I should have phrased that better - I think modeling the long-term political (domestic or otherwise) and strategic factors is outside the realm of what can be done within the simulator. When designing the victory conditions and constraints (weapon availability, no-nav zones), a designer is considering those long-term political factors, but not necessarily modeling them out in the simulator.ORIGINAL: SeaQueen
Sometimes, but not necessarily. They could be set by the scenario designer in the victory conditions (e.g. lose no more than 25% of the available fighters), or by the player based on context. You wear many hats as the player (and as the scenario designer), if the decision makes sense, then make it.
I'm sure there's a planner in Stuttgart who's equally frustrated (although I think Command over-models EOR). The SA-21 functions quite well in an Anti-Access role, denying NATO it's biggest advantages: combat air power and tactical ISR. Gaining access to allow positive correlation of forces is the primary objective for the early phases of that scenario, and is worth the risk of losses. I highly recommend Tangredi's Anti-Access Warfare, since he explains the concepts far better than I can.In my Poland scenario, I'm really frustrated by how an SA-21 site covers almost all of Poland.
This definitely highlights how much the west has placed it's center of gravity in air power. I think that's been the case for a long time; Egyptian AD in 1973 and Serbian AD in 1999 both had significant impacts on the ability of western forces to achieve their operational objectives (at least initially). It's certainly something I need to do some more reading/thinking on.That one SAM site sets the pace for everything else.
