USN CL Question

[DOCUP]

Did the USN design any small cruisers with a large load of torpedoes? Around 5k ton.

[btd64]

John 3rd has a book on the subject. Experimental warships or something....GP

[Admiral DadMan]

I have a few as well. I will have a look...

Akin to the IJN Kitakami class, yes?

[DOCUP]

Admiral: Yes, something similar. Maybe 3 twin 5/38s and a large TT bank a little bit of armor.

[btd64]

Would make a nice upgrade for the four piper CL's. It could make them more useful....GP

[Admiral DadMan]

Nothing found as yet. I have to say though, US torpedoes suck, so for me, this would be a non-starter.

[spence]

It's interesting to note that the HIJMS Oi and HIJMS Kitikami never fired a live broadside of torpedoes and they were both later converted to carrying barges instead of torpedoes. Having 5 mounts per side and the propensity of the Japanese "oxygen propelled" torpedoes to explode and destroy the carrying ship when subjected to relatively minor fires (IIRC either the Chikuma or Chokai suffered a 5" shell near miss that caused its torpedoes to explode) may have caused the Japanese to reconsider those ships' armament after Midway when the contrast between the fates of HIJMS Mogami and HIJMS Mikuma demonstrated the hazards posed by the torpedoes themselves (Mogami jettisoned its torpedoes survived while Mikuma held onto its torpedoes and was sunk after they exploded).

[jwolf]

the propensity of the Japanese "oxygen propelled" torpedoes to explode and destroy the carrying ship when subjected to relatively minor fires

Is this effect modeled in the game, above and beyond normal damage control and fire routines?

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: jwolf

the propensity of the Japanese "oxygen propelled" torpedoes to explode and destroy the carrying ship when subjected to relatively minor fires

Is this effect modeled in the game, above and beyond normal damage control and fire routines?

I think the danger from the torpedoes exploding is built into the durability rating of the ship.

[DRF99]

Found this list on Axis History Forum:

Six Japanese cruisers were sunk due, at least in part, to fires and/or explosions among their oxygen torpedoes.

6 June 1942: Mikuma is hit by bombs, fire breaks out among the torpedoes, torpedoes explode, ship sinks. (Sister Mogami, also bombed that day, has already jettisoned her torpedoes and survives.)

11 October 1942: Furutaka hit by American naval gunfire at night, fires almost immediately break out among her torpedoes, illuminating the ship, apparently drawing more gunfire. Ship is sunk.

3 April 1943: Aoba is hit by bomb from a B-17, torpedoes explode, ship is beached to avoid total loss. Later salvaged.

25 October 1944: Mogami hit by two American 8-inch shells. Fire breaks out, she collides with Nachi (her third collision of the war), then her torpedoes explode. She is bombed and torpedoed again by American aircraft, and finally must be scuttled.

25 October 1944: Suzuya is missed by bombs, but fragments from near misses ignite fires among her torpedoes, torpedoes explode, ship sinks.

25 October 1944: Abukuma is hit by 3 bombs dropped by B-24s. Fires detonate 4 Type 93 torpedoes, ship sinks.

[Zorch]

Oi and Kitikami would have been deadly in the Solomons night battles, properly used. Fire a torpedo broadside and run away before they get hit. Fortunately the Japs didn't see fit to use them there.

[spence]

Oi and Kitikami would have been deadly in the Solomons night battles, properly used. Fire a torpedo broadside and run away before they get hit. Fortunately the Japs didn't see fit to use them there.

Only if surprise was achieved. You would have a hard time arguing that the Japanese achieved surprise in every battle. A hit/near hit/fire on/near one of 10 torpedo mounts on Oi or Kitakami early in a fight might attract alot of unwanted attention.

Given the game's (sometimes) endorsement of Japanese torpedo doctrine, does anyone have some insight as to why they decided to convert those two ships to carrying barges rather than torpedoes?

BTW: From the TROMs of Japanese cruisers on Combined Fleet (25 October 1944):

At 0859, a secondary explosion, probably caused by CHOKAI's own torpedoes on deck, knocks out her engines and rudder. She shears out of formation to port and moves eastward.

Although Chokai was attacked subsequently by TBMs and hit with several aerial torpedoes the explosion of her own torpedoes probably caused her severe damage that was, if not the proximate cause of her sinking; a mighty contribution to her fate.

So that would make 7 cruisers suffering from the explosion of their own torpedoes.

[spence]

quote:

ORIGINAL: jwolf

quote:

the propensity of the Japanese "oxygen propelled" torpedoes to explode and destroy the carrying ship when subjected to relatively minor fires



Is this effect modeled in the game, above and beyond normal damage control and fire routines?


I think the danger from the torpedoes exploding is built into the durability rating of the ship.

Then why do the Kitikami and Oi have the same durability as the other 1920s classes of IJN CLs such as Kuma, Nagara, Sendai et al when those ships have 1/5 as many torpedoes/mounts(28 ratings for those classes)?

[John 3rd]

ORIGINAL: DOCUP

Did the USN design any small cruisers with a large load of torpedoes? Around 5k ton.

Friedman's US Cruisers is an excellent source for this type of question. Pretty much covers any and all designs for American cruisers during the period.

Warships After Washington is also excellent!

[John 3rd]

ORIGINAL: Admiral DadMan

Nothing found as yet. I have to say though, US torpedoes suck, so for me, this would be a non-starter.

Ditto Here with no luck...

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: spence
Given the game's (sometimes) endorsement of Japanese torpedo doctrine, does anyone have some insight as to why they decided to convert those two ships to carrying barges rather than torpedoes?

The Kitakami and Oi's pre-war conversion to torpedo cruisers were to allow them to perform long-range "concealed firing" duties in the expected "Decisive Battle". They were not intended for the closer range torpedo attacks that were to become the common standard for IJN night combat during 1942. Given that, I'd suggest the Japanese adapted them for the transport role in Aug '42 so that they at least could serve a useful purpose for the time being.

BTW: From the TROMs of Japanese cruisers on Combined Fleet (25 October 1944):

At 0859, a secondary explosion, probably caused by CHOKAI's own torpedoes on deck, knocks out her engines and rudder. She shears out of formation to port and moves eastward.

Don't forget the word "probably". It's a theory by Tully from Combinedfleet.com that he believes is a best-fit as an explanation for what happened at this time to the Chokai. However, neither the Chokai nor the ships accompanying her reported any detonation of Chokai's on-board torpedoes, only a bomb hit from US aircraft. And the US ships that were known to be firing at her did not mention any major explosions beyond what would be expected from their 5" rounds. If Chokai's torpedoes went boom at some point during this period, no one seems to have mentioned it in either side's reports. Tully's theory is plausible but it's still circumstantial.

So that would make 7 cruisers suffering from the explosion of their own torpedoes.

Personally, I wouldn't include Furutaka in that list either. While the Furutaka's report of the action indicated a belief that it was the short but spectacular oxygen fire in her port torpedoes that likely drew her enemy's fire, the reports of the US cruisers actually doing the firing don't support this. The USS Salt Lake City and USS Helena had already selected the approaching Furutaka as an FC target prior to the oxygen fire occuring. And it's likely from the Helena's account that it was a hit from one of her salvoes that started the oxygen fire on the Furutaka in the first place.

As for the other two US cruisers, the USS Boise selected the Furutaka only after the Salt Lake City and Helena had already opened fire and the only flames the Boise reported seeing on her new target was near the bow and not in the area of the port torpedo tubes. And the USS San Francisco didn't target the Furutaka at all in this period.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

Friedman's US Cruisers is an excellent source for this type of question. Pretty much covers any and all designs for American cruisers during the period.

Warships After Washington is also excellent!

So would it seem the Omaha class's original 10 TT armament was as ambitious as US light cruiser design got with torpedoes between the wars?

[rustysi]

Given that, I'd suggest the Japanese adapted them for the transport role in Aug '42 so that they at least could serve a useful purpose for the time being.

Yup. Done.[:D]

[crsutton]

Never seen them do diddly squat in any of my campaigns. Just don't see that the engine can handle a 20 torpedo spread.

[spence]

Don't forget the word "probably". It's a theory by Tully from Combinedfleet.com that he believes is a best-fit as an explanation for what happened at this time to the Chokai. However, neither the Chokai nor the ships accompanying her reported any detonation of Chokai's on-board torpedoes, only a bomb hit from US aircraft. And the US ships that were known to be firing at her did not mention any major explosions beyond what would be expected from their 5" rounds. If Chokai's torpedoes went boom at some point during this period, no one seems to have mentioned it in either side's reports. Tully's theory is plausible but it's still circumstantial

Don't forget also that the Chokai was either the largest ship or one of the largest ships lost with all hands in the war (Chokai's survivors were lost when their "rescuing
DD was sunk with all hands a day later). The USS White Plains and USS Samuel Roberts both claimed a secondary explosion much larger than anything possible with their 5" guns on Chokai. Although HIJMS Haguro was trying to keep a detailed log of the action against Taffy 3 and it disputes the claims by Samuel Roberts and White Plains it needs to be noted that its AAR notes it was caused 10 minutes earlier those ship's claims by an air attack that didn't happen (according to other ships in the IJN TF). Having personally "overseen" the writing of a ship's logbook (from which any subsequent AAR will be taken) in the midst of a particularly intense search and rescue and assistance incident I find that the exact times of things not immediately affecting the safety of one's own ship might well be "estimated" or not recalled in perfect sequence. It is well to remember that all involved (and others) were trying to kill one another at the time of the explosion.

Also while looking into this torpedo question I found that the HIJMS Abukuma also noted the explosion of its Type 93s from fires reaching its torpedo room subsequent to an air attack (which was subsequent to to its more famous torpedoing by PTs). That would make 8 IJN cruisers which may have been lost due at least in part to their own torpedoes.