Semi OT, Italy in the Med, a good book

[dr.hal]

Folks,

I've often wondered about the portrayal of the Italian forces in the Med. Were they as poor as some authors would have us believe, or as amazing as the frogmen seemed to illustrate? I recently read an interesting book that I wanted to bring to your attention. It is short and "sweet", full of stuff I was not aware of. It also might change your view of the Regia Marina and the Regia Aeronautica during the latter stages of Italy's participation in the war as a part of the Axis powers. In short, the book illustrates the growth of both forces over the previous years and the deadly consequences of ignoring that growth and allowing preconceived negative stereotypes about the fighting abilities of these forces to persist by the British. The book is by Vincent P. O'Hara and it is titled "In Passage Perilous". Hal

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: dr.hal

Folks,

I've often wondered about the portrayal of the Italian forces in the Med. Were they as poor as some authors would have us believe, or as amazing as the frogmen seemed to illustrate? I recently read an interesting book that I wanted to bring to your attention. It is short and "sweet", full of stuff I was not aware of. It also might change your view of the Regia Marina and the Regia Aeronautica during the later stages of Italy's participation in the war as a part of the Axis powers. In short, the book illustrates the growth of both forces over the previous years and the deadly consequences of ignoring that growth and allowing preconceived negative stereotypes about the fighting abilities of these forces to persist by the British. The book is by Vincent P. O'Hara and it is titled "In Passage Perilous". Hal

warspite1

Happy to provide some commentary on this - but before I do there are two questions please. Firstly

illustrates the growth of both forces over the previous years and the deadly consequences of ignoring that growth

This is an intriguing comment. Can you confirm over what period this "growth of forces" refers to please?

Secondly, what period does this book cover - you mention latter stages - and what is being covered and points made?

Thank-you.

[dr.hal]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Happy to provide some commentary on this - but before I do there are two questions please. Firstly

illustrates the growth of both forces over the previous years and the deadly consequences of ignoring that growth

This is an intriguing comment. Can you confirm over what period this "growth of forces" refers to please?

Secondly, what period does this book cover - you mention latter stages - and what is being covered and points made?

Thank-you.

Hi Warspite, thanks for the interest.

Now, as to your questions, #1 being the period. The book's focus is on only a few months in mid 1942, HOWEVER it gives context to that period and covers (albeit briefly) the fight up to that point. Thus from when Italy joined the fight until the convoys to Malta that are the subject of the book.

Question #2 seems to be a variant of the first question, so I'll assume that you are talking about the actual combat period that the book covers in detail. Late April 42 to mid August 42 is the tactical period. This is a very interesting period in the Med, especially if you juxtapose it to the Soviet and Pacific fronts.

I hope I answered what you asked. Hal

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: dr.hal

Folks,

I've often wondered about the portrayal of the Italian forces in the Med. Were they as poor as some authors would have us believe, or as amazing as the frogmen seemed to illustrate? I recently read an interesting book that I wanted to bring to your attention. It is short and "sweet", full of stuff I was not aware of. It also might change your view of the Regia Marina and the Regia Aeronautica during the later stages of Italy's participation in the war as a part of the Axis powers. In short, the book illustrates the growth of both forces over the previous years and the deadly consequences of ignoring that growth and allowing preconceived negative stereotypes about the fighting abilities of these forces to persist by the British. The book is by Vincent P. O'Hara and it is titled "In Passage Perilous". Hal

warspite1

Happy to provide some commentary on this - but before I do there are two questions please. Firstly

illustrates the growth of both forces over the previous years and the deadly consequences of ignoring that growth

This is an intriguing comment. Can you confirm over what period this "growth of forces" refers to please?

Secondly, what period does this book cover - you mention latter stages - and what is being covered and points made?

Thank-you.

warspite1

Were they as poor as some authors would have us believe, or as amazing as the frogmen seemed to illustrate?

I still don't understand the reference to 'ignoring the growth' so will park that.

Thanks dr hal for the opening 'strawman' comment as this is perfect as an opening because of course, as with most things in life, the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes.

Yes, the Italian armed forces performance was really poor generally speaking. But this has to be put into context. The country was in no way shape or form in a fit state to go to war in 1940. Even Mussolini (in his rational moments) understood this - he only entered the war after it was won (or so he thought). But that truth does not mean that no Italian equipment was good, that all Italian army, navy and air force personnel were rubbish, that they were incapable of fighting bravely or with intelligence. Sadly some people like things simple and for those people "the Italians were ****" seems to work [8|]

The human torpedoes are another perfect example from the opposite end of the scale. The word 'amazing' has been used but is another example of keeping things simple. The attack on Alexandria that took Queen Elizabeth and Valiant out of the war for many months was an audacious operation carried out with bravery and skill. However, iirc all other operations by the Pigs were unsuccessful. Similarly the Barchini(?) attack against HMS York was succesful - but there were some stunning failures too. So just as they were not ****, so they were not 'amazing'.

O'Hara believes that the Regia Marina did an excellent job in WWII - and it is difficult to argue against the fact that they did pretty much what they were asked to do. But was it enough? The position in 1942 gives a tantalising glimpse at what was possible for the Regia Marina - in conjunction with the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica - to have achieved. They held far from a perfect hand, and of course had they tried to be more imaginative, more aggressive, they could have been destroyed. But they held a lot of aces and I firmly believe that had they fought the Royal Navy - and not their reputation - then things could have been very different in the Mediterranean War.

O'Hara makes great capital about the fact that, unlike the Kriegsmarine or the IJN, the RM was largely intact at the end of the war. When your country has lost the war, when your enemy has needed at least two amphibious landings to defeat you, how can the fact that your navy is still intact be seen as a positive?

[dr.hal]

ORIGINAL: warspite1


I still don't understand the reference to 'ignoring the growth' so will park that.

I think my reference to growth becomes a bit more obvious once one reads the book. However maybe a bit more on the subject might help clear things up. There were very tangible instances where both the Italian Air Force and its Navy were getting better at what they do. They had become more effective by early 1942. Yet the perception, justly deserved in the early stages of the war, that Italy's armed forces were inept and easy picking persisted. Certainly if one studies Churchill, it becomes clear that he held Italy's capabilities in contempt (the debacle in Ethiopia, early North Africa, etc.) early on. This seems to have carried over into 1942 despite evidence to the contrary. So the Brits, given their views, were less than prepared to deal with a more effective Italian air and naval forces (and their associated intelligence services) (notice I don't refer to the ground war here) when it came to keeping Malta afloat (the NEED to keep Malta afloat is another whole story that is very much open to debate, but that's another thread). This resulted in major defeats for the British in their Malta resupply efforts during the period the book covers (including the famous SS Ohio incident). It's an interesting read IMHO. Does this help clarify things Warspite? Hal

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: dr.hal

ORIGINAL: warspite1


I still don't understand the reference to 'ignoring the growth' so will park that.

I think my reference to growth becomes a bit more obvious once one reads the book. However maybe a bit more on the subject might help clear things up. There were very tangible instances where both the Italian Air Force and its Navy were getting better at what they do. They had become more effective by early 1942. Yet the perception, justly deserved in the early stages of the war, that Italy's armed forces were inept and easy picking persisted. Certainly if one studies Churchill, it becomes clear that he held Italy's capabilities in contempt (the debacle in Ethiopia, early North Africa, etc.) early on. This seems to have carried over into 1942 despite evidence to the contrary. So the Brits, given their views, were less than prepared to deal with a more effective Italian air and naval forces (and their associated intelligence services) (notice I don't refer to the ground war here) when it came to keeping Malta afloat (the NEED to keep Malta afloat is another whole story that is very much open to debate, but that's another thread). This resulted in major defeats for the British in their Malta resupply efforts during the period the book covers (including the famous SS Ohio incident). It's an interesting read IMHO. Does this help clarify things Warspite? Hal

warspite1

Yes thank-you, I am now clear what is being put forward by O'Hara, I am just really surprised that he has said this. This is quite bizarre. Effectlvely what he is stating is that the British conciously fought the Italians with less naval and air power than was available (and in so doing risked major defeat) because they held their Italian foe in contempt. Well sure, that is one possibility - albeit one that makes no sense whatsoever, but surely what is more likely is the simple, and quite unpalatable truth.

- In 1942 the Royal Navy, that had been at war since day 1, was fighting three Axis navies across every ocean.
- Losses had steadily mounted and resources were stretched to the maximium. The senior service had repeatedly been asked to rescue the army from one balls up to the next - Norway, France (twice), Greece, Crete, Singapore - and each one costing the navy
- The list of responsbilities just continued to grow for the service as the war went on. The USSR coming into the war was a godsend in terms of defeating Germany but gave the RN yet another ocean to operate in and guard from attack (the Kriegsmarine remained in being)
- With Japan entering the war at the end of 1941, those problems kept racking up and, combined with the serious losses at the end of 1941, stretched resources yet thinner.
- To state that in the face of all this the British in the Med were purposely kept short because of contempt for the enemy rather than because they were running out of assets beggars belief and does O'Hara no credit.
- That Malta was kept in the war, was possibly an error on the British part but, that has nothing to do with contempt for Italy and everything to do with morale. The island had become a symbol of defiance in the dark days of the early war years. The nos. of fighter aircraft thrown at the defence were not inconsiderable - nor were the losses to the navy in getting them there.
- Things were so stretched after the loss of Ark Royal we needed USS Wasp to help out.
- Far from treating the Italians with contempt the assets, thrown in to the battle to keep Malta supplied, were considerable - with losses and damaged ships increasing as a result.

Although I don't always agree with O'Hara, I like his works and have a number of his books. But this is a bit of a shocker.

[MakeeLearn]

Any mention of the Attack on Taranto? Many seem to think is was one of the most successful air attacks against ships of the war.
Greatly studied by Japan in their prep for Pearl Harbor. Japan was a voracious student of British Naval tactics.
As shown by their interaction with William Francis Forbes-Sempill, 19th Lord Sempill, - who I believe was the first person to land a Zero on a carrier.

[dr.hal]

Waspite, while I agree with some of what you say, the thesis still stands. I invite you to read the book, read some works ABOUT Churchill (not BY him) and get back to this thread. I would be interested in any change you might express given the new information.

[dr.hal]

Yes MakeeLearn, it certainly was and it was one of the events that shook up the Italian military establishment (note the date of the attack and the dates through which the book covers) into their recognizing and taking steps to undo their substandard performance.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: dr.hal

Waspite, while I agree with some of what you say, the thesis still stands. I invite you to read the book, read some works ABOUT Churchill (not BY him) and get back to this thread. I would be interested in any change you might express given the new information.

warspite1

Come on dr.hal I thought we were having a grown up debate here. Firstly thanks to your initial post I already have this book on order - as I say I like reading O'Hara. BUT this comment "read some works ABOUT Churchill (not BY him)" really takes this exchange down and is really disappointing.

Why, do you say I only read stuff BY Churchill? That is so patronising - not to mention uncalled for. I happen to read a lot about all aspects of WWII from as many perspectives as possible. Rather than insult me with that comment why not continue the debate by telling me what O'Hara states to show what I have said is wrong?

Basically you asked for views, but when I gave one contrary to O'Hara's (and I presume from this your own) you accuse me of pro-Churchill bias as the only reason I am wrong.

[MakeeLearn]

Looks like a good read. Saw it covered the later part of Italy's participation in the war and wondered if this event played into later decisions of the Italian Navy and if the writer makes mention of it. Reviews show it to be a detailed book.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn


Looks like a good read. Saw it covered the later part of Italy's participation in the war and wondered if this event played into later decisions of the Italian Navy and if the writer makes mention of it. Reviews show it to be a detailed book.

warspite1

Hi MakeeLearn - can you confirm what decisions you are referring to please?

Thanks

[MakeeLearn]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn


Looks like a good read. Saw it covered the later part of Italy's participation in the war and wondered if this event played into later decisions of the Italian Navy and if the writer makes mention of it. Reviews show it to be a detailed book.

warspite1

Hi MakeeLearn - can you confirm what decisions you are referring to please?

Thanks

One I wonder is did losing (operational) half their battleships in one night make the Italian Navy gun-shy and more reluctant to commit their forces. Would they have been more aggressive in the battle for Malta? Changes in aircraft/ship cooperation. I believe they started on some small carriers after Taranto.
And any other influence it had on future operations. Morale wise it must have been a downer, although if played right it could have fueled a desire for combat.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn


Looks like a good read. Saw it covered the later part of Italy's participation in the war and wondered if this event played into later decisions of the Italian Navy and if the writer makes mention of it. Reviews show it to be a detailed book.

warspite1

Hi MakeeLearn - can you confirm what decisions you are referring to please?

Thanks

One I wonder is did losing (operational) half their battleships in one night make the Italian Navy gun-shy and more reluctant to commit their forces. Would they have been more aggressive in the battle for Malta?

warspite1

I don't think it changed much if anything in terms of terms of engagement. Supermarina imposed restrictive conditions on Campioni from day 1 (June 1940) and Taranto was not until November 1940. The Italians feared the British carriers - or carrier to be more precise - Eagle in east or Ark Royal in the west) and this led them to refuse combat even with the numerical - and firepower and speed - advantage.

I think therefore that Taranto would only have increased the fear of British naval air (and of course the build up to Matapan 5 months later would have reinforced that view).

[warspite1]

The book should be here Friday so will put my present reading on hold when it arrives to read this asap.

[warspite1]

Ahead of reading the book I would like to state a couple of things to clarify my comments as the problem with these discussions is that the points being made can get lost.

Firstly I don't expect the book to say anything radically different from what O'Hara has said previously in other works - but I am hoping he will put some more detail around the Operations Harpoon and Vigorous.

However, to be clear, the view of the RM and RA (as the latter affects naval battles) is, by definition, very much based on whether one believes that what they were tasked with was appropriate in the context of the war Italy chose to fight. Naval air performance imo was poor regardless, but the navy's performance - looked at solely from Supermarina's perspective - did largely meet expectations.

So to be clear, my poor view of performance is based on what could have been achieved with the resources to hand and what that would have meant for the Axis (and the Allies) in World War II.

[RFalvo69]

IMHO, one of the problems in analysing the Italian Navy performance in WWII is the fixation with "prestige" capital ships. The Regia Marina had one, and only one task: to supply North Africa. Overall, from 1940 to 1942, a stunning 80%+ of the supplies and 90%+ of the troops made through, even if with that molest Malta across the route.

The numbers, of course, vary according to the sources. However, a study that can be found on the US Naval War College site estimated that in July, 1942, 94% of the shipping from Italian and Greek ports safely arrived in North Africa.

https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/1f4 ... Battl.aspx

A simple glance at the war in the Med shows how it were the small units of the Regia Marina which performed well - possibly because the bigwigs (starting with Mussolini) were fixated with the aforementioned "prestige ships" and left alone the "humbler" units (allowing them to perform their daily toil undisturbed).

True, before Alexandria there were some other attempts (three or four) to use the "Pigs" against the British fleet, and all of them failed. However, the one that succeeded sunk two battleships. This means that, overall, with the loss of only a few of low cost "Pigs" and some dozens of men (many of them, BTW, didn't die but became POWs), the Regia Marina basically avenged Matapan.

And then, in august 1942 there was "Operation Pedestal", where, once again, it were the "small" Italian units to cause no end of problems to the British (the overall result of the operation is still hotly debated, with opinions from modern historians ranging to "A strategic victory for the British" to "A disaster comparable only to what happened to PQ-17" - take your pick).

Anyway, a history of the RM during WWII cannot ignore how, factually, there were two navies - and that the successful one was the one seldom talked about.

[warspite1]

According to O'Hara those numbers were 98% of personnel and 90% of supplies for the war as a whole.

It's clear that there is no right or wrong answer to the question of RM performance for the reasons laid out previously. But this is why the Meditteranean theatre is so great for a sensible debate - and even better for wargaming.

[Alpha77]

Imho the Italians are bashed not completly justified.

Eg, parts of the navy performed good, mostly smaller ships eg. torp boats and subs.

Eg2, most of the airforce was good, in fact German crews praised the Italian torp bomber crews (SM 79 planes I believe)

EDIT: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4cl69qp5O78
Sm-79b Torpedo Bomber in Action (this is a propaganda piece tho)

Eg3, Rommel (alledegly) said, that the Italian soldier is good, but his leaders suck

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Alpha77

Imho the Italians are bashed not completly justified.

Eg, parts of the navy performed good, mostly smaller ships eg. torp boats and subs.

Eg2, most of the airforce was good, in fact German crews praised the Italian torp bomber crews (SM 79 planes I believe)

EDIT: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4cl69qp5O78
Sm-79b Torpedo Bomber in Action (this is a propaganda piece tho)

Eg3, Rommel (alledegly) said, that the Italian soldier is good, but his leaders suck

warspite1

Re Rommel's quote there is also, as a counter, plenty of less complementary comments

The smaller craft had some notables successes, but the Italian submarines were, on the whole, very disappointing, both in the Med and the Atlantic

It helps perhaps to put air force performance into perspective that 30% of the Allied warship losses were caused by German aircraft and only 9% by Italian aircraft.