AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

[geofflambert]

I'd say you'd have to scratch an early Phillipines invasion and/or call off the Malaya invasion. Oahu is too far away from support bases of any significance. I wouldn't advise it.

Sorry about that, I was responding to this earlier post:

[paradigmblue]

As an allied player, I would much rather have my opponent use the KB to strike Pearl rather than Manilla.

A Manilla strike can completely wipe out the subs stationed there, leaving the USN without its "eyes" for the early part of the war. Moreover, it allows the KB to then quickly split to interdict the exits from the DEI and/or support landings there. With US carriers still in the Pacific, the KB can operate very aggressively in the first week, racking up ungodly numbers of ship kills in the theater before moving to support action around Port Morseby.

The battleships lost at Pearl are not important in 1942. The loss of my eyes, however, is devastating.

[MakeeLearn]

ORIGINAL: geofflambert

I'd say you'd have to scratch an early Phillipines invasion and/or call off the Malaya invasion. Oahu is too far away from support bases of any significance. I wouldn't advise it.

Sorry about that, I was responding to this earlier post:

90% of my reading and studying of WW2 has been on the ETO. WitPAE has whetted my appetite for the PTO.

True, changes would have to made elsewhere - PI left to be dealt with later, etc., in order to take Midway and the Hawaiian Islands.

However, was this not the ultimate goal, set in motion by the Midway attack?

The biggest benefit to Japan in taking HI would have been in the political and military hurt it would have caused America. It may have resulted in what the Japanese were trying to achieve in the Pearl strike.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn

ORIGINAL: geofflambert

I'd say you'd have to scratch an early Phillipines invasion and/or call off the Malaya invasion. Oahu is too far away from support bases of any significance. I wouldn't advise it.

Sorry about that, I was responding to this earlier post:

90% of my reading and studying of WW2 has been on the ETO. WitPAE has whetted my appetite for the PTO.

True, changes would have to made elsewhere - PI left to be dealt with later, etc., in order to take Midway and the Hawaiian Islands.

However, was this not the ultimate goal, set in motion by the Midway attack?

The biggest benefit to Japan in taking HI would have been in the political and military hurt it would have caused America. It may have resulted in what the Japanese were trying to achieve in the Pearl strike.

The original strike on PH was just to keep the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japan's conquest of the Southern Resource Area (DEI) and Burma. At the time most of the IJN was battleship-centric (just as most Western Naval officers were) so knocking out the battleships at PH was seen as essential. They also hoped to catch the two CVs there but didn't.

The Midway operation was not in the original expansion plans but "Victory Disease" from the early conquests and the Doolittle raid on Japan led the Japanese government to believe that they could capture Midway easily and that they needed it to close a gap in their air search (that let the Doolittle raid approach the home islands).

I have not seen anything to suggest the Japanese planned to take the Hawaiian Islands at any time, IRL.

[ny59giants]

I have broken off Kaga, only CV below 30 knots, into a TF that gets the bonus and have her end up just past CRB to support a Mersing Gambit a few days later (add extra Zeros and pull off either Vals or Kates on 8th). Then, have TF with CVL Ryujo at Babeldoab end up at CRB to quickly join Kaga. A rapid move to divide the Malaysian peninsula in two is very difficult to defend as Allies. This resulting TF can control the Java Sea area easily.

Allowing the other 5 CVs to hit Pearl and destroy too many PBYs and other aircraft is not good. Vals go all in for AF while the Kates go after the BBs. As mainly Allied player, its not the lost BBs that hurt, but heavily damaged CA/CLs my few CV TFs in early '42 will be short of.

Most of the Allied shipping can be destroyed by roving SC TF in the Phillipines, so only the subs may survive. Not worth sending KB to hit Manila for me.

Pearl is the worse option for Allied player. Damaged BBs are OK, the lose of CA/CL and aircraft are the real story here. Going all in for Manila is a long term blessing for Allies, IMO.

[MakeeLearn]

The original strike on PH was just to keep the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japan's conquest of the Southern Resource Area (DEI) and Burma. At the time most of the IJN was battleship-centric (just as most Western Naval officers were) so knocking out the battleships at PH was seen as essential. They also hoped to catch the two CVs there but didn't.

The Midway operation was not in the original expansion plans but "Victory Disease" from the early conquests and the Doolittle raid on Japan led the Japanese government to believe that they could capture Midway easily and that they needed it to close a gap in their air search (that let the Doolittle raid approach the home islands).

I have not seen anything to suggest the Japanese planned to take the Hawaiian Islands at any time, IRL.

I'am reading "Titans of the Seas" (Belote).

In January '42 Yamamoto asked his staff to propose what to do next.

His chief of staff, Rear Admiral Ugaki favored an invasion of Hawaii. Having carrier superiority and an overwhelming advantage in battleships would make an occupation feasible. He proposed seizing Midway, Johnston,and Palmyra islands in June, followed by a invasion of the Hawaiian islands.

This was determined by the Japanese "Think Tanks" to be too ambitious. Surprise was gone, it would be difficult to dominate the skys over Hawaii having to deal with both US land and carrier aircraft.

Next he proposed seizing Ceylon and invading India. The Japanese Army No-Go that.

Admiral Nagano's Naval General Staff pushed for a invasion of Australia - again No-Go from the Japanese Army

Yamamoto recognized that the Doolittle raid was a stunt, but it reminded him forcefully of America's enormous potential.


Ugaki then devised a less ambitious plan of his original Hawaiian plan. He proposed a near simultaneous capture of the outer Aleutian Islands and Midway Island. This would enable them to keep American sorties from Pearl surveilled and blunted. Then Johnston,and Palmyra islands would be taken.

To Admiral Yamamoto this plan had a supreme advantage: It should force the inferior American carrier fleet into decisive battle. If the American carrier force was destroyed, then invading Hawaii might be practicable.



Game wise, in a opening move(s) of trying to take Pearl, the battle(s) itself may prove more beneficial to the Japanese than actually taking the land.

[Anthropoid]

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn

The original strike on PH was just to keep the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japan's conquest of the Southern Resource Area (DEI) and Burma. At the time most of the IJN was battleship-centric (just as most Western Naval officers were) so knocking out the battleships at PH was seen as essential. They also hoped to catch the two CVs there but didn't.

The Midway operation was not in the original expansion plans but "Victory Disease" from the early conquests and the Doolittle raid on Japan led the Japanese government to believe that they could capture Midway easily and that they needed it to close a gap in their air search (that let the Doolittle raid approach the home islands).

I have not seen anything to suggest the Japanese planned to take the Hawaiian Islands at any time, IRL.

I'am reading "Titans of the Seas" (Belote).

In January '42 Yamamoto asked his staff to propose what to do next.

His chief of staff, Rear Admiral Ugaki favored an invasion of Hawaii. Having carrier superiority and an overwhelming advantage in battleships would make an occupation feasible. He proposed seizing Midway, Johnston,and Palmyra islands in June, followed by a invasion of the Hawaiian islands.

This was determined by the Japanese "Think Tanks" to be too ambitious. Surprise was gone, it would be difficult to dominate the skys over Hawaii having to deal with both US land and carrier aircraft.

Next he proposed seizing Ceylon and invading India. The Japanese Army No-Go that.

Admiral Nagano's Naval General Staff pushed for a invasion of Australia - again No-Go from the Japanese Army

Yamamoto recognized that the Doolittle raid was a stunt, but it reminded him forcefully of America's enormous potential.


Ugaki then devised a less ambitious plan of his original Hawaiian plan. He proposed a near simultaneous capture of the outer Aleutian Islands and Midway Island. This would enable them to keep American sorties from Pearl surveilled and blunted. Then Johnston,and Palmyra islands would be taken.

To Admiral Yamamoto this plan had a supreme advantage: It should force the inferior American carrier fleet into decisive battle. If the American carrier force was destroyed, then invading Hawaii might be practicable.



Game wise, in a opening move of trying to take Pearl, the battle itself may prove more beneficial to the Japanese than actually taking the land.

So basically, the Japanese "High Command" were not particularly good "JFB Players," is what I'm reading.

I mean, did they not read Sun Tzu!? [:D]

"Okay guys, we uh, did that whole *Tora, Tora, Tora* Pearl Harbor thing, and it worked great! Are we naval flyboys badass or what!? <entire room full of middle-aged and elderly Japanese staff officers and their younger attaches bolt to their feet, thrusts arms into sky and shouts *BANZAI!!* . . . followed by peels of fiendish laughter>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7edeOEuXdMU

*Yamato finally gets the room to quiet down and resume their seats" . . . I know, I know, so awesome *he says wiping a tear from the corner of his eye* So now, the Yanks are REALLY pissed off!

So!? NOW WHAT!?

In other news . . . invasions southward are going pretty well . . . I guess we should be able to get enough oil, iron scrap to keep the war machine going for a year or so . . .

[MakeeLearn]

So basically, the Japanese "High Command" were not particularly good "JFB Players," is what I'm reading

Well... Yamamoto was a Harvard man. [;)]EDIT : This statement is a joke, it means cut him some slack look what he has been through.

Yamamoto said, to paraphrase, "I will run wild for the first year of the war, after that I cannot promise anything".

After which he probably asked... "Has anyone seen my manual?"

[Anthropoid]

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn

So basically, the Japanese "High Command" were not particularly good "JFB Players," is what I'm reading

Well... Yamamoto was a Harvard man.

Which proves absolutely . . . nothing [:D] Bill Gates, and that Facebook dude were Harbard DROPOUTS!

[Anachro]

Yamamoto also got a D on his class paper and almost failed the courses he took there. I know; I saw the paper while doing research in the Harvard archives. [:D]

[MakeeLearn]

ORIGINAL: Anachro

Yamamoto also got a D on his class paper and almost failed the courses he took there. I know; I saw the paper while doing research in the Harvard archives. [:D]

Yeeeeeeeeeeah!!! a correct decoding of my post, that was previously misread.[&o]

[Oberst_Klink]

ORIGINAL: Anachro

Yamamoto also got a D on his class paper and almost failed the courses he took there. I know; I saw the paper while doing research in the Harvard archives. [:D]

Well... one could relate to all the West Pointers between the US-Mexican and the Civil War... McClellan was top of his class... now how did that turn out

Klink, Oberst

[zuluhour]

I believe Patton finished last in his class

[zuluhour]

......or was that me???

[Anthropoid]

Pretty sure Genghis Khan, one of the greatest conquerors and strategists of human history (and also disproportional contributor of "seed" to the modern human population) never even got accepted to college.

[MakeeLearn]

Keeping on the subject of Harvard... and smart moves...

This was told to me by a veteran of Palau.


A Alabama country boy was accepted into Harvard, the first in his family to go to college.

His first day there he walked up to a group of frat boys and with a big warm smile on his face he said "Howdy y'all! I'am new here, could you please tell me where the library is at?"

Laughter arose from the group of frat boys. Then one of the group responded: "From your dress and your speech it is evident that you are new to anywhere except a barnyard. What has become of these hallowed halls, that someone has been admitted that is too ignorant to know that you don't end a sentence with a preposition."

The Alabama boy thought for a moment then with a even bigger warm smile on his face "Howdy y'all! I'am new here, could you please tell me where the library is at.. a##hole?"

[Anachro]

Well...any frat boy at Harvard is just someone that got rejected from a finals club.

[wneumann]

But it appears that some AFBs are unwilling to accept even the smallest additional challenge (OTOH they have no problem accepting the unhistorical advantages given to the Allied players). Let's face it, it is a game, it has necessarily some limitations and both sides get their share of "unhistorical" advantages and disadvantages.

Playing a scenario with a considerable quantity of additional challenge. I'll reserve comment until end of campaign in 1946.

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn

ORIGINAL: geofflambert

I'd say you'd have to scratch an early Phillipines invasion and/or call off the Malaya invasion. Oahu is too far away from support bases of any significance. I wouldn't advise it.

Sorry about that, I was responding to this earlier post:

90% of my reading and studying of WW2 has been on the ETO. WitPAE has whetted my appetite for the PTO.

True, changes would have to made elsewhere - PI left to be dealt with later, etc., in order to take Midway and the Hawaiian Islands.

However, was this not the ultimate goal, set in motion by the Midway attack?

The biggest benefit to Japan in taking HI would have been in the political and military hurt it would have caused America. It may have resulted in what the Japanese were trying to achieve in the Pearl strike.

The original strike on PH was just to keep the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japan's conquest of the Southern Resource Area (DEI) and Burma. At the time most of the IJN was battleship-centric (just as most Western Naval officers were) so knocking out the battleships at PH was seen as essential. They also hoped to catch the two CVs there but didn't.

The Midway operation was not in the original expansion plans but "Victory Disease" from the early conquests and the Doolittle raid on Japan led the Japanese government to believe that they could capture Midway easily and that they needed it to close a gap in their air search (that let the Doolittle raid approach the home islands).

I have not seen anything to suggest the Japanese planned to take the Hawaiian Islands at any time, IRL.

This line is repeated ad nauseum by armchair admirals. It subtly misinterprets the Japanese operational planning.

As all successful long term successful professional militaries, Japan's was a follower of Clauswitzian theory. The opening moves of the war were a classical implementation of the Clauswitzian maxim of seeking combat with and destroying the main enemy force. There were three main enemy strengths:

(a) the USN Pacific fleet, located at Pearly Harbor
(b) the USA airforce located on Luzon bases (protected by the army)
(c) the British combined forces located in Malaya

Consequently the main thrust on 7/8 December 1941 was simultaneously directed against these three force concentrations using the maximum available Japanese forces deemed necessary to achieve victory. Everything else received only secondary forces using units which could not otherwise be deployed against the main Allied dispositions.

The Midway operation was not victory disease either. Again that is just armchair strategists and lazy authors using a snazzy term. It was once again classic Clauswitzian of seeking to destroy the main enemy force.

Alfred

[Anachro]

Yes, but the well-documented cavalier attitude taken towards the operational planning for Midway can be seen as a symptom of "victory disease." I agree with you on your characterization of the operation and its origin in military thinking, however.