ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
In the early months of the Battle of Burma in 1944, lack of AA really hurt John's army. He worked hard to shift AA forward (too little, too late as it turned out), apparently stripping other areas. He also decided to concentrate his AA in defending strategic targets, perceiving that Allied 4EB would become a serious threat in early 44. My decision to forego strategic bombing while focusing on operational warfare has thus caught John's AA out of position to help in the Luzon campaign. He only a had a couple of AA units present.
It's too early to know whether delaying strategic bombing was the right call, but you can see the various impacts of our decision-making in this regard. To this point, Japanese AA has been a non-factor in the second half of 1943 and first half of 1944.
And the flip side is "strategic bombing" has been a non-factor. If he overreacts and sends AA to the front then strategic facilities will be lacking AA cover.














