Originally posted by Mogami
Hi, I will have to dig up my referance but I believe both FDR and Churchill had agreed that any Jap movement south of a certain line would be considered war. When the Japanese were sighted moving they were still north of this line. The messages sent to Kimmel and Short (and Mac) were based on this movement.
No telling what the US response would have been if the combat had not been directed at them.
There are only 3 valid reasons I can think of for Japan not DOW on USA on Dec 7th.
A. (best of lot) Japan never intends on fighting USA period.
B. Japan feels it can use the assets else where to better effect. (I do not concurr. I think Japans best use of assets if they intend on fighting USA is to hit USA assets when ever and where ever Japan can field an advantage. FDR knew there was no guarantees thats why he secretely authorized the Isabella cruise.
C. Japan does not want USA interference early on. (Again I think hitting the US assets is the best method of insuring they do not interfer. Japan can handle all comers in Dec waiting only makes it harder)
The only agreement was a tacit verbal agreement that FDR gave Churchill at the Arcadia conference, that the US would do everything it could to support Britain if Japan attacked (parapharsing) . Even this ambiguous statement was toned down when he briefed congress of the meeting, basically to a point that it commited the US to nothing concretely. Ambiguous verbal statements do not count for much in the real world. The fact that FDR could not give a formal written agreement to either the Brits or the Dutch speaks volumes of just how limited FDRs power to act was. Churchill knew there was no gaurantees, thats why he authorized operation "Matadore" a planed pre-empive strike into Thailand, even though it was expressly forbiden by FDR. FDR knew there were no gaurantees thats why he secretely authorized the "Isabella" yahct cruises into the south china sea.
