Idea of how to fix the LBA level bomber problem once and for all in UV (and WitP)...

[Apollo11]

NOTE: I posted this on UV forum but, what the heck, why not post it here as well... <VBG>


Hi all,

The UV (and WitP) should be naval power games in first place and strategic
bombing should not have as much influence as it has right now.

It was USN (ships and aircraft) that effectively won the war and not the USAAF
(excluding the A-bomb).


Please note that, in later stages of war, B-29 raids on Japan (and we are
talking about B-29's and not B-17's) showed that they can't hit almost
anything "small". It was found out that pinpoint strikes against factories
were not producing good results and this is why the B-29 were switched to
massive raids against towns themselves using incendiaries.

That was the only way the B-29's were able to be used effectively...


So... where does this leads us in current UV (and WitP)?


IMHO, the biggest problem of bombers is simply overlooked in UV (and WitP).

This problem is their inability to find proper targets and bomb them.

The bombers in WWII didn't have GPS and yet in UV we have them fly many many
HEXes away (i.e. 20 x 30nm = 600nm for B-17/B-24 and 30 x 30nm = 900nm for
Betty) and pinpointly attacking designated target (even at night)...

This is completely unrealistic.

In Europe (yes I know it's different theatre but still) the bomber crew
results were appalling and apart from specialized squadrons (i.e. pathfinders
equipped with H2S ground mapping radar in later stages of war) they were all,
most of the time, hopelessly inept...


This, at the same time, shows why the naval air power was much more effective
- it's simply because they operated at shorter ranges and thus margin for
error was much lesser.



Suggestions for UV (and WitP)

#1
Create "Can Not Find the Target" penalty for LBA (Land Based Aircraft) level
bombers when bombarding "Port" / "Airfield" / "Ground Unit" and docked ships
in "Naval attack" depending on the range of target.

The further away target is the more percentage of crews should simply miss
their target and never have opportunity to bomb it.

The experience of air crews involved should play role here but even 99 EXP
crew should have difficulty finding and bombing target that is 600nm (B-17/B-
24) or 900 nm (Betty) away.

Also the weather over target can be used for this as well (we already have
report of how weather is like over target).


#2
For night operations add to #1 above x2 modifier (i.e. even more crews that
can't find target).


#3
Lessen the effect of LBA level bombers when attacking ships that are docked
(please note that I used term "docked" and not "anchored").

Since CV's can still launch 50% aircraft when docked (assuming that they will
undock and sail in time to have 50% status in air operations) why not giving
this same opportunity to all ships that are docked?

Right now it seems that, when attacked with LBA level bombers, docked ships
are treated almost the same as anchored ones (i.e. to many hits scored).



NOTE:
Please note that for LBA level bombers attacking ships on open sea something
already exists in UV (and WitP I presume). It's the fact that they will almost
never attack ships on open sea if they are more than 10 HEXes away from base
where bombers are (i.e. 10 x 30nm = 300 nm). This was confirmed from
Matrix/2By3.



What do you say gentleman?

Can Matrix/2By2 please comment on this?



Leo "Apollo11"

[mdiehl]

It was USN (ships and aircraft) that effectively won the war and not the USAAF (excluding the A-bomb).

That is incorrect in every conceivable way. The effort required the balanced approach used by the Allies of Navy opening doors, army securing positions, land based air (Marine and Army air units) operating from new bases. Lather, rinse, repeat. The objective was to put strategic bombers in range of Japan. The strategic bombing capmaign was highly effective on all fronts. At the tactical level about which you are complaining, enemy airfield suppression by B17s, B24s and B25s was highly effective.

That was the only way the B-29's were able to be used effectively...

That is incorrect. When the B29s operated from sub-jetstream altitudes in fair weather they were quite accurate. By the end of the war, they were able to bomb accurately in foul weather using improved radar sets that never showed up in the ETO.

This problem is their inability to find proper targets and bomb them. The bombers in WWII didn't have GPS and yet in UV we have them fly many many HEXes away (i.e. 20 x 30nm = 600nm for B-17/B-24 and 30 x 30nm = 900nm for Betty) and pinpointly attacking designated target (even at night)...
This is completely unrealistic.

If you are complaining that bombers do not frequently get lost en route to target. Tough. They routinely did not.

In Europe (yes I know it's different theatre but still) the bomber crew results were appalling and apart from specialized squadrons (i.e. pathfinders equipped with H2S ground mapping radar in later stages of war) they were all, most of the time, hopelessly inept...

That is completely incorrect. On several occasions the USAAF daylight bombing raids came close to destroying the Luftwaffe's aircraft industry (as close as the Uboats ever came to starving out the UK).

#1 Create "Can Not Find the Target" penalty for LBA (Land Based Aircraft) level bombers when bombarding "Port," "Airfield," "Ground Unit" and docked ships
in "Naval attack" depending on the range of target.

It rarely happened that strategic bombers were unable to find their targets. If you are talking about targets being obscured by weather tha's a different subject. But bear in mind that a target that cannot be bombed owing to weather can't operate as an airbase for the same reason.

The further away target is the more percentage of crews should simply miss their target and never have opportunity to bomb it.

That'd be highly unrealistic, both on the general subject of navigation and in the mechanics used to handle it. If, for example, a US Bomb Group were to "fail to find" a target, the whole group would fail, not some fraction of a group.

The experience of air crews involved should play role here but even 99 EXP crew should have difficulty finding and bombing target that is 600nm (B-17/B-24) or 900 nm (Betty) away.

Why would one make it easier on Betties to find a target 600 nm away? Why would one peel 200 nm off of the effective strike radius of the B24? Why would one have "difficulty" finding a target at that range when USAAF heavy crews routinely and successfully flew missions at that range during WW2?

#2 For night operations add to #1 above x2 modifier (i.e. even more crews that can't find target).

Night bombing is the only routine where it would be appropriate to consider any "unit unable to find target" routine.

#3 Lessen the effect of LBA level bombers when attacking ships that are docked (please note that I used term "docked" and not "anchored").

Why would it make a difference? A ship at dock is just as vulnerable as a ship at anchor. Bombing stopped, not anchored, not docked ships was relatibely easy for level bombers. Even B17s.

Since CV's can still launch 50% aircraft when docked (assuming that they will undock and sail in time to have 50% status in air operations) why not giving this same opportunity to all ships that are docked?

Your complaint should be about the fact that CVs can launch planes when docked. They could not.

Right now it seems that, when attacked with LBA level bombers, docked ships are treated almost the same as anchored ones (i.e. to many hits scored).

Docked == Big Fat Easy Target.

[Mike Scholl]

Heavy bombers generally carried navigators who could get
them pretty close to a target. And the Pacific offers a lot of
islands to serve as way-points for corrections if needed. The
only REAL problem for the "heavies" was weather. Heavy
cloud cover could make it difficult to hit anything smaller than
a city even with radar aids right up until almost the end of the
war. The Americans in Europe carried out a lot of "area bombing"
during poor weather, despite our claims of "precision".

Making weather and night modifiers makes sense. Most of
the rest of the suggestion "falls flat". The B-29's went "low"
because Japanese industry was spread out in small shops,
because the bombers could carry a much larger load to target
if they didn't have to climb to altitude, because Japanese flak
was ineffective, and because Japanese cities were such attractive
targets for incendiaries. The only other suggestion that makes
sense is the modifier to targeting "ground units"---it's impossible
to target foxholes from even 5,000 feet with WWII equipment.
Even in Viet Nam, B-52's rained a hell of a lot of bombs on empty
jungle for every one that found enemy troops.

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

Originally posted by mdiehl
That is incorrect in every conceivable way. The effort required the balanced approach used by the Allies of Navy opening doors, army securing positions, land based air (Marine and Army air units) operating from new bases. Lather, rinse, repeat. The objective was to put strategic bombers in range of Japan. The strategic bombing capmaign was highly effective on all fronts. At the tactical level about which you are complaining, enemy airfield suppression by B17s, B24s and B25s was highly effective.

If there was no navy the strategic bombers would not be able to do anything.

It is possible to conceive that victory against Japan was possible without any
other arm except the navy (i.e. Navy including Marines)...

That is incorrect. When the B29s operated from sub-jetstream altitudes in fair weather they were quite accurate. By the end of the war, they were able to bomb accurately in foul weather using improved radar sets that never showed up in the ETO.

The B-29 as "pinpoint" weapon was great disappointment.

The story of strategic bombardment of Japan is very similar to story of
strategic bombardment of Europe.

At start air generals believed that they would be able to "pinpointly" kill
enemy key factories and bring war to en in very short time.

This was proven wrong.

In the end it all ended with huge "area bombing" raids on cities themselves
(without any pretence that specific small objects like factories are main
target).

It was same in Europe and in Japan...

BTW, the B-29's were still inaccurate in Korean war and even then they were
unable to be "pinpoint weapons".

If you are complaining that bombers do not frequently get lost en route to target. Tough. They routinely did not.

British made secret report in 1941/1942 that during moonless nights 90% of
crews were unable to get within 10 miles of target area (let alone
"pinpointly" strike some specific object, like factory, there).

And moonless nights comprise 80% of calendar month.

That is completely incorrect. On several occasions the USAAF daylight bombing raids came close to destroying the Luftwaffe's aircraft industry (as close as the Uboats ever came to starving out the UK).

Just like you said - those were just occasions.

The majority of all strikes (and almost all for British side) were "area bombing" against whole cities.

It rarely happened that strategic bombers were unable to find their targets. If you are talking about targets being obscured by weather tha's a different subject. But bear in mind that a target that cannot be bombed owing to weather can't operate as an airbase for the same reason.

Please read above when I mention British report.

Bombers were unable to find target even in last stages of war and thus only
cities were able to be targeted due to their size (i.e. at night pathfinder
squadrons mark city with incendiaries and all other normal squadrons just
follow).

This was the story in greatest majority of all cases...

Why would it make a difference? A ship at dock is just as vulnerable as a ship at anchor. Bombing stopped, not anchored, not docked ships was relatibely easy for level bombers. Even B17s.

Your complaint should be about the fact that CVs can launch planes when docked. They could not.

I stated this in connection to current UV.

In it the CVs launch 50% air ops when in base HEX (and docked). This is to
assume that CV's would be able to steam out before attack and at least
partially use their aircraft.

So... the way to go would be to eliminate this ability for CVs or to give same
chance of leaving dock for all other categories of ships...


Leo "Apollo11"

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

Originally posted by Mike Scholl

Heavy bombers generally carried navigators who could get
them pretty close to a target.

This is what designers hoped to achieve but until radar (i.e. ground mapping
radar sets) was used for this the results were very very bad.

BTW usage of sextant requires lots of experience and training...

And the Pacific offers a lot of islands to serve as way-points for corrections if needed. The only REAL problem for the "heavies" was weather.

I wouldn't say that many similar looking islands offer great help.

Also Pacific is lot of water and very few islands...

Heavy cloud cover could make it difficult to hit anything smaller than
a city even with radar aids right up until almost the end of the
war.

Not just heavy cloud.

Moonless night (and that is 80% of time during calendar month) is enough
reason for night raid to be lost.

British made secret reports in 1941/1942 that 90% of their crews were unable
to get even within 10 miles of assigned target at night...

The Americans in Europe carried out a lot of "area bombing"
during poor weather, despite our claims of "precision".

The "area bombing" (or "carpet bombing") was all they could do.

The inability of bombers to hit "pinpoint" targets was the reason why city
destroying was the only way to go...

Making weather and night modifiers makes sense. Most of
the rest of the suggestion "falls flat". The B-29's went "low"
because Japanese industry was spread out in small shops,
because the bombers could carry a much larger load to target
if they didn't have to climb to altitude, because Japanese flak
was ineffective, and because Japanese cities were such attractive
targets for incendiaries. The only other suggestion that makes
sense is the modifier to targeting "ground units"---it's impossible
to target foxholes from even 5,000 feet with WWII equipment.
Even in Viet Nam, B-52's rained a hell of a lot of bombs on empty
jungle for every one that found enemy troops.

At the beginning, just like in Europe, it was believed that B-29 would be
great tool for accurate bombing (i.e. "pinpoint" strikes).

After many disappointments the old and proven European recipe was used - the
"area bombing" with incendiaries...

Please guys remember that we are talking about WWII and that even today the
old air force dream of "victory by air alone" is still not possible...


Leo "Apollo11"

[Mr.Frag]

How about we stop with the opinions and let the FACTS speak for themselves.

http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/te ... RLD_WAR_II

Why debate well documented facts?

[mdiehl]

82nd... that's a link to a store. No "fact" checking there unless you purchase the books. The facts are that USAAF pilots on daylight missions did not often get "lost" on their raids. Inability to find the target in ETO/PTO was primarily a consequence of weather. Aborted missions due to failure to find the target or weather involved bomb squadrons rather than individual aircraft.

I'm not sure what the angst about "pinpoint" bombing is. The USAAF never attempted pinpoint bombing. The standard for measuring accuracy was percentage of damage within 1000 feet of the aiming point. I suppose that is fairly described as "carpet bombing" but that is quite different from area bombing. Especially in the ETO where getting a good proportion of hits in that 1000 foot raidius meant that all your bombs hit the targeted production complex.

The USAAF tried several approaches to bombing in Japan. Almost never aborted missions due to "inability to find the target." With respect, Leo, I don't understand the basis for your concern on that. At first I thought you were mixing metaphors so to speak --- equating "lost" pilots' inability to find the target with weather aborts, but you seemed to have separated the two issues. Weather was a real problem. "Getting lost" was not. At least, not during daylight raids.

USAAF B29s had some very successful raids against Japanese factories. It is true, however, that very high altitude bombing (from the jet stream) was wildly inaccurate on the whole. There were several raids, however, (I'll look them up this evening), from sub-jetstream altitudes that were EXTREMELY accurate, even by ETO standards. IIRC, there was one Nakajima plant bombed in winter 1945 that was by JAPANESE assessments 86% irreparbly destroyed.

As to the rest of the post. Yeah, the USAAF could not get in range unless the navy put them there. Well, not at least until the B36 went into production (design laid down in 1943). Beyond that observation I don't see how your point matters. The navy was not going to bring Japan to surrender without the army etc. So there is no need to fixate on one particular service.

About the CVs. I understood your comment to be about UV. UV (WitP) should not allow ANY CV to launch aircraft when it is not underway outside a port. A CV needed (at the time) typically at least 15 knots to launch aircraft, provided that there was also a strong headwind. In a calm air state, CVs could not typically launch a/c unless they were making 20 knots or more. If UV is letting CVs launch while staionary, that's flat out wrong.

And by my estimates, "moonless" nights occur slightly more frequently than 1ce per month. That'd be about 3% of the time. Not 80% of the time.