ORIGINAL: Aurorus
ORIGINAL: Mike Dubost
Well, at the risk of beating a dead horse, I would like to point out a fact that no one has mentioned yet. While it is true that Leslie McNair (the highest ranking American casualty of the ETO) was killed, this was partly due to the approach.
In his memoirs, General Bradley spoke about the friendly fire issue. His statement (note, I have not seen this in detail elsewhere, so be advised it is one credible source only) was that he had planned to have the bombers approach along the front. The Army Air Corps over-ruled him and insisted that it had to be perpendicular to the front. My recollection is that he stated that he never wanted to have another carpet bombing mission that came in perpendicular to the front, not necessarily no carpet bombing at all.
Please consider that when objecting to the example of Cobra. Could the planners of other missions have agreed to a perpendicular approach? Yes, possibly. Would it have made the bombing as effective as you see in game? I don't have enough knowledge of the technology of the time to say.
As I mentioned, Cobra is probably not comparable for a number of reasons, especially in that in Cobra the 4 EBs were used in close support. Using 4 EBs to bomb rear echelon positions, which is more comparable to what John experienced here, was commonplace in the Asian theater, especially in Burma, and the casualty estimates that the WiTP is generating are very much in line with those reported in these types of missions.
The allies did not do this more frequently, because they used the 4 EBs more frequently to establish air superiority by hitting Japanese airfields. That is also why the allies did not make a habit of losing 18 B-29s in one raid to 100 Japanese fighters. There is a tradeoff for all things. If the allies want to use their 4 EBs to attack ground troops and not to establish air superiority, they must expect to take heavy 4 EB loses.
Well, I had meant to mostly address the issue of friendly fire as a counter-argument to the analogy. My apologies for not being clear in that respect.
That being said, I am not sure that the distinction of close air support versus more distant targets is significant. I am re-reading
Eisenhower's Lieutenants by Russell Weigly, and in his section on Cobra, he mentions in the aborted air attack the day before, 3 bombardment divisions of heavies were not able to be called back due to having no dedicated radio channels. He too talks about perpendicular approach being adopted against Bradley's wishes, but his citation is
A Soldier's Story, the aforesaid memoir, so it is not really independent. The point of this statement about lack of radio communication is that forward air controllers were not adding to the effectiveness of the bombing.
Maybe I should stop hijacking the AAR and simply agree that there is arguable evidence in support of the effect, but nothing conclusive. I propose to agree to disagree at this time, unless others wish to continue the debate.
I certainly agree with you that using the 4EB in this role does come with an opportunity cost, and the risk of losses. It is not something that was historically done with much frequency, but I think the limited sample size of historical examples shows that it could have been done more often had the Allies been willing to pay the price.