Rookie II - Saving MacArthur - against opponent no. 5

[Bif1961]

I have tracked the success rate of the MK-14 torpedo in all my games with unreliable torpedoes set the MK-14 has a success of explosion rate once hitting at between 34-22%. I have been told that the game default for unreliable for the MK-14 is 20%, which is higher than historical which was closer to 10%. So even with unreliable torpedoes set you are already doing better than historically. To not set it would be like giving the Zero 4 20MM cannons or the Betty a bomb load of 4,000 pounds.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: Bif1961

I have tracked the success rate of the MK-14 torpedo in all my games with unreliable torpedoes set the MK-14 has a success of explosion rate once hitting at between 34-22%. I have been told that the game default for unreliable for the MK-14 is 20%, which is higher than historical which was closer to 10%. So even with unreliable torpedoes set you are already doing better than historically. To not set it would be like giving the Zero 4 20MM cannons or the Betty a bomb load of 4,000 pounds.

To be sure, a lot of the "misses" in game are part of the torpedo depth and magnetic exploder failure issue. I think only the hits that actually impact the target are reported as duds.

[Bif1961]

True and the duds reflect the fault of the trigger either magnetic or mechanical which was the last of the MAJOR defects of the MK-14 torpedo turning it from what the US Navy thought would be a war winning wonder weapon into a horrible blunder weapon. If you want to play with the unreliable torpedoes off the game gives you that option, my point is, even with unreliable torpedoes setting on it gives the Americans better performance for the MK-14 than historical. Therefore to turn it off would turn the MK-14 into the wonder weapon the Americans thought they had developed instead of the blunder weapon it turned out to be for the first 12-18 months of the war. I shy away from critizing early war sub Captains since they were saddled with such a defective main weapon system. That's like blaming Marine fighter pilots flying Buffaloes at Midway for not being aggressive enough and not trying to take on Zeros with Buffaloes.

[Leandros]

Brisbane Evening Star December 12th 1941:

[Leandros]

Page 3:

[Leandros]

Hi, Everybody!

This is to inform you'all that "Chickenboy" and I have mutually agreed that he is free to withdraw himself from his mission
as my (Japanese) opponent in this PBEM game. I am happy to say that "Dili", another veteran member here, has offered to step
in for him.

I want to underline once again that my intention with this game is to "test/investigate" if an aggressive US leadership could
have made better use of the time-window offered by the Japanese in their advance on the Malaccan Barrier. It is known today
that the Japanese expected a more effective allied resistance than they did and only when this did not occur did they speed
up their invasion schedule.

An aggressive US leadership, on the other hand, with their promises of immediate help to MacArthur, could only move relief
forces forward as fast, and with any means, they could.

This means that the Japanese party in this game needs to follow his original advance schedule. Only when he discovers that
the allies are about to outsmart him is he allowed to use his means differently to keep up the advance according to his
original plans. It should be appreciated that this demands some frustrating initial discipline by the Japanese player.

Included in this aggressive US policy is also their decision to give priority to the relief of the Philippines, rather than
the British Commonwealth, simply because that is believed to be the best all-around defense with the Philippines skirting
the Soutch China Sea, the eventual transport route for the resources originally craved by the enemy. How this is done shall
come to light in the "Brisbane Evening Star" as the game proceeds.

I would also take this opportunity to post a remark on the previous discussion on reliable/unreliable US torpedoes: in the
five days with my game with Chickenboy, NO torpedo hits were made by allied submarines in spite of aggressive patrolling
and commanders - and "reliable" torpedoes.

In the first six days with Dili, two enemy ships have been sunk by allied submarines, one by a Dutch boat. The Japanese subs
have sunk nine allied ships.

Fred

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

I would also take this opportunity to post a remark on the previous discussion on reliable/unreliable US torpedoes: in the
five days with my game with Chickenboy, NO torpedo hits were made by allied submarines in spite of aggressive patrolling
and commanders - and "reliable" torpedoes.

You're incorrect.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Leandros

I would also take this opportunity to post a remark on the previous discussion on reliable/unreliable US torpedoes: in the
five days with my game with Chickenboy, NO torpedo hits were made by allied submarines in spite of aggressive patrolling
and commanders - and "reliable" torpedoes.

You're incorrect.

Did I sink any...? If so, it has passed me by. Anyway, thank you for your cooperation.

Fred

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: Leandros
I want to underline once again that my intention with this game is to "test/investigate" if an aggressive US leadership could
have made better use of the time-window offered by the Japanese in their advance on the Malaccan Barrier. It is known today
that the Japanese expected a more effective allied resistance than they did and only when this did not occur did they speed
up their invasion schedule.

An aggressive US leadership, on the other hand, with their promises of immediate help to MacArthur, could only move relief
forces forward as fast, and with any means, they could.

This means that the Japanese party in this game needs to follow his original advance schedule. Only when he discovers that
the allies are about to outsmart him is he allowed to use his means differently to keep up the advance according to his
original plans. It should be appreciated that this demands some frustrating initial discipline by the Japanese player.

You mention the Japanese historically were able to speed up their invasion schedule due to encountering less "effective allied resistance"
than anticipated. But then you state the Japanese player in your game "needs to follow his original advance schedule".

Does this mean the Japanese player cannot take advantage of any better-than-historical game results in his favour to push on and capture
the next objective ahead of schedule?

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Bif1961
So if you decide to play this game with reliable allied torpedoes on you are changing history.

Yes. Agreed. But the purpose of this game / exercise is to sandbox reliable torpedoes' & aggressive submarine captainship's impact on early war outcome. [8D]

Not exactly - and I think you guys are a little blinded by the "reliable torpedoes" issue. The game shall still decide,
according to its parameters, how effective even "reliable" torpedoes are. My point, as stated earlier, is that the game
is over-playing the "non-reliable" part - that is, making them even worse than they, in reality, was. This is only my personal
impression after a few trial games - I may be wrong. That the US submarine force's commanders, initially, were somewhat
feeble in character is also supposed to be somewhat countered by "better" torpedoes - and the "topping" of US submarine
commanders. The topping of leaders, ship's commanders and pilots, is another part of the game I am not particularly fond of,
I find it a little too easy and therefore unrealistic. However, my opponent is of the opinion that we should do it so that
is how it shall be.

The most important aspect I am aiming at was the US ability to move forward large forces much earlier than they did and so,
among other things, to "save" MacArthur. In a way, even this shall be sabotaged a little by the game in that most of these
units are restricted, making it difficult to go through with this policy as much possible. On the other hand, this shall
also give some realism to the resistance Roosevelt (he is the aggressive actor here) would have met from his military leaders,
particularly the Navy.

Finally, the United States choose (press through) a different sort of cooperation with its allies, giving priority to use its
resources to reinforce The Philippines, rather than supporting the defense of Malacca/Singapore. The British shall, of
course, do their best to achieve their own goals - still with a reasonable support from the Dutch.

Hope this clarify my views - and that we now can go ahead with the game according to its decided basic principles. Both
parties are supposed to post regular bulletins from their different sides. That should be fun!

Fred

A few years ago I aided another forum member and amateur historian who felt the same way about the USN unreliable torpedo parameters and set out to research the issue. My aid was a little software help with conversion and compilation. What he did was go through the war patrol records for all the USN subs in the Pacific and compile attacks, hits, targets, targets sunk, and so on to gain an idea of the numbers involved in malfunctions. He put tons of work into the project.

At the end, as I recall, the forum either did not hear about it or heard very little about it. Why? Because (as I recall) his research confirmed they had the numbers pretty much right.

In real life the torpedo issues were much more complicated than the game treats them as there were a number of malfunctioning features and the game simply gives two dates were the dud rate is reduced. That means any comparison with history will show differences with the game, but taken in the big lumps the game presents for the dud rate, the game is pretty accurate. Quite impressive, IMO.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock
Does this mean the Japanese player cannot take advantage of any better-than-historical game results in his favour to push on and capture
the next objective ahead of schedule?

No more than what the Japanese did historically. As it were they constantly had greater success than expected, except with
MacArthur, still they did not make immediate use of the opportunity. Eventually, they found they had over-estimated the enemy
and sped up their advance. Was this time-window enough to make a difference for an aggressive US leadership? That's what
this is about. I believe I have stated this in previous postings.

OTH, when my Japanese opponent finds that he is getting more trouble than expected he is allowed to take what action he finds
necessary to get back on track...[;)].

Fred

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: witpqsA few years ago I aided another forum member and amateur historian who felt the same way about the USN unreliable torpedo parameters and set out to research the issue. My aid was a little software help with conversion and compilation. What he did was go through the war patrol records for all the USN subs in the Pacific and compile attacks, hits, targets, targets sunk, and so on to gain an idea of the numbers involved in malfunctions. He put tons of work into the project.

At the end, as I recall, the forum either did not hear about it or heard very little about it. Why? Because (as I recall) his research confirmed they had the numbers pretty much right.

In real life the torpedo issues were much more complicated than the game treats them as there were a number of malfunctioning features and the game simply gives two dates were the dud rate is reduced. That means any comparison with history will show differences with the game, but taken in the big lumps the game presents for the dud rate, the game is pretty accurate. Quite impressive, IMO.

To repeat myself, the purpose is not to test if "reliable" torpedoes would have changed history. Please see my previous posting.

I insisted on "reliable" torpedoes because my experience with the game so far is that this "unreliability" is exaggerated in the
game - just my opinion. "Reliable" torpedoes shall also to some degree (hopefully) mirror the more aggressive attitude of both
the US leadership and how this was conveyed to its boat commanders. To that purpose commanders have also been "topped" to some
deggree.

However.....on the afternoon of December 15th, in spite of aggressive positioning and numerous targets and contacts, allied
submarines have only sunk two enemy ships, one by a Dutch submarine, which were supposed to have reliable torpedoes as well
as able crews. Japanese boats have sunk thirteen allied ships, 64 allied ships in total till now. So, even with "reliable"
torpedoes it seems the game is playing tricks.

On the other hand, Japanese sub-chasers and sub-hunting destroyers live a charmed life as well as achieve good results against
allied submarines, several have been sunk.

Reliable torpedoes are certainly not changing this history, so far, anyway, but you are free to have your own opinion on this.
I have a war to fight so I won't use more time on this part of the game....[;)]

Fred

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Leandros

I would also take this opportunity to post a remark on the previous discussion on reliable/unreliable US torpedoes: in the
five days with my game with Chickenboy, NO torpedo hits were made by allied submarines in spite of aggressive patrolling
and commanders - and "reliable" torpedoes.

You're incorrect.

Did I sink any...? If so, it has passed me by. Anyway, thank you for your cooperation.

Fred

Are you inquiring about sinkings or torpedo hits?

Within the first couple days unloading the Malay assault forces, a Dutch sub stuck its nose into the harbor at one of the ports. It hit an AV before it had a chance to disband in that port, critically damaging it. The next turn, the same SS in the same port hit and critically damaged a destroyer. The destroyer and AV were both disbanded in the small port fighting to stay afloat.

North of Luzon (Aparri I believe) you stuck the nose of an American fleet SS into the harbor for a couple days running. It hit and critically damaged an AV that I intended to disband into the port. That ship is also fighting to stay afloat. I believe there was at least one more hit on an xAK by a USN SS on the northern side of Luzon. You can just as easily parse that from the combat reports as I.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

A few years ago I aided another forum member and amateur historian who felt the same way about the USN unreliable torpedo parameters and set out to research the issue. My aid was a little software help with conversion and compilation. What he did was go through the war patrol records for all the USN subs in the Pacific and compile attacks, hits, targets, targets sunk, and so on to gain an idea of the numbers involved in malfunctions. He put tons of work into the project.

At the end, as I recall, the forum either did not hear about it or heard very little about it. Why? Because (as I recall) his research confirmed they had the numbers pretty much right.

In real life the torpedo issues were much more complicated than the game treats them as there were a number of malfunctioning features and the game simply gives two dates were the dud rate is reduced. That means any comparison with history will show differences with the game, but taken in the big lumps the game presents for the dud rate, the game is pretty accurate. Quite impressive, IMO.

Like everything historically with the development and maturity of this game, I recall (vaguely) this development. That the game got it 'pretty much right' was also my understanding based upon his test run too. This is just one iteration of the amazing ability of this game to replicate real-world results.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Leandros
Japanese boats have sunk thirteen allied ships...So, even with "reliable" torpedoes it seems the game is playing tricks.

"Playing tricks"? Not hardly. There are many discrete variables involved in a successful submarine intercept of an enemy ship that application of the gross numbers-as you've done here-isn't helpful or enlightening.

1. Have the Allied submarines been spotted more often than the Japanese submarines have been? This depends on availability and setting of search aircraft and surface ASW platforms and 'clearing' DLs. A detected submarine is a worthless submarine. Are you sending your submarines into areas where they are detected? Is your opponent?

2. Have you swapped out your submarine commanders en masse? Is the crew experience the same as it was historically? Both of these factors impact the likelihood of a successful intercept. Both skill sets were underwhelming in the early war.
Unless you have changed these factors within the first 8 days of the war, you should expect the same underwhelming Allied results from this aspect of the submarine war.

3. Has your opponent buttressed ASW escort or increased individual ASW patrols in or around the 'hot spots'? Having dedicated ASW platforms either within the amphibious TFs or as stand-alone ASW TFs can harry and harass submarines and keep them submerged if detected before they have a chance to get a shot off.

In the first few days of the war, some of the pre-constructed IJN amphibious TFs are bizarrely constructed with CM, cMC, AV, PC, DD, DMS, PB, CL, and so on and so forth. Bloated and top heavy. But with surprisingly high ASW ratings. Some of the pre-formed Aparri / N. Luzon landing TFs had an ASW rating of >30. Application of such a high ASW rating in that default configuration will yield a stiffer defense than 'normally' constructed TFs.

4. Are your submarines in the right place at the right time? Nothing will prevent sinking an enemy ship more readily than there being no ships there. Both sides are offering moving targets. Your opponent is clearly able to predict some of your ship movements with his more numerable successful submarine intercepts. Are you doing as thorough a job at successfully predicting your opponent's ship movements? If so, see number 1.

5. (Relating to number 1) I noticed your proclivity to use the Dutch Dornier and Allied PBY / Catalinas in a naval bombing role in our short game. These planes excel at the naval search function, not naval bombing. A PBY that is engaged in a naval bombing mission is one that is not carrying out a naval search mission. A PBY sortie that ends in an unsuccessful naval bombing mission is doubly wasted. A PBY sortie that ends with an unsuccessful naval bombing mission, an unfulfilled naval search mission and a damaged / destroyed aircraft borders on a squandered asset. You control these settings.

Your aggressive use of this scarce asset is likely enhancing the success of your opponent's submarine war and hindering the success of your own.

6. I noted your use of submarines in coastal port hexes several times in our short game. This is a very risky disposition for your submarines. If spotted, with enemy ASW in the hex, they are at risk of being lost. Coastal hexes are also at greater risk from defensive minefields. Since you cite the unencumbered ability of your opponent's ASW, how have your 'several' Allied submarines been lost? Could it be that you exposed them to destruction in an ahistoric and injudicious manner? I think that's more likely than 'the game is borked'.

[Leandros]

Brisbane Evening Star December 15th.:

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

6. I noted your use of submarines in coastal port hexes several times in our short game. This is a very risky disposition
for your submarines. If spotted, with enemy ASW in the hex, they are at risk of being lost. Coastal hexes are also at
greater risk from defensive minefields. Since you cite the unencumbered ability of your opponent's ASW, how have your
'several' Allied submarines been lost? Could it be that you exposed them to destruction in an ahistoric and injudicious
manner? I think that's more likely than 'the game is borked'.

Thank you for excellent advice - but taking them literally would be "ahistoric" - would it not? I mean, the allies were the
amateurs. There are limits, though...[;)]...

Please, guys, file your opinions to your heart's content but do not expect me to use much time on replying. I have set the
parameters and I only hope my opponent shall uphold his patience, which has been excellent so far, to see this experiment
through. It is quite time-demanding. And it's my wife's birthday today... [:)]

Fred

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: Leandros
No more than what the Japanese did historically. As it were they constantly had greater success than expected, except with
MacArthur, still they did not make immediate use of the opportunity. Eventually, they found they had over-estimated the enemy
and sped up their advance. Was this time-window enough to make a difference for an aggressive US leadership? That's what
this is about. I believe I have stated this in previous postings.

Still not sure whether you are saying the Japanese player in your game can or cannot ever take advantage of better than historical results
to accelerate his invasion schedule. Perhaps the answer to this question will clarify things for me......will the Japanese player ever
be able to invade Tarakan and Menado earlier than Jan 11th, 1942 if the situation in-theatre has become more favorable than was historical?

And is the Brisbane Evening Star to be the only source of Allied wartime news? I might have to go off and buy a pair of reading glasses.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock
And is the Brisbane Evening Star to be the only source of Allied wartime news? I might have to go off and buy a pair of reading glasses.

Sorry about the quality of the "paper", I appreciate your frustration, but as far as I know only pictures can be attached to a
posting. You can copy the "paper" to PAINT and magnify it there. That said, there was some transfer issues with this latest
postings so I shall re-attach it. I have tried to make it as big as possible without "stretching" the PC screen too much.

Fred

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock
Still not sure whether you are saying the Japanese player in your game can or cannot ever take advantage of better than historical results
to accelerate his invasion schedule. Perhaps the answer to this question will clarify things for me......will the Japanese player ever
be able to invade Tarakan and Menado earlier than Jan 11th, 1942 if the situation in-theatre has become more favorable than was historical?

That would make this thread irrelevant, would it not? The idea is to test/investigate the time-window offered by
the original Japanese time-table.

Fred