The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
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- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
I've noted the reports of enhanced AA effect as Moose and crsutton point out. And I've seen evidence of that in this game, espeically from ground AA, but also in the few ship actions versus strike aircraft.
One Forumite (he probably wouldn't mind me crediting him, but I don't want to put words into his mouth) pointed out the KB may be a one-shot wonder; that so many strike aircraft would be lost on the opening day of a great naval-air battle that it would be crippled thereafter. That sounds pretty plausible to me (as supported by crsutton's battle report posted just above).
One Forumite (he probably wouldn't mind me crediting him, but I don't want to put words into his mouth) pointed out the KB may be a one-shot wonder; that so many strike aircraft would be lost on the opening day of a great naval-air battle that it would be crippled thereafter. That sounds pretty plausible to me (as supported by crsutton's battle report posted just above).
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
I've noted the reports of enhanced AA effect as Moose and crsutton point out. And I've seen evidence of that in this game, espeically from ground AA, but also in the few ship actions versus strike aircraft.
One Forumite (he probably wouldn't mind me crediting him, but I don't want to put words into his mouth) pointed out the KB may be a one-shot wonder; that so many strike aircraft would be lost on the opening day of a great naval-air battle that it would be crippled thereafter. That sounds pretty plausible to me (as supported by crsutton's battle report posted just above).
Yes, and the late war ability of the Allies to use escorts with VR squadrons becomes a big benefit. And, a massive air battle will completely deplete AA ammo, so that the person who has the resources for a follow up strike the next day might come off big. I never liked this aspect.
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Sigismund of Luxemburg
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- Bullwinkle58
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
In the south, Makin should be lightly held, Baker is garrisoned but probably not to the teeth, and Tarawa should be a tough nut, but gets a full division and combat engineers.
In my Loka game my recollection is Tarawa was my "crack the nut" island in the region. Cost me Lexington, but it got done. He had keyed on Tabithea (sp?) which is IMO the correct move defensively. It's a great base to hold on either side. Roi Namur and Kwaj are similar to Dutch and Umnak--you need both to cover air and naval. The sizes are complimentary, but neither is a complete base package. Tabi is both, and it's in a great geographic location for many other after-moves.
If I've truly gotten the drop on John again, catching his carriers up north, then I think I'll be able to come out with what I need to make the effort worthwhile. But the main objective is to persuade John to react strongly (hence having Ponape as a wild card) so that he sends Kaigun and KB sprinting south. Then Allies will switch back north and move on Amchitka and later on Attu. I don't like moving into a concentration of forces. Right now, John has alot of firepower up north, including a host of subs. I think (but I'm not positive) that CenPac is pretty open. I've had a line of pickets ships stretching from Midway to northwest of Marcus (and not really very far from Chichi Jimi). Those ships have been sitting out there for weeks undetected. Some of them are quite close to Marcus and Wake. So I think John has been focusing on NoPac.
In 20 days, two more Essex class arrive. At that point, I'm willing to commit Death Star to a contested action for Amchitka. In the interim, I'd like to see John dashing about wildly. I don't mind if Roller Coaster isn't a smashing success as long as I don't suffer a big carrier battle defeat. But there's a risk of that happening.
IMO the Aleutian chain doesn't need any more of your carriers, and is not great carrier water in general due to the tunnel effect E-W and the blind spots up toward Nome. With 2E and your new fighters you can bleed him on supply to the point the other islands are shells. Not as fast, but you have better uses for your big decks.
The Moose
- Bullwinkle58
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
ORIGINAL: crsutton
Yes, and the AA is deadly. Viberpol and I just had a major carrier fight near Chittagong in lousy weather, and the results were scary. 700-800 total plane losses and I lost two SCs. He might have lost a CVL. Due to clouds the bulk of his aircraft went after my BB task force at Chittagong. Look what my two modern BBs did to his Judy's. He hit me a dozen times and messed up the upper decks a bit but look what the costs were. You AFBs better not delay those upgrades..[;)]
I think this is why it no longer pays the Japanese player to conserve his carriers until the end game. If it were me I would want to force a carrier fight as soon as possible.
Loka and I have not had a decisive carrier battle, mostly because I keep running away. After one of the battles we have had he commented that the AA changes make IJN air wings one-shot assets. The super-BBs of 1944-45 are monster AA bases.
The Moose
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
There was a program change a few years ago that allowed ship's guns to have separate ammo usage for surface engagements versus AA. But the scenario files must take advantage of that. Babes does, but I'm not sure about stock and others that are not based on Babes.ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58
ORIGINAL: crsutton
Yes, and the AA is deadly. Viberpol and I just had a major carrier fight near Chittagong in lousy weather, and the results were scary. 700-800 total plane losses and I lost two SCs. He might have lost a CVL. Due to clouds the bulk of his aircraft went after my BB task force at Chittagong. Look what my two modern BBs did to his Judy's. He hit me a dozen times and messed up the upper decks a bit but look what the costs were. You AFBs better not delay those upgrades..[;)]
I think this is why it no longer pays the Japanese player to conserve his carriers until the end game. If it were me I would want to force a carrier fight as soon as possible.
Loka and I have not had a decisive carrier battle, mostly because I keep running away. After one of the battles we have had he commented that the AA changes make IJN air wings one-shot assets. The super-BBs of 1944-45 are monster AA bases.
IIRC, the overriding problem addressed was that a big air attack would deplete all the AA ammo, and even further attacks that day would face a target that didn't fire defensively. They tried increasing ammo stores for AA weapons, but it turned guns like the 40 mm into super-weapons in short range surface battles because of the massive number of rounds available. They put their heads together behind the scenes and came up with the solution above.
AFAIK this scenario that John made is based on Babes.
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- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
Moose, the purpose behind the Aluetians campaign going forward will be to goad/lure John into a big naval battle. My assessment is that John is hurting for capital ships (BBs and CAs), which means every loss he takes is critical now. But I want to give a bit of thought as to when to time a carrier battle. I think John may be entering a bit of a lull in carrier production. Those three Shokaku class are relatively recent arrivals. The next group do by date is Katsuragi, Amagi, etc. I don't know how fast John can expedite their delivery. But it would make sense to time a carrier battle before they arrive and after most of the next group of USN carrier reinforcements arrive.
But, bottom line, I don't have to have anything in the Marshalls or Gilberts or Aleutians. If I get them at a reasonable cost, great. But the primary goals are (1) force John to react expensively (in terms of fuel) and (2) efficiently attrit Japan's navy.
But, bottom line, I don't have to have anything in the Marshalls or Gilberts or Aleutians. If I get them at a reasonable cost, great. But the primary goals are (1) force John to react expensively (in terms of fuel) and (2) efficiently attrit Japan's navy.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
I agree that Tabituea is the plum of the area for Japan. I think it's strongly garrisoned, and I think it can be outflanked if the Allies get a strong lodgement in the Marshalls. I also think John is wired to react strongly - he's a navy guy, he always reacts violenty to incursions on his main line of defense, and it's early enough that he hasn't transitioned to a defensive mindset. So I think this will trigger him, creating more opportunities for friction.
Another aspect is the pending conclusion of the Sumatra campaign. John will have 10 divisions and seven BBs available for duty elsewhere. I'd prefer to draw him to the Pacific, where I've concentrated my forces for action the rest of the year.
And I'm losing those seven divisions in Sumatra. That makes a big land-mass campaign much more difficult. So, rather than fighting in Java or New Guinea, I've chosen an island-heavy campaign.
These are just a few of the many reasons I've chosen this course of action. The question now is whether I've correctly read John and his naval dispersion as creating a good opportunity. I'll know soon.
Another aspect is the pending conclusion of the Sumatra campaign. John will have 10 divisions and seven BBs available for duty elsewhere. I'd prefer to draw him to the Pacific, where I've concentrated my forces for action the rest of the year.
And I'm losing those seven divisions in Sumatra. That makes a big land-mass campaign much more difficult. So, rather than fighting in Java or New Guinea, I've chosen an island-heavy campaign.
These are just a few of the many reasons I've chosen this course of action. The question now is whether I've correctly read John and his naval dispersion as creating a good opportunity. I'll know soon.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
Moose, the purpose behind the Aluetians campaign going forward will be to goad/lure John into a big naval battle. My assessment is that John is hurting for capital ships (BBs and CAs), which means every loss he takes is critical now. But I want to give a bit of thought as to when to time a carrier battle. I think John may be entering a bit of a lull in carrier production. Those three Shokaku class are relatively recent arrivals. The next group do by date is Katsuragi, Amagi, etc. I don't know how fast John can expedite their delivery. But it would make sense to time a carrier battle before they arrive and after most of the next group of USN carrier reinforcements arrive.
But, bottom line, I don't have to have anything in the Marshalls or Gilberts or Aleutians. If I get them at a reasonable cost, great. But the primary goals are (1) force John to react expensively (in terms of fuel) and (2) efficiently attrit Japan's navy.
With the Aleutians, any severely damaged Japanese carriers will have a long way to go to find safe haven. Odds are that with cripples, the Japanese player will suffer the most. Also, Allies subs suck for another few months but then can be deadly. A swarm of subs behind any potential point of contact can be a factor. Worked for me last campaign when a drawn carrier fight turned into a slaughter for him. My subs just tore into his injured ships.
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Sigismund of Luxemburg
Sigismund of Luxemburg
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poodlebrain
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
The island focused offensive has another positive aspect. The 10, or so, freed up Japanese divisions will not garrison all potential targets for you to invade. Thus, they will have to be transported to any island you invade that the Japanese want to contest. Every time that occurs it exposes more Japanese shipping and covering forces to major combat against growing Allied capability, and if major combat can be avoided, the friction that will whittle away at the Japanese. Your ability to conduct large scale land operations will be restored to coincide with your fleet expansion. When that occurs you will be able to crush the defenders of places like Java, Borneo and the Philippines.ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
I agree that Tabituea is the plum of the area for Japan. I think it's strongly garrisoned, and I think it can be outflanked if the Allies get a strong lodgement in the Marshalls. I also think John is wired to react strongly - he's a navy guy, he always reacts violenty to incursions on his main line of defense, and it's early enough that he hasn't transitioned to a defensive mindset. So I think this will trigger him, creating more opportunities for friction.
Another aspect is the pending conclusion of the Sumatra campaign. John will have 10 divisions and seven BBs available for duty elsewhere. I'd prefer to draw him to the Pacific, where I've concentrated my forces for action the rest of the year.
And I'm losing those seven divisions in Sumatra. That makes a big land-mass campaign much more difficult. So, rather than fighting in Java or New Guinea, I've chosen an island-heavy campaign.
These are just a few of the many reasons I've chosen this course of action. The question now is whether I've correctly read John and his naval dispersion as creating a good opportunity. I'll know soon.
Never trust a man who's ass is wider than his shoulders.
- Bullwinkle58
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
Moose, the purpose behind the Aluetians campaign going forward will be to goad/lure John into a big naval battle. My assessment is that John is hurting for capital ships (BBs and CAs), which means every loss he takes is critical now. But I want to give a bit of thought as to when to time a carrier battle. I think John may be entering a bit of a lull in carrier production. Those three Shokaku class are relatively recent arrivals. The next group do by date is Katsuragi, Amagi, etc. I don't know how fast John can expedite their delivery. But it would make sense to time a carrier battle before they arrive and after most of the next group of USN carrier reinforcements arrive.
But, bottom line, I don't have to have anything in the Marshalls or Gilberts or Aleutians. If I get them at a reasonable cost, great. But the primary goals are (1) force John to react expensively (in terms of fuel) and (2) efficiently attrit Japan's navy.
I guess that's a valid goal when you're playing somebody who always strikes at the bait. I'm not.
You don't need carriers there, and neither does he. His LBA air is enough to do whatever can be done in the chain from here on out. For him it's just to delay you jumping to the Kuriles. I get that he won't think that way (boom! smash! banzai! banzai!), but he ought to. But even if you want a carrier battle, consider it's not a great place to have one if you have other, 360-degree choices with blue water. The timing thing is valid too though. If he's in the midst of a shuffle that's the time to dangle bait when you know how he thinks about, well, bait.
The Moose
- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
Operation Roller Coaster.


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"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
6/28/43
Operation Roller Coaster: The TFs move closer to the Marshalls, largely unmolested and downing nine scouting Judys. Pucker factor is high. The TFs will move west taking station just east of the islands. The first landing will take place day after tomorrow.
Operation Circus: Recon reports Half KB North remains posted at Attu. This comes as a surprise. But if John has Half KB South at Truk or some other likely locale, he may feel that that and LBA is sufficient. An IJN CL/DD TF bombarded Adak today to little effect. Garrison at Dutch Harbor down to 56k from the original 81k, so more than 50% finished with the redistribution project. Those Fletchers damaged in combat a week ago are repairing on the West Coast.
Battle of Sumatra: 1st Marine Div. arrives at Sabang for the final chapter. Supply at 10k. The end is nigh.
Operation Roller Coaster: The TFs move closer to the Marshalls, largely unmolested and downing nine scouting Judys. Pucker factor is high. The TFs will move west taking station just east of the islands. The first landing will take place day after tomorrow.
Operation Circus: Recon reports Half KB North remains posted at Attu. This comes as a surprise. But if John has Half KB South at Truk or some other likely locale, he may feel that that and LBA is sufficient. An IJN CL/DD TF bombarded Adak today to little effect. Garrison at Dutch Harbor down to 56k from the original 81k, so more than 50% finished with the redistribution project. Those Fletchers damaged in combat a week ago are repairing on the West Coast.
Battle of Sumatra: 1st Marine Div. arrives at Sabang for the final chapter. Supply at 10k. The end is nigh.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
Moose, the purpose behind the Aluetians campaign going forward will be to goad/lure John into a big naval battle. My assessment is that John is hurting for capital ships (BBs and CAs), which means every loss he takes is critical now. But I want to give a bit of thought as to when to time a carrier battle. I think John may be entering a bit of a lull in carrier production. Those three Shokaku class are relatively recent arrivals. The next group do by date is Katsuragi, Amagi, etc. I don't know how fast John can expedite their delivery. But it would make sense to time a carrier battle before they arrive and after most of the next group of USN carrier reinforcements arrive.
But, bottom line, I don't have to have anything in the Marshalls or Gilberts or Aleutians. If I get them at a reasonable cost, great. But the primary goals are (1) force John to react expensively (in terms of fuel) and (2) efficiently attrit Japan's navy.
I would keep kicking at the Aleutians so that JIII cant concentrate on one approach.
Time is about there where an Allied player can be pushing on more and more lines of approach.
Movement in Burma might get 1-2 Divs from Sabang,A bit of a naval show in the Gulf of Bengal and Sumatra might get 2-3 Divs as garrison, attacks through Tennant Creek/Exmouth gets his attention and drains a bit more, landings in the Gilberts and the Aleutians and he'll wonder st what is the main thrust.
It all adds up to your Primary goals.
Interdum feror cupidine partium magnarum Europae vincendarum
- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
John has been uncharacteristically slow in handling the next turn, and uncharacteristically subdued in tone. I should get the next turn later this morning.
In the meantime, I took the time last night to open the game from the Japanese perspective to see exactly what's at the Japanese bases in the Marshalls. I should have done this long ago. Since information is the most important aspect of this game, failing to get that basic and readily available info is inexplicable. I had invaded the Marshalls in previous games and thought I had a decent feel for what's there. And I invaded the Gilberts in this game (once, back in June '42) and knew what was there. But what's in the Marshalls opened my eyes and prompted a few revisions to the plan.
Wotje, Mili, Maleolap and Jaluit all have decent CD units. Thus I've scrubbed the idea of sending fast transport TFs to Wotje and Jaluit to feel out the resistance. A few APDs with infantry aren't what's needed there. Instead, these fast transport TFs will unload at two other bases - a dot hex north of Wotje and a base (it's named, but I forget at the moment) south of Maloelap that starts with a 1/1 port that hasn't been built up, and the base doesn't have an airfield, so there's a decent chance it's not garrisoned. If either of these two missions succeed, I'll then drop off part of a base force and supply to get some PBYs operational.
It will probably be another day before the main amphibs arrive. I'll have to hit each beach hard with bombardments to handle the shore guns. I'll probably start with Wotje and Maloelap to try and get two airfields as quickly as possible, though that may take a few days.
This is going to slow things down a bit. What I'm interested in seeing is whether John decides to send Half KB North this way. He didn't do so yesterday, which came as a surprise. That's the first thing I'll check when I get the turn.
In the meantime, I took the time last night to open the game from the Japanese perspective to see exactly what's at the Japanese bases in the Marshalls. I should have done this long ago. Since information is the most important aspect of this game, failing to get that basic and readily available info is inexplicable. I had invaded the Marshalls in previous games and thought I had a decent feel for what's there. And I invaded the Gilberts in this game (once, back in June '42) and knew what was there. But what's in the Marshalls opened my eyes and prompted a few revisions to the plan.
Wotje, Mili, Maleolap and Jaluit all have decent CD units. Thus I've scrubbed the idea of sending fast transport TFs to Wotje and Jaluit to feel out the resistance. A few APDs with infantry aren't what's needed there. Instead, these fast transport TFs will unload at two other bases - a dot hex north of Wotje and a base (it's named, but I forget at the moment) south of Maloelap that starts with a 1/1 port that hasn't been built up, and the base doesn't have an airfield, so there's a decent chance it's not garrisoned. If either of these two missions succeed, I'll then drop off part of a base force and supply to get some PBYs operational.
It will probably be another day before the main amphibs arrive. I'll have to hit each beach hard with bombardments to handle the shore guns. I'll probably start with Wotje and Maloelap to try and get two airfields as quickly as possible, though that may take a few days.
This is going to slow things down a bit. What I'm interested in seeing is whether John decides to send Half KB North this way. He didn't do so yesterday, which came as a surprise. That's the first thing I'll check when I get the turn.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
- ny59giants
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
Don't remember which version of RA, but Japan gets more CD guns than stock in some LCUs. Look in Intel Reports for something like.... "4th ADU Coastal Gun Regiment is located at." I don't remember the other LCUs that get some more CD guns, but it will require you to have CL/CAs or larger in your Amphib TFs.
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[/center]RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
A strong strategic Japanese player is going to look at these Aleutians/Marshall moves and simply say "meh". A poor one will rush south from the Aleutians, arrive in the Marshalls too late to achieve anything really substantial and note over his shoulder that the Allies are back in action somewhere else. And then rush off to that somewhere else to witness the same impotence.
The Allied player does not have the strategic initiative to engage in this wishful thinking of leading Japan on a merry dance. A poor Japanese player will dance to the Allied tune, a good Japanese player will not.
1. The Aleutian bases recaptured to date do not represent a meaningful threat to the Empire.
2. Capturing the western Aleutian bases still do not represent a meaningful threat to the Empire. Unless the position is that Hokkaido is currently ungarrisoned. And if that is the case, it really would be a poor Japanese player who will not take advantage of the warning time provided by (1) above and the Allied future effort to effect (2) above to address any deficiencies on Hokkaido.
3. Japan can always afford to lose every single base in the Marshalls because that is not a significant threat to the Empire.
4. An Allied capture of all the significant Marshall bases in the near future represents at best, only a tactical threat to cut off any Japanese extended garrisons deep in the south Pacific. Japan will have time to evacuate any such bases.
5. Longer term the Marshalls do provide a stepping stone to the Marianas, but like Hokkaido, there is plenty of time to address any deficiencies there.
Now look at the other side of the ledger. Japan is close to eliminating Allied forces at Sabang. This presents Japan with much better returns than the above Allied returns.
6. Post #5238 shows what will be lost at Sabang. To which needs to be added the 1st Mar Div plus other units located outside of Sabang. That is more than 8 equivalent infantry divs. Two things immediately become obvious:
(a) at least 2 and 1/3 are units which would normally be found defending India proper or on its approaches (20 Ind Div, 18 Brit Div and 99 Ind Bde)
(b) it is rare to see an Allied player transferring 5 American divs to India to help its defence against a Japanese offensive
7. Some of the Allied divisions which previously fought in Burma will be spotted by Japan in either the Aleutian or the Marshall operations.
8. Following the fall of Sabang it will be a far shorter distance to move the freed up Japanese divs to operate in India/Ceylon/Burma.
9. A good strategic Japanese player would be happy to trade off rocks and coral in the east for Allied bases in the west which bring tangible economic benefits.
Considering the weakened Allied defences in the west, that is where Japan should be looking.
Alfred
The Allied player does not have the strategic initiative to engage in this wishful thinking of leading Japan on a merry dance. A poor Japanese player will dance to the Allied tune, a good Japanese player will not.
1. The Aleutian bases recaptured to date do not represent a meaningful threat to the Empire.
2. Capturing the western Aleutian bases still do not represent a meaningful threat to the Empire. Unless the position is that Hokkaido is currently ungarrisoned. And if that is the case, it really would be a poor Japanese player who will not take advantage of the warning time provided by (1) above and the Allied future effort to effect (2) above to address any deficiencies on Hokkaido.
3. Japan can always afford to lose every single base in the Marshalls because that is not a significant threat to the Empire.
4. An Allied capture of all the significant Marshall bases in the near future represents at best, only a tactical threat to cut off any Japanese extended garrisons deep in the south Pacific. Japan will have time to evacuate any such bases.
5. Longer term the Marshalls do provide a stepping stone to the Marianas, but like Hokkaido, there is plenty of time to address any deficiencies there.
Now look at the other side of the ledger. Japan is close to eliminating Allied forces at Sabang. This presents Japan with much better returns than the above Allied returns.
6. Post #5238 shows what will be lost at Sabang. To which needs to be added the 1st Mar Div plus other units located outside of Sabang. That is more than 8 equivalent infantry divs. Two things immediately become obvious:
(a) at least 2 and 1/3 are units which would normally be found defending India proper or on its approaches (20 Ind Div, 18 Brit Div and 99 Ind Bde)
(b) it is rare to see an Allied player transferring 5 American divs to India to help its defence against a Japanese offensive
7. Some of the Allied divisions which previously fought in Burma will be spotted by Japan in either the Aleutian or the Marshall operations.
8. Following the fall of Sabang it will be a far shorter distance to move the freed up Japanese divs to operate in India/Ceylon/Burma.
9. A good strategic Japanese player would be happy to trade off rocks and coral in the east for Allied bases in the west which bring tangible economic benefits.
Considering the weakened Allied defences in the west, that is where Japan should be looking.
Alfred
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poodlebrain
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
The Japanese launching an invasion of Ceylon or India in 1943 would have the same long-term prospects for success as the Allied invasion of Sumatra in 1942. The Japanese could have some initial success, but they would not be able to capitalize long-term. Sustaining the effort would require devotion of substantial naval assets on a permanent basis. Those assets would have to play an almost constant game of hide and seek with little to no margin for error.
I could understand the benefits of a spoiling attack to capture Chittagong, Cox Bazaar and Akyab. But anything more would likely be counterproductive unless it is limited to improving Japanese defensive perimeter. The Allies should be able to establish air superiority, if not air supremacy, with the higher quality fighters it has begun to deploy. Those fighters will be operating at comfortable ranges from large airfields well protected by AAA. The Allies will not be lacking for bombers available for ground strikes that will limit the mobility and combat effectiveness of Japanese LCUs.
For the same reasons that the Marshalls and Aleutians are "meh" to the Japanese, I would avoid Caylon and India at this point. The cost of ownership exceeds the benefits of ownership.
I could understand the benefits of a spoiling attack to capture Chittagong, Cox Bazaar and Akyab. But anything more would likely be counterproductive unless it is limited to improving Japanese defensive perimeter. The Allies should be able to establish air superiority, if not air supremacy, with the higher quality fighters it has begun to deploy. Those fighters will be operating at comfortable ranges from large airfields well protected by AAA. The Allies will not be lacking for bombers available for ground strikes that will limit the mobility and combat effectiveness of Japanese LCUs.
For the same reasons that the Marshalls and Aleutians are "meh" to the Japanese, I would avoid Caylon and India at this point. The cost of ownership exceeds the benefits of ownership.
Never trust a man who's ass is wider than his shoulders.
- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
Alfred is writing about a hypothetical Japanese player. I'm playing John. If I was facing a different opponent, I'd do different things.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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poodlebrain
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
What would be the goal of a Japanese offensive in CBI? Any economic benefits would be limited. Would such an offensive induce the Allies into a major fleet action that would have a better than average chance to be of decisive benefit to the Japanese? I don't think so.
I was expressing my opinion that the resources freed up after the Battle of Sumatra would be better allocated to defending positions critical to the Japanese Empire. This is especially true for the naval forces. Their ability to project power is in decline, and attempts to project power would expose them to unacceptable risk. However, their ability to deny the Allies from projecting power is still extant, and that is a better use for them.
I was expressing my opinion that the resources freed up after the Battle of Sumatra would be better allocated to defending positions critical to the Japanese Empire. This is especially true for the naval forces. Their ability to project power is in decline, and attempts to project power would expose them to unacceptable risk. However, their ability to deny the Allies from projecting power is still extant, and that is a better use for them.
Never trust a man who's ass is wider than his shoulders.
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
[:D]ORIGINAL: poodlebrain
What would be the goal of a Japanese offensive in CBI? Banzai!!! Any economic benefits would be limited. Would such an offensive induce the Allies into a major fleet action that would have a better than average chance to be of decisive benefit to the Japanese? Banzai!!! I don't think so.
I was expressing my opinion that the resources freed up after the Battle of Sumatra would be better allocated to defending positions critical to the Japanese Empire. This is especially true for the naval forces. Their ability to project power is in decline, and attempts to project power would expose them to unacceptable risk. However, their ability to deny the Allies from projecting power is still extant, and that is a better use for them.
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