Battle of Savo Island

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

So now you're saying that sub deck guns were unusable on any open water during WW II?

I never said anything like that in any way [:-] I said I would not want to be on a running, slippery deck firing 3" shells with iron sights on a dark night with a cross wind in the middle of the Pacific ocean. The Germans hated it, and with good reason, in the Atlantic. They did it, but as a last resort, and under the right conditions...

The Germans "did it" to save their torpedoes, most of which worked.

[Lecivius]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

So now you're saying that sub deck guns were unusable on any open water during WW II?

I never said anything like that in any way [:-] I said I would not want to be on a running, slippery deck firing 3" shells with iron sights on a dark night with a cross wind in the middle of the Pacific ocean. The Germans hated it, and with good reason, in the Atlantic. They did it, but as a last resort, and under the right conditions...

The Germans "did it" to save their torpedoes, most of which worked.

True. Mainly against very small, isolated ships in the mid to south Atlantic. Or along the west coast of Africa. A couple were attacked in the Caribbean. They did not do it as a matter of practice. They sure as heck didn't do it in the North Sea.

[spence]

The Germans "did it" to save their torpedoes, most of which worked

Actually the Germans had severe problems with their torpedoes at first related to their magnetic exploder. IIRC the closer they got to magnetic North the worse their problems became...in the Norwegian Campaign it became so severe that their equivalent of BuOrd actually paid attention and corrected the problem.

Found a link on the web that describes the problems pretty well. Interesting that there were a lot of the same problems with the same systems on US torpedoes.

http://www.uboataces.com/articles-woode ... does.shtml

[Barb]

Also 3"/50 Mk.21 guns the subs carried up to 1943-1944 were usually quite ineffective and required large amount of ammo to sink larger targets. Until larger 4" or 5" guns were obtained, the skippers rarely used deck guns - and even if, they were reserved for junks, sea trucks, or to deliver coup de grâce for ships already torpedoed.

[Fishbed]

And beyond that mere fact, once again as with the 3rd raid on Pearl Harbor, the actual larger picture and thinking of the time shouldn't be mistakenly put aside by a single point of detail. Mk14 torpedoes were not known to be unreliable before they actually got proven unreliable.

You only need a reliable deck gun for commerce raiding.

Then again, Joe, it's a bit strange a remark to make. I have no data on the actual rate of sub attacks using deck guns in the Pacific in mind, but I can bet you it's certainly less or around 10%, and hardly against any target of importance. People were not playing Silent Service 2 or Silent Hunter at that time, you just don't attack and run around a tanker with a deck gun hoping for a fire, knowing nobody will spawn in the vicinity for the next hour of gameplay.

This remark only makes sense if ships were actually sunk in numbers in 1942 using deck guns in absence of reliable torpedoes (apart from the Mk10 of course). Which, without any sort of prior research, seems highly unlikely to me.

[Buckrock]

Gun attacks by US submarines on vessels over 500tons was very rare in the 1942 period being discussed and for good reason.

Most Japanese ocean merchants had equal or better gun firepower than USN subs did in '42. As noted in other posts, surfaced submarines could be considerably less stable gun platforms than their intended victims. I've seen multiple report examples where US subs simply abandoned their night attack with the deck gun after failing to land a hit on the target even in moderate sea conditions. And the larger the merchant target, the more likely it could afford to accept heavier damage in a gunfight than a submarine that was a long way from home.

The 3"/50 most USN submarines carried in '42 was not a weapon specially designed for a role involving regular and lengthy dunkings, resulting in frequent issues like jamming, flooding of sights, etc. The 3" common shell carried by the subs for this gun (normally about 200 rounds in a Fleet Boat) in '42 were old stock (prone to duds), lacked sufficient explosive capacity for their size (later replaced by superior high capacity shells) and did not use flashless propellant for night engagements (often leaving the gun crew night-blind after the first round while self-illuminating the submarine for the enemy).
***Oops, I was wrong on the 3"/50 not being specially designed for submarines. The version of the gun carried on subs was built to cope with extended submersion conditions. The reported problems in '42 with the 3"/50 system actually related more to the gun's mount (frequently jamming in train) and with associated equipment for the gun (like the optical sights becoming inoperable after a period of submersion).

It also didn't help that many US submarines went to sea in early '42 without their crews ever having practised with their deck gun. They were there to sink ships with their torpedoes and that what they trained for. They also believed that they were torpedoing and sinking a not insignificant number of enemy ships, regardless of suspicions that their torpedoes were holding them back from achieving big scores. And few submarines were being lost in this effort.

The US subs simply didn't have the weapons, training or doctrine to conduct an effective commerce raiding campaign by gun against the Japanese. Nor did they have the certain knowledge of their torpedo failures to justify making the deck gun the preferred weapon. They might have delivered a reign of terror on moderate seas against Japanese sampans, trawlers and smaller coastal vessels in '42 but the larger merchant vessels would have been able to go about their business largely unscathed.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

And beyond that mere fact, once again as with the 3rd raid on Pearl Harbor, the actual larger picture and thinking of the time shouldn't be mistakenly put aside by a single point of detail. Mk14 torpedoes were not known to be unreliable before they actually got proven unreliable...

Newspeak?

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: spence

The Germans "did it" to save their torpedoes, most of which worked

Actually the Germans had severe problems with their torpedoes at first related to their magnetic exploder....

I bet that put Churchill's mind at ease.
Not!

"The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril."

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Barb

Also 3"/50 Mk.21 guns the subs carried up to 1943-1944 were usually quite ineffective and required large amount of ammo to sink larger targets. Until larger 4" or 5" guns were obtained, the skippers rarely used deck guns - and even if, they were reserved for junks, sea trucks, or to deliver coup de grâce for ships already torpedoed.

US subs in '42 still managed to sink 180 Japanese ships for a total of 725,000 GRT.

https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_ ... e/sec6.htm

[spence]

I bet that put Churchill's mind at ease.
Not!

The problems were discovered in 1939 but the initial fixes were not made in time for the Norwegian Campaign. The first Uboat sunk in 1939 fired 3 torpedoes at HMS Ark Royal which detonated prematurely alerting the British to the Uboats presence. The Germans deployed all their Uboats to cover the Norwegian invasion and figured that because of torpedo problems they failed to hit/sink a battleship, 7 cruisers and at least 5 transports. All of the problems took until 1942 to correct.

[Fishbed]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Barb

Also 3"/50 Mk.21 guns the subs carried up to 1943-1944 were usually quite ineffective and required large amount of ammo to sink larger targets. Until larger 4" or 5" guns were obtained, the skippers rarely used deck guns - and even if, they were reserved for junks, sea trucks, or to deliver coup de grâce for ships already torpedoed.

US subs in '42 still managed to sink 180 Japanese ships for a total of 725,000 GRT.

https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_ ... e/sec6.htm

Aye, but a few remarks
- There were a grand total of 4 subs berthed in Pearl Harbor on Dec 7th (another reason why going for them would have been foolish btw, if you ever read this argument). There were like 30 of them in Cavite with the Asiatic Fleet. Again, not sure how hitting the fuel would have done much. The need for diesel wasn't in PH at that time.

- I spoke of the first 6 months, not for the whole of 1942. As said earlier, I am only interested in this timespan - for, in much less time than that, any loss suffered to the diesel reserves in Pearl Harbor would have been largely made up for by then.

- Besides, if you check your data for the first 6 months, I would venture the guess that US sub efficiency probably wasn't spread 50%/50% over the year... And certainly not only from COMSUBPAC, but also from COMSUBAF and then COMSUBSOWESPAC when it came online. The fact that I'd bet Mark10 armed S-boats were more common down south probably also affected the success rate there.

Newspeak?

I beg your pardon? Would you please care to elaborate...? [&:]

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: spence

I bet that put Churchill's mind at ease.
Not!

The problems were discovered in 1939 but the initial fixes were not made in time for the Norwegian Campaign. The first Uboat sunk in 1939 fired 3 torpedoes at HMS Ark Royal which detonated prematurely alerting the British to the Uboats presence. The Germans deployed all their Uboats to cover the Norwegian invasion and figured that because of torpedo problems they failed to hit/sink a battleship, 7 cruisers and at least 5 transports. All of the problems took until 1942 to correct.

So after the London blitz from '40-41, the only thing left that ever really frightened Churchill were fully operational U-boats.

[Fishbed]

As a sidenote, a close inspection of the recorded US Sub kills reveal that COMSUBPAC subs were responsible for the following Japanese merchant losses:

None in December 41
3 merchants in January 42
3 merchants in February 42
7 merchants in March 42 (PH has received former COMSUBAF refugees by now)
3 merchants in April 42
13 merchants in May 42 (the COMSUBAF refugees take their revenge)
1 merchant in June 42 (Fleet duty at Midway for most COMSUBPAC boats certainly didn't help with the overall scoring...)

Naturally, apart from the odd japanese submarine sunk here and there, nothing much to show for regarding naval combat units proper.
The only major thing I see coming from the contribution of COMSUBPAC boats in the first months is - actually - invaluable training and experience for the crews despite the whole frustration. But in terms of raw results, not so much. Blowing up the diesel reserves wouldn't have slowed the pace of the overall sub offensive and sub war in a noticeable fashion at all, I believe.

Sources:
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/l ... -wwii.html
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/ ... ses-6.html
http://www.combinedfleet.com/sorg.php

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Barb

Also 3"/50 Mk.21 guns the subs carried up to 1943-1944 were usually quite ineffective and required large amount of ammo to sink larger targets. Until larger 4" or 5" guns were obtained, the skippers rarely used deck guns - and even if, they were reserved for junks, sea trucks, or to deliver coup de grâce for ships already torpedoed.

US subs in '42 still managed to sink 180 Japanese ships for a total of 725,000 GRT.

https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_ ... e/sec6.htm

Aye, but a few remarks
- There were a grand total of 4 subs berthed in Pearl Harbor on Dec 7th (another reason why going for them would have been foolish btw, if you ever read this argument). There were like 30 of them in Cavite with the Asiatic Fleet. Again, not sure how hitting the fuel would have done much. The need for diesel wasn't in PH at that time.

- I spoke of the first 6 months, not for the whole of 1942. As said earlier, I am only interested in this timespan - for, in much less time than that, any loss suffered to the diesel reserves in Pearl Harbor would have been largely made up for by then.

- Besides, if you check your data for the first 6 months, I would venture the guess that US sub efficiency probably wasn't spread 50%/50% over the year... And certainly not only from COMSUBPAC, but also from COMSUBAF and then COMSUBSOWESPAC when it came online. The fact that I'd bet Mark10 armed S-boats were more common down south probably also affected the success rate there.

Newspeak?

I beg your pardon? Would you please care to elaborate...? [&:]

Weren't you required to read Orwell's "1984" in school?
I was.

And there were more subs at other US bases that would soon be operating out of Pearl.

"The fifty-one submarines at Pearl Harbor, on the west coast of the U.S., and at Manila, Philippine Islands were the only ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet able to retaliate after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. The attack put the U.S. Battle Force out of action. Our Fleet Class submarines had been designed as advanced scouts for that force. However, by good fortune, they had the speed, endurance, and weapon load to make them admirably suited for another role; attacking Japanese shipping throughout the Pacific. As a result they were immediately assigned the new role, and a basic military strategy of strangulation of Japan was fashioned about them."

https://maritime.org/doc/subsinpacific.htm

"strangulation of Japan" sounds like commerce raiding.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: spence

I bet that put Churchill's mind at ease.
Not!

The problems were discovered in 1939 but the initial fixes were not made in time for the Norwegian Campaign. The first Uboat sunk in 1939 fired 3 torpedoes at HMS Ark Royal which detonated prematurely alerting the British to the Uboats presence. The Germans deployed all their Uboats to cover the Norwegian invasion and figured that because of torpedo problems they failed to hit/sink a battleship, 7 cruisers and at least 5 transports. All of the problems took until 1942 to correct.

So after the London blitz from '40-41, the only thing left that ever really frightened Churchill were fully operational U-boats.

IIRC, Doenitz didn't fully implement wolf-pack tactics until after the campaign (Paukenschlag (sp?)/Drumbeat) against the unescorted US shipping in early 1942. When escorted British Convoys were suffering high losses with very few sub kills, the Allies finally realized they could lose the Battle of the Atlantic. Priority was switched to ASW warfare and defence and while it was spooling up was the period of greatest anxiety that must have weighed on Churchill.

[Fishbed]

Dear Sir,

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

Weren't you required to read Orwell's "1984" in school?
I was.

I am sorry, I still don't really get you. We didn't go to the same school, nor did we learn this trade in the same language. Pardon my inexperience and ineptitude, for I am a non-native speaker dealing with a foreign topic.

If by this remark you meant, seemingly in a rather unpleasant way I might say, that my argument regarding torpedoes doesn't make sense, I'll be glad to be enlightened [&:]
Even if them submariners had had a gun that could do the trick (which wasn't the case for most fleet subs in 1941, as pointed out by another contributor), they wouldn't have used it as long as they trusted their torpedoes to do what they were made for. You can't expect a submariner to revert to a gun if he doesn't know his torpedoes are faulty in the first place, can you...? [&:]

There were near to no subs operating from PH in December. Submarines use diesel in relatively small quantities that is easily replaced. Unreliable torpedoes are the main cause explaining the US subs lack of efficiency in the first half of 1942, which means that the few patrols that *might* not have taken place in case of a highly hypothetical complete shortage of Diesel fuel aboard ships at PH and ashore wouldn't have impacted the conflict in any meaningful way.

And there were more subs at other US bases that would soon be operating out of Pearl.

I do not dispute that, and you'll be happy to see that I just provided the numbers in my previous post, together with my sources. But as underlined by the data, strangulation of Japan certainly has happened - just not from the Pearl Harbor submarine force in the first half of 1942, which is the whole point of this debate, isn't it...?

Anyway, if you are not familiar with some of the words, the concepts, the acronyms I pick, or the history I (mis)quote, which might lead to some further mutual misundestanding, please feel free to ask, I'll be happy and honored to be of assistance.

[Lecivius]

Newspeak.

Newspeak is the language of Oceania, a fictional totalitarian state and the setting of the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), by George Orwell. To meet the ideological requirements of English Socialism (Ingsoc) in Oceania, the ruling Party created Newspeak, [1] a controlled language of restricted grammar and limited vocabulary, meant to limit the freedom of thought — personal identity, self-expression, free will — that threatens the ideology of the régime of Big Brother and the Party, who have criminalized such concepts into thoughtcrime, as contradictions of Ingsoc orthodoxy

[spence]

So after the London blitz from '40-41, the only thing left that ever really frightened Churchill were fully operational U-boats.

Actually I don't think the London Blitz frightened Churchill much because it was pretty much an expression of Hitlerian bluster. The Uboats went after British merchant shipping with decent torpedoes starting after the Norwegian Campaign and certainly at the start of that time the Brits were all alone in their fight. Apparently the Germans didn't correct the depth controls on their torpedoes til 1942 but they were good enough before that to put a real scare into Churchill. Considering that the issue was in doubt at least until 1943 it seems reasonable.


It should be noted that Churchill also said something along the lines of "Now we've won" right after the US declaration of war against Japan.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

Dear Sir,

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

Weren't you required to read Orwell's "1984" in school?
I was.

I am sorry, I still don't really get you. We didn't go to the same school, nor did we learn this trade in the same language. Pardon my inexperience and ineptitude, for I am a non-native speaker dealing with a foreign topic.

"From: Beijing, China - Paris, France"

Thank you for pointing out what was hiding in plain sight!
So many posters use foreign insignia for their avatar to indicate an affinity with a foreign country in AE and not their actual origins.

The apologies are mine.

à tout à l' heure.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

Newspeak.

Newspeak is the language of Oceania, a fictional totalitarian state and the setting of the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), by George Orwell. To meet the ideological requirements of English Socialism (Ingsoc) in Oceania, the ruling Party created Newspeak, [1] a controlled language of restricted grammar and limited vocabulary, meant to limit the freedom of thought — personal identity, self-expression, free will — that threatens the ideology of the régime of Big Brother and the Party, who have criminalized such concepts into thoughtcrime, as contradictions of Ingsoc orthodoxy

Yes, but I was thinking more along the lines of the following.

"Newspeak ... pretentious diction, and high-flown rhetoric, which produce the meaningless words of doublespeak, the product of unclear reasoning."