Islands of Destiny: RA 5.0 Japanese Side

Post descriptions of your brilliant victories and unfortunate defeats here.

Moderators: wdolson, MOD_War-in-the-Pacific-Admirals-Edition

User avatar
Lowpe
Posts: 24582
Joined: Mon Feb 25, 2013 2:25 pm

RE: June 1944

Post by Lowpe »

ORIGINAL: Anachro

7.4.2.3 KAMIKAZES

Once a squadron is converted to Kamikaze, it may only conduct three Mission types – Kamikaze, Training, and Stand Down. The Kamikaze Mission is a variant of the Naval Attack Mission, which of course if successful means unit casualties.

Not true![:)]

I have used them as escorts and CAP and they do fly. I had hoped they were more likely to ram P47 and B24...alas it didn't seem to work.
User avatar
John 3rd
Posts: 17790
Joined: Thu Sep 08, 2005 5:03 pm
Location: La Salle, Colorado

RE: June 1944

Post by John 3rd »

June 8, 1944

A TK TF carrying 56,400 Fuel and 38,400 Oil departs Singapore.

The 1.0^10x6 very slowly moves westwards to Brunei/Miri. It is now near the Puerto Princesa.

Philippines
Over the skies of Luzon 105 Frank/George jump 22 P-38 and beat up that unit then the remaining 88 Japanese Fighters hit a formation of 45 B-29 at Manila. He is using the B-29s to continuously hit places in Luzon and I LIKE that! The net result is a loss of 12 P-38 and 18 B-29. Not bad for a days work.

An ID begins unloading at San Fernando. No contest there. Another ID, 4 more AA units, and supply will be unloading here in about 4 days. These shall be the last reinforcements for Luzon. We'll fight to delay and hold.

The recently laid MF at Batangas SINKS an American DD. NICE!

Pacific
A large convoy picks up an HQ, 2 big Base Forces, and 3 Engineering units at Rabaul. It will haul these bad boys to Saipan and then on from there.

Reinforcement/Supply convoys unloading at Iwo Jima, Naha, and Daito Soho.

Thailand
The roadblock at 57,56 (west of Rahaeng) continues to hold. A series of single unit attacks over the last six days (all very badly mauled by my boys) culminates in a full scale Deliberate Attack today. The result must really disappoint Dan. It is a 1-2 with Japan losing 1.050 Troops and 26 Guns for the Allies 932 Cas, 31 Guns, and 55 Vehicles.

A number of Infantry units are rebuilding in Bangkok currently. My one and ONLY ID has gone from an AV of 98 to over 300 in two weeks. Given another week, I can begin redeploying these units to build a real defensive line. We'll see if that happens.



Image

Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.
Mike Dubost
Posts: 268
Joined: Sun Aug 24, 2008 6:40 pm
Location: Sacramento, CA

RE: May 1944

Post by Mike Dubost »

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

ORIGINAL: Aurorus

ORIGINAL: JohnDillworth

full stop. the complaint was that 4EB were not operationally used to bomb ground troops. John said he was fine with 2EB, but 4 EB should not be allowed. I called BS. 4EB can, and were, and should be, allowed to bomb troops. There track record is short...but it certainly happened to great effect.

Allied generals were concerned with the inaccuracy of the 4 engine bombers as close support bombers, not the effectiveness of 4 EBs on ground troops. Everyone acknowledged that they were very effective against ground troops.

That 4 EB were not used frequently against ground troops in WWII has more to do with allied strategic decisions than the aircraft capabiities. The allies chose to use them against airbases, railheads, and industry. There is no reason that an allied player in WiTP should be bound by this strategic decision, just as the Japanese player should not be forced to send 4 of his carriers half way across the Pacific blind in support of an invasion of an insignificant atoll.

In my opinion, the game engine handles all aspects of the airwar very well. That is just my opinion. If I did not think so, I would not enjoy the game.

Everyone points to the single big example of Cobra for 4EB. How about the massive 'friendly fire' casualties that happened in several the Bocage attacks there. Didn't the army lose a 3-Star General who went to watch and got killed when they bombed short?

Simple reality, as alluded to earlier, is that the game engine simply cannot handle it.

EX: June 5th Turn just run in Dan and I's game. A 32 plane Liberator attack at Batangas against troops in Sz-4 Forts, not moving, two AA units present, and CAP. Result: 1 Liberator shot down, 11 Damaged to AA/Fighters, and 404 Japanese Cas on the ground.


Well, at the risk of beating a dead horse, I would like to point out a fact that no one has mentioned yet. While it is true that Leslie McNair (the highest ranking American casualty of the ETO) was killed, this was partly due to the approach.
In his memoirs, General Bradley spoke about the friendly fire issue. His statement (note, I have not seen this in detail elsewhere, so be advised it is one credible source only) was that he had planned to have the bombers approach along the front. The Army Air Corps over-ruled him and insisted that it had to be perpendicular to the front. My recollection is that he stated that he never wanted to have another carpet bombing mission that came in perpendicular to the front, not necessarily no carpet bombing at all.
Please consider that when objecting to the example of Cobra. Could the planners of other missions have agreed to a perpendicular approach? Yes, possibly. Would it have made the bombing as effective as you see in game? I don't have enough knowledge of the technology of the time to say.
Aurorus
Posts: 1314
Joined: Mon May 26, 2014 5:08 pm

RE: May 1944

Post by Aurorus »

ORIGINAL: Mike Dubost

Well, at the risk of beating a dead horse, I would like to point out a fact that no one has mentioned yet. While it is true that Leslie McNair (the highest ranking American casualty of the ETO) was killed, this was partly due to the approach.
In his memoirs, General Bradley spoke about the friendly fire issue. His statement (note, I have not seen this in detail elsewhere, so be advised it is one credible source only) was that he had planned to have the bombers approach along the front. The Army Air Corps over-ruled him and insisted that it had to be perpendicular to the front. My recollection is that he stated that he never wanted to have another carpet bombing mission that came in perpendicular to the front, not necessarily no carpet bombing at all.
Please consider that when objecting to the example of Cobra. Could the planners of other missions have agreed to a perpendicular approach? Yes, possibly. Would it have made the bombing as effective as you see in game? I don't have enough knowledge of the technology of the time to say.


As I mentioned, Cobra is probably not comparable for a number of reasons, especially in that in Cobra the 4 EBs were used in close support. Using 4 EBs to bomb rear echelon positions, which is more comparable to what John experienced here, was commonplace in the Asian theater, especially in Burma, and the casualty estimates that the WiTP is generating are very much in line with those reported in these types of missions.

The allies did not do this more frequently, because they used the 4 EBs more frequently to establish air superiority by hitting Japanese airfields. That is also why the allies did not make a habit of losing 18 B-29s in one raid to 100 Japanese fighters. There is a tradeoff for all things. If the allies want to use their 4 EBs to attack ground troops and not to establish air superiority, they must expect to take heavy 4 EB loses.
MechFO
Posts: 864
Joined: Fri Jun 01, 2007 4:06 am

RE: May 1944

Post by MechFO »

ORIGINAL: Mike Dubost

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

ORIGINAL: Aurorus




Allied generals were concerned with the inaccuracy of the 4 engine bombers as close support bombers, not the effectiveness of 4 EBs on ground troops. Everyone acknowledged that they were very effective against ground troops.

That 4 EB were not used frequently against ground troops in WWII has more to do with allied strategic decisions than the aircraft capabiities. The allies chose to use them against airbases, railheads, and industry. There is no reason that an allied player in WiTP should be bound by this strategic decision, just as the Japanese player should not be forced to send 4 of his carriers half way across the Pacific blind in support of an invasion of an insignificant atoll.

In my opinion, the game engine handles all aspects of the airwar very well. That is just my opinion. If I did not think so, I would not enjoy the game.

Everyone points to the single big example of Cobra for 4EB. How about the massive 'friendly fire' casualties that happened in several the Bocage attacks there. Didn't the army lose a 3-Star General who went to watch and got killed when they bombed short?

Simple reality, as alluded to earlier, is that the game engine simply cannot handle it.

EX: June 5th Turn just run in Dan and I's game. A 32 plane Liberator attack at Batangas against troops in Sz-4 Forts, not moving, two AA units present, and CAP. Result: 1 Liberator shot down, 11 Damaged to AA/Fighters, and 404 Japanese Cas on the ground.


Well, at the risk of beating a dead horse, I would like to point out a fact that no one has mentioned yet. While it is true that Leslie McNair (the highest ranking American casualty of the ETO) was killed, this was partly due to the approach.
In his memoirs, General Bradley spoke about the friendly fire issue. His statement (note, I have not seen this in detail elsewhere, so be advised it is one credible source only) was that he had planned to have the bombers approach along the front. The Army Air Corps over-ruled him and insisted that it had to be perpendicular to the front. My recollection is that he stated that he never wanted to have another carpet bombing mission that came in perpendicular to the front, not necessarily no carpet bombing at all.
Please consider that when objecting to the example of Cobra. Could the planners of other missions have agreed to a perpendicular approach? Yes, possibly. Would it have made the bombing as effective as you see in game? I don't have enough knowledge of the technology of the time to say.

That was Bradley whitewashing. Army (meaning Bradley) was pushing for extremely close safety distances, a mile or so. Air Force wanted 5, ended up compromising on 2 or 3. Perpendicular probably would have been worse because it made navigation much more difficult.

In practice CAS FB's etc. did try to fly perpendicular, but usual problems of accurate air navigation, target identification etc. meant even they caused FF.

In the end the got it right with QUEEN, but that was with much bigger safety distances and again, marginal results for considering the resources invested.
MechFO
Posts: 864
Joined: Fri Jun 01, 2007 4:06 am

RE: May 1944

Post by MechFO »

ORIGINAL: Aurorus

ORIGINAL: Mike Dubost

Well, at the risk of beating a dead horse, I would like to point out a fact that no one has mentioned yet. While it is true that Leslie McNair (the highest ranking American casualty of the ETO) was killed, this was partly due to the approach.
In his memoirs, General Bradley spoke about the friendly fire issue. His statement (note, I have not seen this in detail elsewhere, so be advised it is one credible source only) was that he had planned to have the bombers approach along the front. The Army Air Corps over-ruled him and insisted that it had to be perpendicular to the front. My recollection is that he stated that he never wanted to have another carpet bombing mission that came in perpendicular to the front, not necessarily no carpet bombing at all.
Please consider that when objecting to the example of Cobra. Could the planners of other missions have agreed to a perpendicular approach? Yes, possibly. Would it have made the bombing as effective as you see in game? I don't have enough knowledge of the technology of the time to say.


As I mentioned, Cobra is probably not comparable for a number of reasons, especially in that in Cobra the 4 EBs were used in close support. Using 4 EBs to bomb rear echelon positions, which is more comparable to what John experienced here, was commonplace in the Asian theater, especially in Burma, and the casualty estimates that the WiTP is generating are very much in line with those reported in these types of missions.

The allies did not do this more frequently, because they used the 4 EBs more frequently to establish air superiority by hitting Japanese airfields. That is also why the allies did not make a habit of losing 18 B-29s in one raid to 100 Japanese fighters. There is a tradeoff for all things. If the allies want to use their 4 EBs to attack ground troops and not to establish air superiority, they must expect to take heavy 4 EB loses.

Your "source" being a straight reprint of period dispatches without any cross checking or correlating. Rule of thumb, divide reported losses by a factor of anything from 3 to 10 to reach something that might be accurate. And that's for relatively easily counted items such as AFV's or planes.

Casualty figures by their nature are even harder to count so the range of mistakes will probably be even higher.
User avatar
John 3rd
Posts: 17790
Joined: Thu Sep 08, 2005 5:03 pm
Location: La Salle, Colorado

RE: May 1944

Post by John 3rd »

Thanks for remembering that it was Leslie McNair. Could not remember his name whatsoever. Appreciate it!
Image

Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.
User avatar
Lowpe
Posts: 24582
Joined: Mon Feb 25, 2013 2:25 pm

RE: June 1944

Post by Lowpe »

I just wanted to say well done with the fuel oil shipments.[&o]
User avatar
John 3rd
Posts: 17790
Joined: Thu Sep 08, 2005 5:03 pm
Location: La Salle, Colorado

RE: June 1944

Post by John 3rd »

Here is to HOPING we can get a couple more thru. It all depends on where his Fleet is moving to.

Have staged a bit of a surprise. He has been reconning CRB and Saigon continuously and I have purposefully left them as inviting targets. What he doesn't know is that I have two full strength ID and 3 Brigades in central to northern Indochina all in Strategic Mode. They are ready to move. If he shows any sign of moving towards the coast then they move into the two areas listed above and get ready to fight. Since both of these locations have plenty of supply and Forts-4 or higher, I really hope to shock him and make a landing very costly. Perhaps we could even crush on of his rambling landings.

Sort of like fishing and dangling that bait...
Image

Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.
Aurorus
Posts: 1314
Joined: Mon May 26, 2014 5:08 pm

RE: May 1944

Post by Aurorus »

ORIGINAL: MechFO

Your "source" being a straight reprint of period dispatches without any cross checking or correlating. Rule of thumb, divide reported losses by a factor of anything from 3 to 10 to reach something that might be accurate. And that's for relatively easily counted items such as AFV's or planes.

Casualty figures by their nature are even harder to count so the range of mistakes will probably be even higher.

My source is Grehan and Mace, who have publised extensively on the second world war. Their sources are the actual After Action Reports. When you open your combat report, that is what you are seeing... an After Action Report... that is designed... even in the graphics, to look like a WWII After Action Report. There is even a typewriter sound.

If you want to corroborate allied After Action Reports with those of the Japanese, you will at pains to do so. The Japanese war archives are scattered and partial. As with Germany, many documents were destroyed, both by the axis government figures and in the general destruction of Germany and Japan in the final years of the war. Keep in mind that most of the history of the war, until fairly recently, was based almost exclusively on allied After Action Reports. It was only about 20 years ago that an Englishman, who was a colleague of mine at the time at university, wrote the first history of the Normandy campaign that used both German and English-language sources. It was his doctorial dissertation, and I believe is now a published book.
MechFO
Posts: 864
Joined: Fri Jun 01, 2007 4:06 am

RE: May 1944

Post by MechFO »

ORIGINAL: Aurorus

ORIGINAL: MechFO

Your "source" being a straight reprint of period dispatches without any cross checking or correlating. Rule of thumb, divide reported losses by a factor of anything from 3 to 10 to reach something that might be accurate. And that's for relatively easily counted items such as AFV's or planes.

Casualty figures by their nature are even harder to count so the range of mistakes will probably be even higher.

My source is Grehan and Mace, who have publised extensively on the second world war. Their sources are the actual After Action Reports. When you open your combat report, that is what you are seeing... an After Action Report... that is designed... even in the graphics, to look like a WWII After Action Report. There is even a typewriter sound.

straight from amazon:

Despatches in this volume include Air Operations in Burma and Bay of Bengal 1 January to 22 May 1942 by General Wavell, the despatch on air operations in South-East Asia November 1943 to May 1944, by Air Chief Marshal Sir R.E.C. Peirse, the despatch on air operations in South-East Asia from June 1944 to May 1945, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, and the despatch on air operations in South East Asia between May 1945 and September 1945, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park.

This unique collection of original documents will prove to be an invaluable resource for historians, students and all those interested in what was one of the most significant periods in British military history.

Published normally implies more than simple reprinting of somebody else's documents.
ORIGINAL: Aurorus
If you want to corroborate allied After Action Reports with those of the Japanese, you will at pains to do so. The Japanese war archives are scattered and partial. As with Germany, many documents were destroyed, both by the axis government figures and in the general destruction of Germany and Japan in the final years of the war. Keep in mind that most of the history of the war, until fairly recently, was based almost exclusively on allied After Action Reports. It was only about 20 years ago that an Englishman, who was a colleague of mine at the time at university, wrote the first history of the Normandy campaign that used both German and English-language sources. It was his doctorial dissertation, and I believe is now a published book.

So you agree you base your opinion of effectiveness on reports that without fail have been shown to have massively overestimated damage inflicted in each and every case where such reports have been cross checked. Thank you.
User avatar
Chickenboy
Posts: 24648
Joined: Fri Jun 28, 2002 11:30 pm
Location: San Antonio, TX

RE: May 1944

Post by Chickenboy »

My opinion is that we are arguing by degrees. Allied "close air support" involving P-47s, P-51s and other close support aircraft (mostly on the Western Front) was very helpful in scouting Allied flanks, attacking enemy communication columns and also attacking enemy concentrations while in contact with friendly Allied troops. Several high-level autobiographies cite the value of this support in exploiting static positions.

Generally further back were the (IMO understated) 2EB massed attacks. Mostly tactical in nature, B-26, A-26, B-25 and the like were effective in interdicting marshalling yards, train yards, heavily used roads, port facilities, etc. Typically these actions were several miles behind the lines of advancing troops.

Massed application of 4EBs was done only a handful of times in the tactical "close support" model. Both times during Cobra resulted in unacceptably high friendly ground casualties. These casualties have been counted, verified and recorded. Less verifiable were enemy (read: German) ground casualties. But these were by any standards-at least locally-extremely high.

From a pure military perspective: the bombing was effective, but at a high 'friendly' cost. If I recall correctly, the Allied brass (SHAEF-Europe) forswore further use of this approach (4EB bombers used as "tactical close air support") due to friendly casualties.

So-in the game how would that translate? We all recognize that Allied 4EBs are 'overused' compared to historical in theatre. I'm OK with that-Japanese 3rd and 4th generation fighters are tremendously overused compared to historical, so these 'cancel each other out' in my book.

I don't have a problem with Allies using 4EBs on enemy ground troop targets as part of a concerted effort to break through fixed lines in general. But-to retain realism-the game should code for friendly casualties or the Allies should voluntarily limit the practice to keep with reality. As it stands now, the game will not code for *any* Allied casualties from ahistoric massed application of 4EBs in this role. And some Allied players seem to think that they have mastered the fog of war of communications between ground troops and air force pilots dropping from 10,000+ feet. Just because the game doesn't 'punish' that behavior doesn't mean that the game (or the player) is dealing with it realistically or 'fairly'.

Is it 'gamey'? Does it need a house rule? Meh. It's not the 'hill I want to die on' as far as the game is concerned. I'd probably make my point to my opponent and leave it at that.

Oh-and then find a way to stack that hex with EVERY.STINKING.FIGHTER.I.HAVE.WITH.CANNONS. Turn it into a charnel house of 'Sweinfurt kicked up a notch' casualties and he'll reduce the use of the 4EBs in such a role. Because he'll run out of 4EBs.

Don't forget that each 4EB counts as 2 VPs. [8D]
Image
User avatar
MakeeLearn
Posts: 4274
Joined: Sun Sep 11, 2016 1:01 pm

RE: May 1944

Post by MakeeLearn »

"A War of Their Own: Bombers over the Southwest Pacific"


Download






User avatar
Lowpe
Posts: 24582
Joined: Mon Feb 25, 2013 2:25 pm

RE: May 1944

Post by Lowpe »

Chickenboy, I agree with your sentiments. Too often we lose sight that this game operates pretty much as an abstraction.
User avatar
Ol_Dog
Posts: 312
Joined: Sat Feb 22, 2003 11:50 pm
Location: Southern Illinois

RE: May 1944

Post by Ol_Dog »

My Father's Bombardment Group (H), flew B-24s from Italy Jan 1944 to April 1945 - 245 missions. According to their records, they flew troop support to Velletri, Anzio, Cassino, Piombino, and Subiaco. They flew Genoa and Toulon gun positions and Frejus beach area. Also troop concentrations at Podgorica and Novi Pazar. Then in April 1945 they listed 4 days ground support in Italy at Area Able and Area Baker. That is about 15 missions of 245. The other missions generally were marshalling yards, oil refineries, airfields, aircraft factories, and other factories and rail targets.

According to "their records" the ground support missions were very effective, but that was not why they were there.
Common Sense is an uncommon virtue.
If you think you have everything under control, you don't fully understand the situation.
User avatar
John 3rd
Posts: 17790
Joined: Thu Sep 08, 2005 5:03 pm
Location: La Salle, Colorado

RE: May 1944

Post by John 3rd »

That was well said Poultry Man. We'll see what happens next turn as the troops try to hold Batangas. I've got over 200 fighters scheduled to be on LRCAP at either 15K or 30K. We'll see what happens...
Image

Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.
User avatar
Chickenboy
Posts: 24648
Joined: Fri Jun 28, 2002 11:30 pm
Location: San Antonio, TX

RE: May 1944

Post by Chickenboy »

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

That was well said Poultry Man. We'll see what happens next turn as the troops try to hold Batangas. I've got over 200 fighters scheduled to be on LRCAP at either 15K or 30K. We'll see what happens...

Gut 'em like a fish, John.
Image
Aurorus
Posts: 1314
Joined: Mon May 26, 2014 5:08 pm

RE: May 1944

Post by Aurorus »

ORIGINAL: MechFO

straight from amazon:

Despatches in this volume include Air Operations in Burma and Bay of Bengal 1 January to 22 May 1942 by General Wavell, the despatch on air operations in South-East Asia November 1943 to May 1944, by Air Chief Marshal Sir R.E.C. Peirse, the despatch on air operations in South-East Asia from June 1944 to May 1945, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, and the despatch on air operations in South East Asia between May 1945 and September 1945, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park.

This unique collection of original documents will prove to be an invaluable resource for historians, students and all those interested in what was one of the most significant periods in British military history.

Published normally implies more than simple reprinting of somebody else's documents.
ORIGINAL: Aurorus
If you want to corroborate allied After Action Reports with those of the Japanese, you will at pains to do so. The Japanese war archives are scattered and partial. As with Germany, many documents were destroyed, both by the axis government figures and in the general destruction of Germany and Japan in the final years of the war. Keep in mind that most of the history of the war, until fairly recently, was based almost exclusively on allied After Action Reports. It was only about 20 years ago that an Englishman, who was a colleague of mine at the time at university, wrote the first history of the Normandy campaign that used both German and English-language sources. It was his doctorial dissertation, and I believe is now a published book.

So you agree you base your opinion of effectiveness on reports that without fail have been shown to have massively overestimated damage inflicted in each and every case where such reports have been cross checked. Thank you.

It is not accurate at all to state that allied After Action Reports "massively overestimated damaged inflicted in each and every case." That is simply not true. You sell the British and American commanders very short in assuming that they solicited or believed grossly exaggerated casualty estimates. In many cases, the allies actually underestimated the effectiveness of their operations.

The people involved in military intelligence and reconnaissance were very good on both the axis and the allied side. This was a different time in history, when people were, in general, more honest. The goal and focus of military intelligence was very different then. It has since become a proving ground for liars and its goals have become political: i.e. weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. At that time, the goal was accuracy, and it was achieved more often than later skeptics and critics admit. This is often the case in the study of history, where future generations assume, with arrogance, their inferiority of their predecessors. In fact, I can tell you that the allied casualty reports for the German forces in Cobra were remarkably accurate.
I don't have a problem with Allies using 4EBs on enemy ground troop targets as part of a concerted effort to break through fixed lines in general. But-to retain realism-the game should code for friendly casualties or the Allies should voluntarily limit the practice to keep with reality. As it stands now, the game will not code for *any* Allied casualties from ahistoric massed application of 4EBs in this role. And some Allied players seem to think that they have mastered the fog of war of communications between ground troops and air force pilots dropping from 10,000+ feet. Just because the game doesn't 'punish' that behavior doesn't mean that the game (or the player) is dealing with it realistically or 'fairly'.

The game is not going to punish the allies for focusing on ground troops. That is the job of Japanese player. I think that 18 B-29s shot down in one day is the "punishment" that you are looking for.
Mike Dubost
Posts: 268
Joined: Sun Aug 24, 2008 6:40 pm
Location: Sacramento, CA

RE: May 1944

Post by Mike Dubost »

ORIGINAL: Aurorus

ORIGINAL: Mike Dubost

Well, at the risk of beating a dead horse, I would like to point out a fact that no one has mentioned yet. While it is true that Leslie McNair (the highest ranking American casualty of the ETO) was killed, this was partly due to the approach.
In his memoirs, General Bradley spoke about the friendly fire issue. His statement (note, I have not seen this in detail elsewhere, so be advised it is one credible source only) was that he had planned to have the bombers approach along the front. The Army Air Corps over-ruled him and insisted that it had to be perpendicular to the front. My recollection is that he stated that he never wanted to have another carpet bombing mission that came in perpendicular to the front, not necessarily no carpet bombing at all.
Please consider that when objecting to the example of Cobra. Could the planners of other missions have agreed to a perpendicular approach? Yes, possibly. Would it have made the bombing as effective as you see in game? I don't have enough knowledge of the technology of the time to say.


As I mentioned, Cobra is probably not comparable for a number of reasons, especially in that in Cobra the 4 EBs were used in close support. Using 4 EBs to bomb rear echelon positions, which is more comparable to what John experienced here, was commonplace in the Asian theater, especially in Burma, and the casualty estimates that the WiTP is generating are very much in line with those reported in these types of missions.

The allies did not do this more frequently, because they used the 4 EBs more frequently to establish air superiority by hitting Japanese airfields. That is also why the allies did not make a habit of losing 18 B-29s in one raid to 100 Japanese fighters. There is a tradeoff for all things. If the allies want to use their 4 EBs to attack ground troops and not to establish air superiority, they must expect to take heavy 4 EB loses.

Well, I had meant to mostly address the issue of friendly fire as a counter-argument to the analogy. My apologies for not being clear in that respect.
That being said, I am not sure that the distinction of close air support versus more distant targets is significant. I am re-reading Eisenhower's Lieutenants by Russell Weigly, and in his section on Cobra, he mentions in the aborted air attack the day before, 3 bombardment divisions of heavies were not able to be called back due to having no dedicated radio channels. He too talks about perpendicular approach being adopted against Bradley's wishes, but his citation is A Soldier's Story, the aforesaid memoir, so it is not really independent. The point of this statement about lack of radio communication is that forward air controllers were not adding to the effectiveness of the bombing.
Maybe I should stop hijacking the AAR and simply agree that there is arguable evidence in support of the effect, but nothing conclusive. I propose to agree to disagree at this time, unless others wish to continue the debate.
I certainly agree with you that using the 4EB in this role does come with an opportunity cost, and the risk of losses. It is not something that was historically done with much frequency, but I think the limited sample size of historical examples shows that it could have been done more often had the Allies been willing to pay the price.
Mike Dubost
Posts: 268
Joined: Sun Aug 24, 2008 6:40 pm
Location: Sacramento, CA

RE: May 1944

Post by Mike Dubost »

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

Thanks for remembering that it was Leslie McNair. Could not remember his name whatsoever. Appreciate it!

You're welcome. By the way, I realized today that I misspelled Lesley McNair's first name. Sigh, I automatically typed it like a former co-worker spelled it.
Post Reply

Return to “After Action Reports”