Soviet Barbarossa

[821Bobo]

ORIGINAL: Capitaine

Nothing from my "source" but I did come across an actual Soviet archived top secret document, Document 103202/06, which became available after the fall of the USSR. This was signed by Marshall Timoshenko and the Chief of the Soviet General Staff at that time Merezkov. It outlines "Operation Thunderstorm" (or "Operatsia Groza") comprising the invasion of Europe slated for July 10, 1941. It was signed three months before Operation Barbarossa was signed.

It's mentioned in this Wikipedia entry here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Igor_Bunich

I think it's mentioned in that article that Stalin wasn't a military man but a statesman, and relied on others to implement his plans. Now, this looks concrete to me and with something like this in the offing you'd have to insist that nothing short of waiting till an actual Soviet invasion would provide proof of their intent if this doesn't convince you.

You are talking about MP-41 which was mobilization plan for year 41, not plan for invasion. True is that forces mobilized according to MP-41 were enormous and this rises question about purpose of such huge build up. Most obvious answer is attack on Germany.
Plans about Soviet attack on Germany were never revealed and never will(if exist).

[Capitaine]

I defer to your greater familiarity with this matter.

[Aurelian]

ORIGINAL: Capitaine

Maybe, although I doubt puffery constitutes academic proof. Like I've said, evidence to the contrary is evidence to the contrary, Glantz notwithstanding. Vee shall see.

Puffery Smuffery. Read the book then. I did.

[Aufklaerungs]

If you're interested in Col Glantz's recent/current thinking on this very subject, you can easily reach him directly with the contact info provided at http://www.glantzbooks.com/.

I agree with morvael that "not-so-incredible" what-if scenarios would be a tremendous addition, especially for advanced players who have mastered the conventionally accepted versions they've played over the last eight years.

[No idea]

I wonder how they would do it, because currently attacking as the soviets in june 41 is completely pointless [:D]

[HardLuckYetAgain]

ORIGINAL: No idea

I wonder how they would do it, because currently attacking as the soviets in june 41 is completely pointless [:D]

How this games “reality” is set up makes it totally pointless in this game.

[Capitaine]

If you believe that the Soviet units were just inherently poor at the outset of Barbarossa, then it is probably a pointless exercise.

On the other hand, if Soviet units were caught unaware, in attack posture and mentality, had no defensive plan, and thus were in utter confusion responding to the German attack, then perhaps reversing the situation with the Soviets on offense might play differently. You've got to establish the correct rationale for the German offensive success early in Barbarossa, first. In my opinion.

[tyronec]

On the other hand, if Soviet units were caught unaware, in attack posture and mentality, had no defensive plan, and thus were in utter confusion responding to the German attack, then perhaps reversing the situation with the Soviets on offense might play differently. You've got to establish the correct rationale for the German offensive success early in Barbarossa, first. In my opinion.

Well there is a good opportunity to test your prognosis. The Soviets are deployed in attack posture - as you say. So just skip the Axis first move and let the Soviets attack. If they can take Berlin in '41 then you have evidence that an attack could have made some sense.

[Aufklaerungs]

Or do a scenario that has a Sov 1st turn on 15 July, allowing him to finish his attack prep according to his time table; 50+ morale for extra time with the politruks whipping them up; adjust experience to reflect refit-training time and manpower plus-up to reflect new arrivals between 22 June and 15 July. First turn initiative belongs to Sovs, so no axis bonus; full movement allowance, 100%+ for supplies, fuel and ammo, and high TOE rating should make for an interesting situation. Especially if Axis side is not in any kind of defensive posture similar to what the original campaign designers gratuitously provided for the the Red team (dug in and fortified -prepared defensive lines).

[Capitaine]

ORIGINAL: tyronec

On the other hand, if Soviet units were caught unaware, in attack posture and mentality, had no defensive plan, and thus were in utter confusion responding to the German attack, then perhaps reversing the situation with the Soviets on offense might play differently. You've got to establish the correct rationale for the German offensive success early in Barbarossa, first. In my opinion.

Well there is a good opportunity to test your prognosis. The Soviets are deployed in attack posture - as you say. So just skip the Axis first move and let the Soviets attack. If they can take Berlin in '41 then you have evidence that an attack could have made some sense.

I think you'd have to estimate lesser German forces on the frontier as well, since the scenario would presume the Germans didn't preempt the Soviet attack.

And, on Barbarossa D-Day, the Soviet deployments wouldn't be final. You'd have to move them into more effective attack position for a July 10 or 15 jump off date perhaps. Aircraft presence different... Would you assume a standard German garrison force on the frontier? Or what? A lot of variables.

[Kull]

Has anyone read "Stalin's Folly" by Constantine Pleshakov? It's got a lot of information on this matter, including the existence of a single 15 page document delivered to Stalin ("black ink in Vasilevsky's handwriting"), marked "only copy" which was dated 5/15/41 and lays out the details of a pre-emptive strike. No date was given for the attack, but it "suggested finalizing preparations in 1942".

That certainly doesn't support the "early assault" mentioned in the OP, but the author believes that Stalin accelerated the plan dramatically soon thereafter, to include calling up 800,000 reservists in May & June and directing five armies to take up position on the border by July 10th. There's a lot more to it than this of course, and altogether it's an intriguing read. Certainly there was an awful lot of "smoke" pointing to a pending offensive as opposed to movements intended to support a defensive plan.

[Aufklaerungs]

I read it and highly recommend it to anyone curious about this controversy. Pleshakov has argued compellingly since 1990 against historians who want to lay full blame for the Cold War at the feet of Stalin (refers to it as "one hand clapping" theory). IMO, he's even-handed and pulls no punches.

[Telemecus]

I hate to keep banging on these point - but military plans mean nothing. In the 1930s the US military had plans to invade Canada and Britain, Britain plans to attack the USA. Those are well known and published. A good military staff will have plans for everything - including first strike attacks on friends. Only in the latter half of the 20th century did military staffs stop making any plans for attacking everybody.

No amount of war planning meant that the Soviet Union was going to invade Germany anymore than the United States was going to invade Canada. The question is a political one, not military.

The Soviet Union started a war on, blackmailed or occupied every one of its neighbours except Turkey. If Stalin thought he could win a war against Germany easily I have no doubt he would have done it. In 1938 over Czechoslovakia he might have done it in alliance with the west. To know whether the Soviet Union would actually have invaded Germany in 1939 you need to go into the political archives, not military ones. And in the case of totalitarian regimes like the Soviet Union probably even then that would not tell you - you need to go into the mind of Stalin himself.

[postfux]

Planning for an attack dated 5/15/41 is likely a reaction to Germanys conquest of the Balkans. This war of agression also brought Germany on collision course with the SU.

Hasty planning in this timeframe for an attack on Germany can also be interpreted as a lack of intent to attack Germany.

[Stelteck]

auto moderated (I do not know how to delete my own post. I should stop posting in troll thread

[Capitaine]

ORIGINAL: Telemecus

I hate to keep banging on these point - but military plans mean nothing. In the 1930s the US military had plans to invade Canada and Britain, Britain plans to attack the USA. Those are well known and published. A good military staff will have plans for everything - including first strike attacks on friends. Only in the latter half of the 20th century did military staffs stop making any plans for attacking everybody.

No amount of war planning meant that the Soviet Union was going to invade Germany anymore than the United States was going to invade Canada. The question is a political one, not military.

The Soviet Union started a war on, blackmailed or occupied every one of its neighbours except Turkey. If Stalin thought he could win a war against Germany easily I have no doubt he would have done it. In 1938 over Czechoslovakia he might have done it in alliance with the west. To know whether the Soviet Union would actually have invaded Germany in 1939 you need to go into the political archives, not military ones. And in the case of totalitarian regimes like the Soviet Union probably even then that would not tell you - you need to go into the mind of Stalin himself.

So the only evidence acceptable to you is actual behavior -- actually launching the offensive. If "plans" to attack and orders to mobilize wouldn't be enough for you, what separates you from just being a reflexive denier?

[Telemecus]

ORIGINAL: Capitaine
So the only evidence acceptable to you is actual behavior -- actually launching the offensive. If "plans" to attack and orders to mobilize wouldn't be enough for you, what separates you from just being a reflexive denier?

Never a good idea to attack the messenger and ignore the message. I have no views beyond a guess Stalin probably would have done if he thought he could win - so no denial or agreement from me.

The facts come from political analysis, not military war plans - as was described in the message. To refute that message you have to show why military plans would mean an intention to invade in the Soviet Union while it did not anywhere else? Without that you have a fallacious argument - quite simply however true "A" is "B" does not follow. In which case you have to establish things which really would prove the Soviet Union was going to invade which would be something else. If there is no "proof" you are back to the reality of a lot of what we know about history that it is guesses and balance of evidence, not "proof." You cannot refute an argument that your logic is flawed by pretending someone else has a different view they have never claimed to have.

[Aufklaerungs]

I hate to keep banging on these point - but military plans mean nothing. In the 1930s the US military had plans to invade Canada and Britain, Britain plans to attack the USA. Those are well known and published. A good military staff will have plans for everything - including first strike attacks on friends. Only in the latter half of the 20th century did military staffs stop making any plans for attacking everybody.

There's a huge difference between contingency planning and operational planning. OPlans are based on timelines and critical dates/actions set by an operational commander. In this case the debate hinges more on operational planning and designated dates. Both types of planning include specifying resources, but only operational planning triggers marshalling those resources in assembly areas, as we know was the case with Germany. Question remains was SU in the same posture, and concentrating for a jump-off in compliance with their own operational timeline.

Pleshakov's fact-vidence seems to be that there were undeniable early warning indicators of imminent hostilities on both sides of the border, and neither side was preparing for defensive operations.

[Telemecus]

ORIGINAL: Aufklaerungs
There's a huge difference between contingency planning and operational planning. OPlans are based on timelines and critical dates/actions set by an operational commander. In this case the debate hinges more on operational planning and designated dates. Both types of planning include specifying resources, but only operational planning triggers marshalling those resources in assembly areas, as we know was the case with Germany. Question remains was SU in the same posture, and concentrating for a jump-off in compliance with their own operational timeline.

That would be much more persuasive. We could get into semantics about the difference between "plans" and "intentions" - but clearly documents giving an order to invade on date "X" signed by Stalin would be much closer to proof than contingency plans. Operational plans, without political signoff, are still a very grey area. In world war two Britain had very advanced operational plans with dates to invade Norway - but it is still very debatable whether there was the real political intention, or possibility, to do so. And that was with units already assigned tasks and being assembled. As it happens Germany got there first, and some of the units for the invasion became units to help the Norwegian defence. Even with just operational plans including dates it is still contentious whether Britain and France would have invaded Norway.

ORIGINAL: Aufklaerungs
Pleshakov's fact-vidence seems to be that there were undeniable early warning indicators of imminent hostilities on both sides of the border, and neither side was preparing for defensive operations.

I do not know Pleshakov's evidence so I would be interested. Clearly my thought is there would still be an is-ought gap. Some facts can be 100% true but still not imply a commitment to invade if they are not about the political decision. If Churchill could keep troops near ports for an invasion of Norway without pressing the go button, so could Stalin in the East. Leaders like to have options even if they will not use them.

[Ridgeway]

ORIGINAL: Capitaine

..... denier?

You might want to be careful throwing that word around.