Semi OT, Italy in the Med, a good book

[Chickenboy]

Looking at the ranges of the Ju-52, they are from 1,000-1,200km. Gibraltar can be reached from Toulouse (right at 1,000km) or Mallorca (775km), but without a refueling point this would be a one-way trip for those planes and their crews. Granted, it could be done, but only once.

Your other points (Zorch and Warspite1) are good ones re: the political environment and the costs incurred by the Spanish in breaching their 'neutrality'. Which leaves North Africa as a point for stepping off, refueling or whatnot. 60km to Tangier, 20km to Cueta.

Is it so unfathomable that the effort could be mounted from there? Perhaps a palatable deal can be worked out for Petain, et. al.?

[Jorge_Stanbury]

I think the key point is that German's Lebensraum was not in the Mediterranean, Hitler just didn't want any additional diversion from his plan to invade the SU as soon as possible.
And the SU, being a big autarky, had all the resources he needed, mainly oil

As already mentioned, he thought he had the army to do in one campaign. Then afterwards he could prepare for a longer sea-naval war against the UK

[Zecke]

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

I think the key point is that German's Lebensraum was not in the Mediterranean, Hitler just didn't want any additional diversion from his plan to invade the SU as soon as possible.
And the SU, being a big autarky, had all the resources he needed, mainly oil

As already mentioned, he thought he had the army to do in one campaign. Then afterwards he could prepare for a longer sea-naval war against the UK

The germans wanted his movie between Poland and Siberia

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

I think the key point is that German's Lebensraum was not in the Mediterranean, Hitler just didn't want any additional diversion from his plan to invade the SU as soon as possible.
And the SU, being a big autarky, had all the resources he needed, mainly oil

As already mentioned, he thought he had the army to do in one campaign. Then afterwards he could prepare for a longer sea-naval war against the UK

Germany showed a willingness to commit sizable resources to the Mediterranean over the course of the war. I'm postulating the circumstances for them deciding that a commitment to neutralizing Gibraltar was worth the assets.

Would it have been to their strategic benefit to 'trade' Crete for Gibraltar, if possible? Would a British-held Crete be an asset or liability to the British in light of a German-occupied Gibraltar? Would the Germans find Gibraltar to be worth cutting some palatable side deal with Petain? What would a German-held Gibraltar have really meant to all British adventures in the Med? In ultimate hindsight, would that have been worth another look by the German high staff?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

I think the key point is that German's Lebensraum was not in the Mediterranean, Hitler just didn't want any additional diversion from his plan to invade the SU as soon as possible.
And the SU, being a big autarky, had all the resources he needed, mainly oil

As already mentioned, he thought he had the army to do in one campaign. Then afterwards he could prepare for a longer sea-naval war against the UK

Germany showed a willingness to commit sizable resources to the Mediterranean over the course of the war.

warspite1

Don't let O'Hara hear you say that [:D]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Is it so unfathomable that the effort could be mounted from there? Perhaps a palatable deal can be worked out for Petain, et. al.?

warspite1

There are two elements to this:

1. The military operation. I have no idea what any plan may look like but would not discount the German ability to get it done provided they have the full connivance of Spain (definitely) or Vichy (possible). However, there is also the political dimension and I discount Spain for the reasons given above.

2. The Political situation. That leaves Vichy and depends perhaps on whether one is a disciple of Paxton or not. I hope we get to hear from our French forumites for their view here [Please]. There are those that say that Petain would never have thrown his lot in with the Germans – and those, like Paxton, who believe that if the Germans had been interested then Vichy (Darlan in particular) would have been gagging to add a fourth protocol to Syrian airbases, Tunisian ports, submarines at Dakar. The problem once again comes with trying to gauge what would really have happened here. So for example:

- Hitler takes one look at Spanish terms and says thanks but no thanks (allegedly as Franco expects him to do)
- Petain, Darlan and co, pleased to have dodged a bullet over Morocco, put a proposal to Hitler. We will allow passage through Vichy North Africa of troops and equipment and the use of airbases and ports in Algeria and Morocco to allow for an operation against, and subsequent re-supply of, Gibraltar. As with Protocol II and III (that never happened) - let’s call this Protocol IV – IV was going to require serious concessions from Germany. One could argue that Syria (June 1941) is one thing but in 1940, Allowing the use of French North Africa to take Gibraltar? I think the Americans are going to be mightily unimpressed to say the least. So much so that Churchill’s efforts to blockade Vichy are suddenly endorsed, and then some, by the US rather than over-ruled. Again, this is a big problem for Vichy. In taking this action Vichy have ostensibly declared war on the United Kingdom and Commonwealth, and as the US were at pains to tell Vichy in real life, you really don’t want to do anything stupid vis-à-vis Germany if you want France and the US to remain BFF’s.

The above assumes of course that Hitler actually wanted the hated French to be Axis partners – my understanding is that he wanted no such thing and that, despite what Petain may have thought, he and his Vichy regime had one really nasty surprise headed their way when Germany won the war.

Ultimately these Mediterranean adventures – even with Gibraltar, Malta or Cairo as the prize – didn’t happen for good reasons. Could things have been different? It’s difficult to see how.

[bobdina]

Gotta tell you Warspite love your reviews and the discussions that follow. Thanks

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Zorch

ORIGINAL: warspite1

It's an interesting one for sure. I think there are a number of things to consider here.

Both with and without hindsight, taking Gibraltar can only have made the British position hugely worse – although I’ll park the likely effects here as that is an interesting one in itself. So why didn’t Hitler pursue a Mediterranean strategy?

Given a choice between being 'invaded' by 'allied' German troops…..

Hitler was so ruthless prewar…. that it is hard to understand his reluctance to pressure Franco and Mussolini during the war.

I think there are a number of factors – in no particular order:
- I think the key word here is invaded. The pact with Stalin is taken as read now, but was actually a very difficult sell amongst committed Nazi’s. ‘Invading’ a fellow Fascist country – a regime that German blood has helped to install – is not as easy as it perhaps sounds.
- We know what happened to the last ‘Little Corporal’ that decided to stab his Spanish ally in the back and let’s be clear, the Spanish people are going to face starvation as a result of this move.
- The German ‘invasion’ is going to face an uncertain welcome. Obviously even if hostile, the weakened Spanish Army is not going to stop the Wehrmacht, but Hitler has failed to subdue the British, he has just seen the Luftwaffe weakened during the Battle of Britain. He needs to re-build for Barbarossa – never forget that this is his focus. If he makes an enemy (or even a very reluctant ally) of Spain, this is another diversion he doesn’t need and cannot afford. Whatever the outcome, a large garrison will be required in Spain and possibly North Africa. The Canaries will be invaded by the British.
- Spain and her resources were important to German industry. Disrupting those supplies was not in Hitler’s best interests.
- Remember the timing too. There are only a few days between Franco giving Hitler his ‘shopping list’ for entering the war and Mussolini’s disastrous invasion of Greece that stalled almost from the outset. How quickly realised he was going to have to get involved in Greece I don’t know, but Hitler may have felt the opportunities for Barbarossa slipping from his grasp with all these other commitments.
- Hitler probably remained convinced that a quick win in the USSR (remember this was to be a one season campaign) and he can come back and finish off Britain.

For instance, Hitler ought to have summoned the Italian and Greek ambassadors and dictated a peace treaty. And threatened to cutoff Mussolini if he refused. This would have obviated the need to invade Greece and punished Il Duce for starting that little war.

What was Hitler’s relationship with Mussolini? It’s easy to think of Hitler as the monster he was and so assume there were absolutely no human qualities. But even this twisted perversion of the human race had some identifiable humanity about him. After Mussolini’s decision not to move against Germany over Austria, Hitler said he would never forget this – and he didn’t.

Germany had plans elsewhere than the Mediterranean and, not having the benefit of hindsight, Hitler was initially content for Mussolini to undertake his parallel war in the south. Only when things quickly turned south for his Italian chum, and in keeping with his promise to never forget Mussolini’s inaction over Austria, did Hitler intervene to shore up the Italian position. But I don’t think there was a realistic chance of Hitler stepping in over Greece. Given Greece’s initial response “Ochi!” and the fact that the Italians were stopped in their tracks, the only likely peace deal acceptable to Greece would have meant humiliation (and possible toppling from power) for Mussolini. Remember just a month before Greece, Italy had launched their ‘offensive’ against Britain in the desert. They had literally crossed the border into Egypt and stopped, their commander believing they were not yet strong enough to take the offensive further…... Politically I just don’t think putting Mussolini in danger was an option – particularly as by then, Hitler eyes were firmly set to the east.

I don't believe there was any prospect of Mussolini being toppled while Germany was winning the war in 1940-1941.

warspite1

Probably but a lot may depend on what Hitler does re Italy/Greece. Greece have stopped the Italians in their tracks - the poorly equipped Italian troops are literally freezing to death in the mountains, the elite 3rd Julia Division is surrounded and effectively ceases to exist.

Hitler now comes along and enforces a peace deal. Given what the Greeks have achieved they are going to take nothing less than restoration of pre-war borders.

This is a slap in the face of monumental proportions to Mussolini who has lost thousands of men for absolutely nothing, and has to then do exactly what the hated Germans tell him to do.

You may be right that its not enough to topple Il Duce but......

[Lecivius]

ORIGINAL: bobdina

Gotta tell you Warspite love your reviews and the discussions that follow. Thanks

Agreed

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

ORIGINAL: bobdina

Gotta tell you Warspite you sure know how to talk codswallop. Thanks

Agreed

+1

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

ORIGINAL: bobdina

Gotta tell you Warspite love your reviews and the discussions that follow. Thanks

Agreed

warspite1

Thank-you sirs [:)]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

ORIGINAL: bobdina

Gotta tell you Warspite you sure know how to talk codswallop. Thanks

Agreed

+1

warspite1

[:D]

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Lecivius




Agreed

+1

warspite1

[:D]

+1

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Is it so unfathomable that the effort could be mounted from there? Perhaps a palatable deal can be worked out for Petain, et. al.?

warspite1

There are two elements to this:

1. The military operation. I have no idea what any plan may look like but would not discount the German ability to get it done provided they have the full connivance of Spain (definitely) or Vichy (possible). However, there is also the political dimension and I discount Spain for the reasons given above.

2. The Political situation. That leaves Vichy and depends perhaps on whether one is a disciple of Paxton or not. I hope we get to hear from our French forumites for their view here [Please]. There are those that say that Petain would never have thrown his lot in with the Germans – and those, like Paxton, who believe that if the Germans had been interested then Vichy (Darlan in particular) would have been gagging to add a fourth protocol to Syrian airbases, Tunisian ports, submarines at Dakar. The problem once again comes with trying to gauge what would really have happened here. So for example:

- Hitler takes one look at Spanish terms and says thanks but no thanks (allegedly as Franco expects him to do)
- Petain, Darlan and co, pleased to have dodged a bullet over Morocco, put a proposal to Hitler. We will allow passage through Vichy North Africa of troops and equipment and the use of airbases and ports in Algeria and Morocco to allow for an operation against, and subsequent re-supply of, Gibraltar. As with Protocol II and III (that never happened) - let’s call this Protocol IV – IV was going to require serious concessions from Germany. One could argue that Syria (June 1941) is one thing but in 1940, Allowing the use of French North Africa to take Gibraltar? I think the Americans are going to be mightily unimpressed to say the least. So much so that Churchill’s efforts to blockade Vichy are suddenly endorsed, and then some, by the US rather than over-ruled. Again, this is a big problem for Vichy. In taking this action Vichy have ostensibly declared war on the United Kingdom and Commonwealth, and as the US were at pains to tell Vichy in real life, you really don’t want to do anything stupid vis-à-vis Germany if you want France and the US to remain BFF’s.

The above assumes of course that Hitler actually wanted the hated French to be Axis partners – my understanding is that he wanted no such thing and that, despite what Petain may have thought, he and his Vichy regime had one really nasty surprise headed their way when Germany won the war.

Ultimately these Mediterranean adventures – even with Gibraltar, Malta or Cairo as the prize – didn’t happen for good reasons. Could things have been different? It’s difficult to see how.

warspite1

Calling Gilbert, FCharton and Skyland!

I would be really interested to hear from you with any comments from a French perspective please.

Merci beaucoup [:)].

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Is it so unfathomable that the effort could be mounted from there? Perhaps a palatable deal can be worked out for Petain, et. al.?

warspite1

There are two elements to this:

1. The military operation. I have no idea what any plan may look like but would not discount the German ability to get it done provided they have the full connivance of Spain (definitely) or Vichy (possible). However, there is also the political dimension and I discount Spain for the reasons given above.

2. The Political situation. That leaves Vichy and depends perhaps on whether one is a disciple of Paxton or not. I hope we get to hear from our French forumites for their view here [Please]. There are those that say that Petain would never have thrown his lot in with the Germans – and those, like Paxton, who believe that if the Germans had been interested then Vichy (Darlan in particular) would have been gagging to add a fourth protocol to Syrian airbases, Tunisian ports, submarines at Dakar. The problem once again comes with trying to gauge what would really have happened here. So for example:

- Hitler takes one look at Spanish terms and says thanks but no thanks (allegedly as Franco expects him to do)
- Petain, Darlan and co, pleased to have dodged a bullet over Morocco, put a proposal to Hitler. We will allow passage through Vichy North Africa of troops and equipment and the use of airbases and ports in Algeria and Morocco to allow for an operation against, and subsequent re-supply of, Gibraltar. As with Protocol II and III (that never happened) - let’s call this Protocol IV – IV was going to require serious concessions from Germany. One could argue that Syria (June 1941) is one thing but in 1940, Allowing the use of French North Africa to take Gibraltar? I think the Americans are going to be mightily unimpressed to say the least. So much so that Churchill’s efforts to blockade Vichy are suddenly endorsed, and then some, by the US rather than over-ruled. Again, this is a big problem for Vichy. In taking this action Vichy have ostensibly declared war on the United Kingdom and Commonwealth, and as the US were at pains to tell Vichy in real life, you really don’t want to do anything stupid vis-à-vis Germany if you want France and the US to remain BFF’s.

The above assumes of course that Hitler actually wanted the hated French to be Axis partners – my understanding is that he wanted no such thing and that, despite what Petain may have thought, he and his Vichy regime had one really nasty surprise headed their way when Germany won the war.

Ultimately these Mediterranean adventures – even with Gibraltar, Malta or Cairo as the prize – didn’t happen for good reasons. Could things have been different? It’s difficult to see how.

warspite1

Calling Gilbert, FCharton and Skyland!

I would be really interested to hear from you with any comments from a French perspective please.

Merci beaucoup [:)].

I think LST is either a Frenchman living in Germany or a German living in France. Same thing, really. [;)][:D]

In any case, he may have some perspective on this issue. I always appreciate the 'perspective' that his posts provide.

[warspite1]

Okay sadly that looks like that’s a no at least for the moment.

So back to In Passage Perilous and there is another point raised in the book within the conclusion that is worthy of mention and posts 104 and 105 refer to this. O’Hara again makes the point that the Mediterranean was the British main effort and that while Italy used the majority of its navy, most of its air force and a small portion of its army, for Germany the numbers were: less than 2% of its army, circa 15% of its air force and a “small fraction” of its U-boat arm. He rounds off this analysis with this conclusion: Every day it could deflect its enemy’s main effort with tiny forces in Africa or anywhere along the Mediterranean shoreline was a successful day for the Reich [my italics].

I think this statement is false, not least because the argument has already been made that, where else were the British to take the war to the Axis? The German focus was of course on Barbarossa. Hitler, mis-judging the situation, was content for Mussolini to have his parallel war (until of course it quickly went south and the Germans had to divert resources to stop total collapse in North Africa and Greece). Lebensraum was Hitler’s raison d’etre and it does not take the powers of hindsight to know that this war was where Germany would succeed or fail and the last thing he needed when warring with the USSR was his southern flank being exposed.

If there were any doubters within the Nazi hierarchy, the turn of events since the beginning of Barbarossa through to the winter of 1941/42 confirmed the truth; that the Germans massively under-estimated the strength of the Soviet military and the economic resilience of the enemy – not to mention their intention to fight for every inch of ground. Indeed, after the losses suffered in the first 9 months, in order for Army Group South to launch Operation Blue, the Germans needed to raid the assets of the other two Army Groups, for most of their armour and their air assets.

Given such a situation, ANY German assets being expended anywhere but in the east was, far from being a success, actually helping Germany to lose the war. O’Hara likes to repeat the mantra that North Africa was Britain’s main focus (as though the Italians were holding off the entire weight of the British Empire forces) but in reality situation was very different.

As discussed earlier the Italian navy and air force should, given their clear advantages, have been hurting the British who decided that Malta would be kept alive. But during 1940, despite Britain fighting in France, the Battle of Britain, preparing for invasion, the Battle of the Atlantic and needing to keep troops in the Far East, she was beating Italy. The Italian position in North Africa was only saved by the intervention of the Germans. During 1941 pre-Barbarossa, Italy failed to make that help count and by the end of 1941, with the German air force gone, the navy was back in Malta, and the supply situation for Rommel was becoming critical.

Defeat was avoided because Germany returned to the scene. According to Blair it is clear that Donitz did not have enough U-boats to win the battle of the Atlantic, the transfer of U-boats to the Mediterranean – although painful to the RN – was a diversion of resources Donitz desperately could have done without and that he was against. Similarly given the colossal losses of Luftwaffe aircraft in the USSR during that period, ANY aircraft assets being utilised in the Mediterranean rather than in the east was nothing short of a disaster and 15% is not insignificant. The point about the % of German divisions is only partially valid. The number of German divisions was indeed small but that is a function of supplying an army in the desert. Moreover, those divisions may have represented 2% of the German Army but not 2% of the German panzer forces – and because Rommel wouldn’t listen to orders and Hitler indulged him – he constantly needed replacement armour; all of which was needed in the east.

And all this ignores the fighter strength and AA units that were defending Germany from Bomber Command (and from 1942 the USAAF) and garrisons in France, the Low Countries and Norway as the British (and later the US) started building in Britain for the Second Front.

So in my view, rather than this view re-affirming that Italy’s (and in particular the RM’s) limited naval strategy was the correct one to pursue, I think it was actually nothing but harmful to the Axis cause.

[anarchyintheuk]

It would have been a more thorough analysis if he had turned the magnifying glass the other way and reviewed what the army/navy/air %s were for Britain's 'main effort'. I would guess it didn't support his thesis.

[Buckrock]

Actually, O"Hara kinda does....(pages 210-211)

"During those three years Great Britain deployed a great portion of its military strength in the Mediterranean and Middle East. The Royal Navy
maintained, on the average, four battleships, one and a half carriers, and sixteen cruisers in the Mediterranean and Red seas (including Gibraltar).
The RAF based between a quarter to a third of its strength there while fifteen British and Empire divisions— generally the best available— fought
in the Mediterranean and Middle East."

It's not that hard to do a comparison with his RN and Army numbers vs the overall British figures for the period.

[Dili]

I disagree with warspite1. Resources tell us that Britain might have not lost their possessions in Asia even if it did not attacked German occupied France.
Without Italy, D-Day would be more than one year earlier. More probably Spring,Summer 43. Depending how things are going in Asia.
Even possible that invasion of France was done from North and South simultaneously. Or the Southern invasion was done trough Balkans directly to the oil fields of Romenia.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

It would have been a more thorough analysis if he had turned the magnifying glass the other way and reviewed what the army/navy/air %s were for Britain's 'main effort'. I would guess it didn't support his thesis.

warspite1

He says for example:

The Royal Navy maintained, on the average, four battleships, one and a half carriers and sixteen cruisers in the Mediterranean and Red seas (including Gibraltar).

Well as we all know, a man with his head in the oven and his feet in the freezer is, on average perfectly okay [:D]

So lets put some perspective on that. Firstly, as previously mentioned, the British ships were split between the Western and Eastern Mediterranean. The Italians had the central position and so could turn on either with a view to defeating in detail. Note he has also included the Red Sea for some reason too. No idea how he calculates 4 as an average. Does he include the one off convoys where an additional battleship was called in? How does he treat Renown (I assume he is classing her as a BB for this to work) when she's off in the Atlantic?

Secondly, because the Regia Marina had very few distractions (as mentioned previously) they had their best units in the Mediterranean. The two Littorios were faster and better armed and armoured than anything the British could employ. The British had to keep their newest battleships (as they came on line - KGV's) and the most powerful (the Nelsons) in home waters to counter the Bismarcks and Scharnhorsts.

No idea how he worked out the half - is he referring to a time when there was less than one or is he referring to Eagle as a half? I don't know, but if O'Hara is happy to call Eagle a carrier - evoking images of Ark Royal or Enterprise or Shokaku - then fine, but it doesn't really add value to the conversation. Or maybe he is thinking of Argus...... He mentions 16 cruisers but doesn't mention that the Italians had 8-inch ships with generally better speed.

Note only when he talks about the army does he mention the quality because he believes that these were generally the best available and so it suits his argument - how does one judge though? And to counter that most Italian and all German divisions in North Africa were not exactly militia or landwehr were they?

The British had a quarter to a third of its aircraft. Well he provides no detail so not sure if he is taking about those on Malta/Gibraltar/Middle East?? How does that compare in nos. to Axis aircraft? He doesn't say... Again no mention of quality either.