Battle of Savo Island

[Buckrock]

An AE thread going off topic? Never.

I saw your question on it a while ago and thought it was interesting. I had access to digitalized copies of many of the WWII USN carrier and task force reports, so I did a search for any mention of elevator/lift speeds on the assumption someone would have mentioned it in a maintenance report, etc. Nope. All I got was the lift wasn't working or the lift was damaged/destroyed by enemy attack.

There, diversion from O/T over.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

Sterile it is, more so than any Ive come across recently. What you just wrote, again, has nothing to do with my previous point. I do not question Pearl Harbor as a turning point, I question the usefulness of keeping this discussion alive about something that didn't happen and wasn't going to happen ....

And yet you're still here keeping this "sterile" discussion going.

Project much?

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

Just for relevance, the responses to Joe D. in relation to a third Japanese strike destroying the fuel storage facilities ashore at Pearl Harbor so far have been either it would have been a difficult task or that the Japanese would have been unlikely to even target them, except for Warspite1, who claimed he'd seen convincing arguments elsewhere that the third strike did not have the ordnance to destroy the fuel storage facilities anyway. All Joe D. appears to have been doing in most of his questions to Warspite1 since is to try to clarify in what way did the third strike lack the ordnance for the task. Seems a fair enough thing to do for a response he received in a thread he started.

Thank you!

You would think that I could question the "unfeasibility" of a third IJN air strike at Pearl, or Mikawa going for the transports at Savo on my own thread without all the soap box sarcasm.

But there are some self-described military experts online who think anything they post is the definitive last word on the PTO. Yet if hypothetical history is written in stone, why do we all continue to war game AE for hours, days and months on end?

[Buckrock]

I do it to annoy my wife.

[warspite1]

Just to be clear, I said there were comments put forward that sounded pretty convincing - but also made clear in subsequent posts that I neither support nor rubbish those comments as I simply don't know enough about it - i.e. the flammability of the oil, the method of storage, the protection afforded to the facilities, the precision required to ignite the oil etc.

As for the thread, well I think if people are bored by it then they can always choose to not participate and let those who want to have a debate do so.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Just to be clear, I said there were comments put forward that sounded pretty convincing - but also made clear in subsequent posts that I neither support nor rubbish those comments as I simply don't know enough about it - i.e. the flammability of the oil, the method of storage, the protection afforded to the facilities, the precision required to ignite the oil etc.

As for the thread, well I think if people are bored by it then they can always choose to not participate and let those who want to have a debate do so.

Amen!

[Fishbed]

Apologies gentlemen, apparently I certainly misunderstood and have too much imagination. Enjoy yourselves

@Buckrock yes unfortunately, even sources like Norman Friedman's book only have scarce info here and there. If you refer to reports such as Enterprise's damage report at Santa Cruz and thereafter, or Lexington during the Lae Salamaua raids (I remember in both occasions that a single elevator was out of order) it was a fair idea. I didn't look at them for that sort of info, maybe I should.

On the IJN side, the late Mark Peattie, in Sunburst, gives a value of a 40 sec for elevator cycles aboard the Shokaku class (including loading and unloading, and knowing Japanese ships have deeper shafts because of the 2-hangar decks configuration) but goes on saying Akagi and Kaga were slower... Really a tough cookie[:o]

[Anachro]

That's a shame. I didn't realize Peattie had passed or was so advanced in age. Loved Kaigun; now I want to read Sunburst.

As for your game, Fishbed, looking forward to more info as it sounds interesting!

[spence]

A mere 1000 computer trials simulating the third strike in which every one of the 280 250kg bombs carried by attacking planes falls within the 2 major tank farms at Pearl Harbor (flak and fighters account for none prior to release), and the results are that between 22 and 35 of the tanks are directly hit with three additional breached by fragments. This represents between 45% - 69% of the capacity of the 54 tanks present. A complete refill of every ship present in Pearl Harbor on 12/07 required on 61000 tons of fuel. All firefighting precautions and equipment/systems are assumed to be completely ineffective (like the US has no experience whatever storing various fuels as safely as possible).


Because of damage/time to repair and losses there are a total of 265 strike aircraft left after the first strike-thus with a mix of B5Ns and D3As the max bomb load for the third strike is 280x250kg bombs. (This assumes 25 x B5Ns are assigned to search 360 degrees since Nagumo had no idea where the US carriers could be + roughly 100 a/c withheld to attack those carriers should they be found[a minimum]).

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: spence

A mere 1000 computer trials simulating the third strike in which every one of the 280 250kg bombs carried by attacking planes falls within the 2 major tank farms at Pearl Harbor (flak and fighters account for none prior to release), and the results are that between 22 and 35 of the tanks are directly hit with three additional breached by fragments. This represents between 45% - 69% of the capacity of the 54 tanks present. A complete refill of every ship present in Pearl Harbor on 12/07 required on 61000 tons of fuel. All firefighting precautions and equipment/systems are assumed to be completely ineffective (like the US has no experience whatever storing various fuels as safely as possible).


Because of damage/time to repair and losses there are a total of 265 strike aircraft left after the first strike-thus with a mix of B5Ns and D3As the max bomb load for the third strike is 280x250kg bombs. (This assumes 25 x B5Ns are assigned to search 360 degrees since Nagumo had no idea where the US carriers could be + roughly 100 a/c withheld to attack those carriers should they be found[a minimum]).

Halsey's carrier TF was returning from Wake; while the Lexington remained at sea, the Enterprise returned to port on the evening of the attack.

And it's hard to safely store flammables anywhere during a surprise air raid.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

Apologies gentlemen, apparently I certainly misunderstood and have too much imagination. Enjoy yourselves

1+

[Fishbed]

ORIGINAL: spence

A mere 1000 computer trials simulating the third strike in which every one of the 280 250kg bombs carried by attacking planes falls within the 2 major tank farms at Pearl Harbor (flak and fighters account for none prior to release), and the results are that between 22 and 35 of the tanks are directly hit with three additional breached by fragments. This represents between 45% - 69% of the capacity of the 54 tanks present. A complete refill of every ship present in Pearl Harbor on 12/07 required on 61000 tons of fuel. All firefighting precautions and equipment/systems are assumed to be completely ineffective (like the US has no experience whatever storing various fuels as safely as possible).


Because of damage/time to repair and losses there are a total of 265 strike aircraft left after the first strike-thus with a mix of B5Ns and D3As the max bomb load for the third strike is 280x250kg bombs. (This assumes 25 x B5Ns are assigned to search 360 degrees since Nagumo had no idea where the US carriers could be + roughly 100 a/c withheld to attack those carriers should they be found[a minimum]).

Hello Spence,

Much interested in knowing where this data is coming from, and if there's more from where it came from. Is that from Alan Zimm's book or a separate study?

ORIGINAL: Anachro

That's a shame. I didn't realize Peattie had passed or was so advanced in age. Loved Kaigun; now I want to read Sunburst.

As for your game, Fishbed, looking forward to more info as it sounds interesting!

Thanks ^^
Regarding Peattie, yes, that was a shock for me a few months back when I researched ways to get in touch with the gentleman, but he wasn't a young man anymore for sure. He left us with a great legacy.

Regarding Sunburst, be ready for some content you saw already in Kaigun. It's basically at its core the Kaigun's paragraphs dedicated to Naval Aviation, but expanded and enriched with deeper analysis and thought (and a few more years of research).

[spence]

Much interested in knowing where this data is coming from, and if there's more from where it came from. Is that from Alan Zimm's book or a separate study?

It comes from Zimm's book and unlike most of his facts and figures these are not footnoted.

The book does have a nice aerial photo of one of the fuel tank farms (26 tanks) though which does show the earthen berms surrounding individual tanks. The area enclosed by the berm in each case is sufficient to contain the fuel within the tank.

[spence]

Found the same photo dtd 13 Oct 1941 on the Naval History Forums (there is quite a long discussion of "The Third Strike" there.)

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: spence

Found the same photo dtd 13 Oct 1941 on the Naval History Forums (there is quite a long discussion of "The Third Strike" there.)

Without this fuel, the "silent service" wouldn't be able to carry the battle into IJN territorial waters while the rest of the fleet comes back on line.

[Fishbed]

Well.
Wouldn't change much considering what the Silent Service achieved in that first six months worth of a window, that is nothing of strategic importance... Fuel only helps if you have reliable torpedoes.

I'd say, the main achievement of US submarines for the whole first semester of 1942 was probably Nautilus' unwilling and yet decisive contribution at Midway. In regard to submarines, burning down this oil or more exactly the diesel next to it wouldn't have prevented much of what happened afterwards, for nothing much happened at all, to the great consternation of the acting CINCPAC, an old submarine hand himself.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

Well.
Wouldn't change much considering what the Silent Service achieved in that first six months worth of a window, that is nothing of strategic importance... Fuel only helps if you have reliable torpedoes....

You only need a reliable deck gun for commerce raiding.

[Lecivius]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

Well.
Wouldn't change much considering what the Silent Service achieved in that first six months worth of a window, that is nothing of strategic importance... Fuel only helps if you have reliable torpedoes....

You only need a reliable deck gun for commerce raiding.

I read this with some humor. I know what you're saying. But reality sets in a bit. I would NOT want to be on the open ocean, with 6-9 ft swells, on the rear deck of this boat tooling along at 20 knots in a crosswind. This pic is in harbor. Open water is a totally different animal.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

Well.
Wouldn't change much considering what the Silent Service achieved in that first six months worth of a window, that is nothing of strategic importance... Fuel only helps if you have reliable torpedoes....

You only need a reliable deck gun for commerce raiding.

I read this with some humor. I know what you're saying. But reality sets in a bit. I would NOT want to be on the open ocean, with 6-9 ft swells, on the rear deck of this boat tooling along at 20 knots in a crosswind. This pic is in harbor. Open water is a totally different animal.

So now you're saying that sub deck guns were unusable on any open water during WW II?

Aside from some instances of barrel detonations -- often because the gun crew forgot to take away the muzzle protector from the gun -- German U-boats didn't seem to have any problems firing their deck guns on open water.

[Lecivius]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

So now you're saying that sub deck guns were unusable on any open water during WW II?

I never said anything like that in any way [:-] I said I would not want to be on a running, slippery deck firing 3" shells with iron sights on a dark night with a cross wind in the middle of the Pacific ocean. The Germans hated it, and with good reason, in the Atlantic. They did it, but as a last resort, and under the right conditions. The Americans did it as well, but only as a last resort, against small targets, and (usually) again under good conditions.