Originally posted by Mr.Frag
I agree with you on this point to a certain extent, but I need to be very specific as to why.
The big bombers used a few of these fields for divert purposes, landing due to battle damage as opposed to ditching at sea. They did not regularly base out of them, as it would have caused undue risk to the navy to have to ship in the bombs and fuel. They moved forward very slowly once the area had been completely secured. High fuel use and high ammo use should constrain you in being able to move the big boys forward. This is why I suggested cranking up the supply use on the big boys.
When looking at the Pacific Campaign in this area, it was a function of island hopping to forward base the smaller tactical aircraft, not the larger level bombers. I think perhaps LBA could be shifted to a size 6 airfield being required to help resolve this particular problem. Yes, you should be able to get forward airbases running somewhat quickly for a few cap groups or some dive bombers etc, converting a small base into a 200+ heavy aircraft base requires a lot more effort and commitment.
I found a strategic study conducted in 1946 as to the impact of land based bombers in the Pacific theater. Overall, they did very little. Submarines had more impact in the Pacific then the Air Force. The Marines on the other hand did quite well with their forward based aircraft on the smaller bases. Percentage wise, you could remove everything from the Pacific that had 2 or more engines and it would have the effectiveness of 1-2 submarines.
Perhaps we can fix this with a simple rule:
The current rule: aircraft = airfield size x 50
Revise this to: engines = airfield size x 30
Either this, or impose some form of restriction as to how many squadrons can base out of an airbase. (perhaps size = max number of squadrons).
Simply put, the game does not scale well in the later stages. The only real solution is making the effects more trivial and imposing some realistic handling rules.
I honestly hope they sort this one out because while it is annoying now in UV, it will be an absolute writeoff in WitP. If we will be in the situation where the USA can simply sit back and wait for some bombers then completely close off every single production point by LBA'ing it out of existance towards the close of '42, it's going to be a dead game.
I am not an Air Force fanboy by any means, but think that it is an unfair assessment downplaying the effects of LBA on the the conduct of the campaign in the South Pacific, particularly in NG.
The Fifth AF established air superioity by destroying a huge number of aircraft on the ground, suppressed Japanese strongpoints (like Rabaul and Kavieng)through continuous bombing of airfields ports and shipping, and interdicted enemy shipping by damaging, sinking or turning them back. They also provided a great deal of close air support and were crucuial in the conduct of the ground campaigns around Buna and Lae.
Medium bombers such as the A-20 proved to be very effective in low level bombing of airfields, barges, and shipping.
The NG campaign would have been much more difficult if the the Japanense airforce had been allowed to set up operations in NG and not devastated on the ground by the 5th AF at Wewak.
Granted, B-17s were primarily based out of large airfields, but the medium bombers worked out of smaller airfields forward very effectively(the A-20 is a good example).
And one consideration in guagin effects is the shipping turned back without damage. That is not represented in UV. Not many skippers would want to anchor and unload with enemy LBA around, so they would turn back without unloading, or at best wait until dark.
UV has doen quite a bit to fix some of the problems with the over effectiveness of LBA, but still have some major work to do.
But I would hope that it does not make them "ineffective".