Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing?

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I certainly agree that humans – and human reaction - can swing like a pendulum. This is something we see every day in every walk of like and is natural. Wouldn't it have been better - in humanitarian terms - if the Emperors, Kings, Chancellor's, Prime Ministers and Presidents in 1914 had had practical experience of what a war would mean. Instead a few local conflicts, some colonial wars and, further back, the US Civil War, didn't even begin to move that pendulum away from choosing war.

But I disagree for the reasons laid out previously, that Munich was a simple ‘over-reaction’.

Not wanting to go to war against x because world public opinion is actually supportive of x, not wanting to go to war with x because the last war cleaned out the coffers, not wanting to go to war with x because your own friends won’t support such a move, not wanting to go to war because (thanks to the Spanish Civil War) you've had a glimpse of what that could mean to the civilian population, not wanting to go to war with x because one’s own broken populace have no appetite for another one while still recovering from the last, not wanting to go to war because the armed forces, run down after the last charnel house, are in a mess…. This isn’t an over-reaction. These are very real, very big and very pressing concerns.

Over reaction? A little look back in the history books – the last 500 years of European history will more than suffice – will show what going to war without the finance, the support of key allies, the support of your populace, without up to date armed forces can do. And all that wrapped up in being seen as the aggressor state by others who may ultimately have to choose whether to help or support the opposition.

I'm still skeptical. Yes, you have a laundry-list of reasons, but Chamberlain, while not exactly a passivist, was hardly the most belligerent sword in the scabbard. Would that laundry-list have appeared as daunting to someone more so?

warspite1

Not daunting? When did Britain actually run out of cash in WWII? Was running out of money an over-reaction or a disastrous consequence of the situation the United Kingdom found itself in and that was one of the fears playing on Chamberlain's mind?

Certainly plenty of European Kings, Queens, Emperors etc that have gone to war with a half cocked laundry list in the last 500 years.....and we know what happened to them. Just one example, what happened to that French King that thought it would be a spiffing wheeze to side with the US in the American War of Independence? Now what was his name and what happened to that unprepared chappy?........ [;)]

The US? Surely you meant the Colonials? [:D] And, I don't think those Colonials went to war with the odds stacked in their favor, either.

I will admit that a blockade is futile without the Soviets on board, so forget that. But I still think there was some middle path between all-out war and appeasement - just as in 1962. Chamberlain had a lower threshold of impediments than someone more belligerent. How did they go to war only a year later?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay




I'm still skeptical. Yes, you have a laundry-list of reasons, but Chamberlain, while not exactly a passivist, was hardly the most belligerent sword in the scabbard. Would that laundry-list have appeared as daunting to someone more so?

warspite1

Not daunting? When did Britain actually run out of cash in WWII? Was running out of money an over-reaction or a disastrous consequence of the situation the United Kingdom found itself in and that was one of the fears playing on Chamberlain's mind?

Certainly plenty of European Kings, Queens, Emperors etc that have gone to war with a half cocked laundry list in the last 500 years.....and we know what happened to them. Just one example, what happened to that French King that thought it would be a spiffing wheeze to side with the US in the American War of Independence? Now what was his name and what happened to that unprepared chappy?........ [;)]

But I still think there was some middle path between all-out war and appeasement. How did they go to war only a year later?

warspite1

I find it strange that, here we are, debating the build up to WWII and the words ‘middle path’ gets mentioned. What about Adolf Hitler readily allows for those two words? We know Hitler wants the Sudetenland - his stated last territorial ask in Europe. He will order Case Green if he doesn’t get it. If you believe there is middle ground to be explored I’d love to hear it!

How did they go to war one year later? That is the point of no choice - Hitler entered Prague and all pretence at Versailles revision was gone. Poland became the line that could not be crossed. The world saw Hitler for what he was and, despite the UK and France declaring war on Germany, it was the Germans that were the aggressors thanks to case White and Roosevelt was able, eventually, to assist.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

How did they go to war one year later? That is the point of no choice - Hitler entered Prague and all pretence at Versailles revision was gone. Poland became the line that could not be crossed. The world saw Hitler for what he was and, despite the UK and France declaring war on Germany, it was the Germans that were the aggressors thanks to case White and Roosevelt was able, eventually, to assist.

How is Hitler not the aggressor if he is invading Czechoslovakia? And the US had strengthened the Neutrality Acts in the interim to Poland, tying Roosevelt's hands even further. I still think you have to look at Chamberlain as inclined towards peace - if not "at all costs", at least far more than certain other, more belligerent options available.

[philabos]

There is simply no way the US would directly engage in foreign operations in the 1930's.
Even after Hitler's conquest of most of continental Europe, we had sanctions and leans lease, but no direct military action against either Germany or Japan.
Roosevelt's only option was to try goading either or both in an attack on the US.
By this time, we are at the end of 1941 and he thought he would finally get it in the Philippines.
Instead he got Pearl Harbor, and then the Philippines.
I doubt he would have declared war on Germany even then.

Back to 1939, I wonder if Britain and France would have declared war if Germany had simply seized Danzig and not invaded Poland. I suppose by that time acquisition of eastern territories had become a necessity that could not be fulfilled by Danzig alone.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

How is Hitler not the aggressor if he is invading Czechoslovakia? And the US had strengthened the Neutrality Acts in the interim to Poland, tying Roosevelt's hands even further.

warspite1

I was answering the question on the actual going to war in 1939. I said the US was ‘eventually’ able to assist through Lend-Lease (1941).

But I’m a little unclear why you’ve raised the Neutrality Acts. I mean it’s not wrong to mention their existence but this simply strengthens the argument for Chamberlain’s actions. At the time Hitler was getting serious about the Sudetenland the UK and France knew there was no help coming from the US.

Who is the aggressor in this alternate scenario?

Hitler staked his claim based on the right of Self-Determination, oppressed peoples, blah blah, Benes refused to entertain this, Mussolini’s efforts at a peace conference were rebuffed by the ‘war-mongering’ Chamberlain and Daladier, and Britain and France announced a guarantee to Czechoslovakia. Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia and, angry at the losses (not to mention he’s now at war with Britain and France) didn’t stop at the Sudetenlands and conquered the rest of Czech, while Slovakia became ‘independent’ and parts of the carcass were gobbled up by Poland and Hungary. [As discussed previously, it is not certain how this would actually play out, but arguments can be made for defeat and death of Hitler through to stunning victory for Hitler, leading to World War II 2.0].

How would Hitler not have been the aggressor here? Well that depends? Knowing what we do now of course Hitler wouldn’t be seen as the innocent party. Back in the 30’s the story is perhaps seen differently. There is now yet another European war afoot. And why? Well this is where propaganda comes into play. The only reason there is a war is because those two crumbling empires – responsible for the mess that was Versailles - refused to listen to reason and so allow Germany to claim the Sudetenlands and free their oppressed people. Hitler had no choice blah blah.

Put it this way, even if that cobblers wasn’t lapped up in Washington and elsewhere, the situation is not clear cut – unlike Poland 1939.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
I still think you have to look at Chamberlain as inclined towards peace - if not "at all costs", at least far more than certain other, more belligerent options available.

warspite1
Given what has been discussed, what are those options? The bankruptcy/ruination of a nation is being dismissed as though it’s nothing. I really don’t understand this – and certainly don’t understand the ‘Chamberlain as inclined towards peace’ as though that were a bad thing coming on the back of 17 million dead in WWI and the certainty that the next war is going to be worse? Sure, if the Western Allies throw a coin and plump for war in 1938 it might result in victory.... but it might result in destruction of those two countries. What responsible democratic leader is going to throw everything in on one card?

What happened in real life even following Hitler’s gobbling up of Prague in March 1939? Well the Neutrality Act continued and Congress refused to include arms sales. So in March 1939 the gloves were off, any pretence at Versailles revision was over, but the US were firmly staying out of it and not doing anything to assist the western democracies. As said before, I don’t blame the US for looking after their own interests. I do find it more than a little rich though that Chamberlain should be vilified for wanting to try everything to avoid another war in Europe and the ruination of his country in the process.

And remember to those that want to blame Chamberlain and Daladier for Hitler and WWII – the western democracies could have taken an isolationist stance also. “There you go Adolf, why not face east, leave us alone and go play Lebensraum with Uncle Joe…… And if one of those two had emerged as a clear winner, then the west – including the US – have got real problems…..

ORIGINAL: philabos
Back to 1939, I wonder if Britain and France would have declared war if Germany had simply seized Danzig and not invaded Poland. I suppose by that time acquisition of eastern territories had become a necessity that could not be fulfilled by Danzig alone.

warspite1
The Poles made quite clear to Ribbentrop (and others) that there would be no surrender of Danzig and the guarantee had been given, the line in the sand drawn, so yes I believe they would have declared war.

[Orm]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

I'm still skeptical. Yes, you have a laundry-list of reasons, but Chamberlain, while not exactly a passivist, was hardly the most belligerent sword in the scabbard. Would that laundry-list have appeared as daunting to someone more so? There was certainly no US lust for WW-III in 1962, yet Cuba was still de-missiled by a blockade. Two superpowers on the verge of Armageddon managed to escape without war and without appeasement. A blockade might have been an option in 1938 as well.

I have to disagree here. The Cuba-crisis was solved by appeasement. The threat of war might have been a factor, but in my humble opinion, it didn't solve the conflict. US backing down and removing missiles in Turkey was the key factor here. And US removing nuclear missiles in Turkey is appeasement in my book.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I was answering the question on the actual going to war in 1939. I said the US was ‘eventually’ able to assist through Lend-Lease (1941).

But I’m a little unclear why you’ve raised the Neutrality Acts. I mean it’s not wrong to mention their existence but this simply strengthens the argument for Chamberlain’s actions. At the time Hitler was getting serious about the Sudetenland the UK and France knew there was no help coming from the US.

I'm simply pointing out that the prospects for US aid had actually worsened from 1938 to 1939. You were implying the opposite. Everything had worsened by 1939 - yet they still went to war.

Who is the aggressor in this alternate scenario?

Hitler staked his claim based on the right of Self-Determination, oppressed peoples, blah blah, Benes refused to entertain this, Mussolini’s efforts at a peace conference were rebuffed by the ‘war-mongering’ Chamberlain and Daladier, and Britain and France announced a guarantee to Czechoslovakia. Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia and, angry at the losses (not to mention he’s now at war with Britain and France) didn’t stop at the Sudetenlands and conquered the rest of Czech, while Slovakia became ‘independent’ and parts of the carcass were gobbled up by Poland and Hungary. [As discussed previously, it is not certain how this would actually play out, but arguments can be made for defeat and death of Hitler through to stunning victory for Hitler, leading to World War II 2.0].

How would Hitler not have been the aggressor here? Well that depends? Knowing what we do now of course Hitler wouldn’t be seen as the innocent party. Back in the 30’s the story is perhaps seen differently. There is now yet another European war afoot. And why? Well this is where propaganda comes into play. The only reason there is a war is because those two crumbling empires – responsible for the mess that was Versailles - refused to listen to reason and so allow Germany to claim the Sudetenlands and free their oppressed people. Hitler had no choice blah blah.

Put it this way, even if that cobblers wasn’t lapped up in Washington and elsewhere, the situation is not clear cut – unlike Poland 1939.

That doesn't make any sense. Hitler does the invading of a neutral country - he's the aggressor. But, even if you are still hawking that, you could make the same case for Poland. Danzig was a German city.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
I still think you have to look at Chamberlain as inclined towards peace - if not "at all costs", at least far more than certain other, more belligerent options available.

warspite1
Given what has been discussed, what are those options? The bankruptcy/ruination of a nation is being dismissed as though it’s nothing. I really don’t understand this – and certainly don’t understand the ‘Chamberlain as inclined towards peace’ as though that were a bad thing coming on the back of 17 million dead in WWI and the certainty that the next war is going to be worse? Sure, if the Western Allies throw a coin and plump for war in 1938 it might result in victory.... but it might result in destruction of those two countries. What responsible democratic leader is going to throw everything in on one card?

Again, they went to war in 1939 when the situation had gotten even worse. You continue to dismiss Chamberlain's tendencies when I think they played a significant part. The "options" I mentioned above weren't chessboard-move type options, but leadership options. The impediments that were too daunting to Chamberlain might not have been so to someone more belligerent.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: Orm

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

I'm still skeptical. Yes, you have a laundry-list of reasons, but Chamberlain, while not exactly a passivist, was hardly the most belligerent sword in the scabbard. Would that laundry-list have appeared as daunting to someone more so? There was certainly no US lust for WW-III in 1962, yet Cuba was still de-missiled by a blockade. Two superpowers on the verge of Armageddon managed to escape without war and without appeasement. A blockade might have been an option in 1938 as well.

I have to disagree here. The Cuba-crisis was solved by appeasement. The threat of war might have been a factor, but in my humble opinion, it didn't solve the conflict. US backing down and removing missiles in Turkey was the key factor here. And US removing nuclear missiles in Turkey is appeasement in my book.

No wonder Khrushchev was sacked shortly thereafter.

[Orm]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: Orm

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

I'm still skeptical. Yes, you have a laundry-list of reasons, but Chamberlain, while not exactly a passivist, was hardly the most belligerent sword in the scabbard. Would that laundry-list have appeared as daunting to someone more so? There was certainly no US lust for WW-III in 1962, yet Cuba was still de-missiled by a blockade. Two superpowers on the verge of Armageddon managed to escape without war and without appeasement. A blockade might have been an option in 1938 as well.

I have to disagree here. The Cuba-crisis was solved by appeasement. The threat of war might have been a factor, but in my humble opinion, it didn't solve the conflict. US backing down and removing missiles in Turkey was the key factor here. And US removing nuclear missiles in Turkey is appeasement in my book.

No wonder Khrushchev was sacked shortly thereafter.

Yes, it was a mistake by Khrushchev to agree to keep it a secret from the world that the Soviets had come out on top. That they in fact had "won".

And I hardly call two years "shortly thereafter".

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

I'm simply pointing out that the prospects for US aid had actually worsened from 1938 to 1939. You were implying the opposite. Everything had worsened by 1939 - yet they still went to war.

warspite1

I am not sure how I am implying the opposite when I’ve specifically said Poland was all about the line in the sand, the point of no return, the crossing of the Rubicon. America became more entrenched in her splendid isolation, but that was not the point, Prague 1939 was when no one could argue what Hitler was about anymore…. and so yes, things had turned for the worse, but it was Prague that determined the Western Allies as to what had to be done.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

That doesn't make any sense. Hitler does the invading of a neutral country - he's the aggressor.

warspite1

Yes of course it makes sense. Public opinion is not a perfect science. Stories and histories are told imperfectly. Spin was big business. As said, there was a good deal of sympathy for the Germans, there was even admiration, mis-placed certainly, perhaps sometimes grudgingly, but it was there. Germany weren’t going to war because Adolf wanted war. They were going to save the 3m Sudeten Germans who were being victimised daily and hadn't been given the basic right of self-determination.... and it was all down to those pesky imperialists blah blah.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

But, even if you are still hawking that, you could make the same case for Poland. Danzig was a German city.

warspite1

Sorry what do you mean? Poland isn’t Danzig – Danzig isn’t Poland. Hitler couldn’t give a flying one about Danzig for Danzig’s sake and even if he had rights to Danzig, Poland would control the Polish corridor and the important port of Gydnia. But regardless, all that is moot because even if Danzig was important of itself, by the time he gets around to Danzig, Munich has happened “I have no further territorial claims to make in Europe” and then Prague (Versailles revision torn up). At that point in the game it wouldn’t matter if it were downtown, Berlin up for grabs – if Poland was given it under Versailles, Germany wasn’t having it in 1939.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Again, they went to war in 1939 when the situation had gotten even worse. You continue to dismiss Chamberlain's tendencies when I think they played a significant part. The "options" I mentioned above weren't chessboard-move type options, but leadership options. The impediments that were too daunting to Chamberlain might not have been so to someone more belligerent.

warspite1

I haven't dismissed Chamberlain's tendencies because I haven't mentioned them. I’m not sure why you continue to mention the situation having gotten worse as though that matters here. The Rubicon had been crossed – the situation was what the situation was. In trying to do the right thing, in trying to stave off a ruinous war, in trying to bring peace to Europe, things got worse – that sadly turned out to be the price paid for trying everything to stop a general war.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

The impediments that were too daunting to Chamberlain might not have been so to someone more belligerent.

warspite1

And once again the playing down of the impediments. What I find so incongruous here is that if those impediments were proven to have been over-played, then I could perfectly understand your point. But what exactly was overplayed here? What impediments weren’t really impediments but just an excuse not to go to war? Well first and foremost there is the parlous financial position – when did Britain run of cash and how much war was still remaining when they did? The state of Britain’s first line of defence – how did that work out in every ocean on the planet? – how big was Britain’s army and how did it fare? How did the French do in 1940? How prepared were the Western Allies for war – how did Norway pan out, let alone the defence of France. Take the US out of the war (and as we know there was no guarantee the US would get involved) and tell me how it all pans out? Look at what happened and tell me those impediments were somehow made up and that someone with bigger balls than Chamberlain would have simply made good those deficiencies just by being more ‘belligerent’. That sounds like some Goebels propaganda extravaganza Triumph of the Will or some old sloblocks....

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Orm

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

I'm still skeptical. Yes, you have a laundry-list of reasons, but Chamberlain, while not exactly a passivist, was hardly the most belligerent sword in the scabbard. Would that laundry-list have appeared as daunting to someone more so? There was certainly no US lust for WW-III in 1962, yet Cuba was still de-missiled by a blockade. Two superpowers on the verge of Armageddon managed to escape without war and without appeasement. A blockade might have been an option in 1938 as well.

I have to disagree here. The Cuba-crisis was solved by appeasement. The threat of war might have been a factor, but in my humble opinion, it didn't solve the conflict. US backing down and removing missiles in Turkey was the key factor here. And US removing nuclear missiles in Turkey is appeasement in my book.

Well, if your supposition is correct, then it was at least successful appeasement that forestalled armed conflict between the two superpowers at that point. If Chamberlain had successfully appeased Adolph Hitler then perhaps his effort would have been lauded as true 'peace in our times'. But instead it was an abject failure on multiple fronts. Perhaps appeasement was never feasible with Adolph Hitler. Perhaps it was attempted too late (what if Chamberlain had tried it in 1936-1937?). Instead Chamberlain somehow managed to hold both dirty ends of the stick-failed appeasement, failed preparations for belligerency and failed 'vision'. 'Hope' is neither an effective investment strategy nor is it a good foreign policy.

I don't know if he could have done anything different. The die for the Second World War was cast long before the ersatz detente with Chamberlain and Hitler came about. Chamberlain (and all of Europe for that matter) was in for a real **** show no matter.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Orm

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

I'm still skeptical. Yes, you have a laundry-list of reasons, but Chamberlain, while not exactly a passivist, was hardly the most belligerent sword in the scabbard. Would that laundry-list have appeared as daunting to someone more so? There was certainly no US lust for WW-III in 1962, yet Cuba was still de-missiled by a blockade. Two superpowers on the verge of Armageddon managed to escape without war and without appeasement. A blockade might have been an option in 1938 as well.

I have to disagree here. The Cuba-crisis was solved by appeasement. The threat of war might have been a factor, but in my humble opinion, it didn't solve the conflict. US backing down and removing missiles in Turkey was the key factor here. And US removing nuclear missiles in Turkey is appeasement in my book.

Well, if your supposition is correct, then it was at least successful appeasement that forestalled armed conflict between the two superpowers at that point. If Chamberlain had successfully appeased Adolph Hitler then perhaps his effort would have been lauded as true 'peace in our times'. But instead it was an abject failure on multiple fronts. Perhaps appeasement was never feasible with Adolph Hitler. Perhaps it was attempted too late (what if Chamberlain had tried it in 1936-1937?). Instead Chamberlain somehow managed to hold both dirty ends of the stick-failed appeasement, failed preparations for belligerency and failed 'vision'. 'Hope' is neither an effective investment strategy nor is it a good foreign policy.

I don't know if he could have done anything different. The die for the Second World War was cast long before the ersatz detente with Chamberlain and Hitler came about. Chamberlain (and all of Europe for that matter) was in for a real **** show no matter.

warspite1

[&:] Always good to see an honest, interesting, forthright debate brought down to a p***** match over whose got the biggest **** Kennedy or Chamberlain for absolutely no reason...... What the hell was that all about CB?

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Orm


I have to disagree here. The Cuba-crisis was solved by appeasement. The threat of war might have been a factor, but in my humble opinion, it didn't solve the conflict. US backing down and removing missiles in Turkey was the key factor here. And US removing nuclear missiles in Turkey is appeasement in my book.

Well, if your supposition is correct, then it was at least successful appeasement that forestalled armed conflict between the two superpowers at that point. If Chamberlain had successfully appeased Adolph Hitler then perhaps his effort would have been lauded as true 'peace in our times'. But instead it was an abject failure on multiple fronts. Perhaps appeasement was never feasible with Adolph Hitler. Perhaps it was attempted too late (what if Chamberlain had tried it in 1936-1937?). Instead Chamberlain somehow managed to hold both dirty ends of the stick-failed appeasement, failed preparations for belligerency and failed 'vision'. 'Hope' is neither an effective investment strategy nor is it a good foreign policy.

I don't know if he could have done anything different. The die for the Second World War was cast long before the ersatz detente with Chamberlain and Hitler came about. Chamberlain (and all of Europe for that matter) was in for a real **** show no matter.

warspite1

[&:] Always good to see an honest, interesting, forthright debate brought down to a p***** match over whose got the biggest **** Kennedy or Chamberlain for absolutely no reason...... What the hell was that all about CB?

Sorry you took offense. It's not about who's got the bigger ***** at all, but a reasonable comparative of two examples where a similar leadership approach resulted in vastly different outcomes.

I was responding to Orm's assessment (in this very thread) of the resolution of the "Cuban Missile Crisis" by what he suggested was out-and-out appeasement of the Soviets by Kennedy. I've heard this approach before-and there may even some merit to it. And it's an interesting historical parallel to the quandry faced by Chamberlain regarding his failed appeasement of Hitler before the outbreak of the Second World War. It raises some interesting questions about 'what if?' relative to Chamberlain's furtive peace effort. Some of these very questions broach on the OP topic of 'Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing?'

If Chamberlain *KNEW* that war was coming, could he have done *ANYTHING* to forestall it? It's possible I suppose, but I don't see what deal he could have made that would have been: A) Palatable to those on the home front and B) Likely to be honored by Herr Hitler and company. Apparently Chamberlain had some trust in the Germans at some level at some time up until 29 September 1938-otherwise he would have never signed the Munich Accord. What if the Munich Accord went even further and actually satisfied Hitler's designs on Eastern Europe?

Again a historical what if: If Chamberlain had written off the Poles (assuming he was asked to), could war between the UK and Germany been forestalled before Barbarossa kicked off in June 1941? If so, would that have been a better outcome postwar for the UK than the historical state of events? Much depends on how Hitler / if Hitler would have honored said agreement post-signature. And, of course, whether Chamberlain would have politically survived at home-having given such a betrayal to the Poles.

So, I guess it depends on what you mean by "the right thing". Did he avert war? No. Could he have by extended appeasement? Possibly-but at terrible cost to the Poles for one. And what about the French? What was 'the right thing' for the British people? Could greater than a million British souls been saved relative to the historical outcome? All 'what ifs' that bear reasoned hypothetical discussion.

So settle down, sport.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

I'm simply pointing out that the prospects for US aid had actually worsened from 1938 to 1939. You were implying the opposite. Everything had worsened by 1939 - yet they still went to war.

warspite1

I am not sure how I am implying the opposite...

See the last clause in your post #162. You clearly implied that prospects for US aid had improved by 1939.

Yes of course it makes sense. Public opinion is not a perfect science. Stories and histories are told imperfectly. Spin was big business. As said, there was a good deal of sympathy for the Germans, there was even admiration, mis-placed certainly, perhaps sometimes grudgingly, but it was there. Germany weren’t going to war because Adolf wanted war. They were going to save the 3m Sudeten Germans who were being victimised daily and hadn't been given the basic right of self-determination.... and it was all down to those pesky imperialists blah blah.

Again, if you can sell that lie, you can sell Poland as victimized Germans, too.

Sorry what do you mean? Poland isn’t Danzig – Danzig isn’t Poland. Hitler couldn’t give a flying one about Danzig for Danzig’s sake and even if he had rights to Danzig, Poland would control the Polish corridor and the important port of Gydnia. But regardless, all that is moot because even if Danzig was important of itself, by the time he gets around to Danzig, Munich has happened “I have no further territorial claims to make in Europe” and then Prague (Versailles revision torn up). At that point in the game it wouldn’t matter if it were downtown, Berlin up for grabs – if Poland was given it under Versailles, Germany wasn’t having it in 1939.

The Polish corridor was full of Germans - it had been German territory for centuries. So, the same sob-song could have been sung about it as well.

I haven't dismissed Chamberlain's tendencies because I haven't mentioned them.

Head in the sand? They are there, whether you mention them or not.

I’m not sure why you continue to mention the situation having gotten worse as though that matters here. The Rubicon had been crossed – the situation was what the situation was. In trying to do the right thing, in trying to stave off a ruinous war, in trying to bring peace to Europe, things got worse – that sadly turned out to be the price paid for trying everything to stop a general war.

No. Poland was not the "Rubicon" - any more than Czechoslovakia was. The only Rubicon that would have guaranteed war was the Channel.

And once again the playing down of the impediments. What I find so incongruous here is that if those impediments were proven to have been over-played, then I could perfectly understand your point. But what exactly was overplayed here? What impediments weren’t really impediments but just an excuse not to go to war? Well first and foremost there is the parlous financial position – when did Britain run of cash and how much war was still remaining when they did? The state of Britain’s first line of defence – how did that work out in every ocean on the planet? – how big was Britain’s army and how did it fare? How did the French do in 1940? How prepared were the Western Allies for war – how did Norway pan out, let alone the defence of France. Take the US out of the war (and as we know there was no guarantee the US would get involved) and tell me how it all pans out? Look at what happened and tell me those impediments were somehow made up and that someone with bigger balls than Chamberlain would have simply made good those deficiencies just by being more ‘belligerent’. That sounds like some Goebels propaganda extravaganza Triumph of the Will or some old sloblocks....

No. I'm just pointing out that those impediments weren't impediments in 1939.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy
It's not about who's got the bigger ***** at all, but a reasonable comparative of two examples where a similar leadership approach resulted in vastly different outcomes.

And it's an interesting historical parallel to the quandry faced by Chamberlain regarding his failed appeasement of Hitler before the outbreak of the Second World War.

warspite1

Well I have no interest in warfare post Hiroshima – hence I haven’t bought into this aspect of the debate and will simply let those who wish to comment do so. As such I certainly pass no comment on whether the Cuban Missile Crisis was appeasement, successful appeasement or not appeasement at all. Having said that no, I don’t think it is a reasonable comparative to the build up to WWII. There is a not very subtle difference that differentiates negotiations, treaties etc in the pre and post nuclear ages, not to mention that Khrushchev (the Stalin denouncer) was not Adolf Hitler.

So to return to the main purpose of this thread:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Perhaps appeasement was never feasible with Adolph Hitler.

warspite1

Why perhaps? We KNOW that unless Hitler got what he wanted he would resort to the one thing that sane democratic leaders try and avoid; war. Where does perhaps figure?

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Again a historical what if: If Chamberlain had written off the Poles (assuming he was asked to), could war between the UK and Germany been forestalled before Barbarossa kicked off in June 1941? If so, would that have been a better outcome postwar for the UK than the historical state of events? Much depends on how Hitler / if Hitler would have honored said agreement post-signature. And, of course, whether Chamberlain would have politically survived at home-having given such a betrayal to the Poles.

warspite1

So in this scenario Britain and France have told Hitler that so long as Germany respected the French and British Empires he could go fill his boots in Poland and all areas south (except Greece) and east?

If Germany and the Soviet Union go to war then it would be prudent to assume that one side wins. One side – either side, Soviet Russia or Fascist Germany – proving the victor and occupying an area from the Rhine to Vladivostok and all the oil and other resources within, would be a pretty terrifying prospect for the rest of Europe….and the US – especially if its Germany. So no I don’t think that was a starter.

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

So, I guess it depends on what you mean by "the right thing". Did he avert war? No.

warspite1

But what does that tell us? We KNOW now that averting war was not possible (unless, as said, he gave Hitler free reign in the east and that just kicks the can down the road). That is not what the discussion is about. The discussion is about whether Chamberlain took the right decisions, at various times between 1937-1939, based on the information available together with an appraisal of Britain’s (and of course all this applies to France) position at the time.

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Perhaps it was attempted too late (what if Chamberlain had tried it in 1936-1937?).

warspite1

Sorry I've no idea what this means. Attempt what? Are you suggesting he offers up Austria and Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1936-1937? One of the criticisms of Chamberlain is that in trying to come to a compromise through appeasement he only made Hitler bolder. But are you suggesting Chamberlain should have given up 'stuff' unilaterally earlier? And then when Hitler states he wants the Soviet Union then what?

Mind you Chamberlain wasn’t Prime Minister until May 1937, and the Rhineland had happened in 1936 so.... But regardless, what is it you are suggesting Chamberlain should have done or reacted to in 1937 – in fact, what actually happened in 1937 he could have appeased?

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Instead Chamberlain somehow managed to hold both dirty ends of the stick-failed appeasement, failed preparations for belligerency and failed 'vision'.

warspite1

Well maybe there wasn’t a clean end to hold onto and we know - with hindsight - that appeasement wasn’t going to bring Hitler round, but it’s funny isn’t it – apparently it should have been obvious that war was inevitable, glaringly obvious that one mad man was going to take the world to total war etc. And yet…. The Germans who voted for him didn’t do anything about it, nor did the politicians that installed him in power, and nor did the German generals (although they would if Britain and France did their dirty work for them – honest!). All these people could see what was going on inside Germany and did nothing. In fact, despite the fact it was apparently obvious to anyone and everyone that Hitler was going to engulf the world in war, there were only two countries that declared war on Germany without waiting to be attacked/declared war on – Britain and France….. funny old game.

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

But instead it was an abject failure on multiple fronts.

warspite1

Really? Was it? You see there is a limitation even with hindsight. Abject failure? Well if we accept that Britain and France weren’t going to invade Germany pre 1936 (for regime change), if we accept that Britain and France were not going to go against world public opinion and genuine sympathy for Germany (Versailles revision) and invade Germany in 1937/38 (up to September), then the only time for doing so realistically was instead of Munich. That is the point that – albeit with absolutely no guarantee of the outcome (although only on the Czech side is there any real unknown) – the British and French could have gone to war. They didn’t. They took one last (responsible and reasonable) stab at peace and it failed because Hitler then showed his true colours and…..

So was it a failure? Just examine for a few minutes what happened next. Now whatever one may think of any leader, Chamberlain and Daladier no different, they can only do so much. They are not the military men. Just as Stalin (eventually) and Roosevelt realised they needed to leave fighting to the military, just as Hitler didn’t and Churchill sort of did but didn’t, all a leader can (or should) do is give the fighting men the best conditions possible (through all the usual mechanics of government) and then it’s up to them.

Well it’s very easy to look at the French/British collapse in France and Belgium 1940 and – because of that military debacle, decide that everything else was rubbish. But that is too simplistic. Look at what happened – what series of military incompetence’s – allowed for that situation and then look at how it should have played out based purely on the numbers, the equipment (and indeed some of the quality). Then look at just how lucky the Germans got in Case Yellow..... Then look at the ability of the Western Allies to out-build the Germans. May be the plan was actually pretty sound. The execution was for **** but that is not the politicians fault. Abject failure? Depends what you’re talking about, whether you want to do an analysis or just grab the quick wins.

The colossal balls up that was France 1940 quite naturally colours everything around it. The Allied armies were rubbish so mirroring the politicians blah blah. Well yes, that's a simplistic view but not necessarily the correct one.

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

'Hope' is neither an effective investment strategy nor is it a good foreign policy.

warspite1

Crass. Whether you agree or disagree with his attempts to avoid war, where is the suggestion he simply just hoped....

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

I don't know if he could have done anything different. The die for the Second World War was cast long before the ersatz detente with Chamberlain and Hitler came about. Chamberlain (and all of Europe for that matter) was in for a real **** show no matter.

warspite1

What do you mean by that? How long ago is long ago? I hope you are not going down the Versailles = World War II road…. Yes there was a second war, yes it was started by Germany (the “wronged” party at Versailles) but it took 21-years, it took a worldwide economic depression, it took a sociopathic leader to emerge that was not interested in putting Versailles right, it took a policy of appeasement with a lot of offers rejected – in short a hell of a lot of water flew under the bridge between 1918 and 1939. Even AJP Taylor says war was not certain until 1939.

Edit: I was not even close at spelling Khrushchev [8|]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

See the last clause in your post #162. You clearly implied that prospects for US aid had improved by 1939.

warspite1

warspite1

How did they go to war one year later? That is the point of no choice - Hitler entered Prague and all pretence at Versailles revision was gone. Poland became the line that could not be crossed. The world saw Hitler for what he was and, despite the UK and France declaring war on Germany, it was the Germans that were the aggressors thanks to case White and Roosevelt was able, eventually, to assist.

Well here is the last paragraph and I don’t know how much clearer I can be. The British and French went to war not because conditions had improved – they went to war because the line in the sand (Poland) was crossed. The US were able to help eventually (relaxing of cash and carry (Nov 40) and then lend-lease Mar 41). I really don’t know what else to say.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Again, if you can sell that lie, you can sell Poland as victimized Germans, too.

The Polish corridor was full of Germans - it had been German territory for centuries. So, the same sob-song could have been sung about it as well.

warspite1

As per the above, I know you are not stupid so either I’ve suddenly forgotten all my English language skills or you are just being obtuse.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Head in the sand? They are there, whether you mention them or not.

warspite1

No. They are there if you think they are because that is your opinion. Chamberlain, like us all, was a many-faceted creature, but in all the books I’ve read about him and this time period I can’t recall one that suggested he was actually a head in the sand merchant. You appear to be mistaking someone with a genuine understanding and acknowledgement of a problem, and taking the best course of action, with someone running away from reality. Not sure how you've achieved that.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

No. Poland was not the "Rubicon" - any more than Czechoslovakia was. The only Rubicon that would have guaranteed war was the Channel.

warspite1

Sorry Curtis Lemay but this series of responses is not like you. You appear to have changed debating tack for no obvious reason..... But anyway, I know you know the Rubicon is a saying (the Romans and all that). Yes, Poland was the Rubicon. It was the line in the sand that the British Government picked because Poland was to be Hitler's first victim post him making clear (Prague 1939) that Versailles revision was not his goal. That was the Rubicon chosen. It could have been Czechoslovakia - in which case Munich would not have happened and war would have begun then. But Czechoslovakia WASN’T chosen as the Rubicon because Britain was not going to war because 3m Sudeten Germans wanted the right to self-determination. Britain was however going to war over Poland - NOT Danzig, but Poland. So yes, regardless of what you say, factually Poland was HMG's Rubicon. You may not like the Cabinet's decision, you may not agree with the Cabinet's decision, but that was their decision and that was what 3rd September 1939 shortly after 11 o'clock was all about. You can't deny Poland was the Rubicon.... er because she was.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

No. I'm just pointing out that those impediments weren't impediments in 1939.

warspite1

Well two of the impediments were gone. Public opinion. That went in 1939 thanks to Prague. So did the Dominions refusal to go to war alongside the mother country (with conditions in the case of South Africa and Canada).

All the rest were impediments still – to a greater or lesser extent. But I go back to the Rubicon once more – the line had been crossed, Britain still wasn’t prepared, still wasn’t recovered from the last war and was still financially in trouble, but the line was crossed. Britain gave on Czechoslovakia on the basis of Hitler’s promises "I have no more territorial claims in Europe" and because there was at least an argument for the 3m Sudeten Germans. No more.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy
It's not about who's got the bigger ***** at all, but a reasonable comparative of two examples where a similar leadership approach resulted in vastly different outcomes.

And it's an interesting historical parallel to the quandry faced by Chamberlain regarding his failed appeasement of Hitler before the outbreak of the Second World War.

warspite1

Well I have no interest in warfare post Hiroshima – hence I haven’t bought into this aspect of the debate and will simply let those who wish to comment do so. As such I certainly pass no comment on whether the Cuban Missile Crisis was appeasement, successful appeasement or not appeasement at all. Having said that no, I don’t think it is a reasonable comparative to the build up to WWII. There is a not very subtle difference that differentiates negotiations, treaties etc in the pre and post nuclear ages, not to mention that Khrushchev (the Stalin denouncer) was not Adolf Hitler.

So to return to the main purpose of this thread:

I think you've made the discussion here too restrictive. If you want to start a retrospective analysis of whether Chamberlain 'Did the right thing', you need to be able to embrace modern learnings of the event, historic parallels, lessons learned and so forth. Unearthed arcana about Chamberlain per se are germane, but so are other tidbits post-war that have come to light.

Chamberlain's association with failed appeasement is a fact of life. Failed. Appeasement. Don't like the moniker or yoke of that? So sorry. Why is his name inextricably associated with failed appeasement? Because of what we've learned about the situation since 1938. But you're saying that we can't use information or parallel analogies post-Hiroshima (BTW, why Hiroshima and not Nagasaki?) to argue our case in this thread? That's just confusing and unnecessarily stultifying IMO. Perhaps you should have retitled your OP to 'Did the Neville Chamberlain do the right thing in realtime, using only sources and foreknowledge or information gleaned from 1937-1939.'

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Perhaps appeasement was never feasible with Adolph Hitler.

warspite1

Why perhaps? We KNOW that unless Hitler got what he wanted he would resort to the one thing that sane democratic leaders try and avoid; war. Where does perhaps figure?

[/quote]

Perhaps figures because Hitler wasn't offered everything that he wanted. So he took that which he wanted but was not freely given. Perhaps had he been served up Poland and a free path to the Soviet Union and liebenstraum he may have left the UK and France alone. Of course, doing that would be an unpardonable British offense to the Poles, but it was a possibility. A wholly unpalatable one, but still worthy of a mention. That's what I mean by 'perhaps'.

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Again a historical what if: If Chamberlain had written off the Poles (assuming he was asked to), could war between the UK and Germany been forestalled before Barbarossa kicked off in June 1941? If so, would that have been a better outcome postwar for the UK than the historical state of events? Much depends on how Hitler / if Hitler would have honored said agreement post-signature. And, of course, whether Chamberlain would have politically survived at home-having given such a betrayal to the Poles.

warspite1

So in this scenario Britain and France have told Hitler that so long as Germany respected the French and British Empires he could go fill his boots in Poland and all areas south (except Greece) and east?

If Germany and the Soviet Union go to war then it would be prudent to assume that one side wins. One side – either side, Soviet Russia or Fascist Germany – proving the victor and occupying an area from the Rhine to Vladivostok and all the oil and other resources within, would be a pretty terrifying prospect for the rest of Europe….and the US – especially if its Germany. So no I don’t think that was a starter.
[/quote]

Yeah, that's the gist of it. I don't know what 'fill his boots' means, but that's the upshot.

And, since we're limiting discussions to realtime realpolitik of the moment (circa 1938), I don't think it's fair to bring up how the rest of Europe would look post-war. For all we know, if Hitler had accepted the 'boot filling' of Poland and left France and the UK alone, there may not have been a war with the Soviet Union in 1941. The certainty of war with the Soviet Union was not in the cards in 1938, 1939, 1940 or the first half of 1941 as far as the British were concerned. So granting Chamberlain clarity of foresight which he did not have is disingenuous.

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

So, I guess it depends on what you mean by "the right thing". Did he avert war? No.

warspite1

But what does that tell us? We KNOW now that averting war was not possible (unless, as said, he gave Hitler free reign in the east and that just kicks the can down the road). That is not what the discussion is about. The discussion is about whether Chamberlain took the right decisions, at various times between 1937-1939, based on the information available together with an appraisal of Britain’s (and of course all this applies to France) position at the time.

[/quote]

See, I thought the discussion was about if Chamberlain 'did the right thing'. To me, 'the right thing' involves weighing the merits of kicking the can down the road versus possible global warfare. Historically weighed and with a massive leavening of hindsight and lessons learned. Your call for discussion in your OP is unclear on the restrictions of what can be used in the discussion.

So you must also restrict the outcome of any European conflict post 1938 from your discussions about whether he did the right thing or not. Because we *don't know* what would have happened differently on the continent had appeasement been successful or the Poles been hung out to dry early and often. It's akin to multivariate analysis of an equation: change the variables apriori and you have a massively different outcome.

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Perhaps it was attempted too late (what if Chamberlain had tried it in 1936-1937?).

warspite1

Sorry I've no idea what this means. Attempt what? Are you suggesting he offers up Austria and Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1936-1937? One of the criticisms of Chamberlain is that in trying to come to a compromise through appeasement he only made Hitler bolder. But are you suggesting Chamberlain should have given up 'stuff' unilaterally earlier? And then when Hitler states he wants the Soviet Union then what?

Mind you Chamberlain wasn’t Prime Minister until May 1937, and the Rhineland had happened in 1936 so.... But regardless, what is it you are suggesting Chamberlain should have done or reacted to in 1937 – in fact, what actually happened in 1937 he could have appeased?
[/quote]

No, not 'should have done'. But 'could have done'. In my world, retrospective analysis of Chamberlain's actions / inactions must include what he could have done as well. And he could have offered up Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. And when Hitler says he wants the Soviet Union (3 years later mind you), he could have shrugged and said 'have at it'.

I'm not saying that it was the right thing to do in hindsight. It would have been unfathomable for the mindset at the time and almost Evil. But the mindset at the time was clearly that there was a continental line in the sand for which Britain was willing to endure another world war. And that that line in the sand was clearly 'Poland'.

Knowing what we do now, a stark choice in this discussion that should be addressed is this: If Chamberlain had known that over a million Brits (and Commonwealth soldiers) would perish as a result of the war and that the nation would largely be bankrupted post-war and lose many of its overseas colonies, would he have been such a stickler to defend Poland? Was it worth it? Could he have done something different and could that have forestalled such a butcher's bill? Possibly.

Really? Was it? You see there is a limitation even with hindsight. Abject failure? Well if we accept that Britain and France weren’t going to invade Germany pre 1936 (for regime change), if we accept that Britain and France were not going to go against world public opinion and genuine sympathy for Germany (Versailles revision) and invade Germany in 1937/38 (up to September), then the only time for doing so realistically was instead of Munich. That is the point that – albeit with absolutely no guarantee of the outcome (although only on the Czech side is there any real unknown) – the British and French could have gone to war. They didn’t. They took one last (responsible and reasonable) stab at peace and it failed because Hitler then showed his true colours and…..

So was it a failure? Just examine for a few minutes what happened next. Now whatever one may think of any leader, Chamberlain and Daladier no different, they can only do so much. They are not the military men. Just as Stalin (eventually) and Roosevelt realised they needed to leave fighting to the military, just as Hitler didn’t and Churchill sort of did but didn’t, all a leader can (or should) do is give the fighting men the best conditions possible (through all the usual mechanics of government) and then it’s up to them.

Well it’s very easy to look at the French/British collapse in France and Belgium 1940 and – because of that military debacle, decide that everything else was rubbish. But that is too simplistic. Look at what happened – what series of military incompetence’s – allowed for that situation and then look at how it should have played out based purely on the numbers, the equipment (and indeed some of the quality). Then look at just how lucky the Germans got in Case Yellow..... Then look at the ability of the Western Allies to out-build the Germans. May be the plan was actually pretty sound. The execution was for **** but that is not the politicians fault. Abject failure? Depends what you’re talking about, whether you want to do an analysis or just grab the quick wins.

The colossal balls up that was France 1940 quite naturally colours everything around it. The Allied armies were rubbish so mirroring the politicians blah blah. Well yes, that's a simplistic view but not necessarily the correct one.

For purposes of this discussion, and Chamberlain's decision in realtime, we can't color the logic with what happened in France in 1940. For all he knew, the Maginot line would hold and France would present a continental bulwark against the Germans much as it had in 1914-1918.

Chamberlain's choice was whether to go to war or to give up the Poles, not the nuanced vagaries of military fighting. He made up his choice without knowing what would come next. But he had to know that a continental war on the scale of WWI was a distinct possibility. And still he chose diplomatic ties to Poland and international support for his political decision over the cost of embroiling his country in another titanic global war.

To summarize: If you are going to limit the discussion to Chamberlain's realtime realpolitik data, then you can't include what actually happened post-1939. To suggest that the fall of France in 1940 was presaged by Chamberlain's decision making process is fallacious logic.

He 'could have' done a number of things that may have resulted in massively different outcome. We'll never know. All of his choices in realtime would have been fraught with difficulties because he didn't know what he didn't know. Possibly acceptable alternatives (e.g., hanging out the Poles to dry) were not explored more fully, but could have been sufficient to forestall another continental war. But they were heinous and dishonorable choices all. I'm not surprised that he avoided them, but whether it was 'the right thing' to do in hindsight is still a philosophical unknown.

[Chickenboy]

I had to cut my previous post short, as I had to go support Mrs. Chickenboy's dressage competition performance.

But I meant to finish up by saying that, if I read Curtis Lemay's comment re: 'the Rubicon' correctly, that his argument supports mine. Namely, Poland was only a guarantor of imminent warfare because the British chose to draw the line there, instead of Czechoslovakia. They didn't have to do either. The only Rubicon that would have guaranteed war was the Channel.

Chamberlain's outcome options from his box in 1939 (before the invasion of Poland) were:

1. Throw Poland under the bus and avoid continental war. Probability of success small.

2. Support Poland and get a continental war. The most likely outcome.

3. Throw Poland under the bus and get a continental war anyways. Probably the second most likely outcome.

What was the probability of success of option number 1? Zero? No-there was a possibility that it may have worked: giving Hitler all that he wanted in Eastern Europe. For the sake of argument, let's say 10% chance. So-betray the Poles and avoid a million Brit (and Commonwealth) lives lost, save the national treasure and retain the colonies status quo? I'm sorry, but that's tempting. All you have to do is rip up an entangling alliance for all that? Who wouldn't be tempted?

Would that have been the 'right thing'? Where does avoidance of global war at all costs rate in your selection criteria? Is it more important than honor or faithfulness or adherence to rule of law or international respect?

[Orm]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy


But I meant to finish up by saying that, if I read Curtis Lemay's comment re: 'the Rubicon' correctly, that his argument supports mine. Namely, Poland was only a guarantor of imminent warfare because the British chose to draw the line there, instead of Czechoslovakia. They didn't have to do either. The only Rubicon that would have guaranteed war was the Channel.

Well, the original 'crossing the Rubicon' was just a line that the Roman Senate had drawn. They didn't have to react to it when Caesar crossed it with his army (as expressly forbidden). They could have changed their mind and invited him into Rome. Or put a new 'line' further south. There had been no fighting yet. So I would argue that the way Warspite1 uses the term 'crossing the Rubicon' fits perfectly here. In my humble opinion, that is.

[warspite1]

[/quote]warspite1

Well I was starting to respond to those numerous comments over two posts but hadn’t got very far when I realised, before getting anywhere near the subject in hand, I was having to argue against misrepresentation about what I’ve even said the debate is about and what people can and can’t say. Wow that’s not a lot of fun…..
[/quote]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

I think you've made the discussion here too restrictive. If you want to start a retrospective analysis of whether Chamberlain 'Did the right thing', you need to be able to embrace modern learnings of the event, historic parallels, lessons learned and so forth. Unearthed arcana about Chamberlain per se are germane, but so are other tidbits post-war that have come to light.

But you're saying that we can't use information or parallel analogies post-Hiroshima (BTW, why Hiroshima and not Nagasaki?) to argue our case in this thread? That's just confusing and unnecessarily stultifying IMO.

Perhaps you should have retitled your OP to 'Did the Neville Chamberlain do the right thing in realtime, using only sources and foreknowledge or information gleaned from 1937-1939.'

warspite1

Let’s be clear. When entering into debates on assessment of actions and decisions made by historical characters, there are only really two rules as such that I think are vital for any sensible debate.

1. No Hindsight allowed. Person x makes a decision and he/she is judged on it. It is only right therefore that in commenting critically upon that action/decision, we should put ourselves, to the extent possible, in the shoes of that character. Of course it is okay to mention what happened subsequently as part of an overview of the debate and to provide some level of context where required. In addition where decisions are made based on judgement calls for what will happen it can be pertinent to assess whether that was a sound call or a ‘lucky/unlucky shot’.

2. Perhaps even more difficult but to the extent possible one should try and view actions within the time that character lived. If we judged everyone by the standards of today there would be little debate.

But I’ve been accused of the above quotes and so I’d be keen to see where:

- I’ve been seeking to impose restrictions.
- I’ve said no post-war learnings can be taken into account
- I’ve said people can’t draw historic parallels - I simply said I disagreed with your opinion that warfare post Hiroshima was a valid comparison. Indeed I actually said “and will simply let those who wish to comment do so”
- I’ve said ‘unearthed arcana’ about Chamberlain can’t be considered.
- I’ve said only sources, foreknowledge or information gleaned from 1937-1939 can be used

Please can you provide post numbers and/or specific quotes - thank-you.


As for the rest of the comments, there is plenty a response to be written but when I can’t even make myself understood about what Crossing the Rubicon (seriously?) means it all seems a bit of a waste of effort. But this pales into comparison compared to these which I will make comment on as they are kind of fundamental to the whole thread:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

For all we know, if Hitler had accepted the 'boot filling' of Poland and left France and the UK alone, there may not have been a war with the Soviet Union in 1941.

warspite1

So if I have this right you are suggesting, despite all we know, that Hitler would have been happy with a simple revision of Versailles 1.5? If that were true then you do realise Hitler pretty much achieved it by mid-September 1939….

But you are saying it is possible “for all we know” (even now) that Hitler wasn’t interested in Lebensraum! You saying Hitler didn’t state he wanted Germany to be self-sufficient like the US so that Germany would never be subject to WWI style blockade again? You are saying the bread basket of the Ukraine and the oil of the Caucasus were really unimportant to a Greater German Reich and all Hitler really wanted was more bloody Polish coalfields. Well that goes against just about everyone’s thinking, but regardless, I thought one of the criticisms of Chamberlain was that he didn’t know Hitler wanted this when everyone else apparently did. So if you are saying we don’t know even now with hindsight, cabinet papers, memos etc etc. then how could Chamberlain be blamed for not knowing in 1938?

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

See, I thought the discussion was about if Chamberlain 'did the right thing'. To me, 'the right thing' involves weighing the merits of kicking the can down the road versus possible global warfare. Historically weighed and with a massive leavening of hindsight and lessons learned.

warspite1

But again, kicking things down the road (in terms of the 1930’s spelt appeasement because Hitler wasn’t a ‘let’s wait and see kind of guy’).

So, that being the case what exactly are you blaming Chamberlain for? Because coming to a conclusion on whether he did the right thing kind of needs a conclusion on whether one believes he did the right or wrong thing. You said:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Chamberlain's association with failed appeasement is a fact of life. Failed. Appeasement.

warspite1

So what aspect of his appeasement policy are you actually blaming Chamberlain for? Is it real life appeasement because it led to war (even though as shown, there was no guarantee for stopping war no matter what)? Is it not appeasing enough and if so when do you think appeasement should have stopped and to what end was it acceptable? Or perhaps you are blaming Chamberlain for appeasing at all and if so what does that mean for Versailles and treatment of the German nation going forward?

This is important because without understanding the point you are trying to make we get statements like this:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Of course, doing that would be an unpardonable British offense to the Poles….

warspite1

Without any context why would an ‘unpardonable offence’ come about? One assumes it has to refer to post Prague in March 1939 (when Britain gave the guarantee) in which case what has this got to do with appeasement unless you are stating Britain, having given the guarantee to Poland in March 1939, then sometime between April and September 1939 retract it. So what sort of a scenario is this?

All I seem to have got I'm afraid from those posts is:

- faux accusations that I'm trying to stiffle debate by telling people what they can and can't say,
- a rather churlish "Chamberlain's association with failed appeasement is a fact of life. Failed. Appeasement. Don't like the moniker or yoke of that? So sorry". This was rather unfortunate not least because Chamberlain's association with appeasement is a given and not in any way even a remotely contentious point. So far from 'not liking the moniker' I take it as a matter of fact and simply ignore the unsubtle way it was presented.
- no attempt to further the debate by putting forward any scenario of your own in attack or defence of what Chamberlain did.