warspite1ORIGINAL: spinecruncher
okay let's be real here: The reason why the Allies lost France was bc they did not extend the Maginot line and they failed to adequately defend the Ardennes (sp) Now let's turn back the clock to May 10, and put you in charge, IE, you have replaced Gamelin, and you look at the map on May 10 and you realize that the Ardennes need to be better protected -- would you therefore be able to save France? If you put one or two, or hell an AG, in the ARdennes wouldn't that have saved France? You could put more troops in the forest and attack Germany from some other point. I would think a well modeled TOAW4 scenario should answer the question.
The outcome was not 'set in stone'. That the Germans were able to defeat the French in six weeks was the combination of three things:
1. The French battle plan. Please read post 2. It was the Breda Variant (that many French generals as well as the British thought dangerous) that took the 7th Army i.e. the reserves, and had them marching into Belgium en route to Holland. The composition of the French 2nd and 9th Armies was woefully inadequate – and it was these troops that met the Schwerpunkt. The French were fighting the battle according to a First World War time table – hell Gamelin envisaged that the Germans could not be in a position to try and cross the Meuse until day 10! You ask whether the French could have taken the offensive? Look at the plans and, moreover, the poor ‘execution’ of the various counter-attacks designed to throw the Germans back over the Meuse. That will give a good indication. As said before, this wasn't the fault of just one man. Many of the other French generals were of a similar age and similar mindset; the French were not set up or trained to act offensively.
2. Any good luck that went anyone’s way in May 1940 belonged to the Germans. Time and again the panzer generals had to disobey orders to continue their advance – Guderian even had to resign. What if that was accepted? In front of the Meuse, there was a shortage of mines, there were pill-boxes left un-manned and even some crossing points unattended. Probably the biggest piece of luck was the devastating ‘rolling raid’ air strike that effectively broke 2nd Army at Sedan. The plan of attack was worked out between Guderian and Loehzer, but Kleist overruled this and ordered Sperrle to provide a conventional preparatory strike. It was only thanks to the timing of Kleist’s amended order (Loehzer felt it arrived via Sperrle too late in the day for it to be amended without causing confusion) that this massive assault from the skies was launched.
3. Despite the luck spoken about above, the Germans deserve a lot of credit. The plan was bold. One can only beat the enemy before them, and whatever the inadequacies and problems the Allied armies contained, the Germans still had to win a war against an opponent that was similar in size and, in many cases, just as well if not better, equipped.
Look at the force composition (no. of men, tanks, aircraft etc). Germany should not have beaten France in May 1940 – or at least certainly not in 6 weeks. Maybe – even without the Breda Variant - they would have beaten the Allies ultimately, but the cost could have been colossal, and the German economy, as we know, were not set up for a long war. But that sets off a whole host of other questions…..
