Under the Hood

[cathar1244]

Cabido and Larry, thank you for the comments.

From what the log file indicates, I think the defense factor [DF] plays a role in the resolution of overrun actions. As noted with the lab scenario and the SPSAMs versus tanks, this can generate unrealistic combat outcomes: not because of losses to enemy fire, but losses caused by a unit being repeatedly forced to retreat until it evaporates. As Larry suggested, the DF for the Barak SPSAM is set too high. This is one instance in which a scenario designer, by setting up a new piece of equipment with a lowered DF, can correct this issue.

Of course, this solution immediately poses the question as to what a realistic DF should be for a given item of equipment. And that question cannot be simply answered because of the logic employed by the game's software. First, let us consider a definition that was given for DF (this quote was attributed to James Matthews; my apologies to James if that attribution was not accurate.)

The defense factor is a number that, for the vast majority of equipment types, is scaled from 1-10 and represents a rough ability of that equipment to absorb firepower without being destroyed. Equipment is defined here, as items within the database, whether they are multi-man items like squads and teams, or singleton items like AFV’s, and Guns, which also may be multi-man operated.

But for a scenario designer trying to alter the DF of equipment, there is a serious caveat to bear in mind. And this caveat is that in many equipment item cases, the software ignores the DF entered into the equipment file, and calculates a DF value that the game uses for that equipment. Most of these autogenerated values concern guns and vehicles. Any towed, fixed, self-propelled, or railway gun will have an autogenerated DF. Any armored vehicle (as set by Flag 0) will have an autogenerated DF. This last observation also applies to SPSAMs if they are an armored target.

Vehicles like the Barak SPSAM fall into a category that one might call "soft vehicle without a ranged antipersonnel weapon". With these equipment items, the DF can be directly set in the equipment file, and for some reason, the Barak ended up with a DF of 12. Besides these kinds of vehicles, the DF can be directly set for trucks, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, ships, personnel squads, and the armored train.

I will put up another thread that explains which autogenerated values are used for SP guns, etc.

The use of DF in overrun combat can produce illogical outcomes. But a scenario designer could potentially use this quirk to advantage. Say we want to craft a force that has a talent for overruns and forcing retreats (Chinese infantry in Korea, November 1950?)

The autogeneration of DF values produced an extended discussion in a thread about the "Europa 1947" scenario; mentioning items such as SP-guns getting a higher DF than a King Tiger tank. In combat against armored targets, it does not matter. But the way combat power is calculated for overruns makes one wonder, once again, if these autogenerated values could provoke unrealistic combat outcomes.

Cheers

[Cabido]

I think it is sensible to have the defense strength of the defender compared to the attack strength of the attacker as a criteria to define the chance of overrun (together with the density variable, also used), since the ratio (attacker attack strength)/(defender defense strength) defines the exposure to fire of the defender unit. Yet, using the sum (attack strength + defense strength) as the log suggests (here I'm not sure of understanding the role of these values in the log) isn't sensible, since then very high defense value equipment, with very low attack strength would have a high chance of causing enemy units RBC.
As I said earlier, perhaps because of imperfect information in the battlefield, such a unit should have some chance of causing RBC, based on density difference, due to flanking, but not a chance proportional to their defense strength; in that case, it should only be proportional to the density ratio. Anyway, I'm just speculating about the possibility that the defense strength of the attacker unit is being used as a factor, which would contradicts what is said in the manual.

[cathar1244]

ORIGINAL: Cabido

I think it is sensible to have the defense strength of the defender compared to the attack strength of the attacker as a criteria to define the chance of overrun (together with the density variable, also used), since the ratio (attacker attack strength)/(defender defense strength) defines the exposure to fire of the defender unit. Yet, using the sum (attack strength + defense strength) as the log suggests (here I'm not sure of understanding the role of these values in the log) isn't sensible, since then very high defense value equipment, with very low attack strength would have a high chance of causing enemy units RBC.
As I said earlier, perhaps because of imperfect information in the battlefield, such a unit should have some chance of causing RBC, based on density difference, due to flanking, but not a chance proportional to their defense strength; in that case, it should only be proportional to the density ratio. Anyway, I'm just speculating about the possibility that the defense strength of the attacker unit is being used as a factor, which would contradicts what is said in the manual.

Cabido, thanks again for your comments, this is an interesting discussion.

I think the use of DF in overrun attacks -by the attacking unit- is more than speculation, though. Not only does the log file indicate the DF is used by the attacking unit in its calculation ... but my lab scenario, in which units equipped with nothing but "Baraks" [with no AP and no AT rating] were able to regularly overrun defending tank units, also suggests that is the case.

Realistically, in most scenarios, that kind of unit encounter won't be seen, at least, not often. Another consideration is recalling that the DF, for an infantry squad, reflects its manpower count -- and that is something that definitely is realistic to account for in assessing a unit's combat power.

The DF for the Barak SPSAM can be changed in the equipment file (and should be IMO). More problematic are those DF values that are autogenerated by TOAW itself.

Cheers

[cathar1244]

One more comment about the overrun strength calculations. It counts DF as part of the attacker's calculation. As mentioned for rifle squads and manpower counts, this is not necessarily bad. But the calculation also includes the DF of passive defenders (such as the Barak SP-SAM) in reckoning the attacker's strength. That seems off to me.

Cheers

[altipueri]

Does changing the random number seed affect any of these tests?

[larryfulkerson]

ORIGINAL: altipueri

Does changing the random number seed affect any of these tests?

I'm pretty sure it won't. The default, I believe, is the number used
for tests. You can enter a different number to try to get a different
game but I doubt if it makes all that much difference.

[cathar1244]

As a partial wrap-up of the defense strength influence on overruns (RBC), I ran the same lab but replaced the Barak SP-SAMs with regular trucks, which only have a defense strength of one. Although the trucks vastly outnumbered the tanks, they did not provoke retreat before combat and took heavy losses.

Conclusion: Keep the defense strength low of vehicles that do not hold or take ground (like SP-SAMs). The question of passive defenders having their defense strength reckoned as part of overrun attacks is IMO questionable; maybe something for Ralph to consider modifying at some point.

Cheers

[cathar1244]

Another thing I've been wondering about is the antitank ratings of infantry squads. The AT rating of generic squads in TOAW tops out (I think) at 15, implying 15cm of potential armor penetration (the "AT+" rating). TOAW's equipment database correctly identifies this capability as being "1940's", IIRC, 15cm was something like the armor penetration of an early model Panzerfaust.

Of course, the performance of handheld antitank weapons has greatly increased since 1945. For scenario designers, there is much potential here to craft equipment definitions representing the various RPG's and other infantry AT weapons of postwar years. But my question was, "is it worth the effort?" That is, would the TOAW system produce results in such a way that there was clearly a link between increased AT capability of squads on the one hand and tank losses on the other?

Implied by the question was that such detail modeling in the equipment DB might be more an exercise in polishing the chrome of a scenario than anything else.

So, for the lab, I set up two forces. Both sides had five units. One force was made up of 500 rifle squads, the other side had 250 Sherman M4/76 tanks. I chose the Shermans deliberately because I didn't want the game accounting for ultramodern effects like Chobham armor plate or reactive armor. In other words, this was to be the classic confrontation: shaped charged warheads versus rolled homogeneous armor.

For the first five iterations, the rifle squads were considered to be equipped with antitank rifle grenades having a penetration rating of 7. In the last five iterations, I used a modified squad equipped with an RPG-2; the penetration rating deemed to be 18.

The results were gratifying. First, a snippet of the game resolving anti-armor combat (rifle grenades vs tanks), from the log file:

Combat : Blues weapons firing on Greys M4/76 Sherman.
ATCombat : Assault Squad R Gren current terrain/lighting/weather dependent accuracy: 10%.
ATCombat : M4/76 Sherman target cross section bias: 113%.
ATCombat : Assault Squad R Gren current effective accuracy vs. M4/76 Sherman: 11%.
ATCombat : No hit on Greys M4/76 Sherman by Blues Assault Squad R Gren. (shot missed)
Combat : Blues weapons firing on Greys M4/76 Sherman.
ATCombat : Assault Squad R Gren current terrain/lighting/weather dependent accuracy: 10%.
ATCombat : M4/76 Sherman target cross section bias: 113%.
ATCombat : Assault Squad R Gren current effective accuracy vs. M4/76 Sherman: 11%.
ATCombat : Chance of penetration on M4/76 Sherman [9 @ 73 degrees -> 9] by Assault Squad R Gren [7] is 59%.
ATCombat : Effective hit on Greys M4/76 Sherman by Blues Assault Squad R Gren.
Combat : M4/76 Sherman destroyed. (specificAttrit=7)

We see that first the game determines a base hit chance that reckons terrain, weather, and daylight. This is bumped up by a factor of 1.13 because in the equipment database, the Sherman is flagged as "boxy" (easier to hit) in terms of being a target. The "9 @ 73 degrees" blurb is telling us the game decided the grenade struck Sherman armor (rated at 9 in the equipment DB), with the armor presenting an angle of strike to the projectile of 73 degrees (close to a right-angle strike), leading to the game deciding the chance of penetration is 59%.

But what about the RPG-2? Here is the same look as above:

Combat : Blues weapons firing on Greys M4/76 Sherman.
ATCombat : Assault Squad RPG2 current terrain/lighting/weather dependent accuracy: 10%.
ATCombat : M4/76 Sherman target cross section bias: 113%.
ATCombat : Assault Squad RPG2 current effective accuracy vs. M4/76 Sherman: 11%.
ATCombat : No hit on Greys M4/76 Sherman by Blues Assault Squad RPG2. (shot missed)
Combat : Blues weapons firing on Greys M4/76 Sherman.
ATCombat : Assault Squad RPG2 current terrain/lighting/weather dependent accuracy: 10%.
ATCombat : M4/76 Sherman target cross section bias: 113%.
ATCombat : Assault Squad RPG2 current effective accuracy vs. M4/76 Sherman: 11%.
ATCombat : Chance of penetration on M4/76 Sherman [9 @ 84 degrees -> 9] by Assault Squad RPG2 [18] is 100%.
ATCombat : Effective hit on Greys M4/76 Sherman by Blues Assault Squad RPG2.
Combat : M4/76 Sherman destroyed. (specificAttrit=16)

Oh yeah, the increased penetration of the RPG-2 drives the penetration chance up to 100%, showing the game is accounting for the better penetration rating. But what about the results in aggregrate? In fact, the squads equipped with RPG-2's did considerably better. Of five runs of each situation:

One of the runs with rifle grenades ended with a (well-behaved) crash to desktop because the tanks succeeded in destroying the entire opposing force. The game did a formation check, complained that no units existed, and exited. Of the other four runs, 500 infantry squads lost on average 347 squads, or 69% of their force. The tanks opposing them (250 tanks) lost on average 31 tanks, or 12% of their force.

The situation improved for the rifle squads when they were equipped with RPG-2's. Squad losses were on average 235 squads, or 47% of their force. Tank losses increased to an average of 68, or 27% of their force. So up-gunning the squads with the RPG-2 dropped infantry losses by a third while doubling the losses of the tank force.

Conclusion: Including this kind of detail in scenarios is not "just chrome". The effects are easily visible and accord, at the least generally, with what one might expect. This is something for designers of post-1945 scenarios to consider, as the AT capability of the generic squads in the database seems to represent roughly 1945 at best ... while the equipment definitions for modern AFVs represents more accurately their tremendous jump in combat effectiveness. Put differently, how many soldiers today would want to take on a T-80 with a 2.36-inch Bazooka?

Cheers

[cathar1244]

LAB: AIR INTERDICTION AND AIR BOMBARDMENT IN TOAW

Introduction

For these tests, a lab scenario was devised in which an infantry battalion of 100 rifle squads was subjected to air attack in several situations. The attacking air unit had 20 SU-25's for equipment. Both the target unit and the attacking air unit were set to 100% proficiency. All attacks took place in clear terrain and fair weather.

The standard equipment definition of the SU-25 allows it to employ precision guided munitions (PGM). The lab scenario had a default force PGM setting of 20, out of a possible range of 1 to 999. The SU-25 also has the first "optics" improvement; that is, it has targeting capability slightly enhanced above that of equipment using iron sights.

The version of TOAW IV used for testing does not have the new equipment density rules option.

Three kinds of attacks were looked at. The first was a player directed bombardment strike. The second kind was bombardment made against a static unit by an air unit that had been assigned an interdiction mission. The final type of attack were interdiction missions carried out against the target unit while moving.

All air strike kinds include two attack phases against the target. The first is an attritional attack against soft targets and the second phase resolves anti-armor combat. In the lab scenario, no armored equipment was present in the target unit.

Of note is that even in a simple scenario like this, for all mission types there was a significant amount of variation as expressed by the losses inflicted upon the target unit. Loss figures mentioned in these comments should be considered with this variation, and the scenario's relative lack of complex interaction, in mind.

Results of the testing are presented with a brief description followed by percentages indicating the results noted in a series of five lab runs. In cases in which an interdiction strike did not occur, the notation "NA" is given. At the end of the results is an average figure for the five lab runs. The average figure was calculated by discarding the lowest and highest of the five percentages and taking the average of the remaining three figures. In cases where data was deemed insufficient, the average figure is presented as "++".

[cathar1244]

LAB: AIR INTERDICTION AND AIR BOMBARDMENT IN TOAW (Cont.)

Player directed bombardment strikes

These strike non-moving targets and appear to represent less intensive activity by the attacking air unit than strikes conducted while an air unit is assigned an interdiction mission. "Less intensive" refers to two characteristics. The first is that directed bombardment typically produces fewer losses than air interdiction strikes. The second is that multiple bombardments may be directed in a single turn. In the lab scenario, it was possible to direct bombardment of the target by the air unit up to nine times in a single turn, while the highest number of interdiction strikes by a single air unit was six.

Most individual bombardment strikes inflicted a losses of zero to two percent upon the target. On occasion the losses were greater. The maximum observed cumulative loss for the target in a single turn was 27 percent. Thus, it was possible to reduce the target's equipment inventory by roughly one-fourth in a single turn of bombardments.

Results:

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 5 km / hex; Bombardment, minimize losses, nine attacks in day turn:				07%; 07%; 09%; 06%; 02%		07%
 5 km / hex; Bombardment, limit losses, nine-ten attacks in day turn:				14%; 07%; 05%; 10%; 10%		09%
 5 km / hex; Bombardment, minimize losses, nine attacks in half week turn:			04%; 21%; 08%; 09%; 09%		09%
 
 1 km / hex; Bombardment, minimize losses, nine attacks in day turn:				23%; 03%; 19%; 16%; 04%		12%
 1 km / hex; Bombardment, limit losses, nine-ten attacks in day turn:				27%; 16%; 21%; 06%; 11%		16%
 1 km / hex; Bombardment, minimize losses, nine attacks in half week turn:			05%; 17%; 14%; 04%; 18%		12%
 

[cathar1244]

LAB: AIR INTERDICTION AND AIR BOMBARDMENT IN TOAW (Cont.)

Interdiction strike against a non-moving target

This kind of strike may be rare or even non-existent in a typical scenario. In this situation, the air unit has been assigned an interdiction mission, but detected no moving targets. At the conclusion of the target's turn, there is a chance a non-moving target will be designated a "static target of opportunity" and be subjected to an "interdiction (bombardment)" strike [as it is termed in the TOAW Log file]. Of note is that the same sort of strike is used for interdiction strikes against moving targets, or so the TOAW Log file indicates.

These end-of-turn strikes against non-moving targets generated higher target losses than individual directed bombardment strikes. Target losses of two to twelve percent were observed. But, while individual strikes of this kind were more lethal than directed bombardment strikes, the cumulative target losses were normally less than those inflicted by a series of nine directed bombardment strikes in a single turn.

Results:

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 5 km / hex; Static Int, minimize losses, one day turn:						NA;  NA;  NA;  NA;  NA		++
 5 km / hex; Static Int, limit losses, one day turn:						NA;  NA;  NA;  NA;  NA		++
 5 km / hex; Static Int, minimize losses, half week turn:					NA;  04%; 02%; NA;  NA		++
 
 1 km / hex; Static Int, minimize losses, one day turn:						04%; 06%; 07%; 12%; 06%		06%
 1 km / hex; Static Int, limit losses, one day turn:						NA;  NA;  06%; NA;  NA		++
 1 km / hex; Static Int, minimize losses, half week turn:					NA;  06%; NA;  08%; NA		++
 

[cathar1244]

LAB: AIR INTERDICTION AND AIR BOMBARDMENT IN TOAW (Cont.)

Interdiction strike against a moving target

These are the most common interdiction strikes. A moving target is hit with an air strike by an air unit tasked with an interdiction mission.

Strikes against moving targets were slightly more lethal and often occurred more than once per turn during movement of the target. A series of two or three of these strikes during unit movement was not uncommon. Individual strikes were observed to produce target losses ranging from five to ten percent, and commonly led to single-turn cumulative losses exceeding those of directed bombardments.

Results

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 5 km / hex; Moving Int, minimize losses, one day turn:						15%; NA;  NA;  10%; 01%		++
 5 km / hex; Moving Int, limit losses, one day turn:						03%; 01%; 15%; NA;  05%		++
 5 km / hex; Moving Int, minimize losses, half week turn:					10%; 06%; 02%; 07%; 03%		05%
 
 1 km / hex; Moving Int, minimize losses, one day turn:						08%; 12%; 52%; 15%; 32%		20%
 1 km / hex; Moving Int, limit losses, one day turn:						11%; 43%; 12%; 23%; 32%		22%
 1 km / hex; Moving Int, minimize losses, half week turn:					25%; 40%; 30%; 20%; 26%		27%
 

[cathar1244]

LAB: AIR INTERDICTION AND AIR BOMBARDMENT IN TOAW (Cont.)

Time and space

All of the tests were conducted in a scenario using physical scales of one and five kilometers per hex. It is noteworthy that the equipment quantity of the target unit exceeded the recommended density for the one-kilometer scale and it is possible [likely?] this situation increased the losses by some amount. Changing the physical scale to 5 kilometers per hex reduced the losses, but one should note the normal amount of variation in losses indicates outlier results (seemingly too high or too low) will still occur.

Changing the time scale from day turns to half week turns produced a notable increase in the losses of interdiction strikes against moving targets. Likewise, the physical scale of one kilometer per hex produced more losses than five kilometer hexes.

The magnitude of change in losses caused by changes to physical and time scales of the scenario is unknown and the figures shown may be exaggerated by the typical amount of variation seen in target losses. Regardless, equipment density is a factor considered by TOAW, and putting too much equipment in a single hex invites higher losses in any form of combat.

[cathar1244]

LAB: AIR INTERDICTION AND AIR BOMBARDMENT IN TOAW (Cont.)

Conclusions

While at first glance, the effectiveness of interdiction and directed bombardment strikes appears notably different, it is important to note the frequency with which one may conduct directed bombardment. The effects of all air strikes tend to produce roughly comparable results over the span of a single turn, particularly if one considers that moving units have more vulnerability to strike effects than units that have not moved.

Scenario designers should weigh their choice of hex physical scale against the equipment totals of typical units in a given scenario. Scenarios with undersized physical scales will produce higher equipment loss rates. In some scenarios, this aspect may be used to advantage. By way of example, a scenario modeling the carnage of the Falaise Gap in 1944 might have use of a hex scale in which individual units, because of their equipment inventory, present a rich target for artillery and air bombardment.

In scenarios under development, the magnitude of losses inflicted by air strikes alone may be adjusted by creating new items of equipment to represent modified aircraft. The designer may choose to raise or lower aircraft equipment characteristics such as the anti-personnel rating. Designers should be aware the anti-shipping rating of fixed wing aircraft appears to be influenced by the anti-personnel rating: increases in the AP rating will at some point trigger increases in the anti-shipping rating.

[cathar1244]

Low vs High Altitude for air bombardment of ground forces

I was curious if TOAW imposed a penalty on aircraft anti-personnel capability when the aircraft operates a high altitude. To answer this question, I set up a lab in which there were two identical target units, each of 100 rifle squads and 10 BTR-60s. Hex scale was 1 kilometer.

Each target unit was attacked by 300 aircraft. The aircraft were rated for 22 (internally, TOAW would have considered these equal to 11) as anti-personnel strength. One group of the aircraft was flagged as high altitude; the other group was flagged as low altitude.

The results shown below (number of squads lost) for ten runs of the lab indicate TOAW does not penalize high altitude aircraft for bombardment of ground units. That is, one AP point is one AP point, no matter the altitude of the attack. The armored vehicles almost completely escaped any damage.

Cheers

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 ====== Test of low vs high altitude =====
 
 	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
 
 High	 9	29	20	24	25	18	20	17	12	21 +1 APC
  Low	17	29	23	13	19	24	18	11	15	18