Fleet assets

[pasternakski]

Originally posted by Chiteng
If the intent is to NOT want it to happen, then reasons will be found to say it could not happen. It is that simple.
If the intent is a desire to see it happen, then reasons will be found to see it happen.

Oh, NOW I get it.

[Chiteng]

Originally posted by pasternakski
Oh, NOW I get it.

It was obvious.
It has always been obvious.

And you can believe me, because I am always right, and I never lie.

[CynicAl]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
I wonder what kind of damage those special 16" armor pierceing bombs that, sank the Arizona, could have done on the cranes and dry docks.

Probably not very much - the one that blew up Arizona appears to have been the only one of the 50 dropped in the first wave which a) hit a target and b) wasn't a dud. Most of them missed, as level bombing was not the most accurate way to deliver ordnance; most of the rest broke apart on impact or just failed to fuse. One hit the target and (apparently) worked as advertised. (The low success rate has actually prompted some speculation as to other possible mechanisms to explain the loss of Arizona; the reasoning being that while we don't know what happened to Arizona, we do know what happened every other time that type of bomb hit that sort of armor. So far, though, the "Golden BB" theory is still the least unsatisfactory of the available alternatives.)

Also, keep in mind that those things were in rather short supply. Since only one strike on PH was ever actually planned, Kido Butai only carried along enough of the "special" weapons - the 800kg AP bombs and the special shallow-running torpedos - to make... one strike. More would have consumed precious magazine space that was better filled with more general purpose munitions.

[TIMJOT]

I guess that answers that. Any indication on why so many failed to detonate or broke up? Regarding special ordance, I agree with the AP bombs since they would be next to impossible to use against targets at sea, but were not those special torps in fact just standard torps with oversize wood fins that fit over the standard fins. Dont think keeping extra wood fins on hand would take up much space.

[mdiehl]

Hi it would be
USN ....

The critical damage at Midway was inflicted by fewer than 20 SBDs without air cover. Frankly, on 8 Dec it should be assumed that the readiness of the PH carriers is very low. I can't speak to how effective UV (and I assume WitP) will render CAP. The numbers I keep hearing about (50-150 a/c intercepting) are so absurd as to warrant suspension of game development until someone actually reads a few accounts of carrier battles with particular attention to the crappy nature of CAP/CAC pervasive in the Japanese fleet throughout the war and in the USN through 1942.

If the game is modeled properly, if the Jpn player has the option of any ahistorical opening move, then the possibility of surprise should not be guaranteed and the Allied player should be allowed to start his CVs wherever he wishes for them to be. All that Japan knew about the US CVs was that they were not at PH. They did not know, as the latter day 8th December 3rd wave Monday morning QBs know, that only 1 CV was in the area to do anything. *THAT* was one of the major reasons that led Nagumo to the CORRECT decision, under the given historical circumstances, to withdraw when he did.

Chiteng:

And you can believe me, because I am always right, and I never lie.

Riiiiiiiight. :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

[Chiteng]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
I guess that answers that. Any indication on why so many failed to detonate or broke up? Regarding special ordance, I agree with the AP bombs since they would be next to impossible to use against targets at sea, but were not those special torps in fact just standard torps with oversize wood fins that fit over the standard fins. Dont think keeping extra wood fins on hand would take up much space.

Actually I dont see that that answers anything.
What I do see, is that Cynical Al believes that the shells
did nothing. But that is all I see.

[Chiteng]

Originally posted by mdiehl
The critical damage at Midway was inflicted by fewer than 20 SBDs without air cover. Frankly, on 8 Dec it should be assumed that the readiness of the PH carriers is very low. I can't speak to how effective UV (and I assume WitP) will render CAP. The numbers I keep hearing about (50-150 a/c intercepting) are so absurd as to warrant suspension of game development until someone actually reads a few accounts of carrier battles with particular attention to the crappy nature of CAP/CAC pervasive in the Japanese fleet throughout the war and in the USN through 1942.

If the game is modeled properly, if the Jpn player has the option of any ahistorical opening move, then the possibility of surprise should not be guaranteed and the Allied player should be allowed to start his CVs wherever he wishes for them to be. All that Japan knew about the US CVs was that they were not at PH. They did not know, as the latter day 8th December 3rd wave Monday morning QBs know, that only 1 CV was in the area to do anything. *THAT* was one of the major reasons that led Nagumo to the CORRECT decision, under the given historical circumstances, to withdraw when he did.

Chiteng:



Riiiiiiiight. :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

Obviously Mdiehl has no knowledge of Firesign theater

[showboat1]

Originally posted by mdiehl
To do anything to the strategic sub war, you need to find out where the torpedoes are stored and hit them. Ten times as effective as bombing the subs themselves.

The loss of torpedoes, machining equipment, and spare parts at Cavite hurt the US sub effort in the Phillippines badly.

[madflava13]

Loss of the torpedos was the most important accomplishment of the Japanese destruction and eventual capture of Cavite. As late as 1944, US Subs were sent out on patrol with less than full compliments of torpedos. Early in the war, US fleet type subs often used Mk. 10s, which were intended for use on the old S-Boats. I know of one occasion (Tang's final patrol in late 1944) where the sub wouldn't have left with a full compliment of torps had another sub not come down with a mechanical failure, allowing her compliment to be given to Tang. Unfortunately, those were Mk. 18-1s, which were prone to circular runs. One did just that, sinking Tang in the Formosa Strait.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl


If the game is modeled properly, if the Jpn player has the option of any ahistorical opening move, then the possibility of surprise should not be guaranteed and the Allied player should be allowed to start his CVs wherever he wishes for them to be. All that Japan knew about the US CVs was that they were not at PH. They did not know, as the latter day 8th December 3rd wave Monday morning QBs know, that only 1 CV was in the area to do anything. *THAT* was one of the major reasons that led Nagumo to the CORRECT decision, under the given historical circumstances, to withdraw when he did.

In this particular instance I disagree. The opening move is still historical ie; the attack on PH. Simply adding a third attack would not have changed the circumstances of the attack ie; early dectection of the attack force, allowing for redeployment of carriers for an ambush. Whatever Nagumo decided at that point would not have allowed the USN to redeploy its carriers where ever he wished them to be.

Yes, Nagumo did not know if all three CVs were in the area, but he did know no more than three COULD be in the area. I am not one who thinks a third attack would have been worth the effort (with the possible exception of a concentrated attack on the oil farms) heck, I dont even think the first or second attack was worth the effort, but Nagumo's mission was to Destroy the US PacFleet. Yamamoto was prepared to lose up to 1/2 his carrier force to that end. IMO with the foreknowledge of at LEAST 2:1 odds, his mission mandated he conduct a search and destroy mission for those carriers. The USN had been surprised, bloodied and knocked off balanced. Unlike Midway, PH LBA had been effectively nuetralized. IMO the USN was lucky a more astute airminded Adm. like a Ozawa or Yamaguchi was not in command. For we know now that Halsey was looking for a fight and did NOT wait to link up with the Lex, before he set out to find and attack the enemy fleet. Had Nagumo obliged, he would have face 1:6 odds and CERTAIN defeat.

[mdiehl]

The heart of your premise is that the Jpn player should reap full immediate tactical benefit from 60 years of historical hindsight, and tactical information (where the Allied CVs will be at set up is a known characteeristic of the OOB, as is knowledge of the likelihood of success at PH) without risk. It's a poor idea for a strategy simulation, but ok if you change the name of the game to "War in the Pacific on Planet Xenon."

In reality, Japan had no sureties that the PH attack would achieve tactical surprise and no knowledge of the location of the US CVs. A GOOD game will force the Jpn player to confront these realities. An AXIS FANBOY FANTASY will simply allow the Jpn player to skip over these realities and make complete use of knowlegde that was not available to Jpn at the time.

[TIMJOT]

I third attack scenerio is a perfectly legitamate "what if scenerio" If it presupposes for whatever reason the decision had been made. You are correct that it is not a legitamate scenerio if it portends to simulate the circumstances of that decision. In that case you would have to allow for variable deployment of all three carriers, but would aslo have to include for variable deployment of the IJN TF becuase the USN had no confirmation from where the attacks came. the hindsite thing is really a wash IMO.

Regarding hindsite, since we were discussing actions on the 8th, the IJN benifits no more from hindsite than the USN player. Yes he knows they are in the general area west of Hawaii on turn one, but on turn two he has no idea if the USN player has sent them NE for an direct attack, East to take advantage of whatever assetts Hawaii can offer. South out of harmsway. North in an attempt to cut off IJN withdrawl. Or east in an end around and possible ambush. He knows he is faceing 2 CVs but he doesnt know if they are being combined or operating independently. Correspondingly the USN player knows the general location of the IJN TF NW of Hawaii, the composition of that fleet, there effective attack range ect... The USN player does not have to worry that another IJN TF is going to pop-up from the west or south on the 8th. The hindsite thing is really a wash IMO.

Regarding the search and destroy mission, that is just my opinion what Nagumo should have done in the context of his mission and what he did know about the USN strengths. It was not a suggestion of a Alt History scenerio. However if it was going to be a scenerio then I agree it would have to allow for variable deployment of the Lex and Enterprise, but NOT the Saratoga. Including the Sara would be an altogether different what if option.

[wpurdom]

"PH is low on supply because of what? The bombing? What sort of supply is lacking? Engineers? Does the game model assume that all the engineers in PH are sitting around a table in abuilding with a sign on the roof that says "Civil Engineering Division: Bomb Here?"

Repair teams don't work that way. The Civil Engineers whose specialty is substrate, rail lines and runways are not going to be involved in ship damage control because they're not going to know anything about it. For that sort of stuff you'd need mechanical engineers that specialize in naval design (like my cousins). "

I certainly am glad that supply is low in Pearl on the first day, since according to Mogami, that's the constraint on repairs. mdiehl's hypotheticals on repairs I think would apply to the second hypothetical attack on Pearl. As Morrison points out, the Navy probably had the frogmen, etc., on hand to keep the California from sinking but couldn't get its act together. (The California finished sinking on 12/10). That has to be one of the highest priorities in the whole facility. What makes anyway think the repair ingrediates or even the command responsibility to undertake these simple repairs is available in Pearl on 12/7? You're not going to fly any rails out to Pearl in the couple of weeks after the attack if they are not on hand. Why do we think there were any military civil engineers with these specialties available or that you will be able to quickly mobilize civilian contractors to do the work. They're probably not even authorized to single-source the contract, so that they have to put it out on bid until someone gets around to authorizing new emergency war-time measures - probably not before Nimitz arrives. IIRC, when the attack on Wake came, the civilian contractors were useless.
I think Cavite Naval yard in the Phillipines is the best model for the effectiveness of an air attack on naval facilites in December 1941 and that example suggests a large prolonged-temporary impact. mdiehl's evaluations may be more typical of what would have occurred after March, 1942.

[Chiteng]

Originally posted by wpurdom
"PH is low on supply because of what? The bombing? What sort of supply is lacking? Engineers? Does the game model assume that all the engineers in PH are sitting around a table in abuilding with a sign on the roof that says "Civil Engineering Division: Bomb Here?"

Repair teams don't work that way. The Civil Engineers whose specialty is substrate, rail lines and runways are not going to be involved in ship damage control because they're not going to know anything about it. For that sort of stuff you'd need mechanical engineers that specialize in naval design (like my cousins). "

I certainly am glad that supply is low in Pearl on the first day, since according to Mogami, that's the constraint on repairs. mdiehl's hypotheticals on repairs I think would apply to the second hypothetical attack on Pearl. As Morrison points out, the Navy probably had the frogmen, etc., on hand to keep the California from sinking but couldn't get its act together. (The California finished sinking on 12/10). That has to be one of the highest priorities in the whole facility. What makes anyway think the repair ingrediates or even the command responsibility to undertake these simple repairs is available in Pearl on 12/7? You're not going to fly any rails out to Pearl in the couple of weeks after the attack if they are not on hand. Why do we think there were any military civil engineers with these specialties available or that you will be able to quickly mobilize civilian contractors to do the work. They're probably not even authorized to single-source the contract, so that they have to put it out on bid until someone gets around to authorizing new emergency war-time measures - probably not before Nimitz arrives. IIRC, when the attack on Wake came, the civilian contractors were useless.
I think Cavite Naval yard in the Phillipines is the best model for the effectiveness of an air attack on naval facilites in December 1941 and that example suggests a large prolonged-temporary impact. mdiehl's evaluations may be more typical of what would have occurred after March, 1942.

I think it is fairly obvious that Mdeihl simply does NOT wish to see
an option to strike a paralyzing blow at Pearl that immobilizes
the Fleet for a significant period of time(say 6 months).

In his case, not even 3 months.

His argument was slanted with specific intent to attempt to prevent that idea. He very likely believes it also.

Just like another poster spits nails when it is suggested that
ahistorical ship builds be allowed (like the Montana)

Some people simply are only confortable with re-plays of
former events.

[wpurdom]

Compare Eisenhower's remarks in Crusade in Europe about the lack of a war-time mentality in North Africa a year later. After the general comments once example he specifically mentions is that military personnel wouldn't authorize driving the combat vehicles to the front due to peace-time procedures designed to protect the effective life of the vehicles. That's after a year of war and a contested invasion. In December 1941 at Pearl its going to take weeks to get orgnaized on a proper war footing particularly with the distraction of dealing with the damaged ships, planes and the feared invasion.

[Doug Olenick]

During the war is it was a very common practice for capital ships to fuel destroyers, as can be in done in Pacwar.

[mdiehl]

You're not going to fly any rails out to Pearl in the couple of weeks after the attack if they are not on hand. Why do we think there were any military civil engineers with these specialties available or that you will be able to quickly mobilize civilian contractors to do the work.

Because rolling stock, rails, ties and civil engineers were available in plenty stateside. The difference between PH and cavite is the length of the logistical train, and the ability to get stuff there. Unless Japan invades the HI, there is absolutely nothing to stop the full brunt of US logistical power from bring PH up to capacity very quickly. And, the engineers, rails, alls sorts of stuff ALREADY EXISTED in hundreds of idled rail lines, factories, and industrial towns throughout the US. The only question is the speed and quantity with which they can be moved to Hawaii, and that question is entirely a matter of transport capacity.

IIRC, when the attack on Wake came, the civilian contractors were useless.

Useless for what? They weren't trained to operate AAA or coastal artillery. And they were in the middle of nowhere at the end of a non-existent logistical rope. Put these same guys in Hawaii (rather than some isolated sand bar with few tools and no supplies) and in a week they'd have built another 3000 foot runway almost anywhere you wanted one.

IMO that's one of the problems with PW. Can't say for WitP. The speed with which US engineers can improve positions and build runways in forward areas is greatly underestimated. In rear areas -- major towns and urban centers in the HI, Australia and continental US, runways and improved positions ought to spring up almost "on demand."



I think Cavite Naval yard in the Phillipines is the best model for the effectiveness of an air attack on naval facilites in December 1941 and that example suggests a large prolonged-temporary impact. mdiehl's evaluations may be more typical of what would have occurred after March, 1942.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl

IMO that's one of the problems with PW. Can't say for WitP. The speed with which US engineers can improve positions and build runways in forward areas is greatly underestimated.

I dont think you have to worry about that in WitP. In UV US Eng. units, especially the ones with engineering vehicles can put up airfiields in no time. The relative large number of these units make it almost impossible to incapacitate a major allied airbase for anything but the briefest time.

[showboat1]

On a side note, since it was brought up, I must spring to the defense of the civilian engineers on Wake Island. After a short period of adjustment they performed amzing work with little to work with. They built bombshelters, repaired the runway, built revetments for the aircraft, helped move and camoflage and build defenses for gun emplacements. They served as ammunition handlers, passing shells from the makeshift magazines they had built tot he guns. Some even learned how to crew the guns themselves and several actually pitched in during battle when Marines fell and needed replacing. In the end they fought side by side with the Marines, using the weapons of the dead and wounded and even in some cases simply throwing rocks. They were most assuredly NOT useless. They were described as indispensable assets to the defense of Wake Island. They fought and died and endured the captivity, torture, and torment. They were not useless.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by mdiehl


In reality, Japan had no sureties that the PH attack would achieve tactical surprise and no knowledge of the location of the US CVs. A GOOD game will force the Jpn player to confront these realities. An AXIS FANBOY FANTASY will simply allow the Jpn player to skip over these realities and make complete use of knowlegde that was not available to Jpn at the time.

While they had no sureties, they did have a reasonable
expectation of achieving suprise do to their planning. History
shows that US errors and attitudes made it an even better
chance than the Japanese themselves thought. A third Jap
airstrike in the afternoon of the 7th is not an outrageous idea
and would still leave a significant "reserve" aboard Kido Butai
should Enterprise decide to fight (Yorktown wouldn't be in
range). It's "gamey" in the sense that the primary targets
would be the oil tanks and Submarine Shops, neither of which
were the kind of targets the IJN was historically drawn to---
but part of the purpose of a game is to see what might have
happened had the original participants in the affair been as
"clever" as the game-players.

It would (and should) include the chance that Enterprise
MIGHT get in a strike with the kind of lucky timing that occurred
at Midway. Of course, the US search could "miss", and leave
the Enterprise "hung out to dry" as well. And everything in
between. A GOOD game would have all these possibilities.
If 2by3 comes up with a game that makes all of this possibile,
they'll have succeeded in my book.