stock torp dud rate

[Zorch]

This may seem like a stupid question, but why didn't the US just copy other country's firing pins?

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Zorch

This may seem like a stupid question, but why didn't the US just copy other country's firing pins?

Actually, Zilch, that's a damn good question. [:D]

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Zorch

This may seem like a stupid question, but why didn't the US just copy other country's firing pins?

Actually, Zilch, that's a damn good question. [:D]

Or they could have kept (or slightly improved) the firing pins from the Mark 10...but that would have been too easy.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: Zorch

This may seem like a stupid question, but why didn't the US just copy other country's firing pins?

The US copied virtually the entire German electric torpedo ... once they got their hands on one.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: Big B
Therefore, I question the validity of a 90 foot drop free-fall test on it's firing pin? It seems to me one would expect forces exerted on that small firing pin to be (far) greater in such a test than would actually be expected in a real torpedo run through the ocean?
Extrapolating this hypothesis - was the Lockwood test actually creating far more failures than should be expected in real world circumstances?

The data Paul Watson extracted from actual war patrol records of hits and sinkings seems to support my quandary - given that his actual hit percentages correlated from 1942 (the highest recorded by the US Navy) - would suggest this.

This is my open question to our Forum members who understand the topic... I'm unsure.
Hey - maybe I'm all wet....I don't know.

It's been a while since high school physics, so I won't test my memory but I'd be surprised if the group that organized the drop tests lacked sufficient engineering knowledge to determine the proper conditions. And the test results led the "experts" at the Bureau of Ordnance to finally acknowledge the contact exploder needed redesigning, which was no mean feat.

It almost sounds like you're wondering whether the efforts to fix the Mark XIV's problems may have led to the torpedo becoming less effective than it was in the first year of the war. Is that a correct reading of your original post?

I read Watson's article. I didn't necessarily agree with the specific hit rates his modelling suggested but there appears no doubt the yearly comparisons between total torpedoes fired vs total merchants sunk do point to 1942 as the most efficient year. Unfortunately Watson appears to be only able to guess at why this may have happened but his suggestion seems valid that the natural learning curve of experience was being defeated by constant expansion of the submarine force through most of the war. In regards to that, it could also be said 1942 had an additional advantage over later years as it was likely the last time that the majority of fleet subs going out on patrol would be ones manned by highly trained pre-war crews. They may have gone to war with less than suitable doctrine but their prior extensive training and technical skillset should (in theory) have given them a jump-start in adapting to wartime conditons.

Personally, I think it's also worth noting that 1942 was the only year when the Mark XIV was being widely used all year with the Mark VI's magnetic influence device enabled. For all its faults, that component of the Mark VI just might have been making more of a contribution than realised to the overall 1942 score, particularly in the latitudes well north of the equator such the waters off Japan where sizable numbers of ships were actually being sunk despite the various issues of the torpedo.

Can't blame the crews for wanting the Mark VI's influence device gone though. Premature detonations and torpedoes circling back with active magnetic exploders don't make for a fun patrol.