The objectives for the summer offensive of 1942 and Operation Clausewitz.
The coming of summer means that the Wehrmacht can go on prolonged offensives once more. The OKH has detailed the following objectives for the summer of 1942:
1) Moscow- The Soviet capital is the most important objective and will be where the main German thrust will be concentrated in. We expect very heavy fighting. The plan for taking this objective has been named “Operation Clausewitz” and will be presented below.
2) The Kuban- The rich region of the Kuban as well as its highly populated cities are the second objective. Taking it would deny the Soviets manpower sources and would secure the southern flank of AGS.
3) Stalingrad- The industrial city located on the Volga bend is of high political importance as well as a strategic one. Taking it, would allow use to use the Volga as a natural barrier.
The first two objectives are to be achieved simultaneously. The push on Stalingrad will begin once the Kuban has been secured and the flank of AGS is safe. If the situation allows, the push for Stalingrad will be supported by assets from Army Group Center once the Moscow operation has been completed.
The fuel rich Baku and the Caucasus are NOT part of the objectives for the summer offensive. The OKH believes that it would be unwise to undertake such an operation so far south with such a small margin of success. Therefore no offensive will be taken in the sector once Axis forces reach the Caucasus mountains.
Other objectives:
In the following weeks, the Soviet garrisons of Voronezh and Sevastopol should fall, giving us control over these 2 political and strategical targets and allowing us to relocate forces that are supporting these offensives, to other sectors.
The destruction of the Soviet Army and VVS remain a high priority and encirclement opportunities should be exploited whenever the chance presents itself.
It goes without saying that the most fighting will be conducted by the Infantry formations, whose importance often gets brushed under the carpet when it comes to talking about the prowess of the different arms of a military.
Operation Clausewitz
The fact that Moscow was going to be the main target of the summer offensives was known to the OKH since December of 1941. The immense political and strategical importance of the Soviet capital was never lost to the planners of the general staff. This is one of the main reasons why the Germans fought so bitterly to hold on to the positions in the flanks of Moscow during the Soviet winter offensive of 1941-42. The German pincer operations of March, May and June 1942 were concentrated in this sector in order to regain the lost territory, to weaken the enemy forces in the area and to put us in a better position to launch an offensive come summer.
The initial plan for the taking of Moscow was much smaller in scope and not as ambitious as the current one. Initial planning aimed at a shallow encirclement of Moscow. However the failed offensive at the end of May 1942 (see post #415) showed that the Soviets are sitting in highly fortified positions, have organized a defense in depth and have a lot of units concentrated in a narrow front, with ample reserves nearby. Such a shallow envelopment would be very costly in terms of men and material and instead of allowing for fast operations would turn into a bloody slog, reminiscent of WWI battles.
Therefore the OKH accepted the more ambitious “Operation Clausewitz” which calls for a wide envelopment of Moscow and the surrounding area. The plan envisions a push from the northern flank by the 3rd Panzer Army, supported by the 18th and 9th Army as well as Army Group Finland (Karelian and Kannas Armies) and a push from the Southern flank by the 2nd and 4th Panzer Army, supported by the 2nd, 16th and elements of the 4th Army. The main natural obstacles that these forces have to overcome are the Volga river in the north and the Oka river in the south. The terrain along the advancing routes is mostly light woods, which favors the defenders but once taken should favour our troops in holding back Soviet counterattacks. There are also multiple river lines that run parallel to the advance routes which we aim to use to our advantage to cement our positions.
The offensive banks on the lack of Soviet fortifications in the advancing areas and the fact that to defend this huge front the Soviets will need to stretch themselves thin. Adding to that is the lack of natural obstacles, once the 2 major rivers are crossed (although the many urban areas in the path of the advance may present a problem).
The main problem with the offensive is the availability of rail lines and their positioning which does not favor such an offensive manuever. The forces striking from the south will be in an unfavorable position once they cross the Oka and go deep into enemy territory while the forces in the north should be in a better position since they can extend their rail lines to Yaroslavl.
The German forces holding in front of Moscow will go under the command of defensive Corps which will be attached directly to the OKH and will form the Moscow Defense Area.
The offensive forces will be supported by the the VIII and I Fliegerkorps as well as Luftflotte 1 and 4.
