Unusual results

Uncommon Valor: Campaign for the South Pacific covers the campaigns for New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland and the Solomon chain.

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jmkas
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Unusual results

Post by jmkas »

Had 2 encounters last night that left me scratching my head. Both happened on the same turn....I am playing as the USN.

1. 4 Zeros escorting 14 Vals attack my 2 CVs. The CAP of 50 F4Fs intercept. My CAP only manages to shoot down 4 Vals. The taskforce AA shot down 6 Vals during the attack, and the 4 remaining Vals place 2 bombs on Saratoga.

then:

2. I had 19 P39Ds escorting 6 A20s to bomb Lae - 6 Zeros were flying CAP. I lost 8 P39s and 4 A20s in the air to air while taking 1 Zero down.

I have had many air to air encounters so far in the game with most of the results being what I would consider fair, realistic and within the realm of acceptability....but these 2 were by far the most bizarre and one sided I have ever seen. Did my pilots just have a bad day?
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PzB74
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Post by PzB74 »

This sounds like a very realistic result if you ask me ;)
Most of the time battles go as predicted, but sometimes surprise, experience, fatigue and luck appears on the scene and creates unusual results.

That UV actually manage to simulate this effect is one of the things I find so fascinating about it!

Here is a likewise fascinating story from real life about the last US carrier to be sunk in WWII. The entire Jap cv fleet at the battle for the Marianas failed to inflict any serious damage at all. A few months later a single plane created havoc....

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From U.S Navy - A Brief History of Aircraft Carriers (2003) The Loss of USS Princeton website. Retrieved 10.09.2003 from http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/shi ... 3sink.html

"USS Princeton (CVL 23) is sunk;

Oct. 24, 1944 - USS Princeton (CVL 23) was lost in an air attack in the Sibuyan Sea during the Battle for Leyte Gulf. On the 20th, Princeton, commanded by Capt. William H. Buracker, USN, sent her planes against airfields on Luzon to prevent Japanese land based aircraft attacks on Allied shipping massed in Leyte Gulf. On the 24th, Japanese planes from Clark and Nichols Fields found Princeton and her task group.



At 9:38 a.m. on Oct. 24, 1944, a lookout aboard Princeton spotted a single Japanese plane making a shallow dive on the ship. The plane had come out of low-hanging clouds and while under fire from Princeton's guns and those of other ships in company, dropped a 500-pound bomb from under 1,200 feet. It hit forward of the after elevator and slightly to port of the center line, crashed through the flight deck and hangar, then exploded. Flames shot down to the engineering spaces aft and back into the hangar. The explosion also knocked out the after fire-fighting system. Initial fires soon expanded.


The smoke was very thick and flowed across the after part of the ship. The heat from the fires and he dense smoke forced many of the men on the stern of the ship to jump overboard.



The first major explosions rocked the light carrier at about 10:02 a.m., engulfing the ship in more heavy billowing smoke and flame. The first blew out the after elevator; the second, shortly after the first, buckled the flight deck. The explosions also sent fragments of the ship flying in all directions, causing many casualties.


At about 10:10 a.m., USS Irwin (DD 794) went alongside the burning carrier to port. The seriously injured were lowered from the carrier onto the destroyer. Irwin continued to play hoses into the forward part of Princeton's hangar and to take aboard the carrier's crew to the point where between 600 and 700 men were packed like sardines on the small destroyer's decks.


The Task Force commander, Rear Adm. Forrest C. Sherman, seeing the heavy explosions, dispatched the cruiser USS Birmingham (CL 62) and another destroyer to the Princeton's assistance.


At about 10:55 a.m., Birmingham came alongside the blazing Princeton. Shortly after, USS Reno (CL 96) also came alongside but could not remain due to dense smoke and the scorching heat from the fires. As the crew worked the fires toward the after part of the carrier, Birmingham shifted back there as well. By about 1 p.m., enough progress had been made so that it looked as though the fires might be out within 20 or 30 minutes.


Just as Princeton's fires were about to be extinguished, Japanese aircraft were said to be in the vacinity. Immediately, at about 1:30 pm, Birmingham pulled away to get set for a fight that didn't come. Meanwhile, with very little fire-fighting capability on the carrier, Princeton's blazes grew again.


At 3:23 p.m., as Birmingham approached Princeton for the second time, the carrier's reserve bomb and torpedo stowage blew up, blowing away part of the stern. Shrapnel from the blast ripped across Birmingham killing 229 and injuring 420, far more than those hurt on the carrier.


The injured Birmingham was obliged to back off. Princeton had no fire-fighting capability left aboard, and at 4:40 p.m., Capt. Buracker left the carrier, the last to go. A message came from Rear Adm. Sherman: "Destroy Princeton. Remaining ships join task force." Shortly after 5 p.m., USS Irwin began to fire torpedoes at the burning hulk.


At 5:46 p.m., USS Reno relieved Irwin and at 5:49 p.m. the carrier's torpedo warhead storage exploded. Flames and debris shot up 1000 to 2000 feet. Princeton's forward section was gone and what was left of her after section appeared momentarily through the smoke. By 5:50 p.m., she disappeared. Ten officers and 98 enlisted men had been lost, but 1,361 of her crew survived.


Included in that number was Capt. John M. Hoskins, who had been prospective commanding officer of CVL 23 and had lost his right foot with her. Despite this, Capt. Hoskins would become the first commanding officer of the fifth Princeton (CV 37)".
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"The problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without"
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mogami
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Single Plane attack

Post by mogami »

Hi, Was Princeton the ship that thought the aircraft was friendly?
One USN CV was hit by a lone Japanese aircraft that other ships kept saying was an enemy but the ship that was hit kept saying "Hold you fire it's one of ours" Only I seem to recall this ship was a CV not a CVL.

CAP: I don't think all CAP actually takes part in every combat. The screen will show a number (like 50) but during the animation a portion will never actually get a shot. UV battles seem to use more CAP and Escort then the historic battles. (sometimes producing really screwy results) Check out Coral Sea. Both side lauched strikes with 4 Escorts 9 dive-bombers 5 torpedo planes. They kept launching till they had 78-90 aircraft in the air but the strikes were really little groups. When divebombers arrive overe target if they are not bothered by enemy fighters they circle and wait for torpedo planes. If the enemy fighters get on them they attack and leave. This occurs over and over until all aircraft have attacked, or got lost and went home.

In UV the strikes still often arrive like this but since the players always use more then 2 CV in a hex instead of 12-24 fighters they have to go through up to 150+ (many UV strikes are wiped out. This rarely happened. Even the USN TBD's at Midway were part of a larger strike (that arrived piecemeal) So the entire strike there was not wiped out just the TBD's) As a result if your opponent stacks CV you have to match his stack. And you have to set enough escort to get through the higher then ever CAP. But even then if enough strikes arrive later ones get through easy. (The first strikes are wiped out and then a small strike gets in without damage to attack)
The early tendancy for the IJN to launch large coordinated strikes means they suffer huge air to air loss but still have bombers survive.
The early USN tendancy to launch these packet attacks means their early strike are blown away but then (hopefully for USN) a few of these small late arrivals get to attack. Once the USN learns to launch the attacks the way the IJN does then look out Japan. (huge bloodbaths)
The USN radar results in more of their CAP engaging (and engaging more often)

When both player limit the number of CV in a hex (to less then 4) The battles get a little closer to actual events. (I find 2 on 2 produces unpredictable but close to actual results) The problem of course is the Japanese player wants to avoid historical results. (So he makes those 10 CV/CVL stacks) I don't know what you can compare these battles to.
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Damien Thorn
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Post by Damien Thorn »

Mogami wrote:Hi, Was Princeton the ship that thought the aircraft was friendly?
One USN CV was hit by a lone Japanese aircraft that other ships kept saying was an enemy but the ship that was hit kept saying "Hold you fire it's one of ours" Only I seem to recall this ship was a CV not a CVL.
You are probably thnking of the Franklin. I don't know if they thought the Japanese plane was friendly or not but I know Franklin was hit by a single bomb. She was damaged so badly that they scrapped her when she eventually made it back to the US.
Shaggy
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Post by Shaggy »

Yeah, it was the USS Franklin. I just saw a documentry a few weeks ago. There was a vetran from the Wasp on the show that talked about how they kept radioing the Franklin that the aircraft was enemy and kept getting a reply that it was friendly, until it was too late.
There is only one tactical principle which is not subject to change. It is to use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of wound, death, and destruction on the enemy in the minimum amount of time.

Gen. George S. Patton Jr.
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mogami
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Big Ben

Post by mogami »

Hi, Yes thanks I remember now it was the Franklin. Now was it a bomb? or a Kamikaze?
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Shaggy
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Post by Shaggy »

According to this web site the Franklin was hit by a kamikaze on Oct 30 1944 and then by 2 bombs from a single Japanese plane on Mar 19 1945. It doesnt say anything about mistaking either for friendly planes (Im sure thats something the USN doesnt want to highlight). I believe it was the bomb attack where it happened. Franklin web page.
There is only one tactical principle which is not subject to change. It is to use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of wound, death, and destruction on the enemy in the minimum amount of time.

Gen. George S. Patton Jr.
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mogami
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Franklin

Post by mogami »

Hi, It would have to have been the bomb hits. By date and the fact that Franklin was finished after that. Thanks.
A lot of strange things actualy occuered during the war that give you fits when they happen to you in wargames.
My favorite unreproducable event in WW2 remains the IJN sub that hit 3 USN ships with one spread of torpedos. (Wasp/NC and a DD) can you imagine the howels if that happened in UV.
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Shaggy
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Post by Shaggy »

I recently had 3 (yes 3, I couldnt believe the even tried) RAAF Beaufighters fight their way past 20-30 Jap fighters and attack a tanker, 1 torp hit. So I guess it palances out.
There is only one tactical principle which is not subject to change. It is to use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of wound, death, and destruction on the enemy in the minimum amount of time.

Gen. George S. Patton Jr.
Mike_B20
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Post by Mike_B20 »

Mogami's analysis of carrier battles in UV is spot on.
One of the failings in UV is the mega CAP large CV taskforces can mount in a hex.
Carriers did not launch all their fighters on CAP.
Every hour or two they would turn into the wind and launch small packets of about four fighters and land existing CAP that were low on fuel.
Also, the necessity of turning into the wind to launch/recover aircraft makes the fast movement of CV taskforces while maintaining maximum CAP very unreal.
If a CV taskforce was doing everything possible to maintain maximum CAP (which would never be 90-100%) it's movement would have been drastically reduced.
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