Sea-Based Terminal BMD vs ASBM in SCS scenario

[Hongjian]

I wouldnt put too much into non official articles like this. From these sources we also had stories about the J15 being a 'flopping fish', which was disproven quite fast by Andreas Rupprecht of Aviation Monthly, and other articles that are nothing but translations of foreign articles, such as those from Kanwa etc.

In general, I agree that the ASBM will always have vulnerabilities as long as mid-course detection exists. Which is why the entire 1st island chain, the Nansei BMD network, has to go first, or else any salvo will suffer too much attrition before even reaching any CVBG.

[Michael7619]

Hi

If i understand right United States has about 5 Ticonderoca-class Aegis-ships and 25 Arleigh Burke class Aegis ships. In database i found Ticonderoca-ships with RIM-161C missile, but i didn't find Arleigh Burke with that missile. I'm probably missing something. I could offcourse add missile in editor. Does all Aegis-ships have RIM-161C missile?

Regards

[ExNusquam]

ORIGINAL: Michael7619

Hi

If i understand right United States has about 5 Ticonderoca-class Aegis-ships and 25 Arleigh Burke class Aegis ships. In database i found Ticonderoca-ships with RIM-161C missile, but i didn't find Arleigh Burke with that missile. I'm probably missing something. I could offcourse add missile in editor. Does all Aegis-ships have RIM-161C missile?

Regards

According to the MDA there are 5 Ticos and 28 Burkes that are BMD capable. In the command database, I believe every Tico/Burke past 2008 is capable of carrying the SM-3 in it's VLS tubes, although the default loadout is only present on the BMD tagged Ticos. Every Burke post-2008 also appears to have the ABM-Mod for it's SPY-1 and Mk99.

[Tailhook]

Is there more information online about those two ASBM tests on actual ships? I couldn't find anything.

[Araner]

Haha, I just noticed this fantastic conversation was taking place on this thread! Coincidentally, I was just trying to add a notional DF-26 brigade to the SCS 2020 scenario and after discovering no such entry in the database was about to post a thread about it. While doing a preliminary search for other DF-26 references, it pointed right back to my most recent thread!:)

Anyway, it'll be impossible at this stage to properly respond to everyones great commentary but I'll try my best...

First off, I still keep getting bugs when I try to package any scenario for distribution etc... HOWEVER, as an interim measure I put together a reference scenario which includes a partial OOB and locations of selected 2nd Artillery Units in relation to relevant counterpart facilities of the US, JSDF and ROC. All of the unit locations include custom overlays geolocated with each facility. I tried adding all of the overlays through the scenario attachments tool but a bug keeps popping up when I try to package it into a zip even though a zip file does appear to have been created... As a result I have added the uncompressed scenario file, a separate folder for the custom overlays. and the potentially buggy zip file to this Google Drive folder- https://drive.google.com/folderview?id= ... sp=sharing

Feel free to download!

Hopefully, this will allow others to see the templates I've been using for my simulations. As I mentioned earlier, I have used it to model two scenarios at this point. One which takes place in the East China Sea and the other in the South China Sea. Leaving technical gameplay issues aside, the scenarios have helped me arrive at some very basic conclusions which I can go over briefly.

RE: DF21D Threat- The following quote, highlighted by Andrew Erickson recently, is especially relevant to the deployment of the DF-21D -

“Whatever the enemy fears most, that is what we should develop.”
—President Jiang Zemin as quoted by General Zhang Wannian (1999)

With a growing body of literature taking the threat of a "thousand missile strike" on US CBGs as a foregone conclusion, then the former PRC President appears to have calculated correctly.
Outside of Prof. Erickson, the best, albeit somewhat dated source on the actual production of DF-21D missiles I've yet found is the research posted on- http://www.informationdissemination.net ... pment.html. If such estimates are valid then the actual inventory of deployed ASBM units hardly comes close to a force capable of launching the storied "thousand missile strike" on a moving maritime target. The only place that truly lives in the shadow of a thousand PLA missiles at present, is Taiwan.
With these points in mind, I tend to agree with user @desade s assertion that the DF21D "is mostly psychological warfare weapon and technological demonstrator with limited combat value."

In a certain sense then, it doesn't really matter if the "carrier killer" is real or not because as long as the Pentagon spends inordinate resources trying to counter it, and thinks twice before sending a CBG within 1500nm of the PRC coast, then it has already done its job!

Of course, such conclusions have been debated for years already and don't require a CMANO simulation to prove either way. There were however, a number of insights that I never wouldv'e recognized were it not for the unique visualizations available in CMANO.

One insight is related to what former President Zemin might have been referring to when questioning "what the enemy fears most"... At the time he allegedly made that statement, in the 1990s, the PLA was going through a radical transformation following the absolute destruction by US allied forces of a force nearly identical to their own in the Iraqi Army. After studying the 1st Gulf War obsessively, they came to the conclusion that they the Iraqi's were at a clear disadvantage in every respect except for one... The US had no plausible answer to the threat of the Iraqi "SCUD" missiles. Just as the PLA drew their own conclusions about the failed "scud hunt", US defense planners have also taken it as fact that countering the threat of mobile medium ballistic missile launchers will be like finding a needle in a haystack.
If others are able to apply the custom overlay imagery as I was able to, it will be impossible to deny the following conclusion... ITS MUCH HARDER TO HIDE A BALLISTIC MISSILE IN A HEAVILY URBANIZED REGION THEN IT WAS IN THE DESERTS OF IRAQ!!! In fact, once you begin to recognize certain design features unique to PLA military facilities, you'll realize that its actually not all that difficult to pinpoint where the launchers are going to be... One surefire method (and I'm only half-joking about this one...) is to simply LOOK FOR THE PARADE GROUNDS!!! IF there's one thing I've learned about the PLA throughout all this research its that they may like A2AD weapons etc... but they what they LOVE more than anything is MARCHING UP AND DOWN THE SQUARE!!! The following chart illustrates where I believe current PLA priorities lie (and I am in fact 100% joking with this one)-

[Hongjian]

Most resources spent at the moment are rather for the giant reform of the military bureaucracy, as well as the reduction of the MRs from seven to four, with all the horsetrade and, partially, bloody purges it entails...
Parades are held once in five or ten years (unlike Russia's parades every year - a common mistake done by many even veteran western observers who think about China = Soviet Union/Cookie Cutter Commie Country #167), so the resources spent arent that much.

[Dysta]

x1.

Many also forget nowadays Russia also doing not just military parade, but also WWII parade anniversaries, both are PER ONE YEAR!

If all the debate about parade is only thing the strong country will do, then Russia is definitely playing much better than China, and put their gears in real fights too.