The Truth About Force Z?

[MakeeLearn]

Pearl Harbor, Singapore and Force Z... a good documentary that shows betrayal...

"WWII The Fall of Singapore The Great Betrayal"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVpAN_lQgcA&t=2554s

[rustysi]

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn



Pearl Harbor, Singapore and Force Z... a good documentary that shows betrayal...

"WWII The Fall of Singapore The Great Betrayal"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVpAN_lQgcA&t=2554s

Good documentary. I had seen it before and was thinking about it while I was reading this thread. Decided not to post, thought it could send the thread into a 'sticky' area.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: rustysi

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn



Pearl Harbor, Singapore and Force Z... a good documentary that shows betrayal...

"WWII The Fall of Singapore The Great Betrayal"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVpAN_lQgcA&t=2554s

Good documentary. I had seen it before and was thinking about it while I was reading this thread. Decided not to post, thought it could send the thread into a 'sticky' area.

warspite1

I don't see why. How many times have we heard these types of stories:

- Mis-guided **** sells out his country for gold/status/sense of grievance or whatever
- Rich/titled ****, protected by the 'system' gets away with his crimes, the little guy doesn't (not that he deserves to or is any less of a **** just because of a lower social status)

Every country, every period of history. One thing we can all rely on: there will always be ****'s willing to do this. Having said that the number of traitors involved in the Malaya/Singapore story does seem quite large.

I too recall seeing this some time ago. It's a good documentary although not without its faults. Eagle was a sister to Argus? Right. Singapore naval base was built in response to the invasion of Manchuria - despite preceding it by 6-years.

Just one thing though - what a shame Sempill didn't sell the secrets of the Blackburn Firebrand [:D].

[MakeeLearn]

- Mis-guided **** sells out his country for gold/status/sense of grievance or whatever

I was thinking as I watched ... AND a woman.... or women...


As was suggested if the resources spent on the Coastal Guns had been spent on planes instead...

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn

As was suggested if the resources spent on the Coastal Guns had been spent on planes instead...

warspite1

Problem was of course it wasn't just down to money. In the cash starved inter-war years the money wasn't there. There was still time to make good the difference later, but by then Britain was fighting for her very survival and so the Far East was third choice of three in terms of where to send resources as the threat of UK invasion receded and the need to hold the Middle East became paramount.

Promised aircraft for the Far East was slow coming off the assembly lines, and fighter aircraft was shipped to the Soviet Union and Egypt. The sad thing from an Allied perspective was that had the Japanese waited 3-4 months, they may well have missed the bus.....

I don't say that because what the British and Americans would have had guarding the Malay barrier and the Philippines by then was going to necessarily defeat the Japanese, but the conquest of those territories and the NEI was likely going to be a lot more painful, take longer, and with no guarantee of success... The march back to Tokyo would have been a lot easier.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Problem was of course it wasn't just down to money. In the cash starved inter-war years the money wasn't there. There was still time to make good the difference later, but by then Britain was fighting for her very survival and so the Far East was third choice of three in terms of where to send resources as the threat of UK invasion receded and the need to hold the Middle East became paramount.

Promised aircraft for the Far East was slow coming off the assembly lines, and fighter aircraft was shipped to the Soviet Union and Egypt. The sad thing from an Allied perspective was that had the Japanese waited 3-4 months, they may well have missed the bus.....

I don't say that because what the British and Americans would have had guarding the Malay barrier and the Philippines by then was going to necessarily defeat the Japanese, but the conquest of those territories and the NEI was likely going to be a lot more painful, take longer, and with no guarantee of success... The march back to Tokyo would have been a lot easier.

I know the US could have put that extra time to very good use by completing the bulk of their reinforcement program that was already underway when war
broke out but what exactly were the reinforcements for that period that the British were so committed to that Churchill couldn't have found excuses to
further delay? Was he going to resist the temptation of reinforcing the 8th Army just when Operation Crusader's expensive "success" may have opened the
door for the conquest of Libya and more? Surely the Far East could wait a bit longer, just as it had for most of 1941.[:)]

[rustysi]

I don't see why. How many times have we heard these types of stories:

I agree with what you have said. Just thought It might have gone off in a political direction, and so my reticence to post such.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Problem was of course it wasn't just down to money. In the cash starved inter-war years the money wasn't there. There was still time to make good the difference later, but by then Britain was fighting for her very survival and so the Far East was third choice of three in terms of where to send resources as the threat of UK invasion receded and the need to hold the Middle East became paramount.

Promised aircraft for the Far East was slow coming off the assembly lines, and fighter aircraft was shipped to the Soviet Union and Egypt. The sad thing from an Allied perspective was that had the Japanese waited 3-4 months, they may well have missed the bus.....

I don't say that because what the British and Americans would have had guarding the Malay barrier and the Philippines by then was going to necessarily defeat the Japanese, but the conquest of those territories and the NEI was likely going to be a lot more painful, take longer, and with no guarantee of success... The march back to Tokyo would have been a lot easier.

I know the US could have put that extra time to very good use by completing the bulk of their reinforcement program that was already underway when war
broke out but what exactly were the reinforcements for that period that the British were so committed to that Churchill couldn't have found excuses to
further delay? Was he going to resist the temptation of reinforcing the 8th Army just when Operation Crusader's expensive "success" may have opened the
door for the conquest of Libya and more? Surely the Far East could wait a bit longer, just as it had for most of 1941.[:)]

warspite1

Possibly. As I said, there are lots of mights and maybes there and put it this way; I would not bet significant money on a significantly different outcome! - not least because we cannot be certain what extra would have been delivered in that time or what extra training, of units that had formed, would mean for performance - but I would certainly make a wager!

The thinking is straightforward though. We know from what happened that the Japanese attacks on Malaya/Singapore/Burma, NEI and the Philippines were incredibly successful and wrapped up within 6 months.

However we also know that the attacks were conducted like stepping stones and for example, the NEI could not be taken (or would be much more difficult) without PI and/or Singapore taken. Momentum was vital for the Japanese in those early months, momentum that enabled them to claim the oil of the NEI.

We also know that the Japanese were running out of supplies when Singapore finally surrendered.

My understanding is that only two of the five Buffalo squadrons in Malaya were worked up in December 1941. It is unclear to me how much more of the promised aircraft from the US and Beauforts from Australia would have been available in that time if any. But for those units already there - more time, more training.

We know that whatever the British, Dutch and the US lost in those early months was replaceable - particularly ships. But for the Japanese, such losses would not be so easily replaced if at all.

We also know that Admiral Phillips came close to finding the Japanese convoys heading for Thailand/Malaya. If a carrier had been available - perhaps with Exeter and Mauritius joining too, the chances of loss were high - but so too were the chances of the RN finding - and inflicting damage - on those convoys. From what we know the Japanese invasion troops and supply lines could ill-afford any such losses, while the loss of Indomitable, Mauritius and Exeter (in addition to PoW and Repulse) would not have made one jot of difference to Japanese prospects. Indeed Exeter was soon to be lost anyway, while the loss of Indomitable or Mauritius from the RN order of battle would not have been something that would have radically affected later operations (the BPF being the most obvious example, but as said, this is not going to make any real difference to the Pacific War).

You will know more than I about the PI, but the same principles apply here too in terms of damage capable of being inflicted, and what that does to Japanese timetables.

Momentum was everything. The knock-on effect of losses here, delays there, could have been vital given what we know of Japanese reserves and supply lines. Does anyone know the effect of Japan not conquering the NEI in terms of oil?

From all we know would Churchill have sanctioned wholesale reinforcement of the Far East at the expense of the Middle East? No of course not, as has been covered in the recent thread on the RM, the Mediterranean had priority over the Far East. But additional units would have been available (US aircraft and British ships at a minimum together with that all important commodity - time) - its just tantalising to wonder what might have been. Indeed one of the tantalising things is what the Japanese do with the KB? If fighting was prolonged in Malaya and PI, do the Japanese bring the KB into the restricted waters of the South China Sea?......

[Buckrock]

My response was only in relation to the chances of additional units and equipment being sent by the British to bolster their Far Eastern
defences had the Japanese put off their offensive plans for 3-4 months. The rest of what you covered is somewhat beyond that and I won't
go into most of it as I don't want to risk bursting any of your hypothetical British bubbles.[:)]

As to existing British and Commonwealth fighter units performing better (primarily in Malaya/Singapore) had they had more time to train,
logically that should be true but in the scale of the historical mess that happened, any such benefit would would have still been swamped
by the numerous other factors in play that dictated the result for the British and Commonwealth forces in the Far East. The "knock on"
effect of this additional training would likely have had an insignificant impact on the final score.

Now if the British had put this extra time to good use with a serious attempt at creating a fighter defence organization with appropriate
infrastructure and plans for Singapore/Malaya that in some way replicated their efforts at home, then you may well have seen a significant
difference in the Japanese air losses for the campaign and perhaps even an impact on the ground war.

IIRC, you'd stated elsewhere that you were reading Shores' "Bloody Shambles". If so, that should give you a good idea of the overall mess
in Malaya/Singpore I was referring to.

[Revthought]

I mean to me, far more important to the fate of Force Z was the decision to sail with PoE HAC radars out of action and the dismissal of the importance of RAF cover.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

My response was only in relation to the chances of additional units and equipment being sent by the British to bolster their Far Eastern
defences had the Japanese put off their offensive plans for 3-4 months. The rest of what you covered is somewhat beyond that and I won't
go into most of it as I don't want to risk bursting any of your hypothetical British bubbles.[:)]

As to existing British and Commonwealth fighter units performing better (primarily in Malaya/Singapore) had they had more time to train,
logically that should be true but in the scale of the historical mess that happened, any such benefit would would have still been swamped
by the numerous other factors in play that dictated the result for the British and Commonwealth forces in the Far East. The "knock on"
effect of this additional training would likely have had an insignificant impact on the final score.

Now if the British had put this extra time to good use with a serious attempt at creating a fighter defence organization with appropriate
infrastructure and plans for Singapore/Malaya that in some way replicated their efforts at home, then you may well have seen a significant
difference in the Japanese air losses for the campaign and perhaps even an impact on the ground war.

IIRC, you'd stated elsewhere that you were reading Shores' "Bloody Shambles". If so, that should give you a good idea of the overall mess
in Malaya/Singpore I was referring to.

warspite1

Yes I have started reading Bloody Shambles - although takes a distant second to The RN in Eastern Waters and so is slower going than would normally be the case... and The Hollow Legions has just turned up...... and I suddenly have a big desire to read Singapore The Pregnable Fortress because of this thread... ARRGGHHH [:@] Too many books - too little time [:(]

Clearly I was not talking about the British putting in place a fighter defence organisation a la Fighter Command in four months, but yes marginal gains in all areas at some point has a positive effect and without wanting to state the obvious, training, at some point or other, takes effect and as Bloody Shambles illustrates all too clearly, the difference in the levels of training between the Japanese and the Commonwealth pilots was huge in December 1941. So whether a different outcome was possible with just 4 months extra training we can both agree is highly unlikely and lets be clear, what would really be required given the resources to hand was Phillips, with a larger task force and a carrier to hand, catching a break - and then marginal gains taking effect thereafter. Momentum... so important in war. Wouldn't it be interesting to stop the Germans for just a couple of days on the right bank of the Meuse.....

Sadly Bloody Shambles can't tell me about the delayed aircraft coming directly from the US and Australia because it didn't happen and its not that sort of book.

There is no risk of any hypothetical bubbles bursting over here [;)].

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: Revthought

I mean to me, far more important to the fate of Force Z was the decision to sail with PoE HAC radars out of action and the dismissal of the importance of RAF cover.

Do you know any solid references for the HAC sytem failures? I've seen it mentioned in a few authored accounts but none that list what the
source was for the claim. The official RN records only mention the POW's Type 271 (surface) radar failing to be made operational at the time
Force Z left Singapore. No mention of the Type 282 (close AA) or Type 285 (5.25" HA) having issues other than the local humidity causing a
serious ammunition jamming problem for many of the 2 pounder "pom-pom" batteries when it really mattered.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

ORIGINAL: Revthought

I mean to me, far more important to the fate of Force Z was the decision to sail with PoE HAC radars out of action and the dismissal of the importance of RAF cover.

Do you know any solid references for the HAC sytem failures? I've seen it mentioned in a few authored accounts but none that list what the
source was for the claim. The official RN records only mention the POW's Type 271 (surface) radar failing to be made operational at the time
Force Z left Singapore. No mention of the Type 282 (close AA) or Type 285 (5.25" HA) having issues other than the local humidity causing a
serious ammunition jamming problem for many of the 2 pounder "pom-pom" batteries when it really mattered.

warspite1

And regardless, it wasn't important to the sinking of Force Z. Air cover, yes absolutely, but not radar - functioning or otherwise.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Yes I have started reading Bloody Shambles - although takes a distant second to The RN in Eastern Waters and so is slower going than would normally be the case... and The Hollow Legions has just turned up...... and I suddenly have a big desire to read Singapore The Pregnable Fortress because of this thread... ARRGGHHH [:@] Too many books - too little time [:(]

You wouldn't have this problem if you simply concentrated on just one theatre of war.

Clearly I was not talking about the British putting in place a fighter defence organisation a la Fighter Command in four months, but yes marginal gains in all areas at some point has a positive effect and without wanting to state the obvious, training, at some point or other, takes effect and as Bloody Shambles illustrates all too clearly, the difference in the levels of training between the Japanese and the Commonwealth pilots was huge in December 1941. So whether a different outcome was possible with just 4 months extra training we can both agree is highly unlikely and lets be clear, what would really be required given the resources to hand was Phillips, with a large task force and a carrier to hand, catching a break - and then marginal gains taking effect thereafter. Momentum... so important in war. Wouldn't it be interesting to stop the Germans for just a couple of days on the right bank of the Meuse.....

Actually, had they just planned and deployed more realistically, they would have likely had a decent (compared to other areas facing the Japanese) air
defence in place just using what was available in early December. They would have still lost but it would have remained viable for longer. And if you
think additional training for the defending fighters would have made such a difference to Japanese attrition, that's fine. In a hypothetical, all
opinions are equal. Except when they're wrong.

Sadly Bloody Shambles can't tell me about the delayed aircraft coming directly from the US and Australia because it didn't happen and its not that sort of book.

I wasn't suggesting the book for that but I can tell you in early December, the US, Dutch and Australians all had air reinforcements slated to arrive
in the Far East within 4-8 weeks. The British, not so much.

There is no risk of any hypothetical bubbles bursting over here [;)].

But it would be deafening if they did.[:)]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

You wouldn't have this problem if you simply concentrated on just one theatre of war.

warspite1

Yes but its all so damn interesting. Little can be looked at in isolation - so much interconnects and intertwines and looking at one strand leads to another and another....[:)]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

I wasn't suggesting the book for that but I can tell you in early December, the US, Dutch and Australians all had air reinforcements slated to arrive
in the Far East within 4-8 weeks. The British, not so much.

warspite1

Out of interest what Australians are you talking about - because they were building Beauforts designed for Malaya, and what happened to the US aircraft (Buffaloes aside) that were also designated for that theatre?

[Revthought]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

ORIGINAL: Revthought

I mean to me, far more important to the fate of Force Z was the decision to sail with PoE HAC radars out of action and the dismissal of the importance of RAF cover.

Do you know any solid references for the HAC sytem failures? I've seen it mentioned in a few authored accounts but none that list what the
source was for the claim. The official RN records only mention the POW's Type 271 (surface) radar failing to be made operational at the time
Force Z left Singapore. No mention of the Type 282 (close AA) or Type 285 (5.25" HA) having issues other than the local humidity causing a
serious ammunition jamming problem for many of the 2 pounder "pom-pom" batteries when it really mattered.

It appears in Battleship: The Sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. I am at work and do not have the work on hand, so I do not know what Middlebrook and Mahoney cite as support of this, so there is that. Frankly, I doubt I still have this book at all, as I lost a bunch of books to an accidentally unpaid storage unit after I left grad school. I will have to look.

However, if you just compare the Italian losses in Operation Halberd, where we know the British HACS radars were working, with the Japanese losses on Force Z, I think the data heavily implies that PoWs HAC radar may have been non-functional. In the case of Operation Halberd, if I recall correctly, the Italians lost somewhere in the neighborhood of 20 to 25 aircraft to British ship borne HACS directed AAA fire; whereas during the sinking of the Repulse and Prince of Wales, the British ships only managed to shoot down 4 aircraft.

It is hard to believe that, in [s]January 1942[/s] December 1941, Japanese aircraft, pilots, and doctrine were that much better than their Italian counterparts.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Revthought

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

ORIGINAL: Revthought

I mean to me, far more important to the fate of Force Z was the decision to sail with PoE HAC radars out of action and the dismissal of the importance of RAF cover.

Do you know any solid references for the HAC sytem failures? I've seen it mentioned in a few authored accounts but none that list what the
source was for the claim. The official RN records only mention the POW's Type 271 (surface) radar failing to be made operational at the time
Force Z left Singapore. No mention of the Type 282 (close AA) or Type 285 (5.25" HA) having issues other than the local humidity causing a
serious ammunition jamming problem for many of the 2 pounder "pom-pom" batteries when it really mattered.

It appears in Battleship: The Sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. I am at work and do not have the work on hand, so I do not know what Middlebrook and Mahoney cite as support of this, so there is that. Frankly, I doubt I still have this book at all, as I lost a bunch of books to an accidentally unpaid storage unit after I left grad school. I will have to look.

However, if you just compare the Italian losses in Operation Halberd, where we know the British HACS radars were working, with the Japanese losses on Force Z, I think the data heavily implies that PoWs HAC radar may have been non-functional. In the case of Operation Halberd, if I recall correctly, the Italians lost somewhere in the neighborhood of 20 to 25 aircraft to British ship borne HACS directed AAA fire; whereas during the sinking of the Repulse and Prince of Wales, the British ships only managed to shoot down 4 aircraft.

It is hard to believe that, in [s]January 1942[/s] December 1941, Japanese aircraft, pilots, and doctrine were that much better than their Italian counterparts.

warspite1

There were distinct differences though. Force Z was just two ships + 3 destroyers to put up an AA defence - and PoW and Repulse were quickly separated. Repulse's AA was hardly state of the art either.

The first torpedo to strike PoW was about as unlucky a spot to be hit as can be imagined. Much of the guns were put out of action from the resulting loss of power.

For Halberd there would have been more of a "wall of AA" put up by the much larger escort.

The bombers would also have been met by fighters and in some cases had their approaches disrupted.

[MakeeLearn]

Having more aircraft in theater may not have helped Task force Z, for what was really lacking was experience in air to ship cooperation.


You might have a problem if it's 2AM and you find yourself thumbing through the stained, seedy pages of a books' bibliography...

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn


Having more aircraft in theater may not have helped Task force Z, for what was really lacking was experience in air to ship cooperation.

warspite1

.....just look at how many aircraft actually attacked!