WitE 2

[Peltonx]

[quote]ORIGINAL: el hefe

Sorry, Pelton, I don't agree with your assessment that Army Group North didn't have any logistical issues. It is true that Army Group North was definitely better off due to the better quality rail system in the Baltics but they were also in constant crisis mode just like the other AGs. There were constant fuel shortages and supply deliveries did not meet Army Group North's daily requirements. Fuel and ammunition shortages were consistent with all Army Groups as was the rapidly declining capacity of the truck columns that were expected to deliver the supplies from the forward depots. Supply issues did severely impede Army Group North from making the progress that they had planned for.

Trey

[quote]

I disagree and so does history



The German Concentration of Forces Against the Soviet Border

From the moment Hitler alerted the armed forces in late July 1940 for an attack on Soviet Russia, the army general staff thought in terms of rail schedules to execute the Aufmarsch (concentration) for Barbarossa and regauging or rebuilding the Soviet rail system for logistical support of the advance. Generalleutnant Rudolf Gercke, chief of German army transportation, began to oversee the railroad tasks under the first important OKW order for Barbarossa, the Ausbau Ost (Eastern Buildup) order of 9 August 1940, directing the improvement and expansion of eastern Poland's rail system. The Reichsbahn (State Rail Service) and the Ostbahn (Eastern Rail Service) began to build up the eastern rail facilities under the codeword, Program Otto. Concomitantly, Gercke was largely responsible for coordinating the transfer of thirty-five German infantry divisions from France to Poland and East Prussia, using existing facilities, at a leisurely pace from July to October 1940. By 17 January 1941, Gercke informed OKW that of the 8,500 km of rail lines to be improved or rebuilt to concentrate forces for Barbarossa, 60 percent had been completed, most double track.{4} On 2 February 1941, Brauchitsch and Halder began the concentration of forces for Barbarossa, intended to be in four waves of rail movement lasting through 15 May 1941.

Due to unexpected circumstances, including the Balkan campaign and the severe winter of 1940-1941, the German concentration of forces continued until 22 June. Amazingly, the OKH moved some 17,000 trains over and above the normal traffic in the east after the battle of France.{5} Through secrecy and deception, the German command achieved almost complete tactical and operational surprise against the Soviet armed forces and a large measure of strategic surprise against the high political leadership. Stalin and his advisors received warnings of German aggressive intent months before, but they reasonably discounted most of such warnings based on alternate explanations and the vast deceptive circumstance that Germany was at war with Britain. The Soviets must also have had aggressive intentions of their own. Retrospectively, it appears possible that they were preparing to attack Germany or dient states of Germany possibly as early as autumn 1941, and probably no later than summer 1942. Finally, although Stalin was prepared for German political pressure in the summer of 1941, and possibly even military incidents, he was caught totally off guard by a full-blooded military invasion with the Olympian mission to defeat the Soviet state immediately. The unobtrusive movement of 17,000 extra trains to the east and the deceptive explanation of unconcealable activity associated with the concentration of forces made possible the surprise on 22 June 1941, which could have translated into the defeat of Soviet Russia.

Gercke executed the eastern movement in waves beginning with the more innocuous infantry divisions and only a few mobile divisions at a maximum of twelve trains daily along each of the six main rail lines established under Program Otto. The chief of army transportation moved seven infantry and two mobile divisions in the first wave (relatively few), among which it was possible to disguise one panzer and one motorized infantry division. The Germans were extremely sensitive about transferring mobile divisions to the east. They were operating according to the doctrine that panzer divisions and closely associated motorized infantry divisions were to be employed exclusively for deep strategic offensive missions. The Germans assumed with a mirror-image mentality that the Soviets would immediately recognize danger regarding the excessive number of panzer divisions in the east. Accordingly, they left the overwhelming mass of the mobile divisions until the last possible moment for movement eastward. Table II illustrates the German sensitivity to ensuring surprise and the magnitude of the Aufmarsch for Barbarossa:

Table 11. Barbarossa Concentration of Forces (Aufmarsch)*

German Wave and Time Divisions Trains
Wave 1, 2 February—14 March 1941 9 ñ. 14,000 trains divisions
Wave 2, March 1941 18
Wave 3, 8 April—20 May 1941 17 ñ. 3,000 trains for Luftwaffe, army troops, supply and reserve forces
Wave 4a, 23 May—2 June 1941 9
Wave 4b, 3 June—23 June 1941 24
Beginning 21 June—24 July 1941 24
Totals 101 17,000 trains

* Prior to the concentration, the Germans had 47 divisions in the east that eventually took part in the invasion: 12 divisions from the Polish campaign and 35 divisions emplaced between July and October after the French campaign.

In Wave 4b, the last wave of the divisions that launched the attack across the frontier on 22 June 1941 (a day later in a few cases because of the relatively narrow attack fronts), the Germans moved twenty-four panzer and motorized infantry divisions. These, with their tracked and wheeled motor vehides, were difficult to move and even more of a challenge to conceal. The Germans took major precautions to screen the movement of these divisions, then make them disappear into the countryside after offloading. Once this movement began, they considered it would have significant chances of being detected, and it could not be explained by any subterfuge. The Germans also delivered to the border by train an additional twenty-four divisions, which would not take part in the initial attacks but would move into former Soviet territory toward the front from 26 June 1941 onward.


German Rail Lines, Rail Heads, and Truck Columns In the Soviet Union

The trains that moved the German army and the Luftwaffe ground organization to the border could not deliver the armed forces farther east. The Germans would have to move tactically from the frontier and depend for support on the distance between their rail heads and the infantry divisions in the front lines. For the mobile divisions, it was the distance between the German railway system and the finger-like projections deep into Soviet territory. In Barbarossa, the Germans advanced rapidly into territory having no normal-gauge railroads. Logistics would depend on the German capabilities to advance their own rail system into the Soviet Union while simultaneously connecting German rail heads with their troops, disappearing over the horizon into Soviet Russia. An untold, unusual situation almost immediately after Barbarossa began supports a view that, logistically, the Germans had the capability to defeat the Soviet Union. In Army Group Center, seventeen German panzer and motorized infantry divisions did everything in their power to distance themselves from the German railheads. By 26 June 1941, the 7th Panzer Division was 300 km into the Soviet Union from its start on the Lithuanian border, and on the following day the 3d Panzer Division reached Glusa. 350 km into Russia. Current literature has not asked how the Germans could resupply two panzer divisions at that distance from rail heads in German territory. Obviously, they successfully organized truck columns with enormous capacities to run the supplies from the German border to the advancing armies.

By 26 April 1941, the quartermaster general of the German army and the chief of transportation had collected 25,020 tons (freight capacity) of trucks for Army Group Center and smaller amounts for the remaining two army groups.{6} When the campaign opened, the high command of the army provided Army Group Center with approximately 45,000 tons of trucks to deliver supplies from the rail heads on the border to the advancing armies. After a complex transition, their new rail heads were at various distances from the border in Soviet territory.{7} The Germans considered that the 60-ton (freight capacity) truck columns could bridge approximately 400 km between rail heads and the advancing field armies.{8} As the normal-gauge rail lines were constructed along the most important logistics routes into White Russia from Brest to Minsk, the Germans expected on 17 July to take off most of the 60-ton truck columns from the frontier to Minsk between 20 and 30 July 1941. The columns continued to run from the border in decreasing numbers until finally stopped on 5 August 1941.{9} By then, the rail lines were completed beyond Minsk, and the Germans would be operating from rail heads approaching Smolensk.


German Logistics: Quantity of Material and

Mode of Operations Required to Reach the Moscow-Gorki Space
To advance on Moscow in August 1941. the Germans depended logistically on the capacity and location of the rail system they had built by that time. The army high command massed strong forces of railway pioneer troops, battalions of the Reich Labor Service (Reich Arbeits Dienst, or RAD). and Organization Todt (ÎÒ) immediately behind the field armies to ensure construction of the normal-gauge rail lines, train stations, and marshalling yards. In Army Group North, the high command inserted 18,219 men for railway construction during June-August 1941,{10} The construction troops were organized along military lines, armed with rifles, pistols, and light machine guns, and advanced so aggressively behind the German combat formations that they reported 84 combat incidents with scattered Soviet troops. These resulted in 162 combat casualties to themselves. The Germans placed similar construction troops and special railway reconnaissance detachments with the panzer group spearheads to estimate damage and help pull the construction process forward. The details of German-gauge railway construction into the Soviet Union and the exploitation of undamaged Russian-gauge lines, locomotives, and rail cars support" a conclusion that the Germans accurately forecast the logistical necessities for Barbarossa and effectively executed the operations.

Gercke, chief of German army transportation, estimated that one railway battalion could change tracks from Russian to German gauge at a rate of 20 km per day.{11} Railway pioneer units also quickly employed Russian-gauge lines to help bring supplies forward even before they completed the German lines. They used both simultaneously, as long as Russian locomotives and rolling stock held out. On 24 June 1941, Railway Operations Company 203 took over the intact Soviet wide-gauge rail line from Brest to Zabinka, 30 km from the border. The company observed that the Russian-gauge line was intact for an additional 25 km eastward to the station at Tevii. The company began to reduce the haul of the 60-ton truck columns, already running far to the east to support Guderian's panzers, now 220 km on the road to the upper Dnieper at Rogachev.

The German railway pioneer and other construction troops simultaneously built normal-gauge rail lines at a fierce pace. advancing by 25 June some 80 km toward Minsk.{12} By 29 June, they extended normal-gauge track from the frontier at Brest to Oranczyce and, by I July. onto Baranovice.{13} As Gercke commented, a German railway pioneer battahon could replace wide-gauge line with normal at 20 km per day. The distance from Brest to Bara-novice is 210 km, a httle longer using the rail line. The Germans took eleven days to construct the new line, uncannily close to Gercke's estimate despite violent fighting on the southeastern lines of encirclement around the Bialystok pocket. Contrary to conventional interpretation of underestimating the challenges of a campaign in the Soviet Union, the Germans mastered logistics and built their own rail system into the Soviet Union.


Blitz Logistics: Normal Gauge Rail, Brest to Minsk

To operate the rail lines, the Germans had to regauge rail sidings and marshalling areas and, depending on battle damage, to repair buildings and equipment at the train stations.{14} On the most important rail line in Barbarossa, the tracks from Brest directly toward Moscow, the Germans completed the line from Brest to Oranczyce by 29 June 1941 and began to move German trains on normal-gauge track on 30 June. That day. four supply trains arrived at Oranczyce, 85 km into the Soviet Union, with approximately 2,000 tons of supplies. Meantime, regauging of Russian lines continued with work being completed to Baranovice junction by 2000, I July, and three trains reaching that city, 210 km into the Soviet Union. The Germans continued their impressive pace of building a normal-gauge rail system into White Russia and completed regaug-ing from Brest to the capital, Minsk, at noon on 5 July. Army Group Center ran four supply trains there the same day, more than 330 km into the Soviet Union.{15} By 5 July, the Germans began to develop a great rail head at Minsk, which capably supported the lightning panzer advance to Smolensk that overran the city on 16 July. In a historic performance, the Germans regauged the Russian rail system from Brest to Minsk by early July and extended construction to Smolensk before the end of the same month. Their performance established a logistical system able to support an offensive toward Moscow before the middle of August 1941 and bridge the gap between Smolensk and Moscow in a single offensive, similar in style to the earlier leaps to Minsk and Smolensk.

That generalization derives from the actions of Army Group Center from the middle of July to early August 1941. On 15 July 1941, the quartermaster general reviewed the supply status of, Army Group Center in terms of its capabilities to continue offensive operations. He made it clear that the great rail head for continuing operations lay in the cities of Minsk and Molodecno, no longer on the prewar frontier. The army group then had 45,450 tons of 60-ton truck columns and, deducting one-third as inoperable at any time and in repair, still had approximately 30,700 tons available for continuous operations.{16} In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed the substantial total of fourteen trains and 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk. This logistical feat was moderately impressive for the middle of July, with enough trains arriving at the Minsk-Molodecno railroad and more than enough trucks to move a panzer group and an infantry army to Moscow. Meanwhile, the Germans were fighting the battle of Smolensk and would take two more weeks to finish the job and another week to tidy up operationally. The Germans used this time to build up logistic stockpiles at the rail head in the center of White Russia and regauge the main rail line from Minsk through Orsha into Smolensk{17}.

By the second week of August 1941, Army Group Center regained operational freedom of movement. If the army group had been directed by Hitler and OKH at the end of July 1941 to continue operations toward Moscow as soon as possible, it would have eliminated remnants of Soviet forces in the great pocket just north of Smolensk and cleared the communications zone of Panzer Group Guderian to the south. Unhampered by Hitler's stubborn attempt to diffuse the combat strength of Army Group Center about the Russian countryside, and the battle between the Fuhrer and OKH over one decisive objective rather than many indecisive ones. Army Group Center would have entered a period of rest, rehabilitation, and stockpiling on approximately 5 August 1941. Regarding the logistical possibilities for an advance a little over a week later, on 13 August 1941, Army Group Center would receive almost double the number of trains daily it had received a month earher{18} — approximately twenty-four trains rather than fourteen. With time to establish larger stockpiles, and with rail heads advanced to Orsha and Smolensk, Army Group Center obviously had the logistical system to support its advance on Moscow with its entire strength{19}.

[Peltonx]

The problem was KIA/MIA not logistics.

1.0 problem is KIA/MIA not logistics.

In other words the combat system can't equal the combat losses - pockets.

Tring to put 2.0 in a logistics box to = historical gains is not really historically right.

In August AGC had huge depots, railheads and rested troops.
They could have driven easly to Moscow

BUT

they turned south east to help AGS - 100's of miles = to a drive on Moscow.

AGN railhead was 400 miles from start line 27 days after invasion delivering supplys , the rail head was not moved north for over 3 months.

Why Trey they were getting all the supples GHC wanted them to get and moving the extra to AGC.

I do like the prep point system is seems historicaly right, but the non-historical talk it was not possible to get to Leningrad or Moscow is simply wrong.

AGC after closing the Keiv pocket, then turned back to land bridge area and pushed for Moscow only a few miles from where it could have left the last week of August.

No one can refute the fact that instead of going to Kiev (fuel/ammo required) it could have driven to Moscow a full 8 weeks sooner.

Distance was same and there were no rail lines between the 2 running.

Trey historically AGC had 2 options and Hitler picked the wrong one. AGC had the ammo and fuel to do the Keiv operation and did SO
to flip the coin it also had the fuel and ammo to do a drive on Moscow.

On a side note Trey thanks for all the hard work you have done to date on 2.0 its looking great.

[Michael T]

This is one reviewers thoughts on Stahel's work.

This book is more of an anti-German, anti-Nazi tirade than a careful analysis of the military events of Operation Barbarossa, 1941. The author goes to lengths to tell us why the Germans were doomed to failure from the get go. The lengthening supply lines, the difference in railroad gauge, the partisans, the size and defiance of the red army, the difficult terrain, the
inhospitable climate, the primitive or non existent roads, the lack of mechanization of the German army, the inability of the infantry armies to keep pace with the Panzer Groups, the incomplete encirclements, the attrition of German strength, lack of replacements for men and material, the infighting in the German high command regarding the strategic direction all have been brought to the fore long before this author penned this book. Having read JFC Fullers history of the Second world war and works by earlier authors in the 1970's none of the German problems cited in the text of this book is new.

What is new is the anti-wehrmacht screed. All the German Generals are incompetent dotes or sychopantic opportunists with congenital superiority complexes. All German successes are due to the equally incompentent Russian deployments or Russian obsolete equipment. Basically the Germans blundered their way across some 700 miles to the gates of Moscow while capturing millions of prisoners. According to the author the Germans had no chance to capture Moscow and were bound to lose the war after June 22, 1941. It is all quite evident in his conclusion what his real goal is, to demythologize the supposed operational excellence of the German army and the German High command.

No where does he talk about the problems facing the Soviets during these opening battles because no matter what the Germans did the Soviets were bound to overwhelm them with numbers because even the loss of Moscow would not have brought about a Soviet surrender. They would have kept on fighting as in 1812. He may be right, but who can really say. The end result of an immense life and death struggle involving millions over a 6 month time period cannot be easily foretold. There is no mathematical formula you can plug in and come up with a right answer.

Despite what the author thinks, a neutral observer in late August, 1941 would have thought the Germans had a good chance to secure Moscow and more importantly destroy the Russian Army.
They went South instead. The entire month of September was lost to secure the Kiev encirclement. This gave the Russians a full month to reinforce their defenses in front of Moscow which appears to have done the Russians little good as the Germans blew through them with ease starting on September 30th. If the Germans had started their drive earlier they could have reached Moscow before the bad weather set in. With all due respect to Dr. Forczyk and Colonel Glantz the South Western front would not have been able to intervene effectively against Army Group Center. Even Dr. Forczyk has acknowledged the Soviets were unable to launch an effective offensive until Stalingrad over a year later. Most of the South Western fronts mobile units and tanks were destroyed in the battles of Dubno and Brody. Any northward turn would have exposed
their flank to Army Group South.

Whether the loss of Moscow would have brought about a soviet collapse, who knows for sure? They could have kept on
Fighting and with the coming of winter would the Germans have been able to hold the City and its environs?
Again, all conjecture and hypotheticals. One thing is for sure, boths sides of this debate will continue to throw
more wood on the fire.

I won't be bothering. Nothing new here. Just another anti Nazi pro Soviet rant.

[chaos45]

Source for one----

Secondly- it appears to be German written......As it does much to denigrate Hitler and talk up how much smarter the General staff was and how its decisions could have won the war....

This is very common in sources written by German commanders and Generals after the war....it was all Hitler he lost the war and if only he had done everything we wanted....just saying---you have to take many sources with a grain of salt and bounce the information they are providing off other sources as well to get a better picture of what really happened....as many authors on WW2 esp after the war had agendas they were trying to push.

Its why in all honesty some of the new books written based on facts and just the actual army records are more accurate as to the true situation...most the actors are dead now and agendas are slowly dying off as well.

The Kiev push is a very debated issue by German generals primarily...ive seen articles/books written that talk both sides of the Story....to me Hitlers decision to turn south was probably the better decision as AGS was way behind schedule and taking a beating in Real life unlike the walk in the park AGS gets in WITE.....thus the Southern wing of the Soviet army was actually largely intact....so the Germans southern flank of AGC would have been greatly exposed to soviet counterattacks if they had just driven on Moscow...as AGS couldnt handly the Soviet Southern front alone. Also the fact that AGC turned south caught the soviets by surprise and greatly weakened the soviet army overall with the kiev encirclement plus got AGS really moving again.

The game isnt real life---AGS vs the southern front---was very bloody heavy fighting in real life that you dont see in WITE 1. Lengingrad as well should be a much bloodier campaign for the Germans to reach and actually storm the city.

[Peltonx]

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

Stolfi? LOL. A fantabulist. I assume that's an extract from Hitler's Panzers East, which isn't a serious work.

Stahel pretty thoroughly demolishes Stolfi, btw.

You can look up the time and distances and they are right, his opinions on Hitler are opinion.

1. AGC in late August had stack piled supplies and was rested.
2. AGS was taking heavy losses and needed help taking Keiv.
3. AGC had 2 options, a drive on Moscow or help finish Keiv.
4. It had the fuel and supplies as it turned south and helped AGS.
5. After the pocket was wiped out and AGC moved back to the August start line and supplies depots refilled it started its drive on Moscow in October

Flaviusx why could not have AGC drive on Moscow 6 weeks sooner?
It did not lack supplies or it could not have turned south and driven 100's of miles great distances from its railheads/depots.

What is historically wrong?

Anyone what is historically wrong with what I and allot of others have stated, Trey, JB, RedLancer anyone?

Flaviusx seeing you don't trust Stolfi, lets see what GHC/Hitler said.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kiev_(1941)

On 23 August, Halder convened with Bock and Guderian in Borisov (in Belorussia), and afterwards flew with Guderian to Hitler's headquarters
in East Prussia. During a meeting between Guderian and Hitler, with neither Halder nor Brauchitsch present, Hitler allowed Guderian to make
the case for driving on to Moscow, and then rejected his argument.[15] Hitler claimed his decision to secure the northern and southern
sectors of western Soviet Union were "tasks which stripped the Moscow problem of much of its significance" and was "not a new proposition,
but a fact I have clearly and unequivocally stated since the beginning of the operation." Hitler also argued that the situation was even
more critical because the opportunity to encircle the Soviet forces in the salient was "an unexpected opportunity, and a reprieve from past
failures to trap the Soviet armies in the south."[13] Hitler also declared, "the objections that time will be lost and the offensive on
Moscow might be undertaken too late, or that the armoured units might no longer be technically able to fulfill their mission, are not valid."
Hitler reiterated that once the flanks of Army Group Center were cleared, especially the salient in the south, then he would allow the army
to resume its drive on Moscow; an offensive, he concluded, which "must not fail.".[14] In point of fact Hitler had already issued the orders
for the shift of Guderian's panzer group to the south.[16] Guderian returned to his panzer group and began the southern thrust in an effort
to encircle the Soviet forces in the salient.[13]

Again logistics is not why Moscow did not fall. AGC had the supplies and its a known fact that at the time Stalin was his weakest in front of Moscow. 6 weeks later Stalin was in a much better position and Germany simply did not have the time.

[chaos45]

Want to say im not disagreeing with the fact the Germans could have attempted a drive on Moscow earlier...but there are other facts to the situation. LOC is the big reason Hitler turned south.....driving on moscow would have left AGC with a greatly extended flank they didnt have the forces to protect from Soviet counterattacks and it was worried a drive like that on Moscow while AGS was still trying to take Kiev would leave AGC exposed to possible soviet counterattacks into AGC exposed southern flank since AGS wouldnt be there to protect it.

[Peltonx]

ORIGINAL: chaos45

Want to say im not disagreeing with the fact the Germans could have attempted a drive on Moscow earlier...but there are other facts to the situation. LOC is the big reason Hitler turned south.....driving on moscow would have left AGC with a greatly extended flank they didnt have the forces to protect from Soviet counterattacks and it was worried a drive like that on Moscow while AGS was still trying to take Kiev would love AGC exposed to possible soviet counterattacks into AGC exposed southern flank since AGS wouldnt be there to protect it.

Very true my friend, but logistically it was completely possible.

Stalin would have had to pull troops from some place to do counter attack and I believe they could have on come from Kiev area at that time.

All great stuff for 2.0

Your point is 100% historically true my friend, but logistically it was completely possible to drive for Moscow instead of sending 1 PG to AGN and 1 PG to AGS.

[Michael T]

Stahel is not German BTW. He is a New Zealander who studied (post grad) in Berlin. He did his degree in Australia

[Peltonx]

ORIGINAL: chaos45

The game isnt real life---AGS vs the southern front---was very bloody heavy fighting in real life
that you dont see in WITE 1. Lengingrad as well should be a much bloodier campaign for the
Germans to reach and actually storm the city.

Basicly what I been whining about for yrs.

Logistics was a concern, but clearly was not the deciding factor that slowed GHC.
The Germans started planning in 1940 for the invasion and clearly had more then enough fuel/ammo to take/start a drive on Leningrad or Moscow by mid August.

The limiting factor was really the losses in manpower and equipment.

Hitler simply cared about his men and the opinion of his people and Stalin did not.

The game needs to be much more bloody as it was historically, not only in 1941 but in 42-45. Not easy to do for sure.

[Flaviusx]

I'd like to know who that reviewer was.


But you will hate Stahel's work, MT. Not because it is an anti nazi screed, but because it doesn't fit into your narrative of German hypercompetence. But here's the thing: he works completely from German sources. Their own words damn them. He's not making anything up here. If you want to go ahead and ignore all that, go ahead. But you're basically cutting yourself off from all the top scholarship of the last quarter century or so.

[chaos45]

The reason I make my statements as well is anyone researching the topic before the 1990s had limited to no access to Soviet records...so most work prior to 1990s is very pro German, for many reasons- primary sources almost exclusively Axis available...secondly the Soviets were the red menace that needed to be belittled by the Nato side.

Its why I say more recent research is actually, and most likely more accurate as to the total picture. You like or not like Glantz all you want but his work- however dry it is, gets into some very deep details on the real situation and I think sheds better light on militarily why the Germans lost.

IMO- its a ton of reasons why the Germans lost the war....did they have a glimmer of chance in late 1941---I think so...however its also as overwhelming blunt on the economics side of the war that short of the allies just giving up the Germans never had a chance.

Its why this campaign is fun to play---as the Germans historically have a slim chance to win, but the odds are stacked against them.

Me and Pelton talk alot and he knows my opinion is that losses were the main reason the Germans ended up losing...it was a simple numbers game and the odds were so stacked against the germans their kill ratios would have to be insanely good for a very long time to win the war...esp when you add in the economic might of the CW and the USA. Also the fact is the Soviets were willing to die/be sacrificed by their commanders at much higher rates than the Germans were at first willing to accept.....this is huge....as tooth to tail ratios is where your real combat ratios are. Frankly put the soviets kept more manpower actually in the trenches than the Germans did period...so each german lost in the line was a greater loss overall than each soviet.

As trained frontline combat infantry/panzer crew/combat engineers were only like 1:4 of every german......so when only 25-30% of your troops are actual combat troops each loss in those units is more heavily felt. Soviets managed a closer to 1:2 ratio...meant less support per rifleman but at the same time each rifleman lost meant less overall loss in combat power.

Raw numbers are meaningless really---its all about how many actual combat trained troops you have that willing and trained to grab a rifle/faust/MG and face the enemy in the battleline. After the losses of 1941, this was something the Germans were never able to fix/make up for the losses of trained combat personnel.

Again everyone has their own take on things....I think the Germans did some amazing feats of arms in WW2 but the facts are even with those amazing feats they still lost......in fact you can really point to the fact that only because the Germans did better than all expectations did the war last as long as it did...as on economic facts they should have lost the way much more quickly.

[Peltonx]

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

I'd like to know who that reviewer was.


But you will hate Stahel's work, MT. Not because it is an anti nazi screed, but because it doesn't fit into your narrative of German hypercompetence. But here's the thing: he works completely from German sources. Their own words damn them. He's not making anything up here. If you want to go ahead and ignore all that, go ahead. But you're basically cutting yourself off from all the top scholarship of the last quarter century or so.

So could AGC have driven towards Moscow Starting August 22nd instead of driving 200 miles to help AGS or not?
Loses aside and Choas correct thoughts on flanking attacks.

Was Stolfi right or not?

[Flaviusx]

Stolfi was wrong.

AGC couldn't have mounted an offensive before September or so. As it was Typhoon in October was launched on a logistical shoestring despite the extended pause in the center. Trying to do this in August? Not a chance. The Germans were actually on the defense in AGC at that stage. Soviets didn't spend themselves until another month or so.

[Flaviusx]

That being said, a mid September Typhoon might just have gotten Moscow, although AGC wouldn't have been fit to get much further than that. An extra 2-3 weeks of clear weather could be just enough to pull it off.

It would've had a very long southern flank to worry about in this scenario, with SW Front still a going concern. And AGS would've ended up far short of its historical gains. Very doubtful they take the Donetz in this situation.

So instead of the Ukraine, the Germans get Moscow (unclear if they can hold it through the winter.) Not clear to me if that's really much better than the opposite. I'd call it a wash.

[Michael T]

The writers I take notice of are the impartial ones. As soon as I smell a wiff of bias or a hidden agenda (or not so hidden in Stahel's case) I tend to disregard the *authors* interpretation of the facts and draw my own conclusions from personal accounts, records and factual advances/defences.

I agree with the reviewer in so much as nothing new is being uncovered. What is new is the *authors* interpretations of the records. I don't disagree that the Germans had logistical problems. I do not agree they were incompetent. Stahel call's Guderian reckless. This is an absurd opinion of him. I wonder what he would think of Rommel in that case. These guys, Glantz and Stahel make the Germans out to be bumbling fools. It's just rubbish. Not worth the paper it's written on.

What I would dearly love is someone of Erickson's caliber to write an account from the German perspective as he did from the Soviet perspective.

I stand by my statement that authors who write new books on subjects already well covered have to make some kind of new claim or assertion in order to sell books. And let's be real. They do it to make a living out of it. Not for charity. So the motivation is income and/or their own biased agenda.

[chaos45]

I guess I would disagree on Glantz....at least on his stalingrad series....I found it quite in-depth on the entire situation and why what happened, happened.

In fact he specifically pulls from German data alot and specifically says he's pulling more from Soviet operational records since the German side of the operations had been previously well written about. Wont speak to his other series but I think he does a great, if dry bit of historical research on the entire Stalingrad operation.

When you look at the day by day accounts of German records on losses and where they were occuring during the stalingrad operation you quickly see the problem the Germans had was they just didnt have near enough manpower to do everything they wanted to do...and you can also quickly see how determined but disastrous soviet counterattacks all summer long in 1942 actually played a key roll in stopping the Germans at Stalingrad.....as they basically just slowly bleed the German army dry....not just in the streets of stalingrad but all summer long on the flanks as well.

You can take support personnel and make them combat infantry and combat engineers---but their effectiveness and average length of survival in combat is much less...and this is exactly what happens to the German army in 1942...you see Paulus constantly worrying about combat infantry and engineers to make up frontline strength...and being that the Germans robbed AGN/AGC to supply manpower and equipment to AGS the situation must be exactly the same if not worse for those sectors in 1942. The daily loss reports and specific instances of losses when replacements are added into German units really brings the picture to light of how desperate the Germans were for manpower from the very early days of the 1942 campaign.

Was one report in those massive books he wrote about a significant chunk of new replacements being feed into a battalion to get it up to a nominal strength for a push and that by the end of the first 24 hours like 90% of the replacements were dead or missing- in fact like 90% of the unit was dead/missing

Now units kept up with these losses by quick retraining of support personnel, new replacements coming in, and lightly wounded coming back...but what you see is its never enough to even break even on daily losses...so all summer long the German units just get weaker and weaker until almost the entire 6th army is virtually combat ineffective aside from barely having enough men to hold the line....and this is after robbing combat engineer battalions from divisions all of the eastern front and sending them into stalingrad.

Now the soviets lost loads of men and Glantz doesnt cover that up at all....in fact they launch alot of very bad attacks that cost them 10s of thousands of men for each major attack...however its does also inflict losses on the Germans and at critical points in the battle for stalingrad draws off forces from the assault on the city and probably even more critically draws off vast sums of artillery ammunition to defeat soviet attacks that had been needed to support offensives inside the city of stalingrad.

So ya IDK about a total Bias in glantz books...he does say he is mainly covering the soviet side as the german side is well covered, but at least in the stalingrad series I dont feel he makes the Germans out to be idiots...just generals asked to do far to much with far to little--which is a very real and factual analysis of the campaign IMO.

[SigUp]

Oh boy, the heavy use of Stolfi. Where do I start?

ORIGINAL: Pelton

By 26 June 1941, the 7th Panzer Division was 300 km into the Soviet Union from its start on the Lithuanian border, and on the following day the 3d Panzer Division reached Glusa. 350 km into Russia. Current literature has not asked how the Germans could resupply two panzer divisions at that distance from rail heads in German territory. Obviously, they successfully organized truck columns with enormous capacities to run the supplies from the German border to the advancing armies.

It's not the literature that hasn't asked. It's Stolfi who is glossing over something, namely the "Handkoffer" system put in place specifically to ensure supply for the German spearhead in the border areas. The "Handkoffer" system saw the Germans advance their supply columns with the panzer spearheads to replenish them. Obviously this system broke down with increasing distance.

By the second week of August 1941, Army Group Center regained operational freedom of movement. If the army group had been directed by Hitler and OKH at the end of July 1941 to continue operations toward Moscow as soon as possible, it would have eliminated remnants of Soviet forces in the great pocket just north of Smolensk and cleared the communications zone of Panzer Group Guderian to the south. Unhampered by Hitler's stubborn attempt to diffuse the combat strength of Army Group Center about the Russian countryside, and the battle between the Fuhrer and OKH over one decisive objective rather than many indecisive ones. Army Group Center would have entered a period of rest, rehabilitation, and stockpiling on approximately 5 August 1941.

In the middle of August 2nd and 9th Army actually experienced decreasing ammunition stocks due to the heavy fighting encountered (van Creveld, Supplying War, p.168). Generally it was impossible for Army Group Centre to build up stockpiles in August.

Regarding the logistical possibilities for an advance a little over a week later, on 13 August 1941, Army Group Center would receive almost double the number of trains daily it had received a month earher{18} — approximately twenty-four trains rather than fourteen. With time to establish larger stockpiles, and with rail heads advanced to Orsha and Smolensk, Army Group Center obviously had the logistical system to support its advance on Moscow with its entire strength{19}.

Von Bock requested 24 trains a day just to ensure the daily operations of the army group. And this number was not even reached. In the first half of August Army Group Centre only got 18 (Schüler, The Eastern Campaign, p.213). To build up supplies for an offensive von Bock stated the need for 30 trains a day. Moreover, Stolfi just glosses over the fact that the number of trains for Army Group Centre does not equal the number of trains reaching Smolensk, where the conversion reached on 16 August 1941. As late as July 1943 the Orsha-Smolensk line could only handle 13 trains per day (Pottgießer, Die Reichsbahn im Ostfeldzug). The figure for August/September 1941 is bound to be lower.

No one can refute the fact that instead of going to Kiev (fuel/ammo required) it could have driven to Moscow a full 8 weeks sooner.

Distance was same and there were no rail lines between the 2 running.

Just like Stolfi you are ignoring one key fact: the different supply hubs. Guderian's panzer group could drive south without all too significant supply problems because they were using the railheads at Gomel (van Creveld, Supplying War, p.170), which would have fallen out as supply hub for a drive towards Moscow.

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: Pelton

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

I'd like to know who that reviewer was.


But you will hate Stahel's work, MT. Not because it is an anti nazi screed, but because it doesn't fit into your narrative of German hypercompetence. But here's the thing: he works completely from German sources. Their own words damn them. He's not making anything up here. If you want to go ahead and ignore all that, go ahead. But you're basically cutting yourself off from all the top scholarship of the last quarter century or so.

So could AGC have driven towards Moscow Starting August 22nd instead of driving 200 miles to help AGS or not?
Loses aside and Choas correct thoughts on flanking attacks.

Was Stolfi right or not?

No and no. To go east would have meant major combat operations on a sector where the Soviets had the advantage (temporarily) and only lost it again in mid-September - by exhausting their freshly arrived units in the failed sequence of attacks. As an aside WiTE2 gives you the same dilemna. If you attack you stop the Germans building up supplies and inflict heavy losses but also undermine your own build up ... so which to choose.

The key is the Gomel operation to drive in behind SW Front was not a combat operation. Stalin blundered big time (not for the first or last) by pulling back the weak armies of Central Front (yes there was a short lived Front with that designation in 1941) from covering Gomel-Chernigov back to protect Bryansk and allow Western Front to build up for another attack. This decision is well covered by Erickson (Road to Stalingrad: 275:278). Even so the operation was weak as it was very hard to provide fuel for the formations committed and, as they did in the Caucasus in 1942, the Germans had to take fuel from some vehicles to move others.

Good rule of thumb Stolfi is wrong. In the same way that many of the new wave of Russian historians who are pushing the 'wise Stalin' line are fundamentally wrong.

ORIGINAL: Michael T

The writers I take notice of are the impartial ones. As soon as I smell a wiff of bias or a hidden agenda (or not so hidden in Stahel's case) I tend to disregard the *authors* interpretation of the facts and draw my own conclusions from personal accounts, records and factual advances/defences.

...

This is, of course, an excellent approach but one with real challenges. Since you are clear that you are seeing things much more clearly than everyone else would like to know which books/authors you are relying on.

I'll be upfront, from the German side I like Fritz and Stahel. I think both do a great job acknowledging the strengths of the Wehrmacht but pointing to its feet of clay - no about of cleverness could mask their massive logistical challenge and lack of logistical resources. For the Soviets, Erickson remains excellent. I think that Glantz is a bit of a mixed bag. As with Chaos above I think his 1942 stuff is excellent.

My issue is he is too quick to claim this or that action was the 'decisive' step. Also always worth remembering he started his historical research as he was trying to get the US planners to take the Warsaw Pact seriously at a tactical/operational level. He felt (probably with some reason) that the orthodoxy was too focussed on lack of tactical/operational flexibility and how to exploit the flaws in Soviet centralised control.

edit: there is a key and serious point here. Given that to really handle the material you need to be fluent in either German or Russian and to understand the political and military structures and dynamics on both sides. I have yet to find anyone who can manage this. Fritz is a good eg, he is basically a German specialist and it shows. His treatment of the Soviet side is never to the high standard of his scholarship and mastery over German sources and this gap really undermines the final part of his book. At a more political level, Kershaw is another who falls into this trap. His grasp of the structures of the Third Reich is excellent, his attempt (in 'Hitler and Stalin') has the same problem - he just lacks the background on the Soviet side.

Now add on there is no shortage of biases flying around. On the Soviet side you can find endless reworks of the 'Great Stalin/Bad Stalin' argument. On the Axis side you have the Nuremburg defense of the German commanders (the bad man made us do it) and then variants of Hitler being let down by his generals or his generals being undermined by Hitler.

FWIW, I'd argue that anyone who tries to separate out Soviet military decision making from the political structures of the Soviet state is going to struggle. And anyone who can't read Russian is, at best, limited to reworking already existing non-Russian sources.

[SigUp]

ORIGINAL: Michael T

Stahel call's Guderian reckless. This is an absurd opinion of him. I wonder what he would think of Rommel in that case.

You are ignoring context. Stahel doesn't call Guderian generally reckless. He called his insistence on releasing the 29th Motorised Division for a continued advance east in late June 1941 reckless (a request that was denied by von Bock). And Stahel in this specific instance has a case. At that point the 29th Motorised Division was holding the eastern end of the Bialystok pocket by itself and had to fend off breakout attempts by the Soviet forces.

[Michael T]

I really can't believe this narrow mindedness that gets displayed by the Red fan club every time a what if comes up. Do you guys possess any imagination at all?

Can't you see that if a decision was taken to go for Moscow prior to making the decision to go for Kiev that said supply hub/resources at Gomel would simply have been moved north well beforehand? Gimme a break. Have a little room in your heads for some relative logistical changes if objectives were changed earlier.

You are arguing that if the Germans decided to go for Moscow instead that they would have still built and positioned supply dumps for a drive on Kiev. I don't think even Stahel would think them that stupid.