ORIGINAL: Ralzakark
For COBRA the figures I have are some 1,000 casualties total from Panzer Lehr and its supporting paratroops on 25 July. This was from a raid of 1,490 B-17s and B-24s which dropped over 3,370 tons of bombs, 380 mediums and over 550 fighter-bombers. Bayerlein estimated that 50% of his casualties were from bombing. So 2,420 aircraft caused 500 casualties.
So in these examples it needed 6.7, 4.4 and 4.8 sorties to produce one casualty.
This is the permanent damage only of course, the short-terms effects were usually more significant as these raids preceded major ground assaults.
Bayerlein reported that the morale of his men was seriously affected: ‘The morale attitude of a great number of men grew so bad that they, feeling the uselessness of fighting, surrendered, deserted to the enemy or escaped to the rear, as far as they survived the bombing. Only particularly strong nerved and brave men could endure this strain… For me, who during this war was in every theatre committed at the points of the main effort, this was the worst I ever saw’.
For the sake of historical accuracy an in regards to the recent BHND study. The reason for the study and came about as a wondering regarding these casulties figurs that has been around for years. As the weekly loss report for Pz Lehr for the week of the 2 bombigns is less than the 1000 reported over all. How can the casulties during the week for all causes including a week of intense fighting and withdrawl be excede by 1 of the days. How can u then take 1000 casulties on the 25th alone. Where how did the 1000 come by. Clearly both cant be true.
The BHND study does come with a conclusive number as such is by nature of it impossible in a defintive but the result is estimated to be in the very low end of 3 digits numbers. Herin is number of actual german troops in the box(s). As that in self prohibits 500 losses alone. Also if u look at the OOB strength of Pz Lehr on the 23/24th and again on the 1st august where numbers are present. The 1000 cant number be supported as there isnt 1000 in difference between the numbers and no replacements is recieved.
Beyerlein comes up with these numbers it should be noted comes in interviews after the war. He comes with a number of other statements during these which also have been later fact checked. His memory in regards to these intentionally or unintentionally have some very serious flaws. So IMO and otehrs teh credability of his estimate should regarded with a critical eye.
As to the other effects i dont think there is much doubt. Both American and german reports and annecdotal evidence talk about the psycological effect of the bombings. Dazed and crazed german soldiers, suicides and more. Still these casulties are included in the loss reports/difference in the OOB strength.
Futher communication breaks down, phonesline are cut, radios concussed which might to give Beyerlein some credit feel like his division was "obliterated" as he has little control over parts of his division in the imidiate aftermath.
This in it self is ofc also a reducing factor in actual fighting power. Which prolly has alot to do why the Allies break through. At the point of the Cobra bombinbs Pz Lehr is alrdy in a severly reduced state. The six pz gren btn of Pz Lehr plus the eng btn and the parts of the recon btn that is not vehicle based so soldiers that can be used in the front lines is less than 700 men in total. So the total thrench strength of Pz Lehr pre the bombings cover several miles of front line is 700 or so low that the density of troops doesnt allow for the usual german tactics of defending. A forward line to absorb and disrupt and a main line further back. Nor is there any manpower for counter attack unit(s).
The designed reserve of the dívision is exclusivly from the pz regiment(note is has a eng coy). The disruption from the bombs crates and such made it slow going for the german tanks as well as allied plus lack of communication hinder the commander in seing where to deploy this reserve force effectivly. Negating the standart german way of deal with breakthroughs, counter attacks. Nor is there any corps or army reserves to be used in this role at this time for the germans.
IMO its this that is the main reson for teh breakthrough at Cobra along with a much focused appliance of strength(more troops on shorter frontage. Not to forget Rhinoes. All of a sudden germans that was set up and used to having Allied vehicles bound to the narrow lanes/road in the dense bocage. The strength point covering those could all of a sudden be bypassed and attacked from unexpected directions.
There in my mind is no doubt that the distruption effect of carpet bombings should be real if they "hit" their target but these are temporary effects. Pz Lehr fights on just like the other german pz divs and conductes a semi figthting withdrawl in the following days. It doesnt disovlve in any way and is later used in the campaign including Mortain. It isnt withdrawn any soon than the other german divisions and keeps fighting on and doesnt digstignvis it self particular worse. So the "moral" effects very much seem temporary. Hench IMO the model should focus on the temporary effects aka disruption.
This will futher have the effect with the lowered combat value that the chance as historic that the division is booted from the hex allowing for the dazed/morally impaired soldiers to be picked up/added as withdrawl added casulties. Where as u if u dont ground attack it and just bomb it that effect is passing and there soldiers would recover. This how ever is different than the IMO current problem of being able to use HB in an effect of air based attrition. Bombing for the sake of causing casulties and doing so, which is limited evidence of they do in larger numbers espcially if not attacking right after acception the disruptional effects for furthing casulties in retreats effects. Those wouldnt happen if ones attacks here and there with pockets of 40 HB.
I have no problem using HB all they want in teh game and bombs troops all they want but my question is if the model is off. That u give more significantly more casulties than histroic per sorties this in it self is an incentive to use as such a role. Not that if u use airforce 10 times more than historic u shouldnt give 10 times the casulties, but if the model gives 10 times as many casulties per sorties u give 100 times not 10 as many casulties. It in self giving an incentive to use the airforce in that role.
If the BHND study is to beleived the sortie rate per casulty is then some what off for the Cobra bombings not thats its ur fault, u go by given numbers. Its just teh numbers given by Berleyin isnt support by his own divisional loss reports.
Futher the other rates are based solely on ORS estimates that isnt fact checked vs actual german record. Just saying taht would have been nice.
I see u didnt do the same sortie rate to casulty for Charnwood and the D-day use of HBers [;)]
Kind regards,
Rasmus
