The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

In Sumatra, John must be thinking as simply as this: "I've got you where I want you now. You have to come to me if you want to save your troops."

That's a logical stance. So, how do I use it against him?

John does love his traps. Just stay out of them and start putting burrs in every other part of his perimeter. Sooner or later he will not be able to stand the routine bombardment action in Sumatra and will go hunting. He will try to leave something to trap you but he doesn't know how much you can bring to the table.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

In Sumatra, John must be thinking as simply as this: "I've got you where I want you now. You have to come to me if you want to save your troops."

That's a logical stance. So, how do I use it against him?

Interesting. It seems he's already forcing you to react to him, though, whatever the plan is, since his 1:1 attack recently. Maybe he was waiting to see what you do and where you make yourself weaker due to the pressure applied. Not a bad strategy, really.

You can use this by exploiting the dearth of cameras on Japanese recon planes. He can never really trust troop numbers unless there is a CR showing them, so units moving are a bit mysterious until they arrive.

That said, whatever you do to react may play right into his hands ,and you may not be able to do anything about it. You're the one on an island with only two bases to protect, so he can take his time, pick and choose, see what becomes weakened, then concentrate force. But if he's not showing the full KB, then you also cannot reinforce or strike elsewhere comfortably.

[Canoerebel]

There are merits to such a strategy but also risks. The longer the two bases survive in Allied hands the greater the chances that events there or elsewhere could swing in such a way that it becomes more difficult for John to win the campaign. It's like having a rattlesnake in the enclosed garage. You can leave it there in hopes that eventually it dies or goes into the trap. Or you can go in there and kill it before something unexpected happens.

And what about KB. Does John have it upgrading? Answer: Only if he's convinced that he's in total control and that the Allies cannot do anything positive in Sumatra or elsewhere.

If, on the other hand, he's on guard and on edge, he's going to post the KB at Singers or Batavia or Soerabaja (or maybe a bit further back) to await developments. I can't see him doing anything else - like going raiding against Perth or Pago Pago. I don't think he dares to chance the Death Star appearing 15 hexes NW of Sabang as part of a massive reinforcement (ships and planes, not necessarily troops) effort.

And why has John gone totally dark in his AAR? If I had to guess, I'd say he's just busy with work, family and three games and isn't jazzed about a major offensive operation in the works, but is rather in a status quo mindset awaiting an Allied moves. The only other option is that he has OpSec concerns of his own and doesn't want to reveal any secrets in his AAR.

[Canoerebel]

4/26/43

John promptly obliges in two ways (as I'll get to in a moment).

Battle of Sumatra: No invasion. The four Kongos bombard Sabang. Enemy bombers concentrate on the east road. No movement that I can detect on the west side (yet).

The KB shows up halfway between Sabang and Colombo, sinking five picket YMS. I had just posted these out in a broad pattern to tickle John's radar and patrols. None had showed detection, so I wasn't sure John had seen them. And he may not have - KB may have been testing those waters unrelated to Allied ships. Either way, knowing the whereabouts of a major portion of the KB (500 aircraft aboard, consistent with all previous sightings in the past two months) is very helpful.

Operation Circus: This suggests that John is still leaning towards the defense of Sumatra. If all my Circus forces were in place, I'd move now. I'm not quite there yet, but I'm close. The last remaining piece to the puzzle is the Death Star. I think it can reach port, top off fuel, and swap out one or two F4F squadrons for Hellcats in perhaps 12 days. If by chance the KB hangs out between Sumatra and Ceylon for awhile - or if this is part of a bigger op like an invasion of Ceylon or Diego (I am not expecting anything of the sort), all the better. Right now, KB is probably 4-6 days away from the Sunda Straits and at least 20 away from eastern New Guinea. If it remains out there, very soon it won't be able to react in in time to interfere with the initial Allied landings.

I also got a helpful item of SigInt on that score. It gives an exact count at one of the target bases. The number is but a few thousand - much less than I had allowed for.

Bottom Line: Circus could get underway in as little as two weeks. If there is an "all clear" status in about 10 days, then the orders are given and probably there is no pullback. But the KB remains the key. Just how long will John keep it out there?

John's AAR: John posts for the first time in quite awhile. Cryptic "fetch a pail of water" title. Hmmm. I wonder what he's up to. I'm running a Circus and he's running a Fairy Tale?

[Canoerebel]

It's also quite possible KB is out there in a blocking position in preparation for a massed invasion of Sabang. I don't see any direct evidence of that, but we've all been expecting it. If he is coming, this is as good a time as any. It'll make him keep KB on station until the landings are under control. And the Allies are still flush will supply so that the ground troops are ready and able to give a maximum effort.

[poodlebrain]

Troops being sent to Balikpapan and Samarinda are likely intended as some sort of theater reserves. Their effectiveness will be dependent on their ability to get to any trouble spots you might create for them. Once they get to Balikpapan and Samarinda they will require transports and escorts to have any impact on your operations. Do you think the Japanese are going to leave dedicated transports and escorts with the LCUs? I don't. So the Japanese will have some delays in their ability to commit those troops once they actually arrive at Balikpapan and Samarinda.

[Canoerebel]

4/27/43

Battle of Sumatra: No invasions today (I halfway expected one in keeping with my previous post. Most of the activity is on the east side, in the contested hex, where John made a concerted but unsuccessful effort to break through. Six BBs (including the four Kongos) bombarded and massed enemy air strikes hit the hex. The results weren't dramatic due to terrain and forts, but might have been enough to achieve a strong 1:1 but for the timely arrival of a reinforcing USA division. The attack came off at 1:2 but losses on both sides were relatively light - disablements more than anything else.

I think, but I'm not positive, that John would be bombarding Sabang if invasion was imminent there. So whereas last turn I felt like he would invade, today I don't. I'm fickle, that way.

On the west side, 2nd Tank Div. has caught up to 1st Marines. I don't think even with three divisions that John can punch through here due to the quality of the American unit and the jungle-rough terrain. We'll see.

No sign of KB, but I imagine she's still out there.

Operation Circus: No helpful SigInt today. I look at my units/ships and keep wishing they were a day or two days or five days closer to their destinations. The "pull the trigger" date is so close now that it hurts to have to wait those last 10 or 15 days or whatever to assemble the carriers. I have 5,240 PP now - that's enough to buy out the required divisions, or I may drop one division to buy out a bunch of restricted support units, especially AA, which seems golden in this scenario and which John obviously tries to avoid.

[crsutton]

Yep, I have bought out every AA unit I could in the US and India. Two or three in a critical hex will just bleed Japanese bombers. It is nice because you can simply choose to not protect a base with CAP and spare your fighter pools. In stock, I never would have bothered. You get two large AA brigades in NZ that are not built out and can be purchased farily cheaply and then built up to 70 heavy guns and 90 bofors guns. They are just nasty.

[JeffroK]

Somehow these mythological NZ AA Brigades become war winners!

[crsutton]

No sure I get your drift. Nothing mythical about them.

[JeffroK]

Consisting of a Hvy AA Rgt & Light AA Rgt they are too strong, with the 3.7's in permanent positions and the unit filled out with approx. 50% women they should be static.

http://www.riv.co.nz/rnza/hist/auck.htm

In the period before Japan entered the war the only significant change was in personnel, but Japan's sudden marauding in the Pacific zone, altered the situation entirely. Our Government showed commendable energy in the steps it took to defend this country against direct attack, and at the same time it had the wisdom to leave our "Ball of Fire" division in the Middle East. At this time, the decision was made to expand our anti-aircraft defences to 46 3.7-inch heavy guns and 36 Bofors quickfiring 40 m/m guns.

The siting of the heavy guns was an urgent task and as they arrived they were placed, in sets of four, at Belmont, Bayswater, Northcote, Orakei, Outer Domain, Epsom Showgrounds, Ponsonby, Chamberlain Park, Te Atatu, Hobsonville and Whenuapai. Two mobile guns were also kept in reserve. Each gun was bolted to a concrete base 10 feet thick. The concrete work for each set of gun emplacements cost £10,000, and the sets of four guns each cost £48,000. It has been estimated that the total cost of each gun-site, with its accommodation for 120 personnel, would be not less than £150,000.

The second decision was to recruit women to operate the instruments on each gun-site. Women had already proved their worth at this task in Britain and, although the prospect was viewed initially with some alarm, a few month's experience with our woman gunners on predictor height-finder and radar cabin soon convinced us of their superiority in operating these delicate aids to accurate gunfire.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Consisting of a Hvy AA Rgt & Light AA Rgt they are too strong, with the 3.7's in permanent positions and the unit filled out with approx. 50% women they should be static.

http://www.riv.co.nz/rnza/hist/auck.htm

In the period before Japan entered the war the only significant change was in personnel, but Japan's sudden marauding in the Pacific zone, altered the situation entirely. Our Government showed commendable energy in the steps it took to defend this country against direct attack, and at the same time it had the wisdom to leave our "Ball of Fire" division in the Middle East. At this time, the decision was made to expand our anti-aircraft defences to 46 3.7-inch heavy guns and 36 Bofors quickfiring 40 m/m guns.

The siting of the heavy guns was an urgent task and as they arrived they were placed, in sets of four, at Belmont, Bayswater, Northcote, Orakei, Outer Domain, Epsom Showgrounds, Ponsonby, Chamberlain Park, Te Atatu, Hobsonville and Whenuapai. Two mobile guns were also kept in reserve. Each gun was bolted to a concrete base 10 feet thick. The concrete work for each set of gun emplacements cost £10,000, and the sets of four guns each cost £48,000. It has been estimated that the total cost of each gun-site, with its accommodation for 120 personnel, would be not less than £150,000.

The second decision was to recruit women to operate the instruments on each gun-site. Women had already proved their worth at this task in Britain and, although the prospect was viewed initially with some alarm, a few month's experience with our woman gunners on predictor height-finder and radar cabin soon convinced us of their superiority in operating these delicate aids to accurate gunfire.

Ha! Awesome.

It's always funny to me when the abstraction of the game is pointed out to this level. I've always wondered why the Allies would have created a unit of 70 heavy + 90 medium mobile AA guns. Now I know. They didn't!! [:D]

[Canoerebel]

4/28/43

Battle of Sumatra: No enemy invasions. No bombardments. No ground attacks. Air attacks focus on Langsa and the adjacent contested hex. We all wait and wonder.

Operation Circus: No major SigInt today. As you have probably deduced, though, I am proceeding with Circus as opposed to Operation Chicken. Peanut 3 will reach the port of embarkation tomorrow, joining Cotton Candy 1. Peanuts 1 and 2 are three to four weeks out. Not sure either will make it in time. I withdrew some short-time air squadrons today to harvest and additional 100 PPs. I have 5,300 AV. Ideally, I'll need about 6,800 prior to Embarkation Day. I'm not sure I have the 32 days it would take - I'm hoping the Allied invasion TFs can move out in 15 to 20 days.

[witpqs]

Shades of the movie Snatch. I thought you said it was 12 days 5 days ago! [:D]

[JohnDillworth]

Battle of Sumatra: No enemy invasions. No bombardments. No ground attacks. Air attacks focus on Langsa and the adjacent contested hex. We all wait and wonder.

Can't figure this out. John simply can not leave you here. Perhaps he things your supplies are about shot and the ground campaign will finish off what ever is left. I'll repeat. he cannot leave you here

[jwolf]

Peanut 3 will reach the port of embarkation tomorrow, joining Cotton Candy 1.

Just have to say -- I love your code names! Good luck with the op and I can't wait to see some hard information.

[Canoerebel]

Sorry about the uncertainty and vagueness, witpqs. Even I'm not 100% positive of the date of embarkation yet. There are still a lot of things to get into place. Here's what's going on behind the scenes:

1. The carriers are still roughly 10-15 days from the port(s) of embarkation. They have zero or minimal SYS damage, so that's not a problem. They'll need to top of fuel. That's not a problem. Two carriers will swap out F4Fs for Hellcats. A few other carriers need to draw replacements to have full F4F compliments. As we all know, sometimes the replacement and/or upgrade buttons are grayed out when we don't expect them to be, but I think I can get this done pronto.

2. This is a massive amphibious operation that will involve well over 600 ships. I'm still trying to figure out exactly how much I can cover, parceling things out this way: (1) advance assault wave carrying Cotton Candy 1 that will land on D-Day along with a big amphibious engineer unit (lots of naval support) and a USN base force with 60 AV; (2) secondary assault waves carrying Peanuts and Cracker Jacks to nearby bases. This will also include tanks, engineers, and other support troops; (3) backup assault waves carrying several RCT and marine raider battalions prepping for smaller ports, mainly in case I encounter problems seizing one or more of the major bases, thus allowing me to get some bases (and NavSearch) up and running; (4) follow up transport TFs carrying lots more support troops, etc. plus at least 300k supply (and hopefully as much as 500k).

Right now I don't have enough ships to carry what I want to carry. I have lots more ships strung out all over the place making for the port(s) of embarkation. Some of these clearly won't make it in time. But each day brings in more - and the biggest glut arrives from about 5 days from now to about 20 days from now.

When first conceived, this operation was to be late summer or early autumn with 10 divisions. Then, realizing the Sumatra might hold out into the early summer, acting as a massive diversion, I figured I'd do everything I could to cobble together a big enough invasion to suffice before Sumatra falls. I had hopes of making it in early June, but now I'm trying to see if I can pull the trigger by mid May. I'll probably have the equivalent of at least six divisions, but I think two more will be available by the end of May and two others by early June (though additional divisions mean more ships, etc.).

We all know the feeling of needing everything, not having enough of anything, and lacking time above all else. But I'll say this: with Sumatra in the present situation, time is the most important factor of all. So I think it's better to move with six divisions in May than 10 divisions in June.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Sorry about the uncertainty and vagueness, witpqs. Even I'm not 100% positive of the date of embarkation yet. There are still a lot of things to get into place. Here's what's going on behind the scenes:

1. The carriers are still roughly 10-15 days from the port(s) of embarkation. They have zero or minimal SYS damage, so that's not a problem. They'll need to top of fuel. That's not a problem. Two carriers will swap out F4Fs for Hellcats. A few other carriers need to draw replacements to have full F4F compliments. As we all know, sometimes the replacement and/or upgrade buttons are grayed out when we don't expect them to be, but I think I can get this done pronto.

2. This is a massive amphibious operation that will involve well over 600 ships. I'm still trying to figure out exactly how much I can cover, parceling things out this way: (1) advance assault wave carrying Cotton Candy 1 that will land on D-Day along with a big amphibious engineer unit (lots of naval support) and a USN base force with 60 AV; (2) secondary assault waves carrying Peanuts and Cracker Jacks to nearby bases. This will also include tanks, engineers, and other support troops; (3) backup assault waves carrying several RCT and marine raider battalions prepping for smaller ports, mainly in case I encounter problems seizing one or more of the major bases, thus allowing me to get some bases (and NavSearch) up and running; (4) follow up transport TFs carrying lots more support troops, etc. plus at least 300k supply (and hopefully as much as 500k).

Right now I don't have enough ships to carry what I want to carry. I have lots more ships strung out all over the place making for the port(s) of embarkation. Some of these clearly won't make it in time. But each day brings in more - and the biggest glut arrives from about 5 days from now to about 20 days from now.

When first conceived, this operation was to be late summer or early autumn with 10 divisions. Then, realizing the Sumatra might hold out into the early summer, acting as a massive diversion, I figured I'd do everything I could to cobble together a big enough invasion to suffice before Sumatra falls. I had hopes of making it in early June, but now I'm trying to see if I can pull the trigger by mid May. I'll probably have the equivalent of at least six divisions, but I think two more will be available by the end of May and two others by early June (though additional divisions mean more ships, etc.).

We all know the feeling of needing everything, not having enough of anything, and lacking time above all else. But I'll say this: with Sumatra in the present situation, time is the most important factor of all. So I think it's better to move with six divisions in May than 10 divisions in June.

That's even bigger than I had gathered! You can wait too long to make things perfect. As Patton put it, "a good plan executed violently now is better than a perfect plan executed next week."

And in case you haven't seen the movie, here is the clip.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=heiyM61dfio

[Canoerebel]

Yeah, I know. The challenge is that this (like Sumatra) is a penetration offensive, not a perimeter offensive. The Allies are going deep enough (almost certainly New Britain, eastern New Guinea, and part of the Solomons) that they'll be behind enemy lines and will have to stand against an all-out assault by John (either there or Sumatra or perhaps he can do both). This is different than Sumatra because it's later and the Allies have better and more weapons. But waging war behind enemy lines is tough. But it's also fun. Anyhow, that's why I'm fighting the "time" versus "units and material" battle.

However, time is the supreme factor here. That's why I'm moving in mid May, as soon as the carriers are ready, as opposed to June or later.

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Consisting of a Hvy AA Rgt & Light AA Rgt they are too strong, with the 3.7's in permanent positions and the unit filled out with approx. 50% women they should be static.

http://www.riv.co.nz/rnza/hist/auck.htm

In the period before Japan entered the war the only significant change was in personnel, but Japan's sudden marauding in the Pacific zone, altered the situation entirely. Our Government showed commendable energy in the steps it took to defend this country against direct attack, and at the same time it had the wisdom to leave our "Ball of Fire" division in the Middle East. At this time, the decision was made to expand our anti-aircraft defences to 46 3.7-inch heavy guns and 36 Bofors quickfiring 40 m/m guns.

The siting of the heavy guns was an urgent task and as they arrived they were placed, in sets of four, at Belmont, Bayswater, Northcote, Orakei, Outer Domain, Epsom Showgrounds, Ponsonby, Chamberlain Park, Te Atatu, Hobsonville and Whenuapai. Two mobile guns were also kept in reserve. Each gun was bolted to a concrete base 10 feet thick. The concrete work for each set of gun emplacements cost £10,000, and the sets of four guns each cost £48,000. It has been estimated that the total cost of each gun-site, with its accommodation for 120 personnel, would be not less than £150,000.

The second decision was to recruit women to operate the instruments on each gun-site. Women had already proved their worth at this task in Britain and, although the prospect was viewed initially with some alarm, a few month's experience with our woman gunners on predictor height-finder and radar cabin soon convinced us of their superiority in operating these delicate aids to accurate gunfire.

Oh, I see. Now I feel so guilty for buying them out and using them. Not! [;)]