What Book Are You Reading at the moment?

[warspite1]

Thanks. May wait for reviews of this too to see exactly what he is covering, although the guy seems to have the bone fides.

[Greybriar]

The She-Wolf of France by Maurice Druon. It is book 5 of The Accursed Kings series.

[reg113]

Just started "The Fleet at Flood Tide".

[ncc1701e]

This one I recommend if you are interested by urban warfare:

L'ultime champ de bataille
by Frédéric Chamaud and Pierre Santoni

Here is the link:
http://www.editionspierredetaillac.com/ ... e-bataille

[Skeleton]

https://www.amazon.com/Peloponnesian-Wa ... 0142004375

Great, concise, well written history.

[wings7]

ORIGINAL: Marcus the leper

https://www.amazon.com/Peloponnesian-Wa ... 0142004375

Great, concise, well written history.

Excellent! [:)]

[cpdeyoung]

It is an excellent book, holding an honored place on my bookshelf.

For more Kagan I recommend : http://oyc.yale.edu/classics/clcv-205

A review of Greek civilization and a great course to watch.

Chuck

[wings7]

ORIGINAL: cpdeyoung

It is an excellent book, holding an honored place on my bookshelf.

For more Kagan I recommend : http://oyc.yale.edu/classics/clcv-205

A review of Greek civilization and a great course to watch.

Chuck

Thanks for the link! [:)]

[RFalvo69]

"Bitter Victory" by Carlo d'Este.

I'm reading it while playing OCS Sicily II on the gaming table. Quite the experience [:)]

[Ranger33]

The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. I'm actually listening to the audio book, which is 57 hours long!

I'm just now getting to the invasion of Poland, but I've learned so much history that I did not know before. Particularly just how insane Nazi Germany was even before the war started, and how badly Chamberlain screwed things up. I never knew that Czechoslovakia had such a strong military force available to fight the Germans (according to the book, 35 well trained and equipped divisions defending a heavily fortified border), but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment.

[wings7]

ORIGINAL: Ranger33

The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. I'm actually listening to the audio book, which is 57 hours long!

I'm just now getting to the invasion of Poland, but I've learned so much history that I did not know before. Particularly just how insane Nazi Germany was even before the war started, and how badly Chamberlain screwed things up. I never knew that Czechoslovakia had such a strong military force available to fight the Germans (according to the book, 35 well trained and equipped divisions defending a heavily fortified border), but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment.

William Shirer was a great writer, "Rise and Fall..." is a must read for any WWII devotee! [:)]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Ranger33

....and how badly Chamberlain screwed things up......but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment.

warspite1

I think that stating ‘how badly Chamberlain screwed things up’ is somewhat unfair. Less so is ‘but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment’, as yes, I think it is fair to say that this was not Britain and France’s finest hour. But having said that, was the situation really that black and white?

Firstly, to suggest someone screwed something up means that, with the benefit of hindsight (and sometimes even without it) it is clear that another, definitely more advantageous decision to a problem could have been taken. I don’t think that is necessarily the case here, and also ignores the situation in Britain and France in those dark days of the late 30’s.

Yes, with hindsight, knowing what actually happened, it is tempting to think about what may have been. But in doing so we cannot know for certain what would have resulted from the British and French drawing a line in the sand over Czechoslovakia rather than Poland.

Firstly, it needs to be acknowledged that both the British and French premiers were leaders of democratic nations – two nations that had suffered hugely in the First World War – and where public opinion mattered. A government’s first responsibility is to its own people and, quite simply, there was no appetite for war in either country. The post war years were incredibly tough with economic depression, mass unemployment and civil strife blighting the landscape – against that backdrop, asking the people of Britain and France to go to war over a country most could not even place on a map was no easy option. The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia.

In addition to this of course is the growing support that Germany had over the Treaty of Versailles terms. There was a feeling amongst many at the time that the treaty terms were too harsh. This led to a broad consensus that some of those terms needed to be undone in fairness to the German people and in order to avoid future war. Until Hitler took over the rump Czech state in March 1939, what had been conceded to Germany largely involved territory that was either German or had a majority German population. In other words, for the sake of peace, the democracies were bending over backwards to treat Germany ‘fairly’.

With regard to what was on offer, just about everything was on the table – but what Chamberlain in particular did not understand was that Hitler was not like any ordinary politician; what Hitler wanted was not possible to allow. It is difficult to lay too much blame at Chamberlain’s door for not recognising this given the list of people that Hitler fooled – including the German politicians that put him in power in the first place, a large portion of the German electorate and even Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!

Whatever conclusions are drawn from analysing other options that may have been open to Chamberlain and Daladier, it needs to be understood that these two gentlemen, and their governments, were trying to do the best they could in what were pretty unenviable circumstances. And while it is easy to say now what could or should have happened, the reality is that these were colossally high stakes being played for and both Chamberlain and Daladier need to be cut some slack in that regard.

So having said that, was the decision to give the Sudetenland to Germany the best option open to the Western governments? Well as said – and certainly with hindsight - it was a pretty awful thing as it paved the way for the carve-up of the country. But it’s impossible to know whether an alternative would have been better for certain isn’t it? As soon as the historical path is diverted from, all elements are subject to change.

The argument goes that Chamberlain screwed up because the German Army was weaker in 1938, the Czechoslovak Army was strong (with decent border defences) and there was no German-Soviet agreement. If the Germans struggled to beat the Czechs the Western Allies and maybe the Poles would join forces and attack the Germans from three sides. Maybe too, Hitler is overthrown by the Army and the full horrors of WWII and the holocaust are avoided. Simple.

Maybe. But that assumes a lot.

Maybe things would have panned out differently. For one thing, the German Army was weaker yes – but so were the British and French armies. Having declared war over Poland in 1939, neither was in any state to launch an offensive against the German Army. The plan was therefore to sit behind the Maginot Line and wait. Why would that be any different in 1938 when the British could provide even less of an army? The French army was deficient in many areas in 1940 – it was no better off in 1938. Well the Czechs in 1938 may have been more formidable than the Poles in 1939. Again, maybe. This is not something that can be proved one way or the other, and nor is how the Soviets would have reacted to this unfolding drama. The Soviets could have still come to an agreement with Hitler. Even if not, they could not come to the aid of the Czechs as Poland would never have allowed Soviet soldiers on Polish soil as we know from the pre-war negotiations between the Western Allies and the Soviets in 1939. Whether the Soviets got involved at all therefore cannot be known. Finally there is the tantalising prospect that the German General Staff would have launched a coup the moment Case Green was given the go ahead. Again there is no guarantee that this would have been carried out – or that it would have been successful.

In conclusion I think that on balance it is probably more likely than not that the British and French refusing to back down over the Sudetenland would have been better than the action actually taken. But in saying that I recognise that there are no guarantees and the case for an alternative, and less successful outcome for the Allies, can be made. I have a lot of sympathy for the Western leaders in the 1930’s. I think Chamberlain and Daladier were good men who were dealt a really poor hand but did what they thought was right and for the right reasons. If they ‘screwed up’ it was against that backdrop and they deserve understanding not opprobrium.

[wings7]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Ranger33

....and how badly Chamberlain screwed things up......but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment.

warspite1

I think that stating ‘how badly Chamberlain screwed things up’ is somewhat unfair. Less so is ‘but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment’, as yes, I think it is fair to say that this was not Britain and France’s finest hour. But having said that, was the situation really that black and white?

Firstly, to suggest someone screwed something up means that, with the benefit of hindsight (and sometimes even without it) it is clear that another, definitely more advantageous decision to a problem could have been taken. I don’t think that is necessarily the case here, and also ignores the situation in Britain and France in those dark days of the late 30’s.

Yes, with hindsight, knowing what actually happened, it is tempting to think about what may have been. But in doing so we cannot know for certain what would have resulted from the British and French drawing a line in the sand over Czechoslovakia rather than Poland.

Firstly, it needs to be acknowledged that both the British and French premiers were leaders of democratic nations – two nations that had suffered hugely in the First World War – and where public opinion mattered. A government’s first responsibility is to its own people and, quite simply, there was no appetite for war in either country. The post war years were incredibly tough with economic depression, mass unemployment and civil strife blighting the landscape – against that backdrop, asking the people of Britain and France to go to war over a country most could not even place on a map was no easy option. The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia.

In addition to this of course is the growing support that Germany had over the Treaty of Versailles terms. There was a feeling amongst many at the time that the treaty terms were too harsh. This led to a broad consensus that some of those terms needed to be undone in fairness to the German people and in order to avoid future war. Until Hitler took over the rump Czech state in March 1939, what had been conceded to Germany largely involved territory that was either German or had a majority German population. In other words, for the sake of peace, the democracies were bending over backwards to treat Germany ‘fairly’.

With regard to what was on offer, just about everything was on the table – but what Chamberlain in particular did not understand was that Hitler was not like any ordinary politician; what Hitler wanted was not possible to allow. It is difficult to lay too much blame at Chamberlain’s door for not recognising this given the list of people that Hitler fooled – including the German politicians that put him in power in the first place, a large portion of the German electorate and even Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!

Whatever conclusions are drawn from analysing other options that may have been open to Chamberlain and Daladier, it needs to be understood that these two gentlemen, and their governments, were trying to do the best they could in what were pretty unenviable circumstances. And while it is easy to say now what could or should have happened, the reality is that these were colossally high stakes being played for and both Chamberlain and Daladier need to be cut some slack in that regard.

So having said that, was the decision to give the Sudetenland to Germany the best option open to the Western governments? Well as said – and certainly with hindsight - it was a pretty awful thing as it paved the way for the carve-up of the country. But it’s impossible to know whether an alternative would have been better for certain isn’t it? As soon as the historical path is diverted from, all elements are subject to change.

The argument goes that Chamberlain screwed up because the German Army was weaker in 1938, the Czechoslovak Army was strong (with decent border defences) and there was no German-Soviet agreement. If the Germans struggled to beat the Czechs the Western Allies and maybe the Poles would join forces and attack the Germans from three sides. Maybe too, Hitler is overthrown by the Army and the full horrors of WWII and the holocaust are avoided. Simple.

Maybe. But that assumes a lot.

Maybe things would have panned out differently. For one thing, the German Army was weaker yes – but so were the British and French armies. Having declared war over Poland in 1939, neither was in any state to launch an offensive against the German Army. The plan was therefore to sit behind the Maginot Line and wait. Why would that be any different in 1938 when the British could provide even less of an army? The French army was deficient in many areas in 1940 – it was no better off in 1938. Well the Czechs in 1938 may have been more formidable than the Poles in 1939. Again, maybe. This is not something that can be proved one way or the other, and nor is how the Soviets would have reacted to this unfolding drama. The Soviets could have still come to an agreement with Hitler. Even if not, they could not come to the aid of the Czechs as Poland would never have allowed Soviet soldiers on Polish soil as we know from the pre-war negotiations between the Western Allies and the Soviets in 1939. Whether the Soviets got involved at all therefore cannot be known. Finally there is the tantalising prospect that the German General Staff would have launched a coup the moment Case Green was given the go ahead. Again there is no guarantee that this would have been carried out – or that it would have been successful.

In conclusion I think that on balance it is probably more likely than not that the British and French refusing to back down over the Sudetenland would have been better than the action actually taken. But in saying that I recognise that there are no guarantees and the case for an alternative, and less successful outcome for the Allies, can be made. I have a lot of sympathy for the Western leaders in the 1930’s. I think Chamberlain and Daladier were good men who were dealt a really poor hand but did what they thought was right and for the right reasons. If they ‘screwed up’ it was against that backdrop and they deserve understanding not opprobrium.

Excellent post Robert! A question and a statement for you:
Question: Could you elaborate and/or source, "The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia."
Statement: "Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!". Time's 'Man of the Year' does not always translate to 'good or right', it also applies to 'impact (and the like)' to and in the world.

Keep up these posts Robert, absolutely enjoyable and enlightening! [:)]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: wings7

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Ranger33

....and how badly Chamberlain screwed things up......but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment.

warspite1

I think that stating ‘how badly Chamberlain screwed things up’ is somewhat unfair. Less so is ‘but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment’, as yes, I think it is fair to say that this was not Britain and France’s finest hour. But having said that, was the situation really that black and white?

Firstly, to suggest someone screwed something up means that, with the benefit of hindsight (and sometimes even without it) it is clear that another, definitely more advantageous decision to a problem could have been taken. I don’t think that is necessarily the case here, and also ignores the situation in Britain and France in those dark days of the late 30’s.

Yes, with hindsight, knowing what actually happened, it is tempting to think about what may have been. But in doing so we cannot know for certain what would have resulted from the British and French drawing a line in the sand over Czechoslovakia rather than Poland.

Firstly, it needs to be acknowledged that both the British and French premiers were leaders of democratic nations – two nations that had suffered hugely in the First World War – and where public opinion mattered. A government’s first responsibility is to its own people and, quite simply, there was no appetite for war in either country. The post war years were incredibly tough with economic depression, mass unemployment and civil strife blighting the landscape – against that backdrop, asking the people of Britain and France to go to war over a country most could not even place on a map was no easy option. The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia.

In addition to this of course is the growing support that Germany had over the Treaty of Versailles terms. There was a feeling amongst many at the time that the treaty terms were too harsh. This led to a broad consensus that some of those terms needed to be undone in fairness to the German people and in order to avoid future war. Until Hitler took over the rump Czech state in March 1939, what had been conceded to Germany largely involved territory that was either German or had a majority German population. In other words, for the sake of peace, the democracies were bending over backwards to treat Germany ‘fairly’.

With regard to what was on offer, just about everything was on the table – but what Chamberlain in particular did not understand was that Hitler was not like any ordinary politician; what Hitler wanted was not possible to allow. It is difficult to lay too much blame at Chamberlain’s door for not recognising this given the list of people that Hitler fooled – including the German politicians that put him in power in the first place, a large portion of the German electorate and even Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!

Whatever conclusions are drawn from analysing other options that may have been open to Chamberlain and Daladier, it needs to be understood that these two gentlemen, and their governments, were trying to do the best they could in what were pretty unenviable circumstances. And while it is easy to say now what could or should have happened, the reality is that these were colossally high stakes being played for and both Chamberlain and Daladier need to be cut some slack in that regard.

So having said that, was the decision to give the Sudetenland to Germany the best option open to the Western governments? Well as said – and certainly with hindsight - it was a pretty awful thing as it paved the way for the carve-up of the country. But it’s impossible to know whether an alternative would have been better for certain isn’t it? As soon as the historical path is diverted from, all elements are subject to change.

The argument goes that Chamberlain screwed up because the German Army was weaker in 1938, the Czechoslovak Army was strong (with decent border defences) and there was no German-Soviet agreement. If the Germans struggled to beat the Czechs the Western Allies and maybe the Poles would join forces and attack the Germans from three sides. Maybe too, Hitler is overthrown by the Army and the full horrors of WWII and the holocaust are avoided. Simple.

Maybe. But that assumes a lot.

Maybe things would have panned out differently. For one thing, the German Army was weaker yes – but so were the British and French armies. Having declared war over Poland in 1939, neither was in any state to launch an offensive against the German Army. The plan was therefore to sit behind the Maginot Line and wait. Why would that be any different in 1938 when the British could provide even less of an army? The French army was deficient in many areas in 1940 – it was no better off in 1938. Well the Czechs in 1938 may have been more formidable than the Poles in 1939. Again, maybe. This is not something that can be proved one way or the other, and nor is how the Soviets would have reacted to this unfolding drama. The Soviets could have still come to an agreement with Hitler. Even if not, they could not come to the aid of the Czechs as Poland would never have allowed Soviet soldiers on Polish soil as we know from the pre-war negotiations between the Western Allies and the Soviets in 1939. Whether the Soviets got involved at all therefore cannot be known. Finally there is the tantalising prospect that the German General Staff would have launched a coup the moment Case Green was given the go ahead. Again there is no guarantee that this would have been carried out – or that it would have been successful.

In conclusion I think that on balance it is probably more likely than not that the British and French refusing to back down over the Sudetenland would have been better than the action actually taken. But in saying that I recognise that there are no guarantees and the case for an alternative, and less successful outcome for the Allies, can be made. I have a lot of sympathy for the Western leaders in the 1930’s. I think Chamberlain and Daladier were good men who were dealt a really poor hand but did what they thought was right and for the right reasons. If they ‘screwed up’ it was against that backdrop and they deserve understanding not opprobrium.

Excellent post Robert! A question and a statement for you:
Question: Could you elaborate and/or source, "The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia."
Statement: "Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!". Time's 'Man of the Year' does not always translate to 'good or right', it also applies to 'impact (and the like)' to and in the world.

Keep up these posts Robert, absolutely enjoyable and enlightening! [:)]

warspite1

Patrick there is reference to South Africa and Canada's position in Chamberlain and Appeasement (RAC Parker). That this view was supported by the other Dominions I recall from a TV documentary - but sadly cannot remember which one. I don't think it was The World at War though. If I find it I will let you know.

[Ranger33]

warspite1, thank you for the detailed take on the topic! Yes, I was probably a bit too harsh there. As you say, it's difficult to put ourselves in their place, knowing what happened as a result. However, I had always been under the impression that Hitler rolled over all of these minor nations because they were defenseless, but here it was clear that the Germans faced an opponent with teeth. Then all of the other powers came in and pressured Czechoslovakia to surrender, removing a military force that could have threatened Germany otherwise.

In the end though, there is no way of answering what would have happened. Certainly, Hitler shortly proved that he was not afraid of going to war. How long Czechoslovakia could have held out, and whether France and Britain would have taken action in time to make a difference is unknowable. Personally, I doubt that the anti-Hitler generals would have ever launched their coup, despite their later claims.

[wings7]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: wings7

ORIGINAL: warspite1


warspite1

I think that stating ‘how badly Chamberlain screwed things up’ is somewhat unfair. Less so is ‘but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment’, as yes, I think it is fair to say that this was not Britain and France’s finest hour. But having said that, was the situation really that black and white?

Firstly, to suggest someone screwed something up means that, with the benefit of hindsight (and sometimes even without it) it is clear that another, definitely more advantageous decision to a problem could have been taken. I don’t think that is necessarily the case here, and also ignores the situation in Britain and France in those dark days of the late 30’s.

Yes, with hindsight, knowing what actually happened, it is tempting to think about what may have been. But in doing so we cannot know for certain what would have resulted from the British and French drawing a line in the sand over Czechoslovakia rather than Poland.

Firstly, it needs to be acknowledged that both the British and French premiers were leaders of democratic nations – two nations that had suffered hugely in the First World War – and where public opinion mattered. A government’s first responsibility is to its own people and, quite simply, there was no appetite for war in either country. The post war years were incredibly tough with economic depression, mass unemployment and civil strife blighting the landscape – against that backdrop, asking the people of Britain and France to go to war over a country most could not even place on a map was no easy option. The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia.

In addition to this of course is the growing support that Germany had over the Treaty of Versailles terms. There was a feeling amongst many at the time that the treaty terms were too harsh. This led to a broad consensus that some of those terms needed to be undone in fairness to the German people and in order to avoid future war. Until Hitler took over the rump Czech state in March 1939, what had been conceded to Germany largely involved territory that was either German or had a majority German population. In other words, for the sake of peace, the democracies were bending over backwards to treat Germany ‘fairly’.

With regard to what was on offer, just about everything was on the table – but what Chamberlain in particular did not understand was that Hitler was not like any ordinary politician; what Hitler wanted was not possible to allow. It is difficult to lay too much blame at Chamberlain’s door for not recognising this given the list of people that Hitler fooled – including the German politicians that put him in power in the first place, a large portion of the German electorate and even Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!

Whatever conclusions are drawn from analysing other options that may have been open to Chamberlain and Daladier, it needs to be understood that these two gentlemen, and their governments, were trying to do the best they could in what were pretty unenviable circumstances. And while it is easy to say now what could or should have happened, the reality is that these were colossally high stakes being played for and both Chamberlain and Daladier need to be cut some slack in that regard.

So having said that, was the decision to give the Sudetenland to Germany the best option open to the Western governments? Well as said – and certainly with hindsight - it was a pretty awful thing as it paved the way for the carve-up of the country. But it’s impossible to know whether an alternative would have been better for certain isn’t it? As soon as the historical path is diverted from, all elements are subject to change.

The argument goes that Chamberlain screwed up because the German Army was weaker in 1938, the Czechoslovak Army was strong (with decent border defences) and there was no German-Soviet agreement. If the Germans struggled to beat the Czechs the Western Allies and maybe the Poles would join forces and attack the Germans from three sides. Maybe too, Hitler is overthrown by the Army and the full horrors of WWII and the holocaust are avoided. Simple.

Maybe. But that assumes a lot.

Maybe things would have panned out differently. For one thing, the German Army was weaker yes – but so were the British and French armies. Having declared war over Poland in 1939, neither was in any state to launch an offensive against the German Army. The plan was therefore to sit behind the Maginot Line and wait. Why would that be any different in 1938 when the British could provide even less of an army? The French army was deficient in many areas in 1940 – it was no better off in 1938. Well the Czechs in 1938 may have been more formidable than the Poles in 1939. Again, maybe. This is not something that can be proved one way or the other, and nor is how the Soviets would have reacted to this unfolding drama. The Soviets could have still come to an agreement with Hitler. Even if not, they could not come to the aid of the Czechs as Poland would never have allowed Soviet soldiers on Polish soil as we know from the pre-war negotiations between the Western Allies and the Soviets in 1939. Whether the Soviets got involved at all therefore cannot be known. Finally there is the tantalising prospect that the German General Staff would have launched a coup the moment Case Green was given the go ahead. Again there is no guarantee that this would have been carried out – or that it would have been successful.

In conclusion I think that on balance it is probably more likely than not that the British and French refusing to back down over the Sudetenland would have been better than the action actually taken. But in saying that I recognise that there are no guarantees and the case for an alternative, and less successful outcome for the Allies, can be made. I have a lot of sympathy for the Western leaders in the 1930’s. I think Chamberlain and Daladier were good men who were dealt a really poor hand but did what they thought was right and for the right reasons. If they ‘screwed up’ it was against that backdrop and they deserve understanding not opprobrium.

Excellent post Robert! A question and a statement for you:
Question: Could you elaborate and/or source, "The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia."
Statement: "Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!". Time's 'Man of the Year' does not always translate to 'good or right', it also applies to 'impact (and the like)' to and in the world.

Keep up these posts Robert, absolutely enjoyable and enlightening! [:)]

warspite1

Patrick there is reference to South Africa and Canada's position in Chamberlain and Appeasement (RAC Parker). That this view was supported by the other Dominions I recall from a TV documentary - but sadly cannot remember which one. I don't think it was The World at War though. If I find it I will let you know.

Yes if you do find it (TV documentary), please let me know, thanks Robert.

[demyansk]

I just finished a book called "Pleiku" by JD Coleman 1988, Helicopter warfare in Vietnam

Great book along with Hal Moore's books

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: wings7

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: wings7




Excellent post Robert! A question and a statement for you:
Question: Could you elaborate and/or source, "The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia."
Statement: "Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!". Time's 'Man of the Year' does not always translate to 'good or right', it also applies to 'impact (and the like)' to and in the world.

Keep up these posts Robert, absolutely enjoyable and enlightening! [:)]

warspite1

Patrick there is reference to South Africa and Canada's position in Chamberlain and Appeasement (RAC Parker). That this view was supported by the other Dominions I recall from a TV documentary - but sadly cannot remember which one. I don't think it was The World at War though. If I find it I will let you know.

Yes if you do find it (TV documentary), please let me know, thanks Robert.

warspite1

Still cannot recall the documentary but this fits the bill! An extract from Britain and Empire 1880-1945 (Kennedy)

[barkhorn45]

Hitler was furious at chamberlain for appesseing him,he wanted war!

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Ranger33

....and how badly Chamberlain screwed things up......but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment.

warspite1

I think that stating ‘how badly Chamberlain screwed things up’ is somewhat unfair. Less so is ‘but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment’, as yes, I think it is fair to say that this was not Britain and France’s finest hour. But having said that, was the situation really that black and white?

Firstly, to suggest someone screwed something up means that, with the benefit of hindsight (and sometimes even without it) it is clear that another, definitely more advantageous decision to a problem could have been taken. I don’t think that is necessarily the case here, and also ignores the situation in Britain and France in those dark days of the late 30’s.

Yes, with hindsight, knowing what actually happened, it is tempting to think about what may have been. But in doing so we cannot know for certain what would have resulted from the British and French drawing a line in the sand over Czechoslovakia rather than Poland.

Firstly, it needs to be acknowledged that both the British and French premiers were leaders of democratic nations – two nations that had suffered hugely in the First World War – and where public opinion mattered. A government’s first responsibility is to its own people and, quite simply, there was no appetite for war in either country. The post war years were incredibly tough with economic depression, mass unemployment and civil strife blighting the landscape – against that backdrop, asking the people of Britain and France to go to war over a country most could not even place on a map was no easy option. The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia.

In addition to this of course is the growing support that Germany had over the Treaty of Versailles terms. There was a feeling amongst many at the time that the treaty terms were too harsh. This led to a broad consensus that some of those terms needed to be undone in fairness to the German people and in order to avoid future war. Until Hitler took over the rump Czech state in March 1939, what had been conceded to Germany largely involved territory that was either German or had a majority German population. In other words, for the sake of peace, the democracies were bending over backwards to treat Germany ‘fairly’.

With regard to what was on offer, just about everything was on the table – but what Chamberlain in particular did not understand was that Hitler was not like any ordinary politician; what Hitler wanted was not possible to allow. It is difficult to lay too much blame at Chamberlain’s door for not recognising this given the list of people that Hitler fooled – including the German politicians that put him in power in the first place, a large portion of the German electorate and even Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!

Whatever conclusions are drawn from analysing other options that may have been open to Chamberlain and Daladier, it needs to be understood that these two gentlemen, and their governments, were trying to do the best they could in what were pretty unenviable circumstances. And while it is easy to say now what could or should have happened, the reality is that these were colossally high stakes being played for and both Chamberlain and Daladier need to be cut some slack in that regard.

So having said that, was the decision to give the Sudetenland to Germany the best option open to the Western governments? Well as said – and certainly with hindsight - it was a pretty awful thing as it paved the way for the carve-up of the country. But it’s impossible to know whether an alternative would have been better for certain isn’t it? As soon as the historical path is diverted from, all elements are subject to change.

The argument goes that Chamberlain screwed up because the German Army was weaker in 1938, the Czechoslovak Army was strong (with decent border defences) and there was no German-Soviet agreement. If the Germans struggled to beat the Czechs the Western Allies and maybe the Poles would join forces and attack the Germans from three sides. Maybe too, Hitler is overthrown by the Army and the full horrors of WWII and the holocaust are avoided. Simple.

Maybe. But that assumes a lot.

Maybe things would have panned out differently. For one thing, the German Army was weaker yes – but so were the British and French armies. Having declared war over Poland in 1939, neither was in any state to launch an offensive against the German Army. The plan was therefore to sit behind the Maginot Line and wait. Why would that be any different in 1938 when the British could provide even less of an army? The French army was deficient in many areas in 1940 – it was no better off in 1938. Well the Czechs in 1938 may have been more formidable than the Poles in 1939. Again, maybe. This is not something that can be proved one way or the other, and nor is how the Soviets would have reacted to this unfolding drama. The Soviets could have still come to an agreement with Hitler. Even if not, they could not come to the aid of the Czechs as Poland would never have allowed Soviet soldiers on Polish soil as we know from the pre-war negotiations between the Western Allies and the Soviets in 1939. Whether the Soviets got involved at all therefore cannot be known. Finally there is the tantalising prospect that the German General Staff would have launched a coup the moment Case Green was given the go ahead. Again there is no guarantee that this would have been carried out – or that it would have been successful.

In conclusion I think that on balance it is probably more likely than not that the British and French refusing to back down over the Sudetenland would have been better than the action actually taken. But in saying that I recognise that there are no guarantees and the case for an alternative, and less successful outcome for the Allies, can be made. I have a lot of sympathy for the Western leaders in the 1930’s. I think Chamberlain and Daladier were good men who were dealt a really poor hand but did what they thought was right and for the right reasons. If they ‘screwed up’ it was against that backdrop and they deserve understanding not opprobrium.

[barkhorn45]

"The Face of Courage" holders of the knights cross and close combat badge in gold. Florian Berger.
Only 96 men had this distinction