Originally posted by Mr.Frag
I am not anti-USA, I am anti AIR, I want to be able to have a Naval game, where Naval strategies matter once again.
But in WW2 aircraft were central to the naval war.....you can't have a WW2 wargames that does not encompass aircraft. The only place that the last "pure"(modern) naval battles were fought were in WW1 and also the russo-japanese battle.
Never argue with an idiot, he will only drag you down to his level and beat you with experience.
But in WW2 aircraft were central to the naval war.....you can't have a WW2 wargames that does not encompass aircraft. The only place that the last "pure"(modern) naval battles were fought were in WW1 and also the russo-japanese battle.
Never said they were not. They served in proportion to a multiple part solution. No one group won the war. Each helped the other. As we sit now, the USAF doesn't need any help
Originally posted by Mr.Frag Never said they were not. They served in proportion to a multiple part solution. No one group won the war. Each helped the other. As we sit now, the USAF doesn't need any help
I'm sorry I have yet to get the USAF to occupy GC (or any other base) before the ground pounders take over the base and build airfields, usually delivered in navy ships.
WWII was the first war where air power had a signifcant influence on the outcome. So Air Power is very important and if you forget it your ships will get sunk very quickly. The balance is what is important in UV if you do not mantain this balance you can not win. The two navies depended on a different doctrine to fight naval battles, Japan went for quality over quanity where as the US went for quanity over quality. Anytime the two sides were evenly matched in number and type of ships the Japanese came out ahead, even when the Japanese were out gunned they came out ahead most of the time. But when Air Power was added as a factor the Japanese usually came out second best. Some of the Japanese High Command realized that the quality approach would not work against the American hordes but they were overruled. Japan had it back to the wall so they had to shoot their bolt and hope for the best.
I voted to tweak the airbase size issues some. Currently, LRBs take higher operational losses if they operate from an airfield under size 4. It might be good to make that size 6.
Certainly this should apply to b-17s and Liberators. Having them operate pretty much at will from size 4 airfields is a bit much.
Well, i like my heavy bombers, but i will feel comfortable if i can not use them under a size-5-base....it will better reflect the huge place thats needed for this kind of big aircraft.
As for now against the AI, i´m using all my B-17, 100 or so, and 90-100 P-38 at Gili-Gili against Rabaul...
I dont know that place in real life, but i´m shure there will be never enough place for this number of aircraft even with the help of 5000 engineers
In England during WW2, in the middle of an industrialized society with a highly developed infrastructure, I would say operating 100 b-17s simultaneously is not that huge a deal. Operating a bunch of them from Gili Gili, New Guinea, in the middle of a tropical jungle, does seem like a big deal to me.
Also, you will remember that the 8th Air Force in England operated from dozens of bases all over southern and central England. Gili Gili, even with a size 6 air field, is probably indicative of about 2 of these fields. (Most of the larger air fields in the game are not really one air field, but complexes of several fields. I think the "size 9" Rabaul airfield was actually 4 air fields during the war, two of which were bomber-sized)
Estaban,
8th AF routinely put up over 800 bombers/day in '44/'45, plus
escorts. The infrastructure, as you mentioned, was the key to
allow this type of ops tempo. Additionally, this level of activity
was maintained for many days in a row. In some cases, two missions/day(shallow penetrations) were done. This ops tempo
is interesting when compared to the limited number of days heavy
bombers can fly in UV without having heavy morale/fatigue penalties. The more sophisticated logistics 8th AF had can account
for some of this difference, but I still think this needs to be looked
at. If 8th AF could fly almost on a daily basis without having to
bring Gregory Peck in to restore morale, why can't a similar
tempo be maintained in UV. I think modifying the base structure
in, for heavies, is a good idea.
"...the ability to damage enemy airbases and destroy shipping was central to all operations. Until late-war operations illustrated the potential destructive power of the fighter-bomber, the ability to project airpower was largely in the hands of the bomber crewmen. Fighters could make the aerial battlefield much safer for bombers, but it was the heavier aircraft that did the damage. An amphibious force or a land campaign found enemy fighters by themselves to be a nuisance. A bombing attack, however, was a very serious matter. Bombers in sufficient numbers were very harmful to ground forces. Disproving completely the prewar Japanese doctrine that the best way to acheive air superiority was to kill enemy aircraft in flight, a steady bombing campaign proved able to smother the greatest of airbases, leaving an enemy air force a shambles on the ground. Probably most important in the South Pacific was the ability of bombers to destroy shipping. A warship operating in daylight without aircover was in desperate danger. Even more vulnerable were the merchant ships that delivered the supplies required to allow all arms -- naval, ground, and air -- to function properly. If Bombers could roam freely, any garrison was as good as dead. The Allied advances up the Solomons and across New Guinea, as well as the isolation of the large Japanese garrison at Timor in the East Indies, were due to a hail of bombs coming from a variety of aircraft."
"The first major land-based bomber fielded by the allies was the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress. ....the Aircraft played an unanticipated and successful part in the South pacific. Aviation historians have not been kind to the B-17 as employed early in the Pacific war. The major sting to its reputation was in the role assigned by the USAAF -- sinking ships-- which was unsuited to the big bomber at that stage of the war."
"...By the Summer of 1942 USAAF leaders were sending airmen in the Solomons and New Guinea a few squadrons of precious B-17Es, the first model that genuinely deserved the nickname "Fortress." Naturally nothing could change the malignant nature of the theater: Weather, bad fields, lack of navigation aids, inexperienced crews (both air and ground), and a constant shortage of spare parts did more damage than did Japanese interceptors."
"In February 1943 a flight of 4 B-17 bombers with an escort of 4 P-40s attacked Shortland Harbor near Bouganville. At this stage of the warover the Solomons some Japanese units showed signs of operational decline. Others, however, still had trhe old magic: Obviously the American raiders confronted Japanese veterans,. A Large flight of Zeros jumped the Americans, destroyed 3 B-17s (never seen that in UV!), and scattered the escorts. The remaining B-17 was pursued by several Zeros for 1/2 an hour."
-- The Flight Surgeons account of the running battle, aboard the lone Fort is left out for brevity...-- "Whether obvious or not at the time, this was one of the last bombing missions conducted by B-17s in the pacific Theater. The Fortress soldiered on as a recon aircraft and transport, but the bombers were wearing out fast. At this stage of the war governments rarely immediately replaced airplanes in the South Pacific with new and superior models. Instead, with the exception of Corsairs and P-38s, the air forces waited for planes to wear out and only then brought in newer models. The life expectancy of the few B-17s was particularly limited. Officers called uponFortresses to in Australia and the Solomons to fly ,any missions of all types, including long-range flights, which incresed wear and tear on aircraft and crew. Add the the equation improving but still mediocre maintenance, and the Forts were beaten up by 1943. (The importance of qualified ground crews can hardly be overstressed. Far more complex than fighters, heavies did not prove as amenable to the kind of patchwork maintenance that could keep a fighter in the air. Obviously everyone involved realized that if a bomber was lost due to mishap, ten men might lose their lives. There were many individual exceptions, but I think it's safe to say that heavy bombers did not recieve the high level of maintenance required until well into 1943.)" --- Fire in the Sky p. 272-276, Eric M. Bergerud
Now, ask yourselves some questions:
1. Those of you who complain about Betty's & Nell's having torpedo party's with your TF's...Do you fly air cover over them? Do you watch the weather to see if the spotting your TF's will be diminished as they tranist enemy waters.
2. How many of you who use heavy bombers (specifically) run them into the ground on a daily basis, or un-historically go days, even weeks without flying in order for your maintainers to muster large numbers of up A/C?
3. How many of you have seen properly used Heavy bombers leave an airfield in a shambles? Or left a stinging mark on a ground force.
4. For those of you who feel heavy bombers are appearing over your airfields in too great a # are you really doing everything you can to stop them? ie for the PM-Lae battle to you return the favor with your Betty's and Nell's?
Above all, UV is a game meant to give you the tools to recreate or even change history. If one player decides to fly his Heavy's from a level 4 field once or twice a week to maximize numbers thats his perogative. If another player runs his B-17s into the ground, and consequently into the hangar, good on him for his historical accurate gameplan. If you ever see a flight of B-17s demolish a TF, thats just wrong!
TheElf,
My own way of using heavies is as follows:I never,unless an
emergency exists, fly any squadron with a morale rating of less
then "90" to start and a fatigue rating of more then "20" to start.
After flying a mission with these starting ratings, it is not uncommon to see morale dive into the high seventies and fatigue
drop to the forties, regardless of the mission outcome. I do not
try and drive them into the ground as that policy, in the long run,
would be counterproductive. I am currently playing scen #14. It
is 11/43. So far, I have lost 114 B-17s to all causes. I don't know
how that rates historically. I have had '17s shot down, as well
as '24s. The morale/fatigue penalties make the heavy bombers,
in my mind, a "start-stop" weapon. Here again, this is strictly my
subjective opinion, as others have come down on the other side of the coin.
TheElf,
My own way of using heavies is as follows:I never,unless an
emergency exists, fly any squadron with a morale rating of less
then "90" to start and a fatigue rating of more then "20" to start.
After flying a mission with these starting ratings, it is not uncommon to see morale dive into the high seventies and fatigue
drop to the forties, regardless of the mission outcome. I do not
try and drive them into the ground as that policy, in the long run,
would be counterproductive. I am currently playing scen #14. It
is 11/43. So far, I have lost 114 B-17s to all causes. I don't know
how that rates historically. I have had '17s shot down, as well
as '24s. The morale/fatigue penalties make the heavy bombers,
in my mind, a "start-stop" weapon. Here again, this is strictly my
subjective opinion, as others have come down on the other side of the coin.
The 8th air force didn't fly every day. They often stood down for weather, rest and assimilation of new aircraft and replacements. When there was a break in the weather over Europe, they would fly several days in a row. (The late 1943 Regensburg/Schweinfurt ball bearing raids are as I recall, the most famous example, I think those went 3 days straight, but I am a little hazy on the history)
Roger that Navman. I think what you are seeing is how Heavy bombers are supposed to behave in this game. What is attrition after all. It isn't just the destruction of Aircraft and crew by combat necessarily. Webster says it is 1. the act of wearing away, or of being worn down, by friction; abrasion. When you fly a squadron of 12 B-17s across 500 nm of hot humid sandy South Pacific, and then back again you are bound to suffer attrition from mechanical and Aircrew fatigue. When Aircrew are fatigued their morale suffers. Combined with long maintenance hours for a complex 4 engine bomber that SHOULD result in fewer up aircraft on any given day.
Now if you want to rest your crews, say for a week, and let your maintenance Master Seargant work those hangar queens for a week, there is really no reason you can't have a good 80% of your Forts, or even Libs up for a big raid against Lae. Why 80% you ask? Well even a week of maintenance, and 120 aircrew fresh back from a weeks leave in Sydney (mmm....Sydney) doesn't neccessarily mean you'll get those two Supercahrgers Master Seargent needs for his two hangar queens. (I know some one right now is thinking "Well just take a Supercharger from one queens 3 good engines and use it for the other Queens to get one more up Fort" Give me a break its just an example)
I think the game does a pretty good job of simulating the toll the environment and lack of spare parts takes on heavy bombers. It isn't really about what size the base is. The difference is between a size 3 or 4 airfield and size 5 or 6 airfield is simply size, and physical room on the tarmac for 4 engine bombers. If you choose to operate from a size 5 or 6 field you will have higher morale, more up aircraft lower fatigue etc, than if you det out a flight of 6 Forts to a size 1 dirt airstrip where there is no tower, 2,000 less feet of runway, and very little in the way of a parts supply. Opearational losses from take off and landing mishaps will go up as well. That is the perogative of the individual or AI that is playing the role of Theater commander. Either way if, each method of employment should have its modifiers that reflect a players choices. If he saves up for a week or two and manages to put two whole squadrons in the air, fine, great, grand.
Just read my last post something didn't sound right. What I meant was that it shouldn't be about limiting what size airfield a Heavy Bomber can operate from. It should be about the gameplay consequences/modifiers a unit suffers when trying operate from size 1, 2, 3 or 4 Airfield. I say let them try to. But let them also pay the consequences in broken down, stranded aircraft and stressed out, shell shocked malnurished aircrew. After all thats what really happened.
The 8th air force didn't fly every day. They often stood down for weather, rest and assimilation of new aircraft and replacements. When there was a break in the weather over Europe, they would fly several days in a row. (The late 1943 Regensburg/Schweinfurt ball bearing raids are as I recall, the most famous example, I think those went 3 days straight, but I am a little hazy on the history)
You are absolutely right. no unit can fly every day, not sustained combat ops anyway. But if you were a facsist evil Allied UV commander who wanted to try, go for it. Or maybe the tactical situation dictates an all or nothing push on the part of the 93rd BS because the boys on the beaches of Lae are taking a beating. Thats what IV is all about. Replaying history the way you want to. That may mean you'll lose the game, but at least you'll have had fun trying it, and your opponent will think he's a tactical genius.
I just urge people to think before they wish UV would be reprogrammed to help their strategy, or lack there of. There shouldn't be restrictions on basing aircraft at certain fields, just modifiers.
Don't think I said they flew "every day".Think I said "for many days in a row". For a real world example, take a look at the web site for the 92nd BG(8th AF-Typical B-17 outfit) at www.92ndma.org. They have listed all missions flown.I think you will find that the ops tempo far exceeds anything you can realistically do in UV,taking into account the desparity in facilities.
Also, if you can, take a look at Freeman's,"The Mighty Eighth War Diary".This gives a day-by-day account of the missions, a great job of research. I don't think the theater of ops in UV is really conducive to heavy bomber ops. I only fly my heavies from Lunga
and Port Moresby. Supply is another limiting factor on the frequency with which one can effectively use the planes. I never send out less then 4 squadrons, roughly the equivalent of a group.Anything less, and you are inviting losses. The example of
sendind 4 B-17s with an escort of 4 P-40s, is a good example of how not to use heavy bombers. The whole idea was to mass the bombers for mutually supporting fire. In the ETO, at least, this led to the development of the "combat box" formation by LeMay. In my UV experience, tactical aircraft are far more suited for use in the game then the heavies are. BTW, have now lost 172 B-17s.
Don't think I said they flew "every day".Think I said "for many days in a row".
See my previous post. I agreed with you then, and I still do.
The example of sendind 4 B-17s with an escort of 4 P-40s, is a good example of how not to use heavy bombers.
Concur. I used that as an example of the numbers of heavies you MIGHT see on a given day over the South Pacific. Also of note, it was one of the last Bombing missions of the B-17 in SoPac. But in UV if Someone wanted to try thats fine with me. Maybe the current situation calls for it...? Thats why I love this game.
I'm familiar with the Combat Box formation. Historically i'm sure it was used in the SoPac, though when the # of A/c available weren't enough to form a full box, they probably did the best they could.
Navman I'm curious. You seem to favor the doctrine of the ETO. a couple of questions:
1. How many Forts can you field on a mission?
2. Whats the largest raid you've seen using your "Save up and Send" method?
3. Whats the smallest?
4. How bad is the morale toll?
5. What percent of your Forts will be down for maintenance, and how long does it take to get the Sqdn up to strength?
TheElf:Sorry took so long to get back to you.In reply to your last:
1)I try and economize the force as much as possible.I keep one(1)
squadron at each base "on alert".That is, set for naval strike/rest,
just in case. I try not to send anything less than 36 planes on a strike. The number I COULD field would be well over 100, but that
would be marginalizing performance.
2)Largest raid has been approx 75-80,although I have not kept
accurate records, so this is a "gut" feeling.
3)Smallest,aside from the "alert" force launching has been 3 squadrons.I do not use squadrons with less then 10 available planes.
4)The morale toll takes a significant hit, as I alluded to before.Morale even drops on short range ferry missions from
PM /Townsville/Brisbane in SWPAC and Numea/Lugansville/Lunga,
even though I trans in stages.Morale takes a hit even when no
a/c are lost/damaged.
5)My guess is that after a strike, out of say a 10 ship squadron,
3-5 will be unavailable to due "fatigue" Here again,I have not kept
records, and the % could be higher. It seems that it takes forever
to recover both morale and fatigue, no matter where.I'll try and keep some records and relay them to you.
