American subs fire too few torps on valuable targets

[Dili]

ORIGINAL: K 19

ORIGINAL: Lokasenna

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961

Remember about 5 or 6 years ago when Japanese subs were shooting 6-8 torps per attack on insignificant allied targers like AKLs or DE/DDs? It was a legitimate gripe and you guys fixed it.

What I"m finding in my current game is American subs fire too few at large, valuable targers.

Twice in two months my subs have shot only 2 torperdoes at the Ryujo and yesterday only 2 at the Akagi.

This isn't logical and would defy American doctrine that full spreads should be fired at such valuable targets. If some skipper said he was only going to fire 2 fish as the Akagi-which was in good shape- his XO would immediately remove him from command and the crew would support his action. Not to mention the court-martial the skipper would face upon return to Pearl.

Both attacks happened in the fall of '43.

Check the aggression and naval ratings on your commanders.

I have to agree with Rusty. Due to standard naval combat doctrine, wouldn't the commander be required to attack with more than just one or two torps instead of a full salvo on such a valuable target, regardless of his supposed 'aggression rating'. Surely such an incompetent or overly-cautious sub commander would have been immediately relieved of duty or court-martialed (as mentioned above) in real life.

In my opinion, the game places way too much emphasis on aggression rating, which in turn overrides and ignores historical standard combat doctrine and procedures. Basically, every couch potato or overly-cautious sub commander in the navy can do whatever they want and still automatically keep their command. This over-emphasis on the aggression stat vs historical accuracy and doctrine reminds me too much of an RPG game.

No. First, the sub commander need to be close enough to know 100% certain what the target is. Did he ID the target correctly in first place?
The game is excellent showing the vagaries of war.

[BillBrown]

I used Intel Monkey to look back at previous sub attacks on CVs and BBs in one of my games. They all used 4 or 6 torpedoes for their attacks.
So I am not seeing what is being reported here about only 2 tube attacks.

I choose my sub comanders by using the following importance: Naval, Command, Aggression, Inspiration.
As Symon/JWE pointed out a long time ago, If you have a naval vessel your first priority is a very good Naval rating.
I tend to use average( or slightly above ) Aggression ratings ( about 45 - 55 is the normal range for me. )

[K 19]

ORIGINAL: Dili

ORIGINAL: K 19

ORIGINAL: Lokasenna




Check the aggression and naval ratings on your commanders.

I have to agree with Rusty. Due to standard naval combat doctrine, wouldn't the commander be required to attack with more than just one or two torps instead of a full salvo on such a valuable target, regardless of his supposed 'aggression rating'. Surely such an incompetent or overly-cautious sub commander would have been immediately relieved of duty or court-martialed (as mentioned above) in real life.

In my opinion, the game places way too much emphasis on aggression rating, which in turn overrides and ignores historical standard combat doctrine and procedures. Basically, every couch potato or overly-cautious sub commander in the navy can do whatever they want and still automatically keep their command. This over-emphasis on the aggression stat vs historical accuracy and doctrine reminds me too much of an RPG game.

No. First, the sub commander need to be close enough to know 100% certain what the target is. Did he ID the target correctly in first place?

The game is excellent showing the vagaries of war.

You may be correct, but I think it would be pretty hard to misidentify an enemy carrier as something else.

[Dili]

It is not, read history of reports that reach admirals. Even aircraft carriers mixed with a merchant. Not everyday is a sunny day , with the sun in right position. Not every men see perfectly and has the right mind. Some might slighty drunk, some maybe daltonic and eyesight is not perfect or was but turned not too. Or even not...

At 07:45, the scout confirmed that it had located "one carrier, one cruiser, and three destroyers". Another Shōkaku scout aircraft quickly confirmed the sighting.[45] The Shōkaku aircraft actually sighted and misidentified the oiler Neosho and destroyer Sims, which had earlier been detailed away from the fleet to a southern rendezvous point. Believing that he had located the American carriers, Hara, with Takagi's concurrence, immediately launched all of his available aircraft. A total of 78 aircraft—18 Zero fighters, 36 Aichi D3A dive bombers, and 24 torpedo aircraft—began launching from Shōkaku and Zuikaku at 08:00 and were on their way by 08:15 towards the reported sighting(...)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Coral_Sea

[Dili]

And then there are errors in messages sent. Code/decoding errors, ambiguous phrasing, etc.


At 08:15, a Yorktown SBD piloted by John L. Nielsen sighted Gotō's force screening the invasion convoy. Nielsen, making an error in his coded message, reported the sighting as "two carriers and four heavy cruisers" at 10°3′S 152°27′E, 225 nmi (259 mi; 417 km) northwest of TF17.[49] Fletcher concluded that the Japanese main carrier force was located and ordered the launch of all available carrier aircraft to attack. By 10:13, the American strike of 93 aircraft – 18 Grumman F4F Wildcats, 53 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers, and 22 Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers – was on its way. At 10:19, Nielsen landed and discovered his coding error. Although Gotō's force included the light carrier Shōhō, Nielsen thought that he saw two cruisers and four destroyers and thus the main fleet. At 10:12, Fletcher received a report of an aircraft carrier, ten transports, and 16 warships 30 nmi (35 mi; 56 km) south of Nielsen's sighting at 10°35′S 152°36′E. The B-17s actually saw the same thing as Nielsen: Shōhō, Gotō's cruisers, plus the Port Moresby Invasion Force. Believing that the B-17's sighting was the main Japanese carrier force (which was in fact well to the east), Fletcher directed the airborne strike force towards this target.

In this case his message error regarding a carrier was more correct than what the american pilot think he saw.

[Dili]

Inoue's staff directed two groups of attack aircraft from Rabaul, already airborne since that morning, towards Crace's reported position. The first group included 12 torpedo-armed G4M bombers and the second group comprised 19 Mitsubishi G3M land attack aircraft armed with bombs. Both groups found and attacked Crace's ships at 14:30 and claimed to have sunk a "California-type" battleship and damaged another battleship and cruiser. In reality, Crace's ships were undamaged and shot down four G4Ms. A short time later, three U.S. Army B-17s mistakenly bombed Crace, but caused no damage.


Several of the Japanese dive bombers encountered the American carriers in the darkness, around 19:00, and briefly confused as to their identity, circled in preparation for landing before anti-aircraft fire from TF 17's destroyers drove them away.


In the meantime, at 15:18 and 17:18 Neosho was able to radio TF 17 she was drifting northwest in a sinking condition. Neosho's 17:18 report gave wrong coordinates, which hampered subsequent U.S. rescue efforts

[Korvar]

I also took a look at my current campaign via Intel Monkey - I'm seeing that 2 torpedo attacks against capital ships (CV of all types, BB, CA) are rare.

So far there have been 1,655 submarine attacks total, including both torpedo and surface attacks. 1,232 of those have been torpedo attacks. This includes both Allied and Japanese attacks.

Of the 1,232 torpedo attacks, 934 (75.8%) used 2 torpedoes, 280 (22.7%) used 4 torpedoes, and 18 (1.5%) used 6 torpedoes.

Of the 18 attacks where 6 torpedoes were launched, the targets were as follows: CV 5 (27.8%), BB 1 (5.6%), CA 2 (11.1%), DD 2 (11.1%), CM 2 (11.1%), AO 6 (33.3%).

Looking at attacks against CVs of all types, there are 16 total attacks: 2 torpedoes were used in 2 attacks (12.5%), 4 torpedoes were used in 9 attacks (56.3%), and 6 torpedoes were used in 5 attacks (31.3%).

Of the two attacks against carriers which only used 2 torpedoes, one was by an SSX (mini-sub) and the other by an S-boat.

For BBs and CAs, the 2/4/6 torpedo attack spread was as follows: BB (0/3/1 -> 4 total), CA (1/7/2 -> 10 total).


In my game at least, it appears that 4 torpedo attacks are most common against CV (all types), BB, and CA with a tendency to use more 6 torpedo attacks than 2 torpedo attacks. I didn't go into detail about the 2 torpedo attacks, but I can tell you that just transports (xAP/AP/xAK/AK) represent over 80% of all attacks. That figure drops to about half of that with 4 torpedo attacks. Against tankers (TK), it is the reverse: 2 torpedo attacks against them only represent a little over 7% of all 2-torpedo attacks, but TKs account for about 38% of all 4-torpedo attacks. To me, all these figures show clear prioritization of high value targets and ammo conservation against less valuable targets, as it should be.


I think the point I brought up previously is something to think about - how many of the games out there were started before the updated AI and data files were available? That's a possible explanation of why some of you are seeing different results in your campaigns. The campaign I pulled these stats from was started with the latest of everything I could find on the forums running ver .26b (the latest beta).

[Yaab]

USN sub doctrine was to sink xAKs and TKs. Sinking BBs and CVs was just a sideshow to earn publicity points.

[Korvar]

Yes, USN sub doctrine was to prioritize hunting the Japanese merchant fleet - a US sub commander would have been chewed out (or relieved) for repeatedly passing up good transport targets to save torpedoes exclusively for warships. Even getting close enough to a high value target where a firing solution was possible was rare, so it wasn't reasonable to spend a lot of time hunting trophy kills.

At the same time, a US sub commander presented with the opportunity to attack a high value target like a carrier or battleship would be expected to attempt the strongest attack possible. Ammo conservation would no longer be a consideration - even if it meant firing all remaining torpedoes on board and ending the patrol, a shot at a capital ship was worth it. Better to overkill than miss the opportunity. Higher risk taking would also be justifiable, balancing the increased likelihood of success vs the risk to the asset (crew/ship).

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Some players are experimenting with different settings to see if they enhance sub performance. For instance, Lowpe (I think) is using "Low" aggression sub commanders to see if that persuades them to ignore escorts to target more valuable ships. I don't know what his findings are, to this point. And there may be other settings that enhance how a sub takes on a major target. So there may be an issue or there may not be.

The larger point that the Allied sub game may be way too diluted compared to real life is almost certainly true. I think Bullwinkle has been articulate in setting forth the case for this.

But there's an even larger point. The game has reached a mature state in which both sides pretty much know what they get. There's a balance that's been achieved over the years, so that a remedy applied to any one area may threatend to unbalance the competitive nature of the game.

In many ways AE doesn't model the actual conflict of the war or is an abstract representation of major elements of the war, all in the name of a superb, intricate, complicated, challenging, balanced game that makes Japan strong early and the Allies strong late.

So what I'm saying is: as a community, we'll have to approach "corrections" carefully for the sake of balance.

My point is that aggression should play no part in the decision to fire a full-spread at such a lucrative target. Doctrine would dictate such actions.

Right now America subs are only good for reconissance and nothing else. Asking for a full-spread to be fired at the Akagi isn't upsetting the play-balance.

Totally disagree with this. You just need to learn how to make good use of American subs. Even, with crappy torpedes, I have had success. There are many other Allies players on this board who are even more effective with their submarines than me. I have sunk two CVs and a CVL with subs in my game vs a good opponent-with many more capital ships attacked and damaged. Virtually all of my subs have shot 4 or 6 torpedo spreads when a key target was attacked. My only gripe is that I wish they would fire larger spreads at merchants in 1943. That was actually the practice when the torpedoes were so unreliable. Not doctrine but practice.

Regardless, with the loss of michaelm, you should not plan on seeing much in the way of changes in the game. You will just have to adapt. PM me if you want some tips on how I make use of my subs.

[MakeeLearn]

Aggression of submarine commanders...

tm.asp?m=3072909&mpage=1&key=aggression�

tm.asp?m=3303815&mpage=1&key=aggression�

[BillBrown]

This fragment for section 19.2 of the manual may explain some of the confusion:

And, although the player can see all the ships in the defending task force,
the task force commander may not be able to.

I also take this to mean that you may see the type of ship, but the actual on site commander may
misidentify the ship.

[Alpha77]

ORIGINAL: spence

Doctrine would dictate such actions.

+1

Right now US/Allied subs usually fire the same number of torpedoes at Akagi/Yamato as at a PB.

Well Yamato fires also a "full spread or salvo" of scarce main gun ammo at juicy targets like AMs, SCs or AKLs....[;)] And I guess eg. IOWA will do the same ?

So Yamato was send out to fight some CA/BB fleet and stumbles on her merry way about a fleet with 3 AMs, and later over a fleet with 1 SC and 4 AKLs....in the evening of this day finally the enemy BBs were sighted.

Capt of Yamato rubbing his hands: "Finally, the GREATEST day of the IJ navy has arrived. Those 2 old battleships of the weakling imperalists willbe blown out of the water"!

... boom crash... boom.... gurgle gurgle..bubble bubble...

Capt, hardly keeping himself over water "Seems my ship has sunk...what the fuck happened??"

An offcier smimming near him: "We were out of ammo, capt san. Remember all those nice helpless targets we sank with 46cm like those small cargo and escort ships?"

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: Alpha77

ORIGINAL: spence

Doctrine would dictate such actions.

+1

Right now US/Allied subs usually fire the same number of torpedoes at Akagi/Yamato as at a PB.

Well Yamato fires also a "full spread or salvo" of scarce main gun ammo at juicy targets like AMs, SCs or AKLs....[;)] And I guess eg. IOWA will do the same ?

So Yamato was send out to fight some CA/BB fleet and stumbles on her merry way about a fleet with 3 AMs, and later over a fleet with 1 SC and 4 AKLs....in the evening of this day finally the enemy BBs were sighted.

Capt of Yamato rubbing his hands: "Finally, the GREATEST day of the IJ navy has arrived. Those 2 old battleships of the weakling imperalists willbe blown out of the water"!

... boom crash... boom.... gurgle gurgle..bubble bubble...

Capt, hardly keeping himself over water "Seems my ship has sunk...what the fuck happened??"

An offcier smimming near him: "We were out of ammo, capt san. Remember all those nice helpless targets we sank with 46cm like those small cargo and escort ships?"

Presumably Yamato would fire HE shells at unarmored targets, and save the AP/SAP for BB/CAs.

[Lokasenna]

ORIGINAL: Zorch

ORIGINAL: Alpha77

ORIGINAL: spence



+1

Right now US/Allied subs usually fire the same number of torpedoes at Akagi/Yamato as at a PB.

Well Yamato fires also a "full spread or salvo" of scarce main gun ammo at juicy targets like AMs, SCs or AKLs....[;)] And I guess eg. IOWA will do the same ?

So Yamato was send out to fight some CA/BB fleet and stumbles on her merry way about a fleet with 3 AMs, and later over a fleet with 1 SC and 4 AKLs....in the evening of this day finally the enemy BBs were sighted.

Capt of Yamato rubbing his hands: "Finally, the GREATEST day of the IJ navy has arrived. Those 2 old battleships of the weakling imperalists willbe blown out of the water"!

... boom crash... boom.... gurgle gurgle..bubble bubble...

Capt, hardly keeping himself over water "Seems my ship has sunk...what the fuck happened??"

An offcier smimming near him: "We were out of ammo, capt san. Remember all those nice helpless targets we sank with 46cm like those small cargo and escort ships?"

Presumably Yamato would fire HE shells at unarmored targets, and save the AP/SAP for BB/CAs.

The game doesn't differentiate between shell type - if it does, it only uses one of them.

[Alpha77]

Zorch meant in "real life" but in this case Yamato would not fire at all, if their mission was to engage a BB/CA fleet. The battlefleet with Yamato would be faster than AKLs or AMs etc. If they stumbled upon them they would certainly first try to disengage asap to fullfill their main mission. If somehow not possible use only light weapons. So ammo would be left to fight BBs/CAs. As you can see these abstractions in the game do not only hurt Allied subs. So we need to live with them.

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: Alpha77

Zorch meant in "real life" but in this case Yamato would not fire at all, if their mission was to engage a BB/CA fleet. The battlefleet with Yamato would be faster than AKLs or AMs etc. If they stumbled upon them they would certainly first try to disengage asap to fullfill their main mission. If somehow not possible use only light weapons. So ammo would be left to fight BBs/CAs. As you can see these abstractions in the game do not only hurt Allied subs. So we need to live with them.

Right.