Naval War Day-by-Day

[warspite1]

Yeah soz - been so much going on lately - I'll try and be more regular in future.

[warspite1]

6th – 11th January 1940 (North Sea)

As we have seen previously (posts 119, 147, 162 and 210) the Germans conducted audacious – and highly successful - minelaying operations against the English east coast from October 1939.

Despite poor weather conditions that caused some operations to be cancelled or aborted (due to storm damage) these mining operations continued into the New Year.

On the 6th-7th January three destroyers, Friedrich Eckholdt, Erich Steinbrinck and Friedrich Ihn, led by Kapitan Fritz Berger, were tasked with laying mines off the Thames Estuary. The mines sown were responsible for the loss of the destroyer HMS Grenville, which sank on the 19th January with the loss of 77 men. In addition, a further six merchant ships (totalling almost 22,000 tons) were sunk by these mines.

Then, on the night of the 10th -11th January, two operations were carried out – one off the northeast coast near Newcastle and the other, further south off Cromer (Norfolk). The northern operation was undertaken by six destroyers commanded by Friedrich Bonte – Wilhelm Heidkamp, Karl Galster, Anton Schmitt, Friedrich Eckholdt, Richard Beitzen and Friedrich Ihn – but the results were disappointing with only one small trawler believed to have fallen victim to these mines. The southern operation, commanded by Kapitan Erich Bey, involved three destroyers – Bruno Heinemann, Wolfgang Zenker and Erich Koellner caused the loss of three merchant ships totalling just over 11,000 tons.

The Kriegsmarine’s available destroyers numbered only 22 during this period, and no less than 17 of these were involved in these operations on at least one occasion. Crippling losses to the destroyer arm at the hands of the Royal Navy would soon bring these operations to a halt, but there is another episode to be told yet and, during that, the Kriegsmarine destroyer fleet was to suffer losses from an entirely unexpected source…..


German EMC Contact Mines aboard a German destroyer


Sources:
The Gathering Storm (Geirr H Haarr)
Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-45 (Jurgen Rohwer)

[warspite1]

January 1940 (The Winter War)

Sadly sources and information remains scarce for this period of the war in the Baltic and Arctic oceans – although it perks up somewhat with Barbarossa I’m pleased to say. Mind you, with the winter of 1939/40 being so cold, there probably wasn’t that much to report on as the plucky Finns continued to hold the Soviet Union at bay…..

2-31 January: At the start of the month the Soviet minelayers Murman and Pushkin carried out a minelaying operation off the port of Petsamo in Northern Finland. The ships were escorted by two Soviet destroyers, Gromki and Grozny and the patrol ships Groza and Smerch. The Soviet minelayers continued to lay mines during the month – over 200 in all – just in case anyone, namely the British and French, decided to come to the aid of the Finns.

7 January: Back in the Baltic the Soviet submarine M-77 was damaged by Finnish aircraft.

18 January: As on land, so at sea. Finnish naval units attacked the Soviet ice-breaker Ermak that was trying to clear a path for the transport ship Kazakhstan, though with little by way of results. The Soviets responded with an air attack against the harbour at Kotka, resulting in damage to the Finnish ice-breaker Tarmo.

20-21 January: The Soviet air force followed up the attack on Kotka with further bombing operations against Turku, Hanko and Oulo. Finnish aircraft attacked the Soviet naval base at Kronstadt.

29 January: This marked the start of a period of aerial minelaying outside of Finnish ports. Turku, Rauma and Pori were among those ports selected.

The Gnevnyi-class destroyer Grozny. During the second of the 5-year plans, the Soviets still required much assistance from the outside world as they re-built their fleet. The biggest help came from the Italians – particularly with regard to cruisers and destroyers. Many of the Soviet ships built in the thirties are unmistakably Italian in origin and the Projekt 7/Gnevnyi-class destroyers are no different. 48 of these ships were planned and construction began in 1935, but only 30 were actually completed. Their main armament was 4 x 130mm guns and they could also carry 76 mines each. Top speed was 37 knots. Betraying their roots, these destroyers were poor sea boats and had structural weaknesses.


Sources:
Conway’s: All The World’s Fighting Ships 1922-1946
Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet (Rohwer and Monakov)
Chronology of the War at Sea (Rohwer)

[wings7]

Glad to see it back Robert! [:)]

[warspite1]

I need to get this back on track too [&:]

[wings7]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I need to get this back on track too [&:]

Absolutely! [:)]

[cpdeyoung]

You have a lot going on I know. This is such a good read; I hope you find the time to keep it up.

Chuck

[warspite1]

January 1940 (other theatres)

Leave clear for round-up of last remaining points of interest in this month.

[warspite1]

February 1940 (U-boat War)

In terms of tonnage sunk, February 1940 was to be the most successful so far for Donitz's U-boats – although was costly in the number of U-boats lost too. In addition, this was also the last month before the U-boats were withdrawn from the Atlantic for a couple of months in order to support Operation Weserubung - the invasion of Norway and Denmark. Much to Donitz chagrin, this was to have a drastic effect on the tonnage sunk in the coming months.

Individual operations in the North Atlantic were carried out by 8 boats, the most successful of which was by Werner Hartmann’s U-37. Herbert Schultze added another 4 kills to his growing list. These two boats were ordered to try and intercept British capital ships escorting the badly damaged HMS Exeter which had been badly mauled during the Battle of the River Plate and was now returning to the UK. However the plan came to nothing, not least because Schultze got distracted by a convoy that he decided to go after rather than stick to the plan.

U-50 and U-53 added another 9 ships between them, but the latter, commanded by Kapitan Harald Grosse never made it home. She was sunk on the 24th February following an attack by the destroyer HMS Gurkha. All 42 submariners were lost.

Another boat lost with all hands that month was Gustav-Adolf Mugler’s U-41. She was also lost at the hands of a British destroyer – HMS Antelope – at the beginning of the month whilst off southwest Ireland. One week later, on the 12th February, Hans-Wilhelm von Dresky’s U-33 was caught while trying to undertake a mining operation in the Firth of Clyde. The Minesweeper HMS Gleaner made a depth charge attack in which the U-boat was sunk, taking 25 of her crew with her, including Dresky. There were 17 survivors. More importantly for the British, two of three Enigma naval rotors that had not previously been duplicated were captured in this attack. Elsewhere around the waters of the UK mines laid by U-48 off Weymouth claimed no victims and a similar lack of success befell U-34’s mine barrage off Falmouth.

In the middle of the month the Germans tried to form a wolfpack of six boats with Hartmann, on U-37, as the commander. However the operation was not successful not least because two of the boats earmarked for the operation were sunk (U-41 – see above) and U-54 commanded by Gunter Kutschmann. The latter was sunk with the loss of all hands before she had left the North Sea. It is believed she fell victim to a mine barrage laid by the destroyers Ivanhoe and Intrepid. A third boat – U-26 had to abort her patrol with mechanical woes.

U-boat operations continued in the North Sea (see Operation Nordmark below) with the Ducks achieving further success, although one Duck was lost. Gunther Lorentz in U-63 was ordered to attack convoy traffic between the UK and Norway. However, having sunk only one ship, the 3,840 ton Santos, she was set upon by three British destroyers – Escort, Inglefield and Imogen – and sunk. All bar one crew member were saved.

Sinking of the destroyer Daring

A week after joining the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla, HMS Daring commanded by Commander S.A Cooper, was ordered to escort convoy HN12. The 20-ship convoy was bringing Iron Ore from Norway to the UK. Daring was one of four destroyers maintaining position on each quarter of the convoy. As per standing instructions, the destroyers were not zig-zagging while providing escort. Daring was on the port quarter and the convoy was less than 50 miles from the Scottish coast at 0255hrs on the 17th February.

Meanwhile Otto Kretschmer, aboard U-23, had earlier been advised of the convoy’s approach by one of his fellow U-boat captain’s and was thus ready and waiting as the convoy hove into view. Kretschmer felt he could not get in amongst the convoy and so instead launched a single torpedo at the rear of the slow moving ships.

Daring was hit on the port side aft and the explosion was almost immediately followed by a second as her magazine went up and broke the back of the little destroyer. She disappeared beneath the waves in less than 30 seconds. There were just 5 survivors. The rules forbidding zig-zagging were changed after this tragic episode.


HMS Daring was the third of the D-class destroyers built during the early thirties. Displacing 1,375 tons, she was armed with 4 x 4.7-inch guns and had a top speed of 35.5 knots. She had started the war in the Mediterranean and had only recently taken up her new deployment with the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla when she ran into Otto Kretschmer’s U-23.



Summary for the period
U-boat, type, ships sunk

U-9 (IIB) – (1) Linda (11th)
U-10 (IIB) - (2) Kvernaas (17th), Ameland (18th)
U-13 (IIB) - (2) Fram (1st), Anu (6th) (Mine)
U-14 (IIB) – (4) Sleipner (15th), Rhone (16th), Osmed (16th), Liana (16th)
U-20 (IIB) - (1) Maria Rosa (29th)
U-21 (IIB) - (1) Royal Archer (24th) (Mine)
U-23 (IIB) – (2) HMS Daring (18th), Loch Maddy (19th), Tiberton (22nd)
U-25 (I) - (2) Armanistan (3rd) Chastine Maersk (13th)
U-26 (I) – (3) Nidarholm (12th), Langleeford (14th), Steinstad (15th)
U-30 (VII) - (2) Munster (7th) (Mine), Chagres (9th) (Mine)
U-37 (IX) – (8) Hop (4th), L Dawson (4th), Silja (10th), Togimo (11th), Aase (15th), Pyrrhus (17th), Ellin (18th), P.L.M 15 (18th)
U-41 (IX) – (1) Beaverburn (5th)
U-48 (VIIB) – (4) Burgerdijk (10th), Sultan Star (14th), Den Haag (15th), Wilja (17th)
U-50 (VIIB) – (4) Oranja (11th), Maryland (15th), Tara (21st), British Endeavour (22nd)
U-53 (VIIB) – (5) Senstad (11th), Dalaro (12th), Norna (13th), M Goldschmidt (14th), Banderas (18th)
U-57 (IIC) – (1) Gretafield (14th)
U-58 (IIC) - (1) Reet (3rd)
U-59 (IIC) - (3) Ellen.M (1st), Creofeld (2nd), Portelet (2nd)
U-61 (IIC) – (2) El Sonador (18th), Sangstad (18th)
U-63 (IIC) - (1) Santos (24th)

Total: 50 ships with a total tonnage of 184,019 tons. Not inc HMS Daring

The Germans lost 5 U-boats – one to mines (U-54) and four to torpedo/depth-charge attack (U-33, U-41, U-53 and U-63).


The Halcyon-class minesweeper HMS Gleaner. Commanded by Lt-Cdr Price, she successfully attacked U-33 whilst the latter was engaged in a risky operation to mine the Firth of Clyde. The ship, and five of her twenty-one sisters, was actually completed as a survey vessel but was modified for a minesweeping role in 1939. She was armed with two 4-inch guns and could carry 40 depth charges.


Sources:
Hitler’s U-boat War Volume I (Clay Blair)
Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-45 (Jurgen Rohwer)
www.uboat.net
U-boat Attack Logs (Morgan and Taylor)

[Orm]

As per standing instructions, the destroyers were not zig-zagging while providing escort.

So what was the thought behind these instructions?

I may have forgotten that I already read it. If so, I would appreciate it if I could be directed to where I could find the answer.

Edit: U-54 is listed as being sunk by both mines and torpedo/depth-charge attack. I suspect that the former was the case?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Orm

As per standing instructions, the destroyers were not zig-zagging while providing escort.

So what was the thought behind these instructions?

I may have forgotten that I already read it. If so, I would appreciate it if I could be directed to where I could find the answer.

warspite1

Absolutely no idea I'm afraid. First I'd heard of it. Seems bizarre but I can only assume it was to avoid collisions - I can't think of any other possible reason.

Re the Edit: Merci beaucoup - amended [:)].

[wings7]

Awesome Robert, glad to see the thread progressing again! [:)]

[warspite1]

9th - 23rd February 1940 (North Sea)

The German destroyer mine-laying operations (see posts 119, 147, 162, 210 and 242) continued into February. On the night of the 9th-10th February three destroyers from Cdr Fritz Berger’s 1st Destroyer Flotilla – Friedrich Eckholdt, Richard Beitzen and Max Schulz - sailed for the Thames Estuary and three destroyers from Cdr Erich Bey’s 4th Destroyer Flotilla – Bruno Heinemann, Wolfgang Zenker and Erich Koellner - sailed for Cromer on the Norfolk coast.

Berger’s mines accounted for six ships totalling 28,496 tons, while Bey’s mines accounted for a further three ships and 11,855 tons. Still the British remained unaware of what was happening but, as it turned out, with Operation Weserubung in planning, these destroyer operations had come to an end.

Operation Wikinger

It is an oft repeated line – and very true - that the co-operation between the Regia Marina and Regia Aeronautica in World War II was extremely poor. However petty rivalries and squabbles were just as bad between the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe – largely thanks to Hermann Goering’s refusal to agree to anything that would make the navy look good. This meant that co-ordination between the two services was prone to break down or for communications to be lost or mis-read. The problems were highlighted in an episode toward the end of February, an episode that cost the Kriegsmarine two precious destroyers and almost 600 sailors.

Just about every operational Kriegsmarine vessel, from battlecruiser to torpedo boat, and everything in between, was by now needed in preparation for the forthcoming operations in Denmark and Norway. But in the meantime there was still a day job to be done. On the 22nd February a report was received that British trawlers were spotted at Dogger Bank. It was feared that these were being used for spy purposes – to detect where the entrances to swept channels were – and so in the late afternoon six destroyers put to sea, commanded by Cdr Berger. The six destroyers were Friedrich Eckholdt, Richard Beitzen, Max Schulz, Theodor Riedel, Leberecht Maass and Erich Koellner.

At around 1900hrs the six destroyers were heading into an open channel in the Westwall. The destroyers were supposed to have fighter escort but for some reason no fighters appeared. However an aircraft did appear overhead at this time, and after flying over the German ships, the unidentified aircraft flew away. Less than ten minutes later another aircraft (or the same one) appeared. Apparently no attempt at recognition was made from the sea or from the air and instead shots were briefly exchanged before the aircraft flew away.

About forty minutes after the first aircraft appeared a third aircraft was spotted, flying in behind the last destroyer in line, Leberecht Maass. The aircraft was an He-111 of KG26 and it dropped four bombs in the direction of Leberecht Maass, one of which hit. The result was pandemonium amongst the remaining destroyers, with reports of submarines and torpedo tracks being seen. But a rescue operation was launched by Erich Koellner and other ships soon headed toward their stricken sister.

Four further bombs were dropped from the Heinkel and two ‘were seen to hit’, but it is unclear exactly what happened next. What is known is that by the time Berger had brought his remaining ships under control at around 2035hrs and ordered a course for home, both Maass and Max Schulz were no longer afloat.

Both ships were believed to have either strayed onto mines laid previously by the British or were sunk by the aircraft’s bombs and resulting magazine explosions. Whatever the actual reason, there were no survivors from Schulz and sources state between 45 and 60 survivors from Maass.

One thing was clear; whatever caused the ultimate demise of the vessels, the reason for the whole sorry episode was poor communication between the two services. But what could have been a chance to clear the air and make improvements going forward, was simply not taken and a refusal by either side to take responsibility summed up how the German armed forces were just as capable of gross incompetence as any other. No one – navy or air force – was blamed for the incident.

As a sad footnote to this tale, the following day German minesweeper M1, commanded by KapitanLeutnant Hans Bartels, was in the vicinity of Dogger Bank. The minesweeper came across four Danish fishing vessels: Ejjam, Gerlis, Merkator and Polaris. Making no checks, but simply assuming that these four vessels were involved in the events of the previous evening, Bartels ordered the ramming of the four Danish ships. No attempts were made to pick up any survivors and all sixteen crewmen died.


Leberecht Maass (Z1). The first of the Germany post World War I destroyers was the 1934 type. Four vessels were laid down between October 1934 and January 1935 and this design became the blueprint from which later classes were developed. The original design was far from ideal and plenty of work was required to ensure these ships were seaworthy, including a stiffening of the hulls. Only one ship, Richard Beitzen (Z4) survived the war.


Sources:
Conway’s: All The World’s Fighting Ships 1922-1946
The Gathering Storm (Geirr H Haarr)
Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-45 (Jurgen Rohwer)

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Orm

As per standing instructions, the destroyers were not zig-zagging while providing escort.

So what was the thought behind these instructions?

I may have forgotten that I already read it. If so, I would appreciate it if I could be directed to where I could find the answer.

warspite1

Absolutely no idea I'm afraid. First I'd heard of it. Seems bizarre but I can only assume it was to avoid collisions - I can't think of any other possible reason.

Re the Edit: Merci beaucoup - amended [:)].

To save fuel perhaps?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Zorch

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Orm


So what was the thought behind these instructions?

I may have forgotten that I already read it. If so, I would appreciate it if I could be directed to where I could find the answer.

warspite1

Absolutely no idea I'm afraid. First I'd heard of it. Seems bizarre but I can only assume it was to avoid collisions - I can't think of any other possible reason.

Re the Edit: Merci beaucoup - amended [:)].

To save fuel perhaps?

warspite1

Don't know but I will see if I can find out more.

[operating]

The 20-ship convoy was bringing Iron Ore from Norway to the UK

Curious: Was this the last convoy from Norway to UK?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: operating

The 20-ship convoy was bringing Iron Ore from Norway to the UK

Curious: Was this the last convoy from Norway to UK?

warspite1

No, there were many others HN25 - actually departed Norway on the 9th April - the day of the invasion - and arrived in Scotland 3 days later.

[warspite1]

February 1940 (Royal Netherlands Navy)

At the time of World War II many units of the Dutch navy were deployed in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), the most important colony in the Dutch Empire thanks to its oil deposits. With the world increasingly heading toward war, or at least the threat of war, the Dutch decided to strengthen the navy in the Far East.

In 1939 the largest ship type in the Dutch Navy was a light cruiser, of which there were five (one of which was still fitting out when the Netherlands was invaded in May 1940). The Government wanted to build three battlecruisers specifically for deployment in the NEI.

The planned construction – codenamed Project 1047 – was authorised in February 1940, with technical assistance to be provided by Germany. However, further exploratory work and re-designs were undertaken as late as April following a fact finding mission to Italy. The last re-design is believed to have been made on the 19th April less than a month before the project was shelved following the German invasion and occupation of the Netherlands.

Unsurprisingly given the initial design work was done in Germany, the ships would likely have had much in common with the Scharnhorst-class, including the main armament layout of three triple 11-inch guns. Secondary armament was likely to have been provided by between 8 and 12 4.7-inch dual purpose guns. No doubt the AA armament would have been increased during construction in light of aircraft development. Belt armour would have been around 9-inches (similar to the US Alaska-class). Deck armour, like AA, would almost certainly have been increased during construction. These would have been fast ships – circa 34 knots – and would have had a displacement of around 28,000 tons.


One of the designs for the aborted Project 1047



Sources:
Conways All the World’s Fighting Ships (1922-1946)

[warspite1]

14th - 17th Feb 1940 (The Altmark Incident)

We came across the supply ship Altmark previously (see posts 25, 76, 115 and 182) due to her support role for the surface raider Graf Spee. She now makes a re-appearance, playing a key part in an episode that went a long way to crystalising Adolf Hitler’s thoughts on Norway.

Altmark, commanded by Kapitan Heinrich Dau, and crewed by 133 officers and men, had put to sea in August 1939 to support the Graf Spee's proposed commerce raiding activities in the South Atlantic once war broke out. She supported the German pocket-battleship during the latter's maiden - and as it turned out, only - voyage as a surface raider.

After the Graf Spee was scuttled Altmark - with around 300 merchant sailors captured by Graf Spee aboard - initially remained in the South Atlantic as Dau suspected that the Royal and French Navies would be searching for her. Only toward the end of January, with supplies running low, did Dau decide to make a dash for home. On her way home she was disguised sometimes as a Norwegian vessel and on other occasions as an American vessel, and she was able to pass undetected through the Northern Patrol line south of Iceland in mid-February.

By the 14th Altmark had reached Norwegian waters and was less than 2-days from reaching Germany. There, she was spotted (but not yet identified) by lookouts at a coastguard station at Fosen. The Norwegian torpedo boat Trygg was ordered to intercept this mystery ship and see what she was up to. Trygg's commander, Lt Franz Munster ordered his first officer, Fenrik Evju, to board the ship and investigate.

Evju was told that Altmark was travelling back to Germany from the Far East where she had been tasked with purchasing oil. Altmark's crew had concealed her weapons and so, seeing nothing out of the ordinary, and with Dau and his officers able to answer Evju's questions convincingly, at around 1800hrs Altmark was given permission to sail south within Norwegian territorial waters.

However a British ship, Helmond, saw Altmark (although she too did not know it was her) and her captain became suspicious. He reported his sighting to the British authorities at Trondheim - who immediately informed the Admiralty. They guessed exactly who and what this ship was... But it was not just the British who identified her. The Norwegian Commander in Chief of the 2nd Sea Defence District, Rear-Admiral Carsten Tank-Nielsen, also realised the true identity of the ship after he received the report from Trygg.

Tank-Nielsen ordered Niels Simensen, commanding a second torpedo boat - Snogg - to board Altmark once again. By now it was around 2130 hrs and once again, Dau had managed to answer all questions put to him to the Norwegians satisfaction and no detail examination of the ship was carried out before the Norwegian boarding party left the ship. Tank-Nielsen though was not happy. He was all too aware that his country had to be seen to be abiding by international rules in order to maintain their neutral status. As a result, at around 2315 hrs on the 15th February, a third boarding was ordered.

The result was no different and so Tank-Nielsen decided to take a closer look himself. He sailed out to Snogg and questioned her captain about exactly what questions were asked and what examination of the ship had been carried out. When he realised that no one had actually made any examination below decks he ordered a fourth boarding of the German ship. Dau was told that either he allowed a full inspection of his ship to be undertaken or he must leave Norwegian waters. He choose the latter, but asked that he be allowed to wait until dusk before leaving for international waters.

Things now started to heat up. Against regulations, Dau used his radio to get a message to the German Embassy in Oslo to protest at the Norwegian actions. This message was intercepted and Dau was reminded that use of the radio was not permitted while in Norwegian waters.

Meanwhile, while all this was going on, the prisoners down below had not been idle. When the ship was first stopped the prisoners tried to raise the alarm by making as much noise as possible but apparently were not heard. However, on this fourth stoppage they tried again and this time were heard by the boarding party. Tank-Nielsen now realised that there were prisoners aboard the ship, but he did not want to take action against Altmark without authorisation from the Norwegian Government or the head of the navy.

The commander of the Norwegian navy, Admiral Henry Diesen, after consulting with members of the Government, decided that the best thing would be for Altmark to be allowed to continue on her way - through Norwegian waters - so she would no longer be Norway's problem. Poor Tank-Nielsen was reprimanded for doing his job. Altmark continued south and by midday on the 16th was south of Stavanger.

Meanwhile, on the 15th the sighting report had reached Captain Philip Vian, the commander of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla aboard HMS Cossack. Along with fellow destroyers Intrepid, Ivanhoe, Nubian and Sikh, and the attached light cruiser Arethusa, the 4th Destroyer Flotilla went in search of the Altmark. Vian split his forces into two, and the northern force - containing Arethusa, Intrepid and Ivanhoe - was closest to hand when Altmark was spotted by a reconnaissance flight in the early afternoon of the 16th.

The three British ships closed Altmark but were kept at bay by her two Royal Norwegian Navy escorts, the torpedo boats Skarv and Kjell. A landing party was actually launched but was unable to get a line onto the German tanker. The British then fired warning shots - but could not set their machine gun sights onto Altmark's bridge as there were two Norwegian pilots aboard (placed their earlier to help the Altmark steer a course though the confined waters of the Norwegian coast). Ultimately Dau ordered his ship into Jossingfjord to try and escape his tormentors. The Fjord was half frozen over but Altmark took part in some impromptu ice-breaking to get as far into the fjord as practicable. She was followed in by the two Norwegian naval vessels which blocked the British destroyers from entering.

It was now just after 1800hrs, and Vian asked that the commander of the Kjell, Lt Finn Halvorsen, to meet him aboard HMS Cossack. Vian told the Norwegian that he wanted the Altmark searched as there were British prisoners aboard. Halvorsen stated that the ship had already been searched and furthermore, he wanted assurances from Vian that there would be no further encroachment into Norwegian waters and ordered Vian and his destroyers to leave. The meeting ended with Halvorsen agreeing to search Altmark once more and Vian ordering his ships to open sea where he would seek further clarification from the Admiralty as to the next steps he should take.

Incredibly, Rear Admiral Johannes Smith-Johannsen - commander of the 1st Sea Defence District, under whose jurisdiction Altmark now came - at this point gave orders that Altmark was not to be searched and that if the British entered the fjord they should be stopped by force. This, despite the fact that Altmark was no longer passing through Norwegian waters toward home, but had actually entered a Norwegian fjord.

At this point events moved away from Jossingfjord and the Altmark. The British submarine HMS Seal was ordered to lay a 3-mile long net near the fjord. The thinking was that if the Altmark tried to leave the fjord she would become entangled on the net. The net did catch a German ship - although it was not Altmark, still safely holed up in the fjord watched over by the two Norwegian torpedo boats. Instead it was the Baldur, a merchant vessel carrying iron ore from northern Norway. The destroyer Ivanhoe was ordered to intercept the German ship, hopelessly entangled and drifting out to sea. Two warning shots were fired by the destroyer before her crew scuttled her by setting fire to the ship. She sank that night after her crew were picked up by the British.

Back to the Altmark, and matters were coming to a head. Having received Vian's request for orders, Winston Churchill, after a brief discussion with the Foreign Secretary, gave Vian clear orders. Unless the Norwegians agreed to escort Altmark to Bergen for a proper inspection, Vian was to board the ship, liberate the prisoners and the ship was to be left. And so, at around 22:45hrs with a boarding party of around 45 sailors, Vian re-entered the fjord aboard Cossack (the other ships were ordered to remain outside Norwegian waters).

Once more Halvorsen found himself aboard HMS Cossack protesting the British presence and ordering Vian to leave. Vian countered that he was under orders to search the ship and Halvorsen was welcome to accompany him. Seeing a new ship in the fjord Dau ordered the Altmark deeper into the fjord and was followed by Cossack. Suddenly Altmark reversed course and rammed the British destroyer. Dau decided against scuttling the ship - probably as this would be a death sentence to the prisoners below.

With the ships largely locked together the boarding party jumped onto Altmark. What exactly happened next is disputed but firing broke out. Dau initially said that no German was carrying weapons, but given there were 300 prisoners aboard and being guarded, this was clearly nonsense. He then said that there were some weapons distributed, but no German fired that night. The Norwegians supported that version of events. However, for whatever reason a firefight did break out and eight German sailors died -despite the best efforts of members of Cossack crew that entered the water to assist a German that had been shot.

Down below, 299 prisoners were found by the boarding party and released. The Germans advised the British that scuttling charges had been set on the Altmark. Rather than take any chances, Vian ordered the prisoners be loaded onto the destroyer as quickly as possible so that they could exit the fjord. The Germans were not taken prisoner and the ship was left where she was. Cossack got underway around midnight, the damage from the ramming did not impair her sea-worthiness, and she was back in Scotland on the 17th.

So what were the rights and wrongs of this episode? Well it seems likely that the Royal Navy had no grounds to enter territorial waters, but that said, Dau lied to the Norwegians about the status of his ship, he used the radio while in Norwegian waters, he lied about being unarmed and also about the prisoners. The British were also upset at the inadequate searches that were carried out by the Norwegian Navy. Ultimtely there was no long term damage to British / Norwegian relations, but in Berlin, Adolf Hitler was taking a dim view of Norwegian efforts to maintain its neutral status.....


Altmark was one of a class of five supply ships was built during the thirties, known as the Dithmarschen-class. These 'Troßschiffe' were vital to the Kriegsmarine as they allowed their surface raiders to remain at sea for lengthy periods, once they had broken out into the North Atlantic and beyond. They were able to provide essential items including fuel (c.9,000 tons), ammunition (1,000 tons), general supplies (900 tons). They were also able to take crews captured by the surface raider. We shall come across the Altmark again later in this thread.



Captain (D) Philip Vian (pictured in Australia in 1944) was commander of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla at the time of the Altmark incident. He ended the war as a Rear-Admiral in command of the 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron



The Tribal-class destroyer HMS Cossack



Sources:
Conway’s: All The World’s Fighting Ships 1922-1946
The Gathering Storm (Geirr H Haarr)
Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-45 (Jurgen Rohwer)

[warspite1]

18th - 20th February 1940 (North Sea)

Operation Nordmark

On the 18th February the Kriegsmarine launched an operation to try and sink convoy traffic between Norway and the UK. For this mission, commanded by Admiral Wilhelm Marschall, the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (Flagship) were joined by the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and three destroyers – Zenker, Heidkamp and Galster. Wolfgang Zenker’s participation was cut short as she literally sprung a leak and she returned to Germany. The ships were screened initially by four ships of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, which were ordered to peel off into the Skaggerak to intercept merchant shipping there.

In addition to Marschall’s surface ships, six U-boats were employed in this operation – U-9, U-14, U-23, U-57, U-61 and U-63.

Marschall’s small task force sailed as far north as the Shetland Islands but, in a frustrating episode, were unable to locate any convoy traffic and returned home two days later. The U-boats had more success, accounting for 10 ships including the destroyer HMS Daring (see post 249).


The Gneisenau and two of the three escorting destroyers at the commencement of the operation. This shot was taken from Scharnhorst.



Admiral Wilhelm Marschall became the fleet commander in 1939 but only lasted in that role until June 1940 when he was replaced by Admiral Gunther Lutjens. His removal was due to differences with the High Command following Operation Juno (see the Norwegian Campaign later). Thereafter he held a number of desk-bound roles including the naval commander for Occupied France. He survived the war and died in 1976. This picture was taken toward the end of the war during his time as Oberbefehlshaber des Marine Gruppenkommando West.



Sources:
Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-45 (Jurgen Rohwer)
www.scharnhorst-class.dk/scharnhorst/history