Air combat

[decourcy]

Hi all,

I have been thinking about this subject for years and UV was just a spur for me to think and experiment more.
I feel both pure manuever aircraft like the Zero and pure speed, dive aircraft had their problems. Many gamers on this site either love the zero (the designers, uhhhmmm.) or feel that speed dive attacks are the wave of the future and the ultimate air-to-air tactic. I think that both conclusions are flawed and based on misleading data.

The end of the war, '43-'45, showed allied fighters slaughtering axis fighters with their speed, dives, fire power and durability. That is all fine and dandy but... in Europe the Axis were hamstrung by two things; the useless Me109 and high commands decision to ignore fighters and only attack the bombers. Plus they were outnumbered. Oh, and their pilot program had been stripped in '39, '40, '42 and '43. The Germans did not get many good pilots from their training program after '42. You think that might have had some effect on the fighters results? Bad data does not give good conclusions without research.

Now, Japan. Hmmm... No pilot program, Island bases with 90 Zeroes with a top speed of 336 Mph. attacked by 600 carrier planes led by 200 Hellcats that are superior in almost every way. You think those results are skewed as well?

The point of all of this rambling is the Zero which is being fought over
on the UV board. My feeling is that the Zero is rather overrated in game terms. I think one solution could be giving the A6M2 a base manuever rating of 33 but give all A6M2 squadrons a +2 Maneuver in December '41 and a +1 maneuver between January 1st '42 and say July 1st '42. This can show the limited training program of the Allies pre-war and the surprise of the Japanese having much more modern aircraft than anyone in the west, including Janes, suspected.

This form of modifier has been used in many games both board and computer. It could get rid of the allied problem of not being able to defend Port Moresby with P40's and P39's. I feel that the ratings in UV are just a touch too hard on the allies early in thegame. I do not want mass change but at the moment the Zero is more effective than I believe is accurate from my observation in playing UV.

Questions? comments? fish?

Michael

[mogami]

Hi,
Modifiers? Would this be the same as having on map units go from one level of effectiveness to being less effective soley as a result of the date? If any unit/weapon is under-rated or over rated then the rating need to be changed. Every unit should have the rating it brought into the area. (Well trained fighter groups should have higher ratings. I don't like the notion of National modifiers based on time period.
In UV/WITP a player can wreck a good airgroup (It only takes 1 really bad mission) It takes quite a while to produce an elite unit.
A Japanese Zero group (landbased) has 27 AC (max)
Suppose the 27 pilots are
Top 10 Above 90
Next 10 Above 80 below 90
Last 7 Below 80

As long as combat does not kill pilots from top group faster then middle group pilots climb (and are replaced from bottom) The groups performance remains stable (keeping other combat factors the same:distance, fatigue, morale)

If however the bottom group grows while the top and middle shrink then the group loses effectivness. (If many groups suffer same process it is accelerated by poorer quality replacement pilots.)

I think players would be happier if they actually saw their pilot pool.
(ratings and numbers of pilots)

I don't think calendar ratings (even if based on historic time periods)
are good because they negate the players handling of his units.
The calendar effect is already part of the game (Arrival of new enemy aircraft types)


UV/WITP uses a 0-99 pilot rating. It does not matter much what rating we give a pilot. As long as the enemy pilots are rated the same.

I realize the Japanese early carrier pilots get ratings in many cases over 90. The Allied pilots in the SRA are always given lower ratings. (I don't know what would result if we made these pilots 90 as well and only relied on the differing aircraft for results.
If the real ratings were Japanese 70 and Allies 70 at wars start. And the Zero was the better aircraft. Would they still not win the early airbattles. Then as Allied airgroups changed to better aircraft and came in greater numbers without any fiddling the Japanese would begin to lose.
If however we make all Zero pilots 90 and all USN pilots 70 then even the newer aircraft will have less impact. (The high rated Japanese pilots will need to be attrited out first) This is the model many people use and believe in. I'm more in favour of keeping some pilots in 90's for each side but having the majority of pilots in the 65-75 range. (any pilot that had been flying in the military for several years should be at least a 65)
Training programs for replacement pilots will need to reflect not only what was done but what impact they will have if players suffer lower loss (and less demand) or higher loss (and more demand)
If pilots (from any nation) are over rated just to produce the early period victories then that is incorrect. I don't think it is hard to correctly enter the data and produce the correct results. All this being said, it will only hold up in game practice if both players stick to the historic use. (Fight with the same units and in the same manner)
Once one side deviates (avoids the combat where his side suffered the defeat) Then you can not longer have an acurate picture. (Is is wrong for the Allied player to withdraw his Buffalo Groups and wait for better aircraft before engaging? Then the Japanese pilots do not gain from the early battles. The Allied pilots are still the prewar trained pilots. And they have better aircraft. If a modifier is used to insure their defeat it would not be (IMO) a good thing.

(Thanks)

[decourcy]

Hi all,

Mogami,
Could you or one of the other testers try a edited bit with A6M2's starting at about 33 maneuver (or maybe 34) to see how that affects the first couple of days.

I do have to disagree a bit though; The allies were surprised by the Reisen & Hyabusa and the allies were training pilots for WW1 but giving them planes that were not made for that kind of flying. These same Allied pilots in Spitfires & Hurricanes would have done better. There were problems as the British pilots were more reservists & colonials with little training and the Dutch have always skimped on flight training (to this day) and the early American pilots were a mix of well trained and rather poorly trained.

I just feel that the results gained by the Reisen in UV do not match history even when i try to set up situations matching history to attempt to gain a usefull result. I do not want to gimp either side but I think the air combat still needs some work.

If you could test this and if you still get good results in the first days of the war then maybe the Reisen can be lowered in maneuver rating.

Mike

[mogami]

Hi, One of the hardest things in making a wargame is assigning values to units that reflect opinion. How good really was a pilot in a better aircraft who shot down pilots in poor aircraft?
How good really was a ship at night combat if it's only battle was one it had tactical advantage? How good was a infantry unit that always enjoyed numbers, aircontrol and fire support?

When do the ratings produce results rather then the circumstance creating the ratings.
(What happened when the pilot faced a better aircraft, the ship was it's self surprised and the landunit faced by an enemy enjoying the aircontrol, numbers and fire support?

We know in WW2 pilots in inferiour aircraft had victories, we know surprised ships won battles and we know outnumbered forces defeated much larger ones.

I think the whole effort is made near impossible by the players of the games changing all the circumstances from the beginning.

I don't think you can prove to me that the Japanese Zero would be considered the best early war fighter if the British Airgroups in Singapore had been composed of full strength BoB veterans. If the airgroups in PI and PH had been on alert (Had CAP up) What would have occured if Clarkfield had 150 B-17cde and 150 P-40's?
Now in most games the Japanese would simply roll over the allies no matter what. Since they have these National modifiers.
In UV/WITP tests it is interesting to note how easy it is to achive even results. (Place a number of Japanese Zeros at a base, place a equal number of P-40 at a base. Make all pilots the same. Conduct air to air.
Loss rate is 1-1. Now start changing pilots. (add 10 to one group)
So it is not really what one sides top pilot is rated at. It is how the general pilot ratings compare. The closer the opposing pilots rating the more impact the aircraft types have. (If you give a good pilot a bad plane he wins against bad pilots in good planes)(where pilots are equal the plane is the major divider.
How did the Allies make the transition? First they avoided one sided airbattles. Then they introduced better aircraft in larger numbers.
Doing only this in UV/WITP I find the Allies can gain air control where ever they need it. (The problem for the Allies then is getting the Japanese not to do the same.) Both players in UV/WITP can have areas where they are dominant in the air. Where ever these areas overlap a long battle can develop. (This is also how I interpet the historical course of events. Both sides feed in new airgroups to try to outlast the other. When Japan (as it turned out) was no longer able to continue this she lost the campaign. Everything later was Japan trying to re-establish enough airpower to re-engage in another battle of this type.


I have several ideas about the area and period covered by UV.
I think it broke the back of the IJN air more then Midway.
I think it was a mistake by the Japanese to use their Naval air here. (I know it was range related, but if adequte fields for IJA units were not ready then the battle should have been declined. (Naval Air should not be used for air control, long campaigns)

[Drongo]

The point of all of this rambling is the Zero which is being fought over on the UV board. My feeling is that the Zero is rather overrated in game terms. I think one solution could be giving the A6M2 a base manuever rating of 33 but give all A6M2 squadrons a +2 Maneuver in December '41 and a +1 maneuver between January 1st '42 and say July 1st '42. This can show the limited training program of the Allies pre-war and the surprise of the Japanese having much more modern aircraft than anyone in the west, including Janes, suspected.

This won't help you at all but...

I would actually agree with you to a certain extent but I don't think a date-based modifier would be appropriate. Once the Allies started to work out the A6Ms weaknesses, its effectiveness did drop considerably. However, not everyone worked it out at the same time. Some could somewhat cope with the A6M right from the start while others were still having trouble into '43.

Cheers

[fcooke]

Zeros can be countered today in UV, and I think they are about right in UV for 42. In 43 it seems to me that no matter how good the zero pilots are they tend to fall in droves to the Corsairs & Hellcats. If anything were to be tweaked I think pilot exp should be more heavily weighed in WITP and aircraft stats less heavily weighted. Just my opinion.

[fcooke]

forgot to say, that idea of Mogami to show us the actual pilot pool would be great. Drives me nuts that I can do really well as the IJN, lose very few planes, have hundreds of aircraft in the pool, but then lose 20 fighters in one turn and get absolutely horrible replacements (this happens as the US as well).

[Mike Scholl]

One factor that always seems to be left out in these discussions of
air combat in WWII is "attrition". The simple, day-to-day losses of
aircraft and pilots to accidents and equipment failures. These aircraft
were pushing the edge of available technology under adverse wartime
conditions---and accidents of one type or another probably accounted
for more overall losses than combat. The old SPI boardgame WITP put
the figure at 10% per month, and I've never seen anything in my reading
to say that that figure was inaccurate to any large extent.

Now better aircraft flown by better pilots would suffer less in general,
but by the same token newer aircraft types pushed technology the most
and sufferred more until the pilots and service crews got familiar with
their "quirks". Rotten weather conditions in the South Pacific and the
Aluetians caused tremendous problems. Carrier landings are considered
to be a "controlled crash" to this very day, even in peacetime. All of
which means that without any "combat" at all BOTH sides were going to
suffer close to 100% losses (in numbers) every year. Now some would
be coming in new all the time, and on the Allied side, some would be
rotating out---but the basic truth is if you had 1000 planes and pilots
in theatre on January 1st, you would need to add 100 more of each
EVERY MONTH if you wanted to get to December 31st and still have a
force of 1000. That's OVERALL.., so please don't quote records of the
umpteenth squadron which only lost 6 planes during 1943 flying out of
NoName Island.

Training losses were at least as high due to inexperiance. It's not
just a matter of increasing the size of the pilot training units in Japan;
They also need instructors (preferably with front-line experiance) and
airplanes (several different types, from beginning trainers through ad-
vanced trainers and then actual combat aircraft)---plus a lot of fuel and
service personnel. Virtually all of which will have to be replaced every
year do to training losses. All of this is why the US, which produced
almost 300,000 aircraft during the war, virtually never had more than
1/20th of that number "in Theatre" in Combat Zones---and outnumbered
it's opposition significantly during the 2nd half of the war.

Which does make something of a case for giving the Japanese a
"bonus" which diminishes with time. The designers of UV/WITP seem
to have tried to get around the attrition problem by limiting the flow of
new aircraft and pilots (at least I think that's what they've done---does
anyone know for sure?). This would be a legitimate answer to a difficult
problem if they have.., and avoid a lot of extra work on the players part.
But it also avoids the attrition casualties which would have eventually
eaten away the core of combat-experianced aircrews they had gained
in China---even without Allied efforts. So the question needs to be addressed

[mdiehl]

I realize the Japanese early carrier pilots get ratings in many cases over 90. The Allied pilots in the SRA are always given lower ratings. (I don't know what would result if we made these pilots 90 as well and only relied on the differing aircraft for results.

This is undoubtedly part of the problem but has been debated in several forums many times. The Usual Claim is that Japanese naval pilots were better pilots, by virtue of either combat experience in China, hyperselectivity in recruitment, or extensive gymnastics excercises, than American pilots, AND that the Zero was a "better" plane than the F4F.

One would expect, if this tale was correct, that the casualty ratios would at some time have favored the Japanese. In the case of USMC and USN (VMF and VF pilots) the opposite is true, and in the case of USAAF pilots the evidence is inconclusive.

Given poor Japanese in-flight command and control and the use of outdated tactical formations, it'd be more appropriate to rate the USN/USMC and Japanese naval pilots as equals in re "Exp" because Exp is a proxy for both combat experience and training. IJN pilots trained harder, American pilots trained better.

[decourcy]

Hi all,

I completely agree with you Drongo, I am just tryng to solve a problem
that I see. And that others have mentioned.

I do not subscribe to the Zero is unbeatable or the the B17 will win the war all on its own theories. However, in my experience the Zero in '42 raiding to Port Moresby, both sides using rested pilots, the small raids(say 27 Zeroes) do fine, but larger raids (say, 80 Zeroes vs. 30 Warhawks, 10 P400s, and 30 P39's) I tend to see the allies losing 25 fighters while the Japanese lost 2 or 3. Now once in a while that is fine
and I realize the allied aircraft are worse and the allied pilots are not as good, but, it seems to happen pretty regularly when i test it under those conditions. I do not want a wholesale change as the Japs probably did get the better of several raids against Moresby during '42.
But not by the ratios I have run into.

Mike

[MJHerman]

What gets lost in most of these debates, and perhaps is impossible to simulate in a wargame, is the combination of superior tactics and superior airmanship. The latter can be well represented by pilot ratings/experience, but I don't know if/how superior tactics can be represented.

The best WWII example of superior tactics is probably the Thach Weave will eliminated much of the Zero's advantages even in a turn fight.

Forward to Korea, where Mig 15s and F86s are roughly equal in terms of performance (with the Mig being superior in some cases), and superior US tactics and forcing the Migs to fight on US terms leads to a 12:1 kill ratio.

Early Vietnam experience is the opposite, with US pilots being forced (by ROE) to fight on the NVA terms in the air, where superior NVA tactics (in terms of getting in close and dogfighting) allows NVA pilots to down "superior" USAF/USN aircraft.

So how does one simulate that a particular pilot in a particular situation will try and maximize his advantages and "fight on his terms"? I don't know if it can be done, but I do know that its not the plane, its the pilot (plus his use of superior tactics).

[decourcy]

Hi all,

MJHermann,

I completely agree! You just said it much better than me!

As an aside, in the beginning the Mig15s were wacking the Americans pretty badly in Korea, the F86 helped but it was new American tactics that helped more.

Mike

[mdiehl]

(say, 80 Zeroes vs. 30 Warhawks, 10 P400s, and 30 P39's) I tend to see the allies losing 25 fighters while the Japanese lost 2 or 3. Now once in a while that is fine

Once in a while might be incorrect. It's true that Moresby got bounced on several occasions, but these were occasions in which relatively few planes were in the air and in a relatively compromised position (landing or at low-airspeed during or after take-off). Not all to be sure. But if you're positing 70 Allied a/c in the air, they're not all going to be in the "f@ck me" position, and in head to heads or large melees, LOTs of A6Ms are gonna cross the sites of an Allied a/c. And, frankly, at airpseeds in excess of 300 mph and at altitudes less than 10K, the P39 was a much better a/c than the A6M.

The problem seems to be that logistical demands on either player to maintain THAT many a/c at either PM or any given Japanese southern Pacific base seem underestimated. It should really be a VERY difficult achievement to mount an 80 Zeke strike from anywhere in the area and it should pretty much require weeks of complete inactivity to work the a/c up to readiness. Likewise, prior to mid 1943, PM should not be able to easily accommodate that many a/c. Operational losses on long distance raids (I'm assuming that Rabaul was the source, because the notion of an 80 plane raid from Lae or Buna is absurd) should be relatively high for single engined a/c.

[Drongo]

Hi all,
I do not subscribe to the Zero is unbeatable or the the B17 will win the war all on its own theories. However, in my experience the Zero in '42 raiding to Port Moresby, both sides using rested pilots, the small raids(say 27 Zeroes) do fine, but larger raids (say, 80 Zeroes vs. 30 Warhawks, 10 P400s, and 30 P39's) I tend to see the allies losing 25 fighters while the Japanese lost 2 or 3. Now once in a while that is fine
and I realize the allied aircraft are worse and the allied pilots are not as good, but, it seems to happen pretty regularly when i test it under those conditions. I do not want a wholesale change as the Japs probably did get the better of several raids against Moresby during '42.
But not by the ratios I have run into.

If I get the chance, I'll bring up your (and others) concerns/suggestions when next the testing is focused on the air model. Even so, just posting it here will mean there's a good chance one of the developers will see it (and laugh himself silly :p ).

Cheers

[decourcy]

Drongo,

What are you getting at about 'laugh himself silly' ?

Mike

[Drongo]

Decourcy,

Don't concern yourself with a throw-away line about how the developers view people's suggestions in the forums (mine included :p ). It was a tongue in cheek comment only and not aimed at your post or any of the others (although it probably didn't help that I had added it at the end of a post which quoted you).

For clarification, the reason I said I'd bring your post up in the development forums was because I thought it was worthwhile.

Cheers

[Tristanjohn]

The problem seems to be that logistical demands on either player to maintain THAT many a/c at either PM or any given Japanese southern Pacific base seem underestimated. It should really be a VERY difficult achievement to mount an 80 Zeke strike from anywhere in the area and it should pretty much require weeks of complete inactivity to work the a/c up to readiness. Likewise, prior to mid 1943, PM should not be able to easily accommodate that many a/c. Operational losses on long distance raids (I'm assuming that Rabaul was the source, because the notion of an 80 plane raid from Lae or Buna is absurd) should be relatively high for single engined a/c.

Well as I see it the entire game model isn't well balanced, many hedges have been devised, workarounds schemed, all no doubt in an effort to achieve better balance. The result is then always more imbalance, which ultimately requires more hedges, more schemes, less balance still.

The topic here is the air model for the moment, so I'll tackle that and will try to be brief.

"Supply" in this game only makes sense if you need to believe it makes sense. "Supply" has little enough specifically to do with anything and pretty much everything to do with everything if you know what I mean. "Supply" just somehow comes and is then delivered to where we need it the most to do whatever it is it does to maintain our pilots and planes and ground staff with the necessary stuff and in the right description and amount. To keep our aerodromes "supplied" is not such an easy thing, but we press on.

"Attrition" is an unfortunate wedding between pilot fatigue (inarticulately defined--a transfer mission might put a squadron down for a week when in fact a night's sleep should do the trick, CAP wears pilots out as fast or faster than combat, there is no difference between the fatigue hit a squadron takes for winning or losing the same battle, at least that I can see) and "wear and tear" on the planes (which might have been better expressed in terms of engine hours logged) these people drive, weather and state of the airfields. I'm not convinced any one of these values has concrete foundation or consistent meanning. Were there a subsystem I'd be willing to give the nod to, though, this would be it. With reservation.

Air "bases" represent a giant abstract in concept and are allowed to be built in impossible places. You've never seen an 80-plane raid out of Lae? Neither have I, though I've a few 50- and 60-plane raids out of both Lae and Buna. I know in real life that might have been absurd but this system allows a Japanese player who's of a mind to keep those bases in sufficient "supply" to perform this trick any time he wants.

But I've seen better. In a current PBEM my Japanese opponent has flown fighter sweeps over Port Moresby for the past eight consecutive turns. (I assume at high altitude to butcher any P-39s I have on CAP, though the screen doesn't show this--it ought to be obvious to him no opposition will be met as I haven't had a ship in port since the start of the game and the only planes at the base are a C-47 squadron to supply Wau and a bomber or Catalina squadron for recon of Rabaul, but then again I haven't seen any of his snoopers, so I guess he just doesn't know.) The raiding Zeroes are always from the same lone squadron of fighters based on New Ireland. These fighters fly that long roundtrip twice each turn like clockwork. No problem. Just this last turn I saw the first real reduction in the number of fighters the Japanese were able to put up--it's been consistently 18-20 planes for a full week, but today's sweep arrived with just 11 or so first phase, then down to (I think it was) 9 fighters on the second raid.

We've all seen this, right? Ever try anything similar with Allied planes? Is it even possible? (I don't know, I haven't tried myself.) How much "fatigue" do these pilots/planes accumulate? Are they down in the teens for "fatigue" and morale by now? If so, how can the air model justify allowing flesh and machine to continually make these marathon journeys one day after the next?

I've witnessed similar feats with Japanese bombers attacking PM or Gili Gili out of Rabaul. The same bombers will make that round trip twice in the same day, and then be ready to fly an identical mission the next day, too, weather permitting. And for all I can tell with the same deadly effect.

I don't know exactly what's going on inside this game's air model (does anyone?), much less why, though it doesn't model WWII air combat I've read about very closely at all. A glance at historical dog-fight kill ratios once the Americans arrived in the Solomons ought to tell anyone with an open mind that the air model's errant by a whopping margin. Instead of a fairly even fight early on, then a sure, deadly swing in favor of Allied fortunes, the game's August 1942 through February 1943 collective tally is more likely to read out something like 2:1 in favor the Japanese rather than the Allies, if not worse than that. At least that's what I've seen. What have you seen?

And is this a surprise? Japanese pilots start out rated in the 90s for experience (plus training and "savvy" and whatever else that rating wants to express), wheras American carrier pilots in Scenario 14 (1 August 1942 start date) begin the game some 20% lower, and arrive on the board fatigued on top of that. (Fatigued from what? Where have they been fighting lately? Why is their morale relatively low?)

The qualities of these pilots' planes are equally skewed in favor of the Japanese. One might suppose this many years after the war a genereal appreciation had been gained that Zeroes were not demonstrably superior on balance even to P-39s, much less Wildcats, but apparently not. In conjunction with everything else a Zero's transcendence over anything Allied leads to results ahistoric enough for a third-grader to spot. Yet the feedback I get from browsing these forums says hardly anyone sees this stuff save for me. In fact I'm told every day, and with feeling, that the air model not only isn't out of whack with regard to the Japanese, in the opinion of some experienced players it quite possibly should be cranked up further still!

My sense for what we have is essentially a latterday Pacific War. The designer's appreciation for the war and how it might best be "modeled" hasn't changed a jiggle over time. The system is what it was designed to be. A game to play, a game to enjoy, a game to sell at the market.

I have no problem with that whatsoever--Grigsby does this for a living, and he is proficient. I just thought it needed to be expressed.

At bottom: when you find a model as far off as this one is with regard to its crucial functions--in the case before us now air combat--and in such patently obvious ways, morever by a designer as experienced as is Grigsby, then you can bet your bottom dollar it didn't happen by accident in the night, and to judge by what I've read on these boards, the typical buyer is not just satisfied with the result but enthralled.

Is UV historical in any sense? In its own modest fashion I'd guess it is. Yet who cares? The other day a player wrote that he doesn't give a hoot if UV is historically accurate or not as long it plays well and gives him enjoyment. Someone else in this very thread voiced a similar sentiment. And so it goes. History? If you knew what's good for you these days you'd invest in pretzels and beer.

As for mounting huge raids: this should be a considerable problem to work out for the Japanese due to their much inferior war infrastructure; to do anything of the kind more than once a month or so strikes me as a stretch. Given competent management this would be less daunting for the Americans early on, asssuming they could and wanted to assemble the requisite planes for a given operation, though once they get it really cranked up. . . .

Supply, bases, support, pilots/planes, "fatigue," equipment/weapons modeling, all of these things are grossly abstracted for the convenience of the game, all fall far beyond recognition, and these are not the only dynamics in play. The model for airfields (how these are built and most especially where these might be built) seems just as far off, if not farther. Really, anyone who bothered to comb through this game critically would not find much that's "on."

But then balance was never easily made from hedges and workarounds.

I don't mean to pick on Gary, here. It's an awful fun game system to play, a wonderful pastime; let's not mistake, however, that these arguments about the air-model's niceties are really no more pertinent to this game's purpose than an idle reference to the New York Yankees to some caveman staring speculatively at the moon. There simply is no common ground on which a reasonable conversation might proceed.

I'm all for a better simulation, hope we get it soon, but I feel it's all but hopeless. There aren't than many listening to the call, and far fewer still who sincerely care.

[mdiehl]

And is this a surprise? Japanese pilots start out rated in the 90s for experience (plus training and "savvy" and whatever else that rating wants to express), wheras American carrier pilots in Scenario 14 (1 August 1942 start date) begin the game some 20% lower, and arrive on the board fatigued on top of that. (Fatigued from what? Where have they been fighting lately? Why is their morale relatively low?)

Well, given that EXP seems to be the dominant factor in the model, the game has flat out copied the model of GGPW. And you are, of course, completely historically correct in noting that the EXP bias in favor of the Japanese is a flawed understanding of historical a-a combat results. Moreover, a 70 EXP arrival level for ANY allied USN/USMC pilot is manifestly absurd if the Japanese are starting in the 90s, and this is an unexamined holdover from GGPW. Frankly, that fact alone is sufficient to write off the game. Anyone who is that confused about air to air combat in any period, or the relative merits of Japanese and Allied pilot training programs during WW2, probably should not be designing simulations on the subject.

The qualities of these pilots' planes are equally skewed in favor of the Japanese. One might suppose this many years after the war a genereal appreciation had been gained that Zeroes were not demonstrably superior on balance even to P-39s, much less Wildcats, but apparently not. In conjunction with everything else a Zero's transcendence over anything Allied leads to results ahistoric enough for a third-grader to spot. Yet the feedback I get from browsing these forums says hardly anyone sees this stuff save for me. In fact I'm told every day, and with feeling, that the air model not only isn't out of whack with regard to the Japanese, in the opinion of some experienced players it quite possibly should be cranked up further still!

Well, you are now carrying the same torch that I have carried around here for several years. There seems no likelihood of defeating the mythologized accounts of Japanese pilot superiority. You can analyze real facts all you want, but for many, the claim made by Saburo Sakai that his unit shot down so many planes on a certain date is usually treated as an unquestionable fact, even though the planes observed to blow up (by the Japanese) landed safely with minor damage, and even though the Japanese claims are demonstrably widely inaccurate (typically off by an order of magnitude). The mythologized viewpoint often draws support from very shallow and trivial readings of the US POV. It is often noted that Halsey was disappointed by the relative performance of US pilots vs Japanese ones, and there is an oft mentioned report from August or September 1942 that gets trotted out (based on Thach's discussion of results fo date). But when looks at the fine print, one sees that the USN thought it was obtaining a 3:1 favorable kill ratio, and were still disappointed with those results. (Any other major power would have assumed that a 3:1 kill ratio was proof positive of outstanding success.)

In short, the Axis Fanboy position is based in part on a childishly uncritical reading of a few post-war Japanese pilot memoirs, a complete willingness to overlook the actual historical combat results and sustained loss ratios in 1941-1942, and a failure to understand the American way of war.

My sense for what we have is essentially a latterday Pacific War. The designer's appreciation for the war and how it might best be "modeled" hasn't changed a jiggle over time. The system is what it was designed to be. A game to play, a game to enjoy, a game to sell at the market.

Quite so. And appropriately entitled, perhaps, "War in the Pacific on Planet Xenon" because it bears so little resemblance to a simulation of WW2 strategy, tactics, and the logistics and supply considerations that put strategy and tactics into effect, on planet Earth.

[Tristanjohn]

In short, the Axis Fanboy position is based in part on a childishly uncritical reading of a few post-war Japanese pilot memoirs, a complete willingness to overlook the actual historical combat results and sustained loss ratios in 1941-1942, and a failure to understand the American way of war.

Just to be fair, early on in the Lower Solomons Allied air losses were severe. Many pilots were forced to bail, though scads of these were ultimately saved and then ministered to by coastwatchers and native friendlies throughout the archipelago. Equipment losses from all causes put a tremendous strain on Allied commanders to try and maintain a semblance of effective defense in the early going . . . all was not roses for the red, white and blue.

Even so, our losses were nothing like those sustained by the Japanese--a loss is not necessarily a loss, ours were not the same as theirs with regard to strategic import. Moreover ours could be and were made good within the fullness of time, whereas theirs represented permanent reduction in operational strength expressed subsequently in terms of Japan's very much reduced ability to hold sway in the region (even by desperately stripping assets away from its naval arm), and all too soon enough even to momentarily check our first, most modest advances to the north.

In all, Guadacanal amounted to the first test of will and strength between Japan and America, and America won out over that terrible course--a course, by the way, entirely more terrible for the former than the latter.

The bottom line doesn't change: at the conclusion of eight months of combat Japan had been pushed out of the southern extremity of the Solomons, had wiped its bloody nose, was denying its loss of face, and, with the worst too fast on its way, was busily ignoring, as best it might, the all too clear writing on the Emperor's paper-thin walls.

Point is for our purpose here: in spite of the favorable talk around the forums, for all the shouting, the whining, and I'll throw out the gross behavior . . . UV doesn't get it any closer to right than Gary's earlier games on the subject, and from all I can tell for pretty much the same fundamental reasons.

[Tristanjohn]

Quite so. And appropriately entitled, perhaps, "War in the Pacific on Planet Xenon" because it bears so little resemblance to a simulation of WW2 strategy, tactics, and the logistics and supply considerations that put strategy and tactics into effect, on planet Earth.

Well, yes. But I hate to put in such dire terms. Gary is, afterall, an excellent designer of fun games, and there's nothing wrong with a game that's fun. I enjoy playing UV and will continue to play it no doubt. I just don't understand his continuing desire to always design them down to such a low-leveled audience. These people would buy UV anyway, even it were remotely accurate, so why cater to them? As you note, these people apparently believe whatever they're told, no matter how dubious, how patently errant the source, so where's the problem with getting it right, or at least reasonably closer to right in the first place?

Joel! Are you listening? Walk away from Gary and never look back. It's best for both of you.