Flashpoint and Support Ops

[LTCMTS]

http://www.newnanbiz.net/msnyder/

The table is based on all the old manuals, the Jane's, etc that I've collected over the years. The information is entirely unclassified and is an educated guess based on the sources and some extrapolation from the formulas and data in "Technology of Tanks" a two volume discussion of mobility, firepower, protecetion, etc published in 1991, Orgorkiewicz, Richard M, I would say the values are around 90% accurate for average conditions for gun tubes and ammo in decent condition and fairly recent manufacture. Gun tube life, powder degradation, life cycle deterioration, etc all would reduce the values.

[LTCMTS]

In Zaloga, there's confirmation from the Russian side of some info I had seen on the US side. The 100mm D-10T/TG/T2S gun in the T-54/55 firing the BR-412D APHE round could not penetrate the M60A1 across the frontal quarter even at point blank range. This evidentally caused consternation and rage within the Soviet tank command. Since the T-62 was placed in production before the information on the M60A1 could have gotten to the Soviets, the T-62 must have been based on the tests of the US T95, from which the M60A1 derived its turret design.

[LTCMTS]

In Zaloga, there's confirmation from the Russian side of some info I had seen on the US side. The 100mm D-10T/TG/T2S gun in the T-54/55 firing the BR-412D APHE round could not penetrate the M60A1 across the frontal quarter even at point blank range. This evidentally caused consternation and rage within the Soviet tank command. Since the T-62 was placed in production before the information on the M60A1 could have gotten to the Soviets, the T-62 must have been based on the tests of the US T95, from which the M60A1 derived its turret design.

It was intended to use silliceous cored armor in the M60. This was a glass/ceramic core within rolled homogenous armor plates or injected into cavities within the cast armor sections of the hull and turret. This is equivalent to the Soviet "K" armor introduced on the T-64. The SCA was twice as efficient as a single plate of RHA at equivalent thickness aganist HEAT rounds, while being slightly better than the equivalent thickness of the bonded plates against KE projectiles. The problem was additional weight, about 4,500lbs for the M60, additional manufacturing costs and that the system was vulnerable as each KE strike would fracture the SCA plate or layer and reduce resistence in that area to further HEAT rounds. It also provided no protection against HESH/HEP, but we didn't (?) know that the Soviets never fielded such rounds.

[LTCMTS]

Soviet logistics at division and below were not all that different than US/NATO doctrine. The differences tended to cluster around the evident concentration of the Soviets on the offensive.

The Soviets did not intend to use a "pull" system of resupply. They would push forward standard resupply packages. Whatever the resupplied unit didn't need would be left in place for later collection, classification and redistribution. Wounded and remains would be evacuated on the resupply vehicles reducing the need for "dedicated" transport (ie. ambulances).

Recovery and maintenance ops were similar. Equipment non-repairable at crew/unit level would be left in place and collected by follow-on echelons. Equipment would be repaired and returned to the supply system. That's why there weren't as many recovery vehicles in Soviet units.

It was intended that each battalion/regiment carry as much fuel and ammo with it as possible. When a unit became combat ineffective, for whatever reason, another unit from the follwoing echelon would conduct as passage of lines and continue the mission. This doctrine was particularly enforced above divisional levels, where echelons would pass through and continue the mission while the unit "passed" would resupply/refit or be withdrawn for reconstitution/regeneration.

This system and the suppression of "customer/consumer" demand (Soviet units received the bare minimums, ammo and fuel, with food and other commodities being provided as available) resulted in a slimmer, less robust logistics/support system, that would have been stressed in sustained offensive conditions where insufficient force structure was available or if thrown on the operational defensive for any length of time (say two weeks to a month).

[Blackhorse]

Some selected observations:

1. Engagement Ranges: During my tenure in Germany ('81-'85) we had no confidence in the ability of our M68 105mm main gun in the M60A3 -- or the M1 when we got it in 1983 -- to penetrate the frontal armor of Soviet tanks at extended range. Where possible, our squadron (2/11) intended to let tank units close to within 1200-1500m before opening up with sabot. HEAT would be used exclusively for other armored vehicles.

"Where possible" is the operative term. If we were spotted and taking fire from long range, there was little reason *not* to shoot back. Even where ambushes were possible, there was an ugly trade off. If you let the enemy close, you'll get more first-shot kills . . . but you'll sacrifice most of your accuracy advantage. If you start off outnumbered 3:1 (standard NATO doctrine) and every shot is a first-round kill, then you're still outnumbered 2:1, and you are inside the battlesight range of any T72/80.

2. Thermal sight fogging: Was rare in my unit. Probably because our TTS' were new -- they were installed in early '82, IIRC. I had to get through one gunnery exercise using the *shudder* old infrared sights.

[LTCMTS]

I was looking through some 25 odd years of odds and ends collected in the service and I found an old GTA 71-1-1Weapons Range Reader. I cannot for the life of me remember when I acquired it, I think probably in Germany in 1980-83. The circle is covered with Soviet weapon systems on the left side in red and US on the right side in Blue. You would set up your posiitons on a 1:50,000 map and then use the wheel to determine effective ranges for your "kill" zones or those of the enemy. The wheel gives the hit probablities of 50% or more for the:

RPG-7 ~100m on stationary or moving targets
SPG-9/BMP-1 ~800m for stationary and ~600m for moving
T-54/55 & T-12 HEAT about the same
T-54/55/& T-12 APDS ~1200m stationary & ~1100m moving
T-62 HEAT ~800m for stationary and ~600m for moving
T-62 APDSFS ~1400m for stationary & ~1200m for moving
AT-3 Sagger ~3000m for both
TOW ~3000m for both
M60A1 APDS ~1800m stationary & ~1300m moving
M60A1 HEAT ~1300m stationary & ~900m moving
M60A1 HEP ~900m stationary & ~700m moving
M60A2/M551 MGM ~3,000m
M551 HEAT ~900m staionary & ~500m moving
M60A2 HEAT ~1100m stationary & ~700m moving
Dragon ~1000m both
LAW under 100m for both

No indication of the level of training or readiness of the crews using the systems. I think this may be a VERY "conservative" book solution.

I think the training device itself is from the mid-70s, given the inclusion of the M60A2 "Starship". In any case it demonstrates the intense interest in guided projectiles at the time that resulted in the M60A2, MBT70/M803, M551 and T-64B. It was the revolution in computer technology and the development of high velocity mass projectiles (tungsten and DU "long rod" penetrators) which, along with the bad experience with 70s level technological maintenance costs and readiness, consigned missile armed tanks to oblivion in the West, while the failure to even maintain pace in the electronics revolution doomed the Soviets to perpetuating the gun launched, HEAT armed missile, in a time of armor technology revolution that minimized the HEAT warhead's effectiveness.