Fleet

[IBender]

The more I play the global game (all options turned on) the more I realize that I dont play the navy part all that well. Playing as Japan you begin with a lot of ships of all types. In the beginning I played with massive stack of units attacking here and there, but oil issues forced me to change that up. More recently I play with much smaller fleets and that seems to work better.

With that said, if anyone has thoughts/ considerations regarding what good fleet composition might be I would appreciate it.

Thanks

(ment to put this in WIF School so if someone can move it that would be great thanks)

[brian brian]

Look at the way the Naval Combat Results Table works, is one good starting point. So when selecting a set of ships to place in a Sea Box, using 4 or 7 is a good amount to maximize their combat factors without moving up a column on the results you will take from enemy action. Sending 5 or 8 ships to a Sea Box is less desirable usually.

In some sea zones - the ones where you are in contact with the enemy the most - you can expect to fight Naval Air Combats. Send the ships with the best AA factors to those zones. In your more interior zones, this is less likely - ships there will probably be dealing with submarines and you need a mix of forces in high boxes, and some with the Convoy Points in the Zero Box.

[Courtenay]

When both sides have approximately equal naval strength (i.e US-Japan before the Essexes arrive), your naval strategy should be largely reactive. If you send out most of your fleet to one sea area, your opponent will say "Fine, you can have that one", and hit you every place else. Put some forces out; if one of them gets jumped, then you can respond with a larger force, unless your opponent puts out everything in one sea area himself, at which point you go everyplace else. This can often lead to a situation where the bulk of both sides' fleets stay in port most of the turn; they aren't "doing nothing"; they are stopping the enemy's fleet from doing anything.

A critical rule is "In the presence of the enemy". *Both* the US and Japan want to use the rule; otherwise both get driven out of their minds by ahistorical deep raids.

[paulderynck]

An important consideration is matching movement and range. Keep units that can move the same distance and go to the same box together. Often when naval moves are scarce because you take a Combined action, you don't want to be forced to stop in a lower box because of one or two slower ships. If playing with the In the Presence of the Enemy option you can send in the 6 moving ships the first impulse and then the 5 movers the next and they can then reach the same box.

For naval combat you must develop the knack of knowing when to stay and fight, versus cutting your losses and fleeing, after the first round of combat.

If you anticipate a prolonged series of engagements over several impulses, then ideally disorganize aircraft and subs first to initiate searches. Your surface ships are precious due to their lengthy construction times, so when the time comes to get out of Dodge (not after combat but in anticipation of being overwhelmed by the enemy in his next follwoing impulse) you can only move the ships that have yet to be disorganized.

[Centuur]

Also: try not to have ships in a lot of sea boxes. Sure, one needs the convoy escorts to be preferably in the 0,1 and 4 box, but one needs to avoid the fact that the fleet can get destroyed by you having ships in f.e. the 2 and the 3 box.

And: land based air is far better than carrier based air. So I rather spend money building NAV and long range FTR's with a major power, than build out all carriers and put planes on them...

And finally: it's strange, but it is the same in MWIF as it was during WWII. You don't have good admirals. You have lucky ones and unlucky ones. Especially at sea any plan can fall into pieces by you throwing a 10 and the opponent rolling a 1, which means that your opponent just caught your CV's with the planes sitting on deck getting refuelled...

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Centuur

And finally: it's strange, but it is the same in MWIF as it was during WWII. You don't have good admirals. You have lucky ones and unlucky ones. Especially at sea any plan can fall into pieces by you throwing a 10 and the opponent rolling a 1, which means that your opponent just caught your CV's with the planes sitting on deck getting refuelled...

warspite1

Well why am I not surprised? If your going to talk about Midway it would help to read about it first so you understand what happened instead of quoting tired lazy cliches.

And as for the continual no 'good admirals' BS - why do you persist in spouting such blatant cobblers?

[Centuur]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Centuur

And finally: it's strange, but it is the same in MWIF as it was during WWII. You don't have good admirals. You have lucky ones and unlucky ones. Especially at sea any plan can fall into pieces by you throwing a 10 and the opponent rolling a 1, which means that your opponent just caught your CV's with the planes sitting on deck getting refuelled...

warspite1

Well why am I not surprised? If your going to talk about Midway it would help to read about it first so you understand what happened instead of quoting tired lazy cliches.

And as for the continual no 'good admirals' BS - why do you persist in spouting such blatant cobblers?

You can prepare all you can as admiral, but if the enemy finds you at a wrong moment, you are toast. That is the war at sea before the era of the satellite. Sure, if you got more power than the enemy, you might prevail. But even that isn't always clear.
The best admiral the Netherlands ever had, Tromp, stated this himself in the Staten of Holland, when asked why he was succesfull after a battle he won. He answered: "I got lucky and the English were unlucky, because of the wind".

The sinking of the Hood? One hit on a bad place and the ship was gone. What if that one went a couple of meters to the side? The Bismarck got sunk because it was found at the latest possible moment and a lucky torpedo hit damaged the rudder of the ship. Nagumo got caught with his planes refueled sitting on deck and surprisingly planes from two different US task forces arrived at about the same time. How unlucky...
These kind of things have nothing to do with being a good or a bad admiral. These things are about pure and simple luck.

Sure, I know that you disagree about this. But lets agree to disagree on this one...

[warspite1]

Sure we can agree to disagree but I am so incredulous that you simply condense a thousand plus years of war at sea to a simplistic statement that whenever you mention it I am compelled to respond.

Naval Warfare according to Centuur
The winner was lucky, the loser was unlucky; conclusion its all BS.

You mention the era of the satellite but what has that got to do with anything? By your reasoning even in the modern age any battle comes down to a lucky hit. This is just so dismissive.

The war at sea is different to the war on land or the war in the air – but all types of warfare require skill, judgement, boldness, coolness under pressure and yes, a degree of luck. Luck – good and bad -is a part and parcel of life.
You quote one admiral and one (no doubt modest) comment he made about one battle and decide that applies to all naval warfare?

So what examples did you give to support your opinion?

The sinking of the Bismarck. A British admiral got lucky and his German counterpart was unlucky? Well it can’t be denied that Lutjens was unlucky to have Bismarck torpedoed where she was. But there was nothing lucky or unlucky about his decision to make a radio message after he’d lost his pursuers. That was his choice – and cost him his ship. An unlucky admiral or a foolish one?

The sinking of the Hood. The German admiral got lucky and the British admiral was unlucky? Really? So you don’t give any credit to the quality of German gunnery vs the British? Tell me how many hits did Hood record against the enemy before she sank. How quickly did the German guns find their target? Admiral Holland knew the score, this has nothing to do with wind conditions or the lack of satellites or any other rubbish; simply Holland knew he was pitting his un-modernised 25 year old battlecruiser against one of the newest battleships in the world. His ship was vulnerable to plunging shell fire and he needed to close the range fast. He chose to put Hood in the van and not the newer Prince of Wales. He was in charge, he knew the odds, he made the call. He didn’t make it.

The Battle of Midway. You continue to repeat the mantra about Nagumo being caught with his planes on deck being refuelled. Why? I am glad though that you mentioned Midway. The Japanese lost 4 fleet carriers, the US 1. So by your reckoning the Japanese admiral’s bad luck was off the chart. Please take the time to read Shattered Sword. The US were lucky in the way they found the Japanese carriers but if you think unlucky is a word that accurately – or even in any way closely - describes the Japanese performance at Midway or that the US victory was solely down to luck then I wouldn’t even know where to begin and really insults Nimitz, Spruance et al.

How about Jutland? Again in line with your belief, you must be of the opinion the German admiral got lucky and the British unlucky? Yes, once again there were elements of luck in the battle – but it might surprise you to know (given the outcome of the battle) that there was no one luckier than Scheer that day – he made 4 crucial errors but poor British judgement – NOT bad luck - (Allied to Jellicoe understanding that he needn’t take risks) allowed Sheer to largely get away with them. But you put the loss of three battlecruisers down to luck and not rank poor judgement by Jellicoe and Beatty in ensuring cordite handling procedures were followed? You put the same loss – and the fact that Hipper’s battlecruisers weren’t annihilated down to luck and not the rank poor judgement of Beatty in the handling of the 5th Battle Squadron? You put Scheer’s decision twice to put his High Seas Fleet into the teeth of the Grand Fleet down to bad luck and not appalling judgement? You put the fact that the HSF was saved down to luck and not Jellicoe’s lack of boldness/caution? You put the fact that the HSF got home down to luck and not the poor judgement of Jellicoe and his subordinates?

But your view doesn’t seem to apply to land warfare. You quote from Tromp but why so selective? Why not mention Napoleon and his quote about the possibility of promoting a subordinate to general “Yes but is he lucky?” If land warfare is all about skill and no luck is involved then where does the saying “no plan survives contact with the enemy” come from?

Because as said at the outset, all warfare relies on many factors – and as has been shown down the ages – luck, sometimes critical, sometimes less so and sometimes good and sometimes bad - is one of those factors. Sorry but to suggest it’s the only factor where naval warfare is concerned is, quite simply, crass.

[paulderynck]

Analysis of who got luckiest at Leyte Gulf or Savo Island, anyone?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: paulderynck

Analysis of who got luckiest at Leyte Gulf or Savo Island, anyone?

warspite1

That's a piece of p***. Let me see, the US/Aus forces at Savo lost so Crutchley was unlucky, while the Japanese won so Mikawa was lucky. Faulty Allied reconnaissance, a poor communications set-up, a bold Japanese commander, poor Allied performance from certain captains, messages not passed on adequately to subordinates, Japanese night battle training, none of that matters or is relevant - its all down to luck apparently.

Ditto Leyte, no need for analysis of individual performance, boldness, coolness under fire (or lack thereof) required, training, equipment. The answer is simple - Luck. Amazing how unlucky the Japanese were for most of WWII.....

[Orm]

Yes, yes, it was all luck. [:D]

Speaking of luck. That raid on Scapa Flow, that U-boat spent a lot of luck there. And that Captain sure was lucky. That time, at least.

[Orm]

And speaking of lucky Germans. How lucky were they during the Norwegian campaign. Luck in abundance there. [:D]

[TeaLeaf]

Regarding 'in the presence of the enemy', with the allies I really like to steam some single few old BB/CA to sea areas just to hinder enemy reaction movement towards 'my' critical areas.

Good example is the Pacific:
Let's say I want to invade Truk or Rabaul from The Solomons (Sea) and the IJN lies waiting at Singapore (for example because Japan has chosen that its first target should be the RN west of India). If the USN moves just 1 old BB into the South China-, Bismarck- and Coral Seas, the fast IJN carriers can't reach the invasion fleet in The Solomons Sea in one impulse (other than the 0-section). If Japan would like to attack them, first the three patrolling BB's must be removed or at least 'neutralised' by the presence one of their own patrol ships. If Japan chooses to fight this type of war, it easily results in a war of attrition we all know the USN usually wins.

Regarding the 'luck' discussion in posts above, as long as it 's about (M)WiF and not real naval battles (I thought Peter meant that), I can see merit in both points of view. Still, if it pops up too much, or in some too critical battles, I do feel luck has a stronger influence on the game (so also on naval warfare) than a good admiral or field marshal can have. I stil remember losing 9 of 14 allied FTR (with Pilots) over Cape St. Vincent, fighting 9 German FTR at +4/-4 initial air to air rating in allied favor (without surprise points).

[paulderynck]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: paulderynck

Analysis of who got luckiest at Leyte Gulf or Savo Island, anyone?

warspite1

That's a piece of p***. Let me see, the US/Aus forces at Savo lost so Crutchley was unlucky, while the Japanese won so Mikawa was lucky. Faulty Allied reconnaissance, a poor communications set-up, a bold Japanese commander, poor Allied performance from certain captains, messages not passed on adequately to subordinates, Japanese night battle training, none of that matters or is relevant - its all down to luck apparently.

Ditto Leyte, no need for analysis of individual performance, boldness, coolness under fire (or lack thereof) required, training, equipment. The answer is simple - Luck. Amazing how unlucky the Japanese were for most of WWII.....

I actually posted that in support of your position but it seems you have your dander up for a confrontation.

[paulderynck]

ORIGINAL: TeaLeaf

Regarding 'in the presence of the enemy', with the allies I really like to steam some single few old BB/CA to sea areas just to hinder enemy reaction movement towards 'my' critical areas.

Good example is the Pacific:
Let's say I want to invade Truk or Rabaul from The Solomons (Sea) and the IJN lies waiting at Singapore (for example because Japan has chosen that its first target should be the RN west of India). If the USN moves just 1 old BB into the South China-, Bismarck- and Coral Seas, the fast IJN carriers can't reach the invasion fleet in The Solomons Sea in one impulse (other than the 0-section). If Japan would like to attack them, first the three patrolling BB's must be removed or at least 'neutralised' by the presence one of their own patrol ships. If Japan chooses to fight this type of war, it easily results in a war of attrition we all know the USN usually wins.

Sure, that works. You'd think JP would have it's own pickets out. I prefer CAs as they can get to a higher box and if left alone they "last" longer. One of the reasons I like the ITPOTE rule is that it does promote many small naval and naval air actions as opposed to the "two big fleets waiting to see who moves first" approach.

[Centuur]

All things mr. Warspite have said, have some degree of sense. Decisions made by admirals have effect on the circumstances why they might have lost or did win a battle. Good training of men and superior equipment also have effect on this. But those things are not the ultimate reason why the battle was won or lost.

No, that simply relied on whether or not you found the enemy ships at sea. And that wasn't something that one could take for granted at all, before the age of the satellite. Hitting the enemy was mostly a case of luck too. That is what I mean by saying that there are no good or bad admirals, only lucky or unlucky ones. Some writers do say that a decision made sure a battle was won or lost. I don't agree to that in most cases. There are too many circumstances which an admiral doesn't control...

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: paulderynck

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: paulderynck

Analysis of who got luckiest at Leyte Gulf or Savo Island, anyone?

warspite1

That's a piece of p***. Let me see, the US/Aus forces at Savo lost so Crutchley was unlucky, while the Japanese won so Mikawa was lucky. Faulty Allied reconnaissance, a poor communications set-up, a bold Japanese commander, poor Allied performance from certain captains, messages not passed on adequately to subordinates, Japanese night battle training, none of that matters or is relevant - its all down to luck apparently.

Ditto Leyte, no need for analysis of individual performance, boldness, coolness under fire (or lack thereof) required, training, equipment. The answer is simple - Luck. Amazing how unlucky the Japanese were for most of WWII.....

I actually posted that in support of your position but it seems you have your dander up for a confrontation.

warspite1

Not at all - I guessed that you posted for that reason and I merely used it as a springboard to further the argument against any result in naval warfare being solely down to luck (the more examples, the more it becomes obvious that the idea is without merit) - not to attack your comment because I thought you were also of the opposite school of thought (which I have no reason to believe was the case).

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Centuur

All things mr. Warspite have said, have some degree of sense. Decisions made by admirals have effect on the circumstances why they might have lost or did win a battle. Good training of men and superior equipment also have effect on this. But those things are not the ultimate reason why the battle was won or lost.

No, that simply relied on whether or not you found the enemy ships at sea. And that wasn't something that one could take for granted at all, before the age of the satellite. Hitting the enemy was mostly a case of luck too. That is what I mean by saying that there are no good or bad admirals, only lucky or unlucky ones. Some writers do say that a decision made sure a battle was won or lost. I don't agree to that in most cases. There are too many circumstances which an admiral doesn't control...

warspite1

How does that differ from a general? So Manstein came up with a brilliant plan to defeat France. Hitler sanctions the attack. Right. Having done so how much control does he - or his Army Group, Army, Corps and Divisional commanders now have?

- The French never manned the Meuse properly (the Germans could not know that would be the case).
- The French never mined the approaches to the Meuse (the Germans could not know that would be the case).
- The Allies never counter-attacked in a co-ordinated way when the German tanks were stretched out in a long and exposed line (the Germans could not know that would be the case).
- The German generals were at war with each other over the plan and what to do once the Meuse was crossed. Guderian was actually sacked at one point. No knowing which way that argument would go and was crucial because it was the drive of Guderian that was fundamental to the panzers reaching the sea.
- Guderian, in company with Loerzer of Luftflotte 3, worked out an aerial bombardment of French positions across the Meuse to effectively destroy French resistance. The devastating rolling raid nearly didn't happen as Kleist countermanded the plan. The only reason it went ahead was because Loerzer received the new order too late to change the plan without running the risk of confusing the squadrons. How lucky was that? The rolling raid took place and the rest is history. Hitler needed his commanders to be bold for Case Yellow to succeed - but are you telling me he controlled the process? Did von Rundstedt? Did von Kleist? Or Guderian or the panzer division commanders? There was massive amounts of luck in that attack - massive. Given the evenness in terms of nos. of men and tanks there was no way the Germans could win as they did without massive doses of luck. Does that mean Case Yellow can be dismissed as just the Germans were lucky, the Allies were unlucky? No of course not - so why should it be the case for the navy?

Does a general control the weather? - vital for flying operations. Did Eisenhower own the weather when trying to undertake D-Day? Did he control the weather post the landing when one Mulberry was destroyed and the other badly damaged?

All generals, admirals, air marshals - no matter how sound their plan may be - may be faced with events they can't control; their genius (or otherwise) is what they do about those events.

[brian brian]

To get lucky, you have to roll the dice.

Was Kurita lucky or unlucky @ Leyte Gulf?

[paulderynck]

No - the USN was lucky he thought he was facing CAs and more - a lot more - CVPs; and withdrew before sinking a good portion of the invasion fleet and CVEs/CVLs. The JP were lucky before that when Halsey took the bait (one of the few times an overly complicated JP plan of attack worked to the point where the enemy actually did what they were expected to do, obviating the need for the non-existing contingency plans). So Kurita made up his own plan on the fly, based on incorrect assumptions.

Lacking those same plans was also lucky for the USN when the JP BB force didn't abort.