China - What have you done here as a modder?

[el cid again]

WITP (pre AE as well as AE) basically oversimplifies the entire concept of support. They do
provide the regular and motorized support squad, but that is it. This does NOT simulate the difference in
lift of various kinds of units.

In order to model that, RHS has four kinds of transportation squads -
bearers (humans)
pack (mules or horses)
draft (wagons or carts pulled by mules or horses)
truck
All of these are very peculiar almost unarmed squads and they are matched
by an equal number of support (or motorized support) squads.

Strangely, motorized units are actually smaller than unmotorized units are,
and have fewer "mouths to feed." At the same time, motorized major units have
more firepower (because of bigger artillery tubes). The weakest units - mainly
because they have the lightest artillery - are those supported by bearers.
Non motorized units are much more difficult to "lift" - more squads - and much
more expensive to "feed" - more squads again. Our "transport" units don't
transport anything in game terms - they carry what is needed by the units they
"support." The only game effects of these squads are to show the cost in shipping
and supply a real supply train has on a major unit (e.g. a division). Otherwise,
by increasing squad count, they have a minimal effect on combat. But they have
almost no weapons and no heavy weapons.

[Dili]

Problem is all those squads that do nothing make the other side waste hits on them but don't effect the combat capability of the unit. I prefer to increase the load cost of devices and squads if it is a viable alternative.

[US87891]

ORIGINAL: ny59giants_MatrixForum
What changes have you done in this theater to make the war more static and a stalemate like it actually was?

There seems to be significant differences in what China has from stock to DBB.

JWE made some modifications to China before we replaced AE with our own programs. The purpose was to present the simulation teams with the sorts of problems that an actual commander would have faced. Focus was on two main areas, movement and infrastructure; movement was too fast and too easy; infrastructure was too lax in modeling the debilitating effects of activity – any activity, from combat down to simple movement.

Movement: edited all roads and railroads down a level. An expansion of the “gnarly roads” variant, this takes all primary roads down to secondary <except in urban hexes> and all secondary roads down to “graded trace” or “trace”. The hidden web of roads in the great Chinese plain <the tracks of “gnarly roads”> were deleted and movement defaults to the terrain rate, except for a few judicious retentions. Other tracks, such as those following railroads, were deleted as well, except for judicious terrain related retentions <certain RRs through mountainous regions>. Major railroads were modified to minor. Minor railroads were broken <half-hex gaps created> at selected intersections.

The “track” type road designation was changed to “trace” and represents unimproved, ‘semi-graded’ surfaces suitable for slow, careful, directionally constrained, movement through otherwise problematic terrain. An additional road type, “graded trace”, was created having movement/supply characteristics half way between a secondary road and a trace. All these combine to constrain movement speed and diffusivity and canalize direction, placing a premium on operational planning.

Infrastructure: Support was conceptually redefined. “Motorized support” is nothing but a text label in the database. The name is irrelevant and can be changed to anything anyone wants. The device data is the only relevant factor. It is important to recognize that “devices” have nothing whatever to do with movement. The movement algorithm is only functional at the “unit” (LCU) level. The two support devices (252 and 253) were modified with different load costs, builds, and characteristics, representing different differences between intrinsic and extrinsic support and different national norms. These can be used in any and all mixes of ‘leg’ and ‘motor’ units for different movement rates.

Support was conceptualized into two main types: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic support is that contained within a unit (LCU) itself. This was reduced to the region of 20% to 40% of required levels, depending on respective national norms. This means that LCUs are unable to sustain long term activity, especially in remote regions. Chinese units are clearly at the bottom of the scale, but the Japanese are not very much better off. Their operational norms required support to be concentrated at higher echelons (division HQ or higher), while the “operational” units made do with approximately 25-28% of requirements. The extrinsic support devices (squads) are found in HQ units and/or QM/Sup/Ord/Med LCUs. They provide the “extra” support required by operational units to remain healthy, but according to AE algorithms only “share” functionality at bases. One can see how drastically this effects operations and how much planning (and preparation and time) is required to undertake a major advance, such as Ichi Go.

These are the high points.

[Dili]

ORIGINAL: US87891


(...)

Support was conceptualized into two main types: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic support is that contained within a unit (LCU) itself. This was reduced to the region of 20% to 40% of required levels, depending on respective national norms. This means that LCUs are unable to sustain long term activity, especially in remote regions. Chinese units are clearly at the bottom of the scale, but the Japanese are not very much better off. Their operational norms required support to be concentrated at higher echelons (division HQ or higher), while the “operational” units made do with approximately 25-28% of requirements. The extrinsic support devices (squads) are found in HQ units and/or QM/Sup/Ord/Med LCUs. They provide the “extra” support required by operational units to remain healthy, but according to AE algorithms only “share” functionality at bases. One can see how drastically this effects operations and how much planning (and preparation and time) is required to undertake a major advance, such as Ichi Go.

These are the high points.

This is something i have been dealing with for my Med mod . Persistence of units on field and necessity of their rotation out of combat. This would mean that the support of a typical corps should be less than the devices of all units of the Corps, they should have to go to a base that has excess support to recover. That means a city.

The city support is also dependent on city size and industry, these are the base forces in my mod, because i also ended mostly the concept of base forces for field combat. So a land element of a aircraft squadron if it is alone in a base is very vulnerable to a special force attack since they only have air support, some support and 1 or 2 Mg's.
So Base forces are mostly static units at city level with some exceptions.
With sound detectors less performing and radar somewhat too ( i wonder if i should make a "city" radar - careful chosen sites etc- and a "field" radar less performing) i intend to make maneuvering of air squadrons also an eventual solution to defense from air attacks at least in beginning of war forcing the other side to invest in anti-air reconnaissance. The bomber will always get trough was true in earlier war in field. Only a complete radar network in Britain - not sound detector - could stop most of it even then there were many instances of small low level attacks that succeeded before being intercepted even in late war.

I have several militia AA, infantry and coastal units and since they were not capable of fight in the field and i want to retain the capability to move them from city to city i made them without or with a very small support.

Another unit that had a drastic change of support are special forces, they also barely have any. They are go in go out units one time attack. To recover disabled devices only at city base they come from.

Of course only testing will show if all this theory works.

[US87891]

The thread is speaking about China.

[Dili]

Yes but that support issues are valid for any theater.

[US87891]

There was also a revamp of the Chinese OOBs to reflect normative practice in the 1942-44 period. The artillery was vetted specifically.

Functional GHQ Artillery Pool as of March 1942:
These were organized in 17 Artillery Regiments, totaling 377 guns in 41 battalions. These were separate and distinct from artillery allocated to division and field army echelons. These were closely held by GHQ and parceled out to War Areas, in battalion (occasionally regiment) packets, for specific operations. These are always listed separately in OPOL returns and are typically not included in War Area, Group Army, and Field Army tabulated returns.

1st Artillery Regiment- 19 guns in 2 Bns of 3x 3 gun batteries each; Bofors 75mm L/20 Mtn
2nd Artillery Regiment- 12 guns in 1 Bn of 3x 4 gun batteries; 76mm Soviet M1902/30 Fld Gun
-------------and----------- 8 guns in 1 Bn of 2x 4 gun batteries; 4.5in QF (Soviet supplied) Fld How
3rd Artillery Regiment- 8 guns in 1 Bn of 2x 4 gun batteries; 76mm Soviet M1902/30 Fld Gun
-------------and----------- 4 guns in 1 Bn of a single battery; 4.5in QF (Soviet supplied) Fld How
4th Artillery Regiment- 24 guns in 2 Bns of 3x 4 gun batteries each; 76mm Soviet M1909 Mtn
6th Artillery Regiment- 36 guns in 3 Bns of 3x 4 gun batteries each; 75mm Mle.1897 Fld Gun
7th Artillery Regiment- 16 guns in 2 Bns of 2x 4 gun batteries each; 76mm Soviet M1902/30 Fld Gun
-------------and----------- 8 guns in 1 Bn of 2x 4 gun batteries; 4.5in QF (Soviet supplied) Fld How
8th Artillery Regiment- 36 guns in 3 Bns of 3x 4 gun batteries each; 75mm Mle.1897 Fld Gun
9th Artillery Regiment- 18 guns in 2 Bns of 3x 3 gun batteries each; Bofors 75mm L/20 Mtn
-------------and----------- 12 guns in 1 Bn of 3x 4 gun batteries; 75mm Mle.1897 Fld Gun
15th Artillery Regiment- 16 guns in 2 Bns of 2x 4 gun batteries each; 76mm Soviet M1902/30 Fld Gun
-------------and----------- 8 guns in 1 Bn of 2x 4 gun batteries; 4.5in QF (Soviet supplied) Fld How
16th Artillery Regiment- 24 guns in 2 Bns of 3x 4 gun batteries each; 75mm Mle.1897 Fld Gun
18th Artillery Regiment- 36 guns in 3 Bns of 3x 4 gun batteries each; 75mm Mle.1897 Fld Gun
19th Artillery Regiment- 24 guns in 2 Bns of 3x 4 gun batteries each; 75mm Mle.1897 Fld Gun
20th Artillery Regiment- 12 guns in 1 Bn of 3x 4 gun batteries; 76mm Soviet M1902/30 Fld Gun
-------------and----------- 8 guns in 1 Bn of 2x 4 gun batteries; 4.5in QF (Soviet supplied) Fld How

Motorized Field Regiments
10th Artillery Regiment- 18 guns in 2 Bns of 3x 3 gun batteries each; 150mm L/32 Rheinmetall
11th Artillery Regiment- 18 guns in 2 Bns of 3x 3 gun batteries each; 105mm leFH18 Rheinmetall
13th Artillery Regiment- 12 guns in 2 Bns of 3x 4 gun batteries each; 105mm leFH18 Rheinmetall
-------------and----------- 6 guns in 1 Bn of 2x 3 gun batteries; 150mm sFH18 L/30 Krupp
14th Artillery Regiment- 18 guns in 2 Bns of 3x 3 gun batteries each; 150mm sFH18 L/30 Krupp

As of March 1942, NRA Central Government Field Armies held 436 artillery pieces in 42 artillery battalions. Of these, 29 were 3 battery (12 gun) bns, 9 were 2 battery (8 guns) bns, and 4 comprised a single 4 gun battery. Six NRA Field Armies had two three-battery battalions, 17 had one three-battery battalion, 9 had a two-battery battalion, and 4 had a single battery.

Additionally, 14 ‘select’ NRA divisions were honored with an integral artillery component. 6 of these had a three-battery battalion, 4 had a two-battery battalion, 4 had a single 4-gun battery, totaling 120 pieces.

About 85% of Army and Division level artillery pieces were mountain guns of various types. The most common were the Krupp 75mm M1903 Mtn, Japanese 75mm Type-41 Mtn (itself a copy of the Krupp M08), and the Chinese Types 12 and 13(Taiyuan) copies of the M1903 and Type-41 respectively. The remaining 15% were Type 13(Liao) copies of the Krupp 75mm M1903 Field Gun, or the Japanese Type-38 Field Gun equivalent, Soviet M1902, and French M1897 Field Guns.

Warlord/Provincial forces to follow.

[US87891]

Warlords, one at a time, because they are all pretty different. Shanxi (Yan Xishan) first.

Yan Xishan (II Military Region, II War Zone)
Shanxi & Suiyuan, N. Shaanxi, Chahar (technically assigned, but obviously not operational)
Shanxi (Yan, II War Zone) forces constituted 8 Army HQs, each nominally comprising 3 infantry divisions and associated Army-level troops. Initially organized with one field and 12 mountain artillery regiments, equipped from local production of the Taiyuan Arsenal, Shanxi forces lost much of their equipment in the 1937-38 fighting. As of January, 1942, the remaining pieces were concentrated in 4 ‘line’ artillery regiments of reasonably similar make-up, and a ‘training/reserve’ regiment holding what medium pieces remained.

The 23rd Regiment comprised 3 battalions; the 1st with 12 type-13 (Taiyuan copy of IJ Type-41 75mm Mtn) mountain guns, the 2nd with 12 type-17[18] (Taiyuan ‘improved’ type-13) 75mm mountain guns, the 3rd with 8 type-18 (Taiyuan licensed copy of Krupp 8.8cm FK Z.A.) field guns.
The 24th Regiment comprised 3 battalions; the 1st and 2nd each with 12 type-13 75mm mountain guns, the 3rd with 8 type-17[18] 75mm mountain guns.
The 27th and 28th Regiments identically comprised 3 battalions; each battalion with 12 type-13 75mm mountain guns.
The training/reserve Regiment comprised one 3-battery (9 guns) battalion of type-16 (Taiyuan license built Krupp 105mm L/12 B.H.) mountain howitzers, and one 2-battery (8 guns) battalion of type-13 75mm mountain guns.

Shanxi forces’ organization, as of January 1942, held constant to the end of the Japanese war. The Jan. 1942 organization is identical to that of Oct. 1944. The following is only the organized ‘field’ force, itself nominally part of the National Army. It does not include ‘provincial’ forces, which were semi-organized militia-type levies formed into 3 ‘defense’ brigades.

6th Group Army – 19th Army (68th, T 37th, T 42nd Divs), 23rd Army (T 40th, T 46th T 47th Divs), 24th Arty Regt.
7th Group Army – 33rd Army (71st, T 38th, T 41st Divs), 34th Army (73rd, T 44th, T 45th Divs), 23rd Arty Regt.
8th Group Army – 43rd Army (70th, T39th, T 43rd Divs), 61st Army (69th, 72nd, T 48th Divs), 27th Arty Regt.
13th Group Army – 83rd Army (66th, T 49th, T 50th Divs), 1st ‘Cav” Army (1st, 2nd, 4th ‘Cav” Divs) 28th Arty Regt. (Cavalry in ‘name’ only, for historical/nostalgic purposes. Organized and equipped as ordinary Infantry.)

Average divisional strength (1944) was 6,711 out of an authorized establishment of 7,502, indicating they were well recruited. The Military Affairs Council (MAC) contributed a Field Army (the 13th) and an independent division (the 21st) to II War Zone. These were the only troops actually answerable to the central government, although the Shanxi forces were well regarded and considered loyal to Chonqing.

[LargeSlowTarget]

Good stuff - keep it coming, Mat!

[Dili]

Some good sources also in Axis Forum
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewforum.php?f=101

[Skyros]

Matt are these OBs reflected in DBB?