Howland Smith

[zed]

Just reading last night what a SOB Howland Smith was on Saipan.
He relieved Ralf Smith - commander of 27th Division for no cause. It must have troubled his conscience because he wrote many excusatory statements after the war. It almost reminds me of how MacArthur treated Blamey or the first marine division on New Ireland.

[Mike Scholl]

Just reading last night what a SOB Howland Smith was on Saipan.
He relieved Ralf Smith - commander of 27th Division for no cause. It must have troubled his conscience because he wrote many excusatory statements after the war. It almost reminds me of how MacArthur treated Blamey or the first marine division on New Ireland.

Assuming you mean Marine General Holland M. Smith (aka "Howlin' Mad"
Smith). Otherwise you nailed the incompetent SOB right on the head.

[Sonny]

Just reading last night what a SOB Howland Smith was on Saipan.
He relieved Ralf Smith - commander of 27th Division for no cause. It must have troubled his conscience because he wrote many excusatory statements after the war. It almost reminds me of how MacArthur treated Blamey or the first marine division on New Ireland.

Yeah, I sure hope in WitP we will be able to ****-can some generals/admirals for no good reason. It will make the game just that more realistic.

[Snigbert]

"Yeah, I sure hope in WitP we will be able to ****-can some generals/admirals for no good reason. It will make the game just that more realistic. "

Their will be a price for relieving commands/changing commands etc.

[RevRick]

Ghormley to Washington, or FJ Fletcher to command air forces in Alaska?

[Sonny]

"Yeah, I sure hope in WitP we will be able to ****-can some generals/admirals for no good reason. It will make the game just that more realistic. "

Their will be a price for relieving commands/changing commands etc.

Good. Don't want the good admirals and generals popping up all the time. Gotta have some duds in there.

[Aussie]

Just reading last night what a SOB Howland Smith was on Saipan.
He relieved Ralf Smith - commander of 27th Division for no cause. It must have troubled his conscience because he wrote many excusatory statements after the war. It almost reminds me of how MacArthur treated Blamey or the first marine division on New Ireland.

From what I can remember from my readings on the matter, Howlin Mad was tired of the slow & meticulous progress of the army units on Saipan, compared with the marines. That's why he sacked the army Smith. Didn't they loose a baby flatop to kamikazes due to the early delays in securing the island?

Dan

[Snigbert]

At Iwo Jima, Howlin' Mad was fighting tooth and nail with the navy to get the maximum naval gun support and naval air support for the invasion hoping to save as many Marines as possible when they finally hit the beach. At that point he seemed to be well liked by his men (27th Marines, IIRC) although I dont know much about his exploits at Saipan.

[Aussie]

I might have to recheck my sources on this, don't quote me anyone

[Hoplosternum]

Wasn't his main problem that he was a Marine and the general he sacked was an Army one? That did not go down well at all with a big inter service row and partizan point scoring on all sides afterwards.

Ralph Smith was making little or no progress causing the US line to be bent out of shape. The marines were no longer having their flanks covered as they advanced and the 27th could not. Now Saipan was a tough campaign and I doubt the problems RS / 27th were having would have been overcome any sooner by the Marines. But when you are failing to make your objectives and causing a hold up you're vulnerable. An Army commander in [Marine] Smith's position position may well have acted in the same way. They certainly did elsewhere. Many commanders who got into difficulties not of their own making where sacked.

This episodes claim to fame is that it was a Marine sacking an Army guy. Not that it was any more unjust than most sackings.

[pry]

Wasn't his main problem that he was a Marine and the general he sacked was an Army one? That did not go down well at all with a big inter service row and partizan point scoring on all sides afterwards.

I think the main problem was one of training and tactics The Marines tended to bypass strong points and pockets of resistance (to be dealt with later) to press the attack while the Army attacked slowly behind an artillery barrage and reduced each and every strong point along the way.

It's not like H Smith just summarily dismissed R Smith, he went to the 3 senior commanders in the area Jarman, senior Army officer, and Turner and Spruance made his case and was granted permission by Spruance (Commander 5th Fleet) to relieve R Smith.

While it was unheard of for a Marine commander to dismiss an Army commander the real outcry was in Washington, remember the 27th was an old National Guard division (New York National Guard) and the political fallout was huge, New York's congressional delegation was outraged. Most of the controversy played out in the press at home the military dealt with it better than the politicians back home did.

[fcooke]

One of the IJN I-boats got that CVE off Makin back in 43. Marines were trained to take an island as quickly as possible, while the Army was trained to take territory with the least casualties possible. The Marine methodology was in part influenced by the need to not keep the USN shipd tied to a specific location (and therefore more vulnerable to attacks). I think something like 600+ sailors died on that CVE.

[krishub1492]

I note that H. Smith never again commanded army units after Saipan. He was booted upstairs to a basically administrative position as Commander - Fleet Marine Force - Pacific.

[Mike Scholl]

One of the IJN I-boats got that CVE off Makin back in 43. Marines were trained to take an island as quickly as possible, while the Army was trained to take territory with the least casualties possible. The Marine methodology was in part influenced by the need to not keep the USN shipd tied to a specific location (and therefore more vulnerable to attacks). I think something like 600+ sailors died on that CVE.

....that the Marines don't mention. One, the 27th Division did capture
Makin AHEAD of the schedule established in the Operations Orders...,
and Two, the only means the Army Unit had of speeding the process
up (the commitment of it's "floating reserve" Regiment) dissappeared
when it was sent to support the Marines on Tarawa. The whole of the
"lost CVE story" is a barrel of BS put out to cover poor Marine planning
that had to be retrieved by the valour of Marine Infantry. On the
Regimental and even the Divisional level, there were no finer troops in
the Pacific than the Marines---but above that the Corps total lack of
training to handle large formation battles and command structures showed from the beginning of the war to the end. They lacked the
schools, the training, and the staffs to handle a corps level battle well.

[Snigbert]

"I note that H. Smith never again commanded army units after Saipan. He was booted upstairs to a basically administrative position as Commander - Fleet Marine Force - Pacific."

H. Smith commanded at Iwo Jima. Did you mean R. Smith never commanded again?

[krishub1492]

No. I mean Holland Smith was no longer Commander - V Amphibious Corps. Harry Schmidt assumed command in October 1944 and led the corps at Iwo Jima. Although Smith was present at Iwo, he was not in operational command. He did have administrative control of all marines in the Pacific.

[rich91a]

Howlin' Mad made serious errors of judgement when dealing with his juniors at Tarawa too.

Enough for people who were subjected to the howling to realise he was out of touch with reality and a bully for no good reason or purpose.

[fcooke]

....that the Marines don't mention. One, the 27th Division did capture
Makin AHEAD of the schedule established in the Operations Orders...,
and Two, the only means the Army Unit had of speeding the process
up (the commitment of it's "floating reserve" Regiment) dissappeared
when it was sent to support the Marines on Tarawa. The whole of the
"lost CVE story" is a barrel of BS put out to cover poor Marine planning
that had to be retrieved by the valour of Marine Infantry. On the
Regimental and even the Divisional level, there were no finer troops in
the Pacific than the Marines---but above that the Corps total lack of
training to handle large formation battles and command structures showed from the beginning of the war to the end. They lacked the
schools, the training, and the staffs to handle a corps level battle well.

....I'm not trying to defend Smith here, just pointing out that the Marines were more aggressive (and seemingly less worried by casualties) than the Army. Part of this was the fact that the Marines were a subordinate service to the Navy. The kamikazes later proved that it was indeed very dangerous to keep ships tied to invasions for any more than the bare minimum of time necessary.

[panda124c]

Yeah, I sure hope in WitP we will be able to ****-can some generals/admirals for no good reason. It will make the game just that more realistic.

How about randomizing the traits of all the different commanders. Then you would not know who was a good commander by name. Then you'd have to fire one or two until you get what you need.