WitE 2

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: Michael T

I agree they planned for a short war. But they did plan to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Rostov and beyond. So why would anyone think they did not plan to send and supply their armies that far east?

Anyway I digress. I don't rate Glantz. I prefer other authors. Simple as that. I form my views based on a wide range of books. Not just one author. I will leave it at that.

its always good to read a range of sources but it is unfortunately true that the Germans made reality fit into their plans. They knew they couldn't supply major operations east of the Dneipr so they decided that the decisive battle would resemble France 1940 and be fought to the west. They then decided that the Soviet army would be destroyed and any subsequent fighting limited.

Perhaps the book I've read that is most convincing about this is Fritz's Ostkrieg. The first two-thirds are excellent both on the intersection of logistics and German operations and how their (and here to stay within the forum rules) 'other interests' didn't help. When you are moving around large numbers of (unwilling) civilians you are using up rail capacity that could have been used to support their military operations.

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

Erickson is very good but somewhat dated at this point. Still, surprising how much of his work stands the test of time. He had to work without access to the kind of records that only became available post Cold War.

...

to be fair Erickson also got access to records that have never been declassified. He was allowed to read the handwritten daily diaries of the Stavka and the main combat Fronts. He wasn't allowed to make notes so he'd have to go back to his hotel and try and remember as much as he could.

The key here is its sometimes this sort of research that gives you confirmation and/or insights that you miss any other way.

Also, he did his main research at a time of relative Soviet openness over the Great Patriotic War - the need to laud/damn Stalin had largely passed with the Brezhnev era - and he was able to interview senior Soviet commanders like Koniev. I think that is why his underlying arguments still stand so well - even if he is wrong on a lot of smaller details?

[morvael]

ORIGINAL: Pelton
I agree with your points over all, just making the point that Romanian rail system was not useless or worse then Russia's.

If you read up on the who controlled the rail systems, Germany did.
But your point is a good one, but not and end all.

Germany was not stupid in the study I sent to MT it was clear that
Germany knew before invading they had HUGE issues they faced logisticly in the center.

AGN was never and issue and historically it never was logisticly. Ports/raods/not many lines to convert/rolling stock/engines/standard support system and willing workers.

AGS had a big advantage over AGC-ports, still a bitch but not as hopeless as AGC.

AGC was the bitch which is why 41/42 winter was a hit for AGC and not the other 2 AG's

Each area is its own logistical problem, to make all 3 the same is not historical.

I never assumed to be expert here, too few books read on the subject, I'd like to read many more. It was just my personal view, based on some general logic.

In every theater it was easy for a PG to outrun supply chain, and it was the PG that lost most time, compared to infantry armies. Even in AGN, PG4 spent a week on Luga waiting for supplies and support from infantry. AGN was said to have least problems because they didn't have to go as far East, were the smallest AG, and as you say had Baltic ports (so support from Kriegsmarine) and Baltic rail (though they went the eastern Pskov-Novgorod route, not via Estonia).

AGS had only Rumanian navy to help, were advancing slowest against strongest opposition and had two big delays. I remember reading they had not enough fuel because available supply capacity was diverted to sending more ammo. The same actually happened every time the Germans paused, Soviets attacked and this required sending more ammo, preventing buildup of fuel reserves.

AGC had two PG, and more difficult terrain to cross than AGS, so indeed it sort of canceled the effort put into this sector.

And yes, rail conversion is not everything, rolling stock and installations (including manpower to operate) are also important. As always, if these are not modeled by reduced capacity then it must be offset with slower conversion rate.

[Peltonx]

+1 loki100 - I did not know that, interesting stuff on Erickson

[Peltonx]

ORIGINAL: Red Lancer

I've already translated the data on Baltic rail conversion into game metrics and shared
with Joel. We are already pretty close in with what we are seeing with the new rail
conversion rules.

Reading this excellent discussion two things come to the fore.

Firstly I need data for the non Baltic area so if any one has that info please share and
we can check that against the system.

Secondly please remember that with the new logistic rules rail conversion is
only half the problem. You also need to create depots.
Depots built on locations with larger railyards are much more capable.
It's not rail capacity that is the limiting factor it's depot capacity.
This is where the new system can be made to be much more historical as the end points
of the rails are not equal. Excessive rail usage (i.e congestion) means that freight
delivery costs more and therefore you get less but a Depot is still limited by its maximum
capacity. Testers are learning to capture key railyards and not just convert the rails
closest to the major targets like Moscow and Leningrad. For the Soviets holding these
locations for an extra turn is well worth it.

I will keep digging around as there are several other areas I am interested in.

Basicly all of Baltic States rail was converted by Jan 1 1942, which simply can't happen with 1.0 and I think this is critical for 2.0.
I do like the depot system and have played allot of games using it, which is why I would like to see Baltic area done historically right.

If it is then the hole area would be full of depots/ports by August 41 and reflex the historical fact AGN had very little issue with
with supplies.

I have a good idea of how the system is going to work going forward.
Non 2.0 testers can stress test logistic by playing WitW or get a very good idea how 2.0 will work.

Not sure how the road system is being done, but Baltic, near Leningrad, Moscow and Donets historically had good raods.

[SigUp]

ORIGINAL: Michael T

I agree they planned for a short war. But they did plan to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Rostov and beyond. So why would anyone think they did not plan to send and supply their armies that far east?

The German operations department guys were notorious for not heeding the advices of their logisticians. German logisticians warned in 1941, and then again in 1942, that the plans set were unrealistic. They had no plan how to adequately supply their forces beyond Dvina and Dnepr. As Flavius or loki have already said, the Germans planned to defeat the Red Army west of Dnepr and Dvina. The rest was called "pursuit operations".

[Michael T]

I don't profess they did not have serious logistical issues. I do question the level of incompetence aimed at them though by certain posters and authors.

[Peltonx]

ORIGINAL: SigUp

ORIGINAL: Michael T

I agree they planned for a short war. But they did plan to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Rostov and beyond. So why would anyone think they did not plan to send and supply their armies that far east?

The German operations department guys were notorious for not heeding the advices of their logisticians. German logisticians warned in 1941, and then again in 1942, that the plans set were unrealistic. They had no plan how to adequately supply their forces beyond Dvina and Dnepr. As Flavius or loki have already said, the Germans planned to defeat the Red Army west of Dnepr and Dvina. The rest was called "pursuit operations".

I would like to see your proof.

I have posted that AGN had no logistics problems and could have easly supported a 2nd PG and did for a short time- 3rd PG.

I and other's have posted things we like to see part of 2.0 based on historical facts we have provided links. 2by3 is not going to take so and so said and so and so said so it much be true as a reason to change something.

Who warned? When and where is the link?

Its like the rail and road net work in Baltic States, It was European standard rail and allot of paved roads. Hopefully this will be reflexed in 2.0, not because it a just so story it was an historical fact.

morveal's point of 4th PG waiting a week for supplies is correct, but before and after that it was never an issue as trains were delieveing supplies 400 miles from the front 27 days after the start of invasion.

Supplies did not stop the Germans from taking Leningrad KIA/WIA did, that's crystal clear historically.

GHC and Hitler figured they could simply cut the rail lines ( September 8th ) and the city would starve and moved 2 Panzer Corp to AGC + infantry + support
units to help with drive on Moscow. They could have stormed the city while it was poorly suppied and probably
taken it as they had 6 weeks before the mud hit.

AGC with the 2 PC from AGN attack on Moscow failed because of supplies, AGN did not fail because of supplies it failed because Hitler did not want to waste men taking it.

I am hoping that 2.0's logistics system and combat system can do this. 1.0 dispite morveals best simply can't.

Will 2.0 have historical options like this?

it is much better to post data that supports your points as Ice did then to just post a just so story.

To Stalin and his Generals credit they did not surrender at Leningrad.

Sigup take the time and read Hitler's Directives, start with 21 as from what I read they did not expect Russia to surrender any time soon.

Quote"At the beginning of March logistical exercises took place at ArmyHigh Command headquarters, and Army Group South held a supplyand administration game based on the lessons learned during Soden-stern's command post exercise of the preceding month. During thefollowing weeks the Armed Forces and Army High Commands issueda series of directives and regulations pertaining mainly to supply andadministration"

[atheory]

With regards to Partisans, with the map regions being coded (i'm blind here on this), is it possible to incorporate the VP effect from WITW, but replace VPs with logistic problems.

So if security forces weren't enough, partisans would grow in the region preventing in turn a % of supplies from entering/flowing through the region based on the level of rebels. Moving additional security forces into the region would gradually reduce the partisan effects in the region until 0% is reached.

or something like that.

[Michael T]

Sorry if this link has been posted before.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/stolfi/11.html

[Flaviusx]

Stolfi? LOL. A fantabulist. I assume that's an extract from Hitler's Panzers East, which isn't a serious work.

Stahel pretty thoroughly demolishes Stolfi, btw.

[Michael T]

Just a guess, but I would think you would aim to discredit anyone who does not conform to your own self admitted biased views on the subject. I might pick up the Stahel book. I haven't read Stolfi, apart from this web link. I did check his credentials. He is a professor and his references look good. Why would his interpretations be any more or less accurate than others who look at the same German and US records? I don't consider Soviet records relevant in this case unless somehow they might know more about German logistics than the Germans themselves, were the Soviets that good? As for a fantabulist, sounds like a good descriptor for Glantz as well.

[Great_Ajax]

Sorry, Pelton, I don't agree with your assessment that Army Group North didn't have any logistical issues. It is true that Army Group North was definitely better off due to the better quality rail system in the Baltics but they were also in constant crisis mode just like the other AGs. There were constant fuel shortages and supply deliveries did not meet Army Group North's daily requirements. Fuel and ammunition shortages were consistent with all Army Groups as was the rapidly declining capacity of the truck columns that were expected to deliver the supplies from the forward depots. Supply issues did severely impede Army Group North from making the progress that they had planned for.

Trey

ORIGINAL: Pelton

ORIGINAL: SigUp

ORIGINAL: Michael T

I agree they planned for a short war. But they did plan to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Rostov and beyond. So why would anyone think they did not plan to send and supply their armies that far east?

The German operations department guys were notorious for not heeding the advices of their logisticians. German logisticians warned in 1941, and then again in 1942, that the plans set were unrealistic. They had no plan how to adequately supply their forces beyond Dvina and Dnepr. As Flavius or loki have already said, the Germans planned to defeat the Red Army west of Dnepr and Dvina. The rest was called "pursuit operations".

I would like to see your proof.

I have posted that AGN had no logistics problems and could have easly supported a 2nd PG and did for a short time- 3rd PG.

I and other's have posted things we like to see part of 2.0 based on historical facts we have provided links. 2by3 is not going to take so and so said and so and so said so it much be true as a reason to change something.

Who warned? When and where is the link?

Its like the rail and road net work in Baltic States, It was European standard rail and allot of paved roads. Hopefully this will be reflexed in 2.0, not because it a just so story it was an historical fact.

morveal's point of 4th PG waiting a week for supplies is correct, but before and after that it was never an issue as trains were delieveing supplies 400 miles from the front 27 days after the start of invasion.

Supplies did not stop the Germans from taking Leningrad KIA/WIA did, that's crystal clear historically.

GHC and Hitler figured they could simply cut the rail lines ( September 8th ) and the city would starve and moved 2 Panzer Corp to AGC + infantry + support
units to help with drive on Moscow. They could have stormed the city while it was poorly suppied and probably
taken it as they had 6 weeks before the mud hit.

AGC with the 2 PC from AGN attack on Moscow failed because of supplies, AGN did not fail because of supplies it failed because Hitler did not want to waste men taking it.

I am hoping that 2.0's logistics system and combat system can do this. 1.0 dispite morveals best simply can't.

Will 2.0 have historical options like this?

it is much better to post data that supports your points as Ice did then to just post a just so story.

To Stalin and his Generals credit they did not surrender at Leningrad.

Sigup take the time and read Hitler's Directives, start with 21 as from what I read they did not expect Russia to surrender any time soon.

Quote"At the beginning of March logistical exercises took place at ArmyHigh Command headquarters, and Army Group South held a supplyand administration game based on the lessons learned during Soden-stern's command post exercise of the preceding month. During thefollowing weeks the Armed Forces and Army High Commands issueda series of directives and regulations pertaining mainly to supply andadministration"

[Flaviusx]

MT, here's the thing: we're all of us biased. I put mine up front and for the world to see -- for throat clearing purposes if nothing else, and because it seems to me absurd to pretend otherwise. Nobody is perfectly objective.

You have your own biases, which you aren't admitting.

Anyhow, I've read Stolfi and in my estimation his work just doesn't stand up to scrutiny. It's been pretty thoroughly debunked. (In this sense, if in no other, it rather reminds me of Icebreaker.) I keep going back to Stahel here, but he is the gold standard on the subject of German logistics now.

[Michael T]

Well biases aside (I am really not biased to either side). I just s much enjoy crushing German or Soviet foe.

The fact is the Germans pushed a PzGp from the surrounds of Smolensk and Bryansk to the surrounds of Kiev by early September. The same distance roughly from Smolensk to Moscow. To argue that the Germans could not possibly get to Moscow, in the same period of time, based on logistical factors alone is nonsensical. Which is the very point many Red Fanbois can't seem to accept. And it was commonplace for German mech units to operate quite effectively 300Km or more from rail heads in July/Aug/Sept 1941. These are facts.

We are getting lost though. Are not we discussing rail conversion rates? The rates in WITE are too low. They should be increased. There are numerous examples that support this lack of rail conversion speed in the game.

[Flaviusx]

Well, I wouldn't say impossible. Merely highly unlikely.

My own view is the Germans did just about as well as they possibly could have in 1941 with a good deal of cooperation from Comrade Stalin. They might've done a bit better here and there but only at the expense of something else -- material factors were such that they were very much in Peter having to rob Paul mode.

So I can, for example, imagine them taking Leningrad. But that would've come at the expense of Typhoon. Or alternatively they might just have been able to get to Moscow...but only at the expense of AGS. Etc. and so forth. There was no magic formula here available to the Wehrmacht to take all of it and more in a single campaign season. Something somewhere was going to give.

Vanilla WITE simply doesn't reflect these hard material constraints or tough choices very well. I'm hopeful that WITE2 will do a better job of it.

[Michael T]

I agree with the gist of your 3rd paragraph, except in the case of Leningrad. Here I believe the city would have fallen had a determined assault been made upon it after it was isolated. Even with the forces on the scene at the time. But that doesn't mean I think it should fall every time in the game.

As a general observation I don't think the casualty rates are high enough in WITE, nor the exhaustion factor high enough, for both sides. Simply it's not bloody enough. And the replacement rates for manpower are too high, again for both sides.

[RKhan]

ORIGINAL: Michael T

I agree with the gist of your 3rd paragraph, except in the case of Leningrad. Here I believe the city would have fallen had a determined assault been made upon it after it was isolated. Even with the forces on the scene at the time. But that doesn't mean I think it should fall every time in the game.

As a general observation I don't think the casualty rates are high enough in WITE, nor the exhaustion factor high enough, for both sides. Simply it's not bloody enough. And the replacement rates for manpower are too high, again for both sides.

+1

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: GrauWolf80

With regards to Partisans, with the map regions being coded (i'm blind here on this), is it possible to incorporate the VP effect from WITW, but replace VPs with logistic problems.

So if security forces weren't enough, partisans would grow in the region preventing in turn a % of supplies from entering/flowing through the region based on the level of rebels. Moving additional security forces into the region would gradually reduce the partisan effects in the region until 0% is reached.

or something like that.

I think you are right this is how to model it. In essence if you have enough garrisons then freight (which is a combination of fuel, supplies, ammo and replacements) passes at 100%. As you fall short then the rail capacity dips. What I'd like to see is an option for the Soviet player to be active too - by allocating resupply missions to an area. That would be a good way to simulate the ebb and flow of centralised Soviet usage of the partisan war (as opposed to the localised ongoing vicious little wars) as a tool to support their own major operations.

Worth noting that in the WiTW/WiTE2 rail system you can overload a line (ie send more freight than its notional capacity) but this comes at an increasing cost to your overall total rolling stock up to a point where you can't send any more. So if the partisan effect hits the 'optimal' capacity, the incremental cost of exceeding this and lowers the total capacity that will be a neat representation.

Clearly the WiTW system doesn't really translate as that sought to combine the need for the German player to keep fixed garrisons along with the need to suppress any local partisan activity.

ORIGINAL: RKhan

ORIGINAL: Michael T

...

As a general observation I don't think the casualty rates are high enough in WITE, nor the exhaustion factor high enough, for both sides. Simply it's not bloody enough. And the replacement rates for manpower are too high, again for both sides.

+1

It is ... I'm seeing some eyewatering losses in individual battles. A large battle over a city or well fortified position can generate 8-10,000 losses per side. A failed Soviet attack can cost them 2,000+. Just generally the attrition of combat is far better modelled

Last PBEM I inflicted 2.2m losses on the Soviets despite only 1.1m lost in pockets (up to the winter offensive) - you'll never see that in WiTE. On my side I lost around 650k and only got 250k German replacements

[SigUp]

ORIGINAL: Pelton

I have posted that AGN had no logistics problems and could have easly supported a 2nd PG and did for a short time- 3rd PG.

That's simply not true. Army Group North's assault towards Leningrad had to be delayed by several weeks because of supply shortages. They requested 34 trains a day, got promised 18 and in the end even this figure wasn't reached on a consistent basis (Schüler, The Eastern Campaign As a Transportation and Supply Problem).

Who warned? When and where is the link?

The Quartermaster-General Eduard Wagner told Franz Halder in Autumn 1940 that an army with two million men, 300k horses and 500k vehicles (well short of the actual three million men, 625k horses and 600k vehicles in June 1941) could only be supported for an advance of about 700-800km with food and ammunition only sufficient for 20 days. Further operations would require a significant delay of several weeks to rebuild their stocks. In the actual environment of June 1941 the German logistics apparatus was only capable of sustaining an advance of up to 500km (Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East).

Sigup take the time and read Hitler's Directives, start with 21 as from what I read they did not expect Russia to surrender any time soon.

I am proficient in the German language and have read the original version of Directive 21 and the operation study by Erich Marcks. It is absolutely clear that the Germans assumed that there would be no need for large-scale combat operations past the Dnepr-Dvina line. Everything past that was dubbed "pursuit" of an essentially beaten enemy.

The problem of logistics is not simply solved by converting the railways. German repairs, due to material shortages, time constraints etc, could not ensure a high efficiency of the rail lines. Moreover they also had to establish new infrastructure due to the extent of Soviet destruction and the fact that German locomotives were not able to travel as far as Soviet ones. The need for the Germans to use their own locomotives also greatly strained the ability of the Reichsbahn. Prior to the war the Germans expected to be in a position to seize Soviet rolling stock and use Soviet railways to resupply, so they were not prepared to the challenges presented during the course of Barbarossa. So as morvael indicated, you have to reflect those circumstances either by abstraction (slower rail repair speed), or implement some form of capacity reduction.

Another problem for the Germans was then getting the supplies from the depots to the frontline units. In some cases the transport vehicles for the divisions had to make a 500-600km roundtrip to fetch supplies and the vehicle stock was taking a beating. By early August 1941 Army Group North for example had already lost 40% its transport vehicles.

[goranw]

Hi!
As this has been discussed.
Some maps from Armegruppe Nord. Sorry that I cant make them more readable.
Progress in dates.Rail in the Baltics.
Cant be uploaded here so I took the liberty to do it at
Scenario Design and Modding-Planning map/Frontline-Date map
Goran