Naval fire control systems of WWII

[engineer]

Friedman digs into the nuts and bolts of all this in his Naval Firepower. The Mk 3 fire control radars were integrated into the analog computers as a radar range-finder but they had poor enough resolution that bearing information was not precise enough for fire control. The book includes a photo of the Washington with a Mk 3 from early 1942. The late war Mk 8 fire control radars could provide range, bearing and spotting. He notes that Mk 8 equipped battleships at Surigao Strait were straddling the Japanese battleships on 1st and 2nd salvoes at about 25k-26k yards. The Mk 3 equipped Pennsylvania didn't open fire until less than 20,000 yards.

[spence]

I think that I read somewhere that most Allied commanders didn't trust radar anyway. It was to new and if they couldn't see the target, the target didn't exist.

This describes both Admiral Callahan and Admiral Scott who commanded the US TF on the night of 12-13 November 1942 but two nights later the Japanese ran into Admiral Lee and Capt Davis on the USS Washington and suffered such a defeat that they never seriously tried to reinforce Guadalcanal again. Admiral Lee and Captain Davis were both believers in the potential of radar and Capt Davis had relentlessly drilled both his radar operators and his gunners to take the fullest advantage of that potential.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_lundgren/ ... alysis.pdf

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: spence

I think that I read somewhere that most Allied commanders didn't trust radar anyway. It was to new and if they couldn't see the target, the target didn't exist.

This describes both Admiral Callahan and Admiral Scott who commanded the US TF on the night of 12-13 November 1942 but two nights later the Japanese ran into Admiral Lee and Capt Davis on the USS Washington and suffered such a defeat that they never seriously tried to reinforce Guadalcanal again. Admiral Lee and Captain Davis were both believers in the potential of radar and Capt Davis had relentlessly drilled both his radar operators and his gunners to take the fullest advantage of that potential.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_lundgren/ ... alysis.pdf

Very interesting, thank you.

[spence]

When I first entered the Coast Guard (1969) some of the older Radarmen still remembered the days when one got to manually crank the radar antenna around and then sorted the 'strongest' return signal out of the grass as the bearing of the target. That was a search radar similar to the SC radar in game The range could then be read off of an oscilliscope by matching a hand cranked "bug" to that 'strongest' return. The earliest fire control radars worked similarly. IF the bearing of the target was correctly sorted out of the grass the range to the target was dead on. If the bearing wasn't read perfectly however the range was off. In any case there was no "god's eye view" (looking down on the battle from above where one could see the location of all friendlies and enemies even after the (mechanical) sweep of the antenna).

Thus the earliest radars didn't really show commanders what they needed to know. The SG radar with its PPI scope changed all that. Throughout most of 1942 only a few ships had SG radars.
If Admirals Scott or Callahan had ever been on board USS Helena and seen the PPI view of a fleet or battlefield any doubts they had about radar's potential would have instantly disappeared.

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: spence

When I first entered the Coast Guard (1969) some of the older Radarmen still remembered the days when one got to manually crank the radar antenna around and then sorted the 'strongest' return signal out of the grass as the bearing of the target. That was a search radar similar to the SC radar in game The range could then be read off of an oscilliscope by matching a hand cranked "bug" to that 'strongest' return. The earliest fire control radars worked similarly. IF the bearing of the target was correctly sorted out of the grass the range to the target was dead on. If the bearing wasn't read perfectly however the range was off. In any case there was no "god's eye view" (looking down on the battle from above where one could see the location of all friendlies and enemies even after the (mechanical) sweep of the antenna).

Thus the earliest radars didn't really show commanders what they needed to know. The SG radar with its PPI scope changed all that. Throughout most of 1942 only a few ships had SG radars.
If Admirals Scott or Callahan had ever been on board USS Helena and seen the PPI view of a fleet or battlefield any doubts they had about radar's potential would have instantly disappeared.

In other words, they picked the wrong ship to be on - whichever one had the Helena under his command. Maybe the ship's captain should have suggested a visit and had them look at the radar while not in combat.

[Buckrock]

Scott should have already had some idea before the November battle. He'd previously used the SG/PPI equipped San Juan as his flagship for two weeks during the Guadalcanal landings, including the Battle of Savo.

[Sardaukar]

4+ yr thread necromancy! [8D]

But lots of good info for many. [8D]