrol boat V209 in the Heligoland Bight. However patrols in this area were not to last much longer as German ASW measures proved highly effective and the boats had to be withdrawn for their own safety.

Before that happened however, this small initial success was about to be followed up by something a good deal larger…..

Baltic Sea and Arctic Ocean November 30th – 6th December 1939

As mentioned previously the Soviet invasion of Finland began on the last day of November. The main naval action, such that it was, took place in the Gulf of Finland before it froze over. However there were also naval forces at work in the far north. The Finns had no naval units based at Petsamo – their only sizeable port on that bleak coast – as they knew the area was indefensible should there be a war with the Soviet Union.

The Soviets used elements of the Northern Fleet to soften up any defenders at the town of Petsamo as a preliminary to a landing by the 104th Division on the 1st December. The operation was flanked by two destroyers and a couple of submarines with a mixed flotilla of trawlers and patrol boats to provide close escort of the troops to the shore.

Further south in the Gulf of Finland, the Finns had a number of naval batteries that needed to be silenced – and quickly. To this end the USSR undertook further naval landing operations. Various islands in the gulf had been “requested” previously as part of the treaty that the USSR was looking to sign prior to the war. Now the Soviets took them by force.

These islands – amongst them Seiskari, Lavansaari, Pien-Tytarsaari and Suursaari – situated menacingly between the two countries, deep in the Gulf of Finland were obvious targets. The Baltic Fleet provided support in the form of six destroyers and assorted motor torpedo boats, minesweepers and trawlers in addition to the transports, barges etc. The islands quickly fell to the invaders.

During the first couple of days of the war the cruiser Kirov, escorted by two destroyers (possibly Stremitelnyi and Smetlivyi), was ordered to shell the Finnish coastal battery on Russaro island that protected the important port of Hanko. The counter-fire was accurate and the Kirov was forced to retire after damage incurred.

Mine barrages were also laid by Soviet submarines.

[warspite1]

1st – 13th December 1939 (South Atlantic – the surface raiders)

When we left Kapitan Langsdorff, the Graf Spee was heading back into the South Atlantic after a less than successful spell off Mozambique (see Post 137). It appears that the German captain had grown bored of the commerce raiding activity with which he was tasked. From stories told by at least one of the prisoner officers he spoke to, it seems that Langsdorff felt there was little by way of honour and glory in what the Graf Spee was doing – hiding, sinking merchant ships then hiding, then more sinking before hiding back into the expanse of the ocean once more.

So what did Langsdorff propose to do about it? He decided to disobey his orders - and wrote a lengthy report in his war diary about what he planned to do and the reasons why.

Essentially Graf Spee had enough fuel for another 3 months – and that does not include fuel reserves aboard the Altmark. However, her machinery was in need of an overhaul having sailed over 30,000 miles to date. This work would need to be carried out in Germany. The plan was therefore:
- To spend the first week of December attacking targets on the Cape route.
- He would then head west to the expected rich pickings off the River Plate estuary, before starting the long voyage home.
- The important change – and where the disobeying of orders comes in – is his decision not to avoid enemy ships.

Having disguised his ship with a dummy funnel Langsdorff sailed east and, on the 2nd December, Graf Spee came across the Doric Star (Captain Stubbs), a 10,000 ton refrigerated cargo liner that was carrying foodstuffs from New Zealand to the UK. Curiously Langsdorff did not make use of his ship’s new disguise and ordered fire to be opened at long range. Stubbs ensured that the Doric Star’s distress signals were picked up by other ships before acceding to Langsdorff’s order that signalling be stopped. He further ensured that the liner’s machinery be put out of action so the ship could not be taken as a prize. As it happened, at the same time that Graf Spee was engaging the British liner, the Graf Spee’s Arado, on a search patrol, had ditched in the sea. Langsdorff decided to quickly remove Doric Star’s crew and then sink her before heading off to search for his floatplane.


Crewmen from the Graf Spee watch as one of her victims disappears beneath the waves.


The Arado and its crew were duly rescued and the pocket-battleship then continued on in a south-westerly direction. The following morning smoke was sighted in the distance. It was the 8,000 ton Tairoa (Captain Starr) carrying a mixed cargo from Australia to the UK. The merchant vessel was overwhelmed and five crewmen were injured from German gunfire – although once again not before the appropriate distress signal had been sent off. The British now had definitive proof that a German surface raider was at large in the South Atlantic. Gunfire had damaged the British ship sufficiently to ensure that she could not be taken as a prize and, after removal of her crew, was sunk by a torpedo. As with the Doric Star, the Tairoa’s cargo yielded little in the way of bounty, but she was relieved of a dozen or so bottles containing carbonic acid – which would be used in repairing the Graf Spee’s troublesome refrigeration plant.


The trail of destruction started on the 30th September with the sinking of the Clement and ended on with the sinking of the Streonshalh on the 7th December.


Langsdorff now decided to head, as per plan, to the waters off the River Plate. But before doing so would seek one more replenishment from the Altmark – whereupon he would hand over the prisoners (less the captains, radio officers and injured sailors) from his previous sinkings. On the 6th the two German ships sailed west as the Altmark refuelled the Graf Spee. The following day the two ships separated and in the late afternoon Graf Spee came upon what would be her final victim, the 4,000 Streonshalh (Captain Robinson) which was sailing from South America to Sierra Leone. The Germans were able to capture some useful information from this ship – including details of merchant vessel sailings from Buenos Aires – before she was despatched to the bottom of the sea.

Although Langsdorff had by now been warned that four British cruisers – Cumberland, Exeter, Ajax and Achilles* - were in the area, fortified by the merchant vessel sailing information gained from the Streonshalh, he continued on his planned course. Langsdorff decided to abandon the disguise for this part of the operation. During the voyage the Arado’s spare engine finally gave up the ghost; Langsdorff would be without his eyes in the sky from now on.

*Some sources state Achilles as HMNZS. However, the Royal New Zealand navy was not formally formed until the 1st October 1941. At the outbreak of World War II the New Zealanders were a Division of the Royal Navy and the ship was thus HMS.

Nothing was sighted for some days until, at just before 0600hrs on the morning of the 13th December, the look-outs on Graf Spee spotted three ships on the horizon. Langsdorff considered his next move briefly – he still had time to change his mind and stick to his orders - before ordering that course be maintained – a course that would lead Graf Spee straight into the path of three Royal Navy cruisers.

As has been said, Langsdorff was aware that four British cruisers were in the vicinity. These four-ships made up Hunting Group Force G (see Post 117) which was commanded by Henry Harwood. Harwood had been made Commodore commanding the South American Division of the South Atlantic Station in 1936. But for the two years prior to this he had been the Chief Staff Officer of the Second Cruiser Division. Harwood had spent some of this time thinking about and perfecting his ideas on fighting pocket-battleships. Now, from his Flagship, the 8-inch gunned HMS Exeter, Harwood would have the chance to put those ideas into practice.

Harwood’s first crucial decision was made some days before the battle. Upon hearing of the sinkings of the Doric Star and Tairoa, Harwood had to decide where Langsdorff would head next – and be in a position with his three cruisers* to intercept the pocket-battleship. Harwood figured that Langsdorff would be likely to choose one of three destinations next a) the waters off Rio b) the waters off the River Plate or c) the Falkland Islands (the anniversary of the First World War battle was the 8th December).

*unfortunately for Harwood he would be without the 8-inch County-class cruiser HMS Cumberland which was under-going repairs at Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands.

Harwood plumped for the Plate. He figured that this is where the German ship could expect to find the most valuable traffic and so would be the place to head for. The three British cruisers – sailing from their various stations - joined forces on the 12th December. The British captains had not operated as one before and had only one evening to carry out manoeuvres before the plan was called upon to be executed. Harwood’s plan called for 1st Division (Ajax (Captain Woodhouse) and Achilles (Captain Parry)) to attack as one, with Exeter (Captain Bell) attacking from the other flank. Harwood impressed upon his captains the need to hurt the enemy. Sinking her was only a secondary consideration. Because she was so far from home or anywhere to seek shelter or repairs, the overriding concern was that she would be sufficiently hurt that she could never make it home - whether that be the result of sinking her now or at the hands of follow-up forces later was immaterial.

[warspite1]

1st – 13th December 1939 (South Atlantic – the surface raiders) (Cont)

And so Scene I was set. No one knew it at the time but this was a play destined to be played out in two parts. The forthcoming battle was merely the opening….

The battle started at 0617hrs when Graf Spee opened up her 11-inch guns at just over 21,500 yards. Langsdorff, now committed to the battle, knew he would have to sink the British vessels as he would be unlikely to be able to shake them off if pursued. Graf Spee headed at top speed toward the cruisers in order to close the range. Exeter took the brunt of Graf Spee's initial salvos which were deadly accurate, but three minutes later, the British cruiser was able to return fire and scored a hit both on one of Graf Spee’s 4.1-inch AA guns and her fresh water plant. Graf Spee countered with a direct hit on Exeter's B turret and splinters from this shell smashed into her bridge killing almost everyone there. Captain Bell was wounded but he was able to continue giving orders from the secondary control position.

Meanwhile, the light cruisers had begun opening fire at 0622hrs and at about 0630hrs, with Exeter having taken severe punishment, Langsdorff turned his attention to Ajax and Achilles. While the three ships fired at each other, Exeter used the respite to launch an unsuccessful torpedo strike. Graf Spee then turned her attention back to the heavy cruiser once more and for about ten minutes the two ships, Exeter with just four guns left, duelled. The Graf Spee was hit twice more but by now Exeter had just one turret operational. Graf Spee then switched target once more and Achilles was badly damaged by an 11-inch shell near-missing her and causing many casualties in her director control tower. This damage affected her firing accuracy and both she and Ajax were now having problems hitting their target. After this, Graf Spee switched back one final time to Exeter, resulting in the heavy cruiser breaking off the engagement at 0729hrs when her third and final turret went out of action.

However, Graf Spee had not got away unscathed and her forward turret had given her problems intermittently during the battle. The two remaining cruisers started to hit the German ship more frequently, although many of the British shells were simply bouncing off the Graf Spee’s armour belt. Graf Spee responded with a shell that took out both X and Y turret on Ajax. It was now 0730hrs and the range was 11,000 yards. Ajax launched a torpedo strike, as did Graf Spee but neither were successful. The fighting continued until 0740hrs, when Harwood decided to withdraw in order to conduct a night attack.

But Graf Spee did not follow. Instead, Langsdorff headed west towards the River Plate, shadowed by the two bruised and bloodied light cruisers. From time to time the pursuers strayed into range of the enemy guns and had to withdraw under smokescreen, but they ensured that they remained sufficiently close to Graf Spee so as not to lose her.

To the surprise of those on board the British vessels Graf Spee, with 36 officers and crew dead or dying and 60 wounded aboard, was making for the neutral country of Uruguay and Montevideo harbour. Harwood’s goal had been achieved, although his ships had been hit hard, the pocket-battleship had been sufficiently hurt – and as a result she would never see Germany again….

As was to be expected the butcher’s bill was greater for the British with 73 dead – 62 of which were from the Exeter.

There would be a short interval while Graf Spee entered the harbour of the Uruguayan capital. Scene II however would swiftly get under way and would take place largely on land……


HMS Exeter. The two ships of the class* York and Exeter were heavy cruisers built post the Washington Treaty. Although the Washington Treaty did not limit cruiser tonnage, such restriction was the next logical step. After the failure of the 1927 Geneva conference, limitations finally came into force with the signing of the 1930 London Naval Treaty. The British needed large numbers of cruisers to maintain the Empire’s sea-lanes but the construction of large, 8-inch gunned vessels meant that total numbers were compromised. Anticipating restrictions that were likely to be imposed in the future, the Exeter and York were an experiment in building smaller 8-inch gunned ships by dispensing with one of the four turrets. After these two vessels the experiment was ended and the British gave up heavy cruiser construction and concentrated on smaller 6-inch gunned light cruisers in order to maximise numbers. HMS Exeter was re-built following the battle only to be sunk just over two years later - while out-gunned once more – this time at the hands of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

*Only one source I have ever come across has named the two ships the Cathedral-class. All other sources state the class was the York-class. However, the York and Exeter were more step or half-sisters as they featured key differences in both appearance and detail.


Harwood’s 1st Division. The 6-inch gunned HMS Achilles as seen from the Ajax just before the battle.


Admiral Sir Henry “Bobby” Harwood Harwood KCB, OBE
‘Phoney War’ Hero. His victory at the Battle of the River Plate at last gave the British public something to cheer about in what was otherwise a cold and miserable winter….. After the River Plate Harwood held a variety of shore based commands before retiring at the end of the war.



Sources:
The Price of Disobedience (Grove)

[Capt. Harlock]

Harwood’s goal had been achieved, although his ships had been hit hard, the pocket-battleship had been sufficiently hurt – and as a result she would never see Germany again….

Good to see the posts again. There is a report that a shell from Exeter had found the Achilles heel of the Graf Spee. Because the German pocket battleship used diesels instead of the usual steam engines, it was necessary to process the fuel oil through a special on-board treatment plant so that it would ignite in a diesel engine. This treatment plant was allegedly destroyed by an 8-inch hit, leaving the Graf Spee with less than 24 hrs of usable fuel.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

Harwood’s goal had been achieved, although his ships had been hit hard, the pocket-battleship had been sufficiently hurt – and as a result she would never see Germany again….

Good to see the posts again. There is a report that a shell from Exeter had found the Achilles heel of the Graf Spee. Because the German pocket battleship used diesels instead of the usual steam engines, it was necessary to process the fuel oil through a special on-board treatment plant so that it would ignite in a diesel engine. This treatment plant was allegedly destroyed by an 8-inch hit, leaving the Graf Spee with less than 24 hrs of usable fuel.

warspite1

Hi Capt. Yes the true situation re the fuel seems clouded in a degree of mystery.

Apparently there was a report in 2000 (not seen by me - I have no sources for it either) that states the hit to which you refer left Graf Spee with 16 hours of useable fuel - and this was "confirmed" in an exchange between SKL and Langsdorff's no.2.

If true, this really rather important fact was not disclosed by the Germans to the Uruguayans and not picked up by them either. The story for why this is so is that the Germans would not want the British to know of this vulnerability of the ships design.

If this is true this suggests a valid reason for Langsdorff making for a port (repairs were impossible at sea) but masks two key point that ultimately makes the Graf Spee's escape impossible in any case:

1. Her ammunition supply of 11-inch shells was down to 186 - enough for about 40 minutes of action.

2. Her engines were in a desperate state - cracked cylinders and pistons out of true. Langsdorff's engineers could only guarantee a top speed of 17 knots.

So whichever way one slices it, it does not appear remotely possible that the Graf Spee was ever getting back to Germany.

If you ever find out where that report comes from I would love to read it.

[warspite1]

I will finish off the Graf Spee tale in the next few days. I know its not exactly day by day but will be easier to finish this episode before moving onto the U-boat war for December.

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

Harwood’s goal had been achieved, although his ships had been hit hard, the pocket-battleship had been sufficiently hurt – and as a result she would never see Germany again….

Good to see the posts again. There is a report that a shell from Exeter had found the Achilles heel of the Graf Spee. Because the German pocket battleship used diesels instead of the usual steam engines, it was necessary to process the fuel oil through a special on-board treatment plant so that it would ignite in a diesel engine. This treatment plant was allegedly destroyed by an 8-inch hit, leaving the Graf Spee with less than 24 hrs of usable fuel.

warspite1

Hi Capt. Yes the true situation re the fuel seems clouded in a degree of mystery.

Apparently there was a report in 2000 (not seen by me - I have no sources for it either) that states the hit to which you refer left Graf Spee with 16 hours of useable fuel - and this was "confirmed" in an exchange between SKL and Langsdorff's no.2.

If true, this really rather important fact was not disclosed by the Germans to the Uruguayans and not picked up by them either. The story for why this is so is that the Germans would not want the British to know of this vulnerability of the ships design.

If this is true this suggests a valid reason for Langsdorff making for a port (repairs were impossible at sea) but masks two key point that ultimately makes the Graf Spee's escape impossible in any case:

1. Her ammunition supply of 11-inch shells was down to 186 - enough for about 40 minutes of action.

2. Her engines were in a desperate state - cracked cylinders and pistons out of true. Langsdorff's engineers could only guarantee a top speed of 17 knots.

So whichever way one slices it, it does not appear remotely possible that the Graf Spee was ever getting back to Germany.

If you ever find out where that report comes from I would love to read it.

Was it an option to head upstream to Buenos Aires? The government there being more friendly than Uruguay.
The Germans might have tried to 'sell' Graf Spee to Argentina in the same way that Goeben and Breslau were 'sold' to the Turks.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Zorch

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock



Good to see the posts again. There is a report that a shell from Exeter had found the Achilles heel of the Graf Spee. Because the German pocket battleship used diesels instead of the usual steam engines, it was necessary to process the fuel oil through a special on-board treatment plant so that it would ignite in a diesel engine. This treatment plant was allegedly destroyed by an 8-inch hit, leaving the Graf Spee with less than 24 hrs of usable fuel.

warspite1

Hi Capt. Yes the true situation re the fuel seems clouded in a degree of mystery.

Apparently there was a report in 2000 (not seen by me - I have no sources for it either) that states the hit to which you refer left Graf Spee with 16 hours of useable fuel - and this was "confirmed" in an exchange between SKL and Langsdorff's no.2.

If true, this really rather important fact was not disclosed by the Germans to the Uruguayans and not picked up by them either. The story for why this is so is that the Germans would not want the British to know of this vulnerability of the ships design.

If this is true this suggests a valid reason for Langsdorff making for a port (repairs were impossible at sea) but masks two key point that ultimately makes the Graf Spee's escape impossible in any case:

1. Her ammunition supply of 11-inch shells was down to 186 - enough for about 40 minutes of action.

2. Her engines were in a desperate state - cracked cylinders and pistons out of true. Langsdorff's engineers could only guarantee a top speed of 17 knots.

So whichever way one slices it, it does not appear remotely possible that the Graf Spee was ever getting back to Germany.

If you ever find out where that report comes from I would love to read it.

Was it an option to head upstream to Buenos Aires? The government there being more friendly than Uruguay.
The Germans might have tried to 'sell' Graf Spee to Argentina in the same way that Goeben and Breslau were 'sold' to the Turks.

warspite1

It's a good question. The reasons given by Grove are:

- Montevideo was the quickest to reach of the options available to Langsdorff.
- Langsdorff feared a night time torpedo attack from his pursuers hence the wish to get to the closest port.
- Given the state of the engines (see earlier post) this is perhaps understandable.
- Intriguingly, it is suggested that Uruguay's generally pro-Allied stance was unknown to Langsdorff.
- None of Langsdorff's subordinates appear to have raised the issue of Argentina's more friendly government with their captain.
- Once at Uruguay Langsdorff believed that the RN heavy units had arrived and so a subsequent trip to Buenos Aires was impossible anyway.

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Zorch

ORIGINAL: warspite1


warspite1

Hi Capt. Yes the true situation re the fuel seems clouded in a degree of mystery.

Apparently there was a report in 2000 (not seen by me - I have no sources for it either) that states the hit to which you refer left Graf Spee with 16 hours of useable fuel - and this was "confirmed" in an exchange between SKL and Langsdorff's no.2.

If true, this really rather important fact was not disclosed by the Germans to the Uruguayans and not picked up by them either. The story for why this is so is that the Germans would not want the British to know of this vulnerability of the ships design.

If this is true this suggests a valid reason for Langsdorff making for a port (repairs were impossible at sea) but masks two key point that ultimately makes the Graf Spee's escape impossible in any case:

1. Her ammunition supply of 11-inch shells was down to 186 - enough for about 40 minutes of action.

2. Her engines were in a desperate state - cracked cylinders and pistons out of true. Langsdorff's engineers could only guarantee a top speed of 17 knots.

So whichever way one slices it, it does not appear remotely possible that the Graf Spee was ever getting back to Germany.

If you ever find out where that report comes from I would love to read it.

Was it an option to head upstream to Buenos Aires? The government there being more friendly than Uruguay.
The Germans might have tried to 'sell' Graf Spee to Argentina in the same way that Goeben and Breslau were 'sold' to the Turks.

warspite1

It's a good question. The reasons given by Grove are:

- Montevideo was the quickest to reach of the options available to Langsdorff.
- Langsdorff feared a night time torpedo attack from his pursuers hence the wish to get to the closest port.
- Given the state of the engines (see earlier post) this is perhaps understandable.
- Intriguingly, it is suggested that Uruguay's generally pro-Allied stance was unknown to Langsdorff.
- None of Langsdorff's subordinates appear to have raised the issue of Argentina's more friendly government with their captain.

All true...but could Langsdorff have tried for Buenos Aires after reaching Montevideo?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Zorch

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Zorch



Was it an option to head upstream to Buenos Aires? The government there being more friendly than Uruguay.
The Germans might have tried to 'sell' Graf Spee to Argentina in the same way that Goeben and Breslau were 'sold' to the Turks.

warspite1

It's a good question. The reasons given by Grove are:

- Montevideo was the quickest to reach of the options available to Langsdorff.
- Langsdorff feared a night time torpedo attack from his pursuers hence the wish to get to the closest port.
- Given the state of the engines (see earlier post) this is perhaps understandable.
- Intriguingly, it is suggested that Uruguay's generally pro-Allied stance was unknown to Langsdorff.
- None of Langsdorff's subordinates appear to have raised the issue of Argentina's more friendly government with their captain.

All true...but could Langsdorff have tried for Buenos Aires after reaching Montevideo?

warspite1

Our posts must have crossed - I added an answer to that while you were typing [:)]

It appears that the British efforts at subterfuge were so successful that Langsdorff had convinced himself the Renown and co were already waiting off Montevideo.... If here engines were in the state reported, and those Allied ships where there - she would never have made Buenos Aires any more than a run for the sea.

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Zorch

ORIGINAL: warspite1


warspite1

It's a good question. The reasons given by Grove are:

- Montevideo was the quickest to reach of the options available to Langsdorff.
- Langsdorff feared a night time torpedo attack from his pursuers hence the wish to get to the closest port.
- Given the state of the engines (see earlier post) this is perhaps understandable.
- Intriguingly, it is suggested that Uruguay's generally pro-Allied stance was unknown to Langsdorff.
- None of Langsdorff's subordinates appear to have raised the issue of Argentina's more friendly government with their captain.

All true...but could Langsdorff have tried for Buenos Aires after reaching Montevideo?

warspite1

Our posts must have crossed - I added an answer to that while you were typing [:)]

It appears that the British efforts at subterfuge were so successful that Langsdorff had convinced himself the Renown and co were already waiting off Montevideo.... If here engines were in the state reported, and those Allied ships where there - she would never have made Buenos Aires any more than a run for the sea.

Raeder should have taken a more active stance. Instead of "if ship is scuttled do your best to make sure...", he ought to have ordered Langsdorff to fight and inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy. That's what a British admiral would have done. Raeder also had good intelligence that Renown was nowhere near Montevideo.

It's only 175 statue miles from Montevideo to Buenos Aires. At 17 nautical miles an hour that seems very doable, even if the 16 hours of usable fuel report was true. And some of that would have been within the 3 mile limit (although British might not have respected that if Renown had been present.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Zorch

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Zorch



All true...but could Langsdorff have tried for Buenos Aires after reaching Montevideo?

warspite1

Our posts must have crossed - I added an answer to that while you were typing [:)]

It appears that the British efforts at subterfuge were so successful that Langsdorff had convinced himself the Renown and co were already waiting off Montevideo.... If here engines were in the state reported, and those Allied ships where there - she would never have made Buenos Aires any more than a run for the sea.

Raeder should have taken a more active stance. Instead of "if ship is scuttled do your best to make sure...", he ought to have ordered Langsdorff to fight and inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy. That's what a British admiral would have done. Raeder also had good intelligence that Renown was nowhere near Montevideo.

It's only 175 statue miles from Montevideo to Buenos Aires. At 17 nautical miles an hour that seems very doable, even if the 16 hours of usable fuel report was true. And some of that would have been within the 3 mile limit (although British might not have respected that if Renown had been present.

warspite1

Another thing that has been mentioned is that Langsdorff was afraid that Graf Spee's radar and other sensitive equipment would fall into Allied hands if she was captured - or even sunk in shallow water.

All in all it was a strange episode wasn't it? Given what happened later with Admiral Scheer and others, it seems likely that Graf Spee would have got home had he stuck to orders and not gone looking for a fight.

[AbwehrX]

I wasnt aware of GS fuel system damage. I wonder how it wouldve played out if Raeder wouldve ordered Langsdorff to turn the ship over to Uruguay custody? Perhaps after repairs Uruguay wouldve joined the Axis naval war?! [:D]

[Orm]

ORIGINAL: AbwehrX

I wasnt aware of GS fuel system damage. I wonder how it wouldve played out if Raeder wouldve ordered Langsdorff to turn the ship over to Uruguay custody? Perhaps after repairs Uruguay wouldve joined the Axis naval war?! [:D]

Or, more likely, Uruguay would have turned the ship over to the British.

[warspite1]

Royal Navy (and later Royal New Zealand Navy). Leander-class Light Cruisers.

Leander – Completed March 1933
Achilles – Completed October 1933
Orion - Completed January 1934
Neptune – Completed February 1934
Ajax – Completed April 1935

The Leander-class consisted of five ships built for the Royal Navy between 1930 and 1935. Three half-sisters of the Amphion-class followed and this class will be looked at separately later. The Leander-class ships were named after mythological characters.

The design of the Leander-class went through a great many iterations before, in November 1929, a final design was agreed upon and an order placed for one ship (Leander) in the 1929/30 programme. Then, following the signing of the 1930 London Naval Treaty (which set limits on cruiser tonnage and restricted the British to 91,000 tons of new construction until the end of 1936), the Admiralty decided to end the construction of 8-inch gunned ‘heavy’ cruisers and maximise cruiser numbers through the construction of smaller, 6-inch ‘Light’ cruisers. As a consequence an order for a further three ships was placed in 1930 and a fourth the following year. After Leander, detail changes were made to the subsequent ships in order to find weight savings and as a result the final ship (Ajax) weighed in at 6,985 tons (Standard) compared to the 7,270 tons (Leander).

The Leanders were fitted with eight 6-inch guns mounted in four twin turrets in A,B,X and Y positions that could elevate to 60 degrees.

Secondary armament was originally limited to four single Mk V 4-inch High Angle guns, although these were replaced before the war with the newer Mk XVI gun in four twin mounts (note: Achilles did not receive this upgrade until her refit in 1943-44). For close range anti-aircraft (AA) protection the ships were originally fitted with three quadruple 0.5-inch machine guns. AA protection was substantially strengthened during the war on all ships.

Their weaponry was rounded out by two quadruple 21-inch torpedo tubes. A catapult was fitted with space for one aircraft (This was the Fairey Seafox, and later, the Supermarine Walrus).

Armour protection was provided by a belt with a maximum thickness of 3-inches which covered the machinery spaces. Box protection to a maximum of 3.5-inches covered the ammunition spaces. Deck armour was 1.25-inches. Turret armour was 1-inch.

The power output was increased from the projected 60,000 SHP of the original design to 72,000 SHP and this gave a top speed of 32.5 knots.

Leander and Achilles were crewed by New Zealanders, initially as part of the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy, and in October 1941 the Royal New Zealand Navy came formally into existence. HMS Neptune, which was largely crewed by Kiwis, was to have been so transferred but she was badly needed in the Mediterranean and before a formal handover could be effected, she was to be lost with all hands save one after hitting numerous mines in the Mediterranean in December 1941.

The Leanders were fine cruisers that gave excellent service to the British, Australian and New Zealand navies within which they served. HMS Orion won no less than 13 battle honours during World War II. Although all ships of the class were damaged on at least one occasion during the war, only HMS Neptune was lost.


HMS (later) HMNZS Achilles. Achilles was badly damaged while operating off Guadalcanal in January 1943. She was sent to the UK for repair and a major refit. Other priorities at the time meant that this work was delayed until May 1944. During this period she finally received twin 4-inch mounts like her sisters. She was fitted with a second High Angle Director and close-range AA was considerably beefed up. To make room for the latter, X-turret was landed. The latest radar equipment was also added during this refit. Having been involved in the first set piece naval battle of World War II in 1939, HMNZS Achilles was part of the British Pacific Fleet at the war’s conclusion almost six years later.



HMS Ajax, like her sisters, was heavily involved across a range of theatres during World War II. She was perhaps most famous for her exploits at the River Plate and in the Mediterranean, but she also won battle honours for the Normandy Landings (Operation Neptune). In between times she missed out on most of 1942 and 1943. She underwent a substantial refit in 1942 and had barely returned to service in the Mediterranean when she was hit by a 1,000lb bomb off Tunisia. Repairs to this damage was undertaken in the US, allowing her to be ready for action come D-Day.



HMS Orion – a name synonymous with the Battle for the Middle Sea. No less than eleven of her thirteen WWII battle honours were won in the Mediterranean. The picture below shows the damage incurred off Crete. The officers and men of the Royal Navy, operating with no air cover, were subjected to attack after attack. But, just as in Norway, France, Greece and Singapore, and despite serious losses, the senior service would not let the army down……


Sources:
Nelson to Vanguard (DK Brown)
Conways: All the World’s Fighting Ships 1922-1946
British Cruisers (Norman Friedman)

[Zorch]

Reminds me that Friedman has a book coming out in October, 'The British Battleship: 1906-1946'.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Zorch

Reminds me that Friedman has a book coming out in October, 'The British Battleship: 1906-1946'.

warspite1

Mmmmm. This should be an automatic purchase for me, but having recently bought Burt's British Battleships of WWI and 1919-1945, I will have to check what this book has in addition. If Friedman covers the planned Lion-class (which Burt doesn't) then I will buy but otherwise.....

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Zorch

Reminds me that Friedman has a book coming out in October, 'The British Battleship: 1906-1946'.

warspite1

Mmmmm. This should be an automatic purchase for me, but having recently bought Burt's British Battleships of WWI and 1919-1945, I will have to check what this book has in addition. If Friedman covers the planned Lion-class (which Burt doesn't) then I will buy but otherwise.....

It's hard to see what Friedman can add...so many writers have covered this ground, including himself in other books.

The blurb says "Norman Friedman brings a new perspective to an ever-popular subject in The British Battleship: 1906-1946. With a unique ability to frame technologies within the context of politics, economics, and strategy, he offers unique insight into the development of the Royal Navy capital ships. With plans of the important classes commissioned from John Roberts and A D Baker III and a color section featuring the original Admiralty draughts, this book offers something to even the most knowledgeable enthusiast."

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Zorch

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Zorch

Reminds me that Friedman has a book coming out in October, 'The British Battleship: 1906-1946'.

warspite1

Mmmmm. This should be an automatic purchase for me, but having recently bought Burt's British Battleships of WWI and 1919-1945, I will have to check what this book has in addition. If Friedman covers the planned Lion-class (which Burt doesn't) then I will buy but otherwise.....

It's hard to see what Friedman can add...so many writers have covered this ground, including himself in other books.

The blurb says "Norman Friedman brings a new perspective to an ever-popular subject in The British Battleship: 1906-1946. With a unique ability to frame technologies within the context of politics, economics, and strategy, he offers unique insight into the development of the Royal Navy capital ships. With plans of the important classes commissioned from John Roberts and A D Baker III and a color section featuring the original Admiralty draughts, this book offers something to even the most knowledgeable enthusiast."

warspite1

Doesn't sound like there will be anything on the Lion-class then. I will probably wait for the reviews before taking the plunge.

There are a couple of others for later in the year - one ordered and one I am considering.

- The British Carrier Strike Fleet after 1945 (Hobbs) - Considering
- No Room For Mistakes (Haarr) - ordered

A third possible, Japanese Battleships 1897-1945 (Burt) has not got good reviews so I will give that a miss.

The Japanese navy book I really want - Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War (LaCroix and Wells) - is sadly about £250 outside of my price range.....[:(]

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Zorch

ORIGINAL: warspite1


warspite1

Mmmmm. This should be an automatic purchase for me, but having recently bought Burt's British Battleships of WWI and 1919-1945, I will have to check what this book has in addition. If Friedman covers the planned Lion-class (which Burt doesn't) then I will buy but otherwise.....

It's hard to see what Friedman can add...so many writers have covered this ground, including himself in other books.

The blurb says "Norman Friedman brings a new perspective to an ever-popular subject in The British Battleship: 1906-1946. With a unique ability to frame technologies within the context of politics, economics, and strategy, he offers unique insight into the development of the Royal Navy capital ships. With plans of the important classes commissioned from John Roberts and A D Baker III and a color section featuring the original Admiralty draughts, this book offers something to even the most knowledgeable enthusiast."

warspite1

Doesn't sound like there will be anything on the Lion-class then. I will probably wait for the reviews before taking the plunge.



The Japanese navy book I really want - Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War (LaCroix and Wells) - is sadly about £250 outside of my price range.....[:(]

The Japanese navy book I really want - Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War (LaCroix and Wells) - is sadly about £250 outside of my price range.....

Amazon has a copy of Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War for $175 USD - still pretty steep.

I will probably get Falkner's 'The Great War at Sea: A Naval Atlas, 1914-1919' when it comes out next month.