USN air combat data from Office of Naval Intelligence

[mdiehl]

Call me confused. I thought this was the WitP suite of threads, not the UV one. I recognize that the one borrows from the other just as they both borrow from GGPW, but I am confused about what game Drongo is providing AARs for and TristanJohn is providing complaints for.

TristanJohn - Your offer is very generous and I appreciate it but my answer remains no. If your contention is that UV bites I will cede the point. I was not impressed by the AARs in the first year after it's release and am unable to comment on whether the sim has been substantially improved.

When I say that I am not certain that there is a major cause for concern in the WitP model it is because I'm not certain that there is a major cause for concern in the WITP model. Mogami's results alpha testing WitP seem within 10% of historical except where large numbers of aircraft are involved, and that seems pretty good to me. It does suggest to me that when large numbers of a/c are launched on a mission (one source, one destination) there may be a substantial problem.

Drongo -

A group of P-38 pilots engage a Oscar flown by hot shot, witness his actions and then return to base to immeadiately come up with tactics which will, of course, bring an immeadiate improvement in not just their own counter-measures but also those of the entire allied airforce (except the poor old wirraway pilots) and will begin having an impact in the very next engagement with any Oscar by any Allied fighter pilot (except those in wirraways). (take breath). Did I read that correctly?

No, you are way overinterpreting. It's not that Oscar or Wirraway pilots can't learn. It's that in most circumstances and adequately trained pilot in a greatly superior a/c will defeat most pilots, even veterans, flying greatly inferior a/c. Going up against an exceedingly good Oscar pilot gives the P38 pilots an object lesson in the one and only strength of the Oscar as a machine. Since the P38 has more than enough advantages to offset that strength, it's hard to see the same P38s being defeated in the same way by an Oscar.

If you could convince me that a Wirraway had a whole suite of advantages over the Oscar such that Wirraway pilot would, using knowledge gained from the experience, exploit the superior characteristics of the Wirraway to negate the Oscar's maneuverability, then I suppose Oscar pilots could learn from this particular experience how to better deal with Oscars, even when Oscars are flown by Japanese top guns or whatever.

Yeah. The viral model for Allied pilots is appropriate. All the anecdote proves is that in one encounter a group of pilots were unable to destroy an Osacr. There are so many other really good examples of the viral learning thing in the Allied pilot anecdotes from multiple sources, that it seems strange to wiggle the whole thing into some generalization. I'd bet dollars to doughnuts that most rookie pilots in P38s shot down the first veteran Japanese Oscar pilot they encountered. The Oscar pilot in the anecdote may well have been the best Oscar pilot in all of New Britain/New Guinea.

And to the other commentor: Japanese dogma, training and tactics were, AFAIC, rigidly inflexible in the face of strong evidence that changes were required. I see no utility for a strong viral model for Japanese learning. The flew three-plane sections until, IIRC, the end of 1943. The doctrine of heroic individualism prevailed throughout the war, even though (IIRC Sakai, among others) front-line pilots complained that new pilots were not being trained to fly in teams. All this despite many fatal lessons inflicted by the Allies starting in April 1942 by the USN and August 1942 by the USMC and USAAF, and steadily deteriorating overall Japanese performance from October 1942 onward.

Do you differentiate between the pre-war trained Japanese pilots and those who came later?

Doesn't everyone?

Lundstrom's analysis of the pre-war Japanese pilots and how they flew (both in the tactical use of the shotai/chutai and in combat cohesion) would not quite match the above description.

I think it pretty closely matches. At no point were Japanese pilots, pre-war or otherwise, as remotely interested in team fighting as the Allied ones. The pre-war Japanese pilots may have been better than post Dec 1941 pilots, but teamwork was not their strong point. Reread the text closely (you seem to have it before you) -- note the repeated observations that Japanese fighters were easily identifyied from afar because of their ragged formations and all the wing-waggling, looping and turning. Cohesion was also adversely affected owing to their lack of radios worth their weight in fuel. Hard to call out to your wingmate without a radio that works.

[mogami]

Hi, I wonder what the impact of losing team members is on overall "teamwork" performance. If pilots train together and get to know exactly what the other pilots will do in combat. What each pilots role in combat is. Where all the other team members will be in any situation.......(more of same type stuff)

What happens when 1 team member is lost and replaced by another pilot. (even one considered trained) Does performance fall by the ratio of new pilots or more? How much influence can 1 new team member have? How long does it take to train new members into the team?

What are the differences in how pilots are trained at school and how they actually fly in combat?

Are some team members impossible (difficult) to replace?

From my limited reading Japanese pilots did stress teamwork. Each member of each group from the 3 man formations up to Daitai level was trained to react in a specific manner. I know people object to using S. Sakai as example. But he claims he never lost a wingman. (I've seen many Allied pilots make the same claim) The wingman had far fewer air victories but then his job was not to chase enemy aircraft but to watch over Sakai. Pilots that had wingmen that went off on their own had a problem.... The 3 plane formation used by the Japanese appears to me to be 1 plane looking for a fight and 2 planes watching over the 'hunter' In UV/WITP terms I think this results in 66 percent more Japanese fighters always engaging. (Not to say the other 2 aircraft never engaged only that they would limit their actions to engaging aircraft that threatened their 'hunter' (As always I over simplify) The Allied finger 4 was much the same only you have 2 hunters and 2 guards.
If a veteran (ACE) pilot flew with a novice-bad teamwork pilot his butt was hanging out much more then if he kept the same man. (They would know what the other would do in any situation)

To outside appearance the Japanese mixing in new pilots might appear a lack of teamwork. (but it would really be poor teamwork from inexperiance) The early pilots did use teamwork. Teamwork only lasts as long as the pilots on the team do. Once you start mixing in new pilots the teamwork goes down the tubes. I think this is also true for allied units. Only they were trained more in what to expect when they arrived in combat groups and had more chance to train together when not actually engaging the enemy. A new Japanese pilot in the team often resulted in the need for another new team member. Once you get whole groups of pilots that have never flown together it really gets bad.

How this was percived by the allies is "Japan stressed individual flying"
But this is only the natural result of the teams breaking down from the loss of members.

[Mike Scholl]

Your post of multiple results in a controlled set of circumstances is what
I'd hoped Mogami would come to. He never quite got there. From what you
report, it would seem the Zero's advantage is somewhat higher than it should
probably be. I would have expected something closer to 1 : 1.25 or so in the
Zero's favor just as aircraft (at 10,000 feet). But at least it's a usable set
of numbers for comparisons. Have you run any others? Be nice to have some
more comparisons. And thanks for the effor.

[Nikademus]

Lundstrom points out, in very specific detail that the prewar Japanese trained extensively in group and team tactics. Their sense of teamwork was indeed strong and their coordination for some of the most experienced units (in terms of working together as well as battle experience) was described at times as bordering on psyhic.

The Kido Butai pilots had radios. They didn't work well but at times, neither did the Allied sets.

the oft mentioned V3 plane element disadvantage was not the case. The Japanese Shotai was not a British "Vic" and did not suffer from it's disadvantages.

The description of 'ragged formations' does not apply to the pre-war Kido Butai formations, nor have i seen this reference for pre-war/early war trained Land based units either. This description does match formations encountered over Guadalcanal in the later stages of the conflict (i.e. well after the decisive period covered by Frank's book) Bergerud called them "gaggles"

[mdiehl]

I agree with Mike Scholl. The loss ratio should be close to 1.25:1 if we treat this as an abstraction of all USMC and USN pilots. If different EXP ratings or whatever are given to USN pilots and USMC pilots, I'd say the results should be 1.5:1 favoring the USN when fighting any Japanese naval pilot, and somewhere from 1.2-1.5:1 favoring the Japanese when fighting against a USMC group. In 1942. Thereafter the state of training of US units as they arrive at the front line should increase until new US pilots EXP levels approach the same levels as veteran, well-trained Japanese pilots.

Nikademus -

The 3-plane formation was not the same as the Vic. It was still a manifestly inferior tactical formation. That is why the Japanese changed it in late 1943-1944. Japanese radios were manifestly far inferior to Allied ones. Does anyone seriously contend otherwise? Sakai threw his radio out of his Zeke because he considered it to be of NO TACTICAL VALUE. Ever hear of an Allied pilot doing that? Psychic powers don't exist. Kido Butai was so superior at mutual support that they lost 1.5 Zekes in face-to-face engagements per 1 F4F (VF based) destroyed through June 1942. That should put Japanese mutual support (something the absence of which Sakai noted repeatedly throughout the war) and tactics into perspective for you if you are at all interested in seeing it the way that I do.

To The Assembled Multitude -

It comes down to this. If we buy the Axis Fanboy myth we are required to believe all of the following:

1. Japanese pilots were superior to Allied pilots by virtue of more extensive training.
2. Japanese pilots were superior to Allied pilots by virtue of extensive combat experience.
3. The A6M was a "better" (wtf that means) a/c than the F4F.
4. As a result of these things a game that simulates WW2 should routinely see Japanese Zeke pilots trouncing their enemies by wide margins in re kill ratios.
5. The undeniable historical evidence to the contrary is to be ignored. Somehow the real world did not reflect the dynamics of the real world.

Now I'm done. My POV is clearly stated and the historical evidence is there to back it up. If someone wants to YET AGAIN 'SUMMON THE FLOATING HEAD OF DEATH' AND INVOKE ABSURD NOTIONS OF JAPANESE ALLROUND PLANE PLUS PILOT SUPREMACY IN 1942 they are free to do so. They're wrong. If that's, however, the driving goal for the "look and feel" for the game that comes out of all this, more power to the guys who find clients to pay for it.

[Nikademus]

The 3-plane formation was not the same as the Vic. It was still a manifestly inferior tactical formation. That is why the Japanese changed it in late 1943-1944. Japanese radios were manifestly far inferior to Allied ones. Does anyone seriously contend otherwise. Sakai threw his radio out of his Zeke because he considered it to be of NO TACTICAL VALUE. Ever hear of an Allied pilot doing that? Psychic powers don't exist. Kido Butai was so superior at mutual support that they lost 1.5 Zekes in face-to-face engagements per 1 F4F (VF based) destroyed through June 1942. That should put Japanese mutual support (something the absence of which Sakai noted repeatedly throughout the war) and tactics into perspective for you.

The Japanese changed the formation because they err'd in believing that the formation could still work properly as long as the lead pilot was still a veteran while the two wingmen could be rookies. They did not change it because it was "inferior" Lundstrom clearly points out in vol 1 that the shotai was not inferior.

The point regarding radios was that they had them. They did not work well but that does not translate to did not work at all, a far more inaccurate statement, esp for carrier planes. Sakai? Sakai was only a pilot remember? you said that long ago and nothing he said was of value. Guess you were wrong on that count USN radios were often redenered useless as well by defects, weather and overload from too much chatter. To say they 'always' worked is equally inaccurate.

I never said KB was superior in mutual support, you just did. I said they were well versed in it. Your statement about your vaunted KR is irrelevent and misleading as it has nothing to do with the topic at hand. Particuarily since if true, the reason for it was due to one action (at midway) Prior to that the Zeros were winning your precious KR fight. Odd that you constantly attempt to downplay the equally lopsided Japanese fighter victory of Aug7 but are perfectly willing to accept Thach's "victory" over a dispersed CAP that had up till then shot down nearly 40 enemy aircraft. Also mutual support does not automatically translate into a positive kill ratio. In case you havn't heard, the mission of fighters is not simply to attempt to kill enemy fighters. It is not the only measuring stick.

Now I'm done. My POV is clearly stated and the historical evidence is there to back it up. If someone wants to YET AGAIN SUMMON THE FLOATING HEAD OF DEATH AND INVOKE ABSURD NOTIONS OF JAPANESE ALLROUND PLANE PLUS PILOT SUPREMACY IN 1942 they are free to do so. If that's the driving goal for the "look and feel" for the game that comes out of all this, more power to the guys who find clients to pay for it.

No, your not done. You never will be. But i am. I only popped in to correct yet another of your distortions, not be dragged into another expanded version of your agenda driven grandstandings. I have read your books, still have all of them (unlike you) and have aquired other sources devoted to the topic. They do not back up your claims and the 'data' you provide is selective, carefully edited and tailored to support your point of view. Thats fine btw. Its what people do when they want others to conform to their POV. What is not fine however is your constant whinings that you and only YOU have the "facts" while anyone who disagrees with you is an AXIS FANBOY attempting to promote some great untruth

Very mature. I look forward to your complaints when WitP AAR's start coming out after the game is released. There should be plenty of material there for you.

[Chiteng]

Much said

Dont feel bad Nick. You are NOT the only person that disagrees with Mdiehl.

We are talking about simulating aircombat. NOT about building a working plane.

Lets see:

Buffalo at the bottom? lets give it a quantitative value of 2 (Arbitrarily)
Nate any better? yes lets give it a 3
Hurricane? Yes lets give it a 4
Spitfire? YES lets give it a 6
Zero vs Spit? seems like Zero would lose on that say 5
Me109? 6
FW190? 8
F4F? 5
B-29? 10

See its easy to make comparisons SIMPLE. It is only hard when you dont wish to.

[Drongo]

Drongo -
No, you are way overinterpreting.

Hard to see what was overinterpreted given the way you worded it.

It's not that Oscar or Wirraway pilots can't learn. It's that in most circumstances and adequately trained pilot in a greatly superior a/c will defeat most pilots, even veterans, flying greatly inferior a/c. Going up against an exceedingly good Oscar pilot gives the P38 pilots an object lesson in the one and only strength of the Oscar as a machine. Since the P38 has more than enough advantages to offset that strength, it's hard to see the same P38s being defeated in the same way by an Oscar.

I completely agree that the P38 as an aircraft had "more than enough advantages" (overall) over the Ki-43. Their is also no doubt that those Allied pilots were wiser for the experience. The question is "could the now wiser group of 4 Allied pilots now automatically be assumed to be able to deal effectively with that Japanese pilot in that aircraft at that altitude and under those same conditions (no surprise, etc)?"

If you could convince me that a Wirraway had a whole suite of advantages over the Oscar such that Wirraway pilot would, using knowledge gained from the experience, exploit the superior characteristics of the Wirraway to negate the Oscar's maneuverability, then I suppose Oscar pilots could learn from this particular experience how to better deal with Oscars, even when Oscars are flown by Japanese top guns or whatever.

Yeah. The viral model for Allied pilots is appropriate. All the anecdote proves is that in one encounter a group of pilots were unable to destroy an Osacr. There are so many other really good examples of the viral learning thing in the Allied pilot anecdotes from multiple sources, that it seems strange to wiggle the whole thing into some generalization. I'd bet dollars to doughnuts that most rookie pilots in P38s shot down the first veteran Japanese Oscar pilot they encountered. The Oscar pilot in the anecdote may well have been the best Oscar pilot in all of New Britain/New Guinea.

Once again, I agree a viral model could be considered as appropriate to represent in a game like WitP and I also feel the Allies would benefit more from it.
It was a big factor in the decline of the A6M.

However, your stated conditions as to how it would work are a bit over the top.

The Ki-43 had been encountered in New Guinea for about 6 months at the time the 2 described encounters occured. The Allies would certainly have also previously encountered the said aircraft being flown by top pilots. Neither of the 2 groups of 4 Allied pilots were fresh out of school and new to the theatre.

Despite what should have been an existing relative wealth of in-theatre info on the aircraft's capabilties and the existence of Japanese hot shot pilots, these two groups had no answer to the antics of those Japanese plane/pilot combinations when they encountered them.

What the viral learning model is not is absolute. The lessons are passed on but they still have to be understood, accepted, absorbed and even then, often need to be repeatedly driven home by both the squadron commanders and the enemy before they have a chance of getting through.

As to your dollars to doughnuts statement, I wouldn't be too confident on that until you see some figures proving the case (but I don't expect that to stop you).

I do know that there are more than enough "embaressing" encounters between P-38 groups and Ki-43s to at least cast doubt on any idea that just flying a P-38 was enough to to ensure an allied pilot emerged victorious.

And to the other commentor: Japanese dogma, training and tactics were, AFAIC, rigidly inflexible in the face of strong evidence that changes were required. I see no utility for a strong viral model for Japanese learning. The flew three-plane sections until, IIRC, the end of 1943. The doctrine of heroic individualism prevailed throughout the war, even though (IIRC Sakai, among others) front-line pilots complained that new pilots were not being trained to fly in teams. All this despite many fatal lessons inflicted by the Allies starting in April 1942 by the USN and August 1942 by the USMC and USAAF, and steadily deteriorating overall Japanese performance from October 1942 onward.

The three plane section (Shotai) was not evidence in itself of the Japanese being rigidly inflexible. Lundstrom gives it the same effectiveness as the 2 man element. Wasteful, yes but it was a capable tactical unit that the pre-war Japanese aviators were trained to use. Given their overall situation, were the Japanese to be considered rigidly inflexible because they couldn't pause their offensive operational tempo to start retraining their frontline airgroups in the use of a new tactical formation?

As to the heroic individual, it doesn't mean such an individual in a well trained, pre-war unit wouldn't have support while conducting his heroics.

I think it pretty closely matches. At no point were Japanese pilots, pre-war or otherwise, as remotely interested in team fighting as the Allied ones. The pre-war Japanese pilots may have been better than post Dec 1941 pilots, but teamwork was not their strong point. Reread the text closely (you seem to have it before you) -- note the repeated observations that Japanese fighters were easily identifyied from afar because of their ragged formations and all the wing-waggling, looping and turning. Cohesion was also adversely affected owing to their lack of radios worth their weight in fuel. Hard to call out to your wingmate without a radio that works.

Do you mean their loose, flexible formations complete with a few of the aircraft being conspicious in their radio-less efforts to draw the attention of his fellows as to the nearby presence of Allied victims. :p

You have to give full credit to the early war Japanese fighter pilots. They had superb radio discipline.

[mdiehl]

Sakai? Sakai was only a pilot remember? you said that long ago and nothing he said was of value. Guess you were wrong on that count USN radios were often redenered useless as well by defects, weather and overload from too much chatter. To say they 'always' worked is equally inaccurate.

I have never claimed that 'nothing Sakai said was of value.' I specifically stated that his claims in regard to victories were of no value, as no pilots' claims are of value, when one wishes to know how many aircraft were actually shot down. I also specifically stated that if one wants to know how to fly a Zeke in combat, his pov has great value. I take it as symptomatic of "Axis Fanboyism" if someone has to make up, whole cloth, entire treatises and conclusions and attribute them to me in order to create a straw man "guess you were wrong on that count" in some sort of childish effort at rhetorical one-upmanship. If that was not your intent, or if you really just incorrectly recalled that I said that "nothing Sakai said" is of value, then I withdraw any implication that you may be an Axis Fanboy and accept your apology for misrepresenting my POV.

I never said KB was superior in mutual support, you just did. I said they were well versed in it.

My apologies to you then. I mistunderstood your comment in its context.

Your statement about your vaunted KR is irrelevent and misleading as it has nothing to do with the topic at hand. Particuarily since if true, the reason for it was due to one action (at midway) Prior to that the Zeros were winning your precious KR fight.

Err, no, the results were about the same at Coral Sea. Collectively that is. I think someone recently posted the Coral Sea results around here somewhere.

Odd that you constantly attempt to downplay the equally lopsided Japanese fighter victory of Aug7 but are perfectly willing to accept Thach's "victory" over a dispersed CAP that had up till then shot down nearly 40 enemy aircraft.

I'm not sure to what event you are referring. In re the events of August I have only discussed combats between 25th AF and the pilots at Guadalcanal, and specifically mentioned that there are two outliers in that data set for 1942 --- one favoring the Japanese and another one favoring the Americans at Guadalcanal.

Also mutual support does not automatically translate into a positive kill ratio. In case you havn't heard, the mission of fighters is not simply to attempt to kill enemy fighters. It is not the only measuring stick.

I'm working real hard to see the relevance. I think I was talking about the desirable objectives for a strategic simulation when the results of repeated air combats play out over a campaign on the order of, say, one to three quarters. And I think I was stipulating that there were certain kill ratios that seemed like a reasonable "target" for the model, however it gets there.

No, your not done. You never will be. But i am. I only popped in to correct yet another of your distortions, not be dragged into another expanded version of your agenda driven grandstandings. I have read your books, still have all of them (unlike you) and have aquired other sources devoted to the topic. They do not back up your claims and the 'data' you provide is selective, carefully edited and tailored to support your point of view. Thats fine btw. Its what people do when they want others to conform to their POV. What is not fine however is your constant whinings that you and only YOU have the "facts" while anyone who disagrees with you is an AXIS FANBOY attempting to promote some great untruth.

One can only hope you are finished. Funny thing about this conversation is that I'm the only one who at any point has posted any facts or any statistical analyses of the historical results. So I suspect your claim to have data that fail to back up my claims is completely spurious. You are, nevertheless, invited to post up your own data here, cite the sources, and explain how your selection criteria for inclusion address the question in which you are interested.

Odd how posting analysis is "grandstanding" when unattributed claims to have contrary information and the blanket assertion of an agenda-driven analysis is not grandstanding. If we both seem to be grandstanding, at least I've stated quite clearly what I consider relevant, why, where the information comes from, and the results of the analyses. What have you contributed to these threads, I wonder, other than lots of whining about whatever you think my agenda might be? It's typical of your behavior around here to try to make me, or some made up secret agenda that you think I may be harboring, the subject of your posts, rather than anything that has to do with the historical events that we're supposed to be discussing.

[Drongo]

Your post of multiple results in a controlled set of circumstances is what
I'd hoped Mogami would come to. He never quite got there. From what you
report, it would seem the Zero's advantage is somewhat higher than it should
probably be. I would have expected something closer to 1 : 1.25 or so in the
Zero's favor just as aircraft (at 10,000 feet). But at least it's a usable set
of numbers for comparisons. Have you run any others? Be nice to have some
more comparisons. And thanks for the effor.

I can plug any aircraft or variation into the test scenario, it all comes down to time and motivation.

Maybe later.

[HMSWarspite]

Let's see, I choose (and oh I so often wonder why) to be hypercritical of a wargame system that doesn't blush when it rates both models of the "Betty" with a durability rating identical to the P-47, and the most incisive dream to pop into your head is that I must be having a "relapse"?

Real sharp, Warspite.

Well, if I am suffering a relapse it's of the all-too-regrettable "here we go all over again with PW II" variety.

I was referring to the style of recent posts, NOT the content

[mdiehl]

Drongo -

The question is "could the now wiser group of 4 Allied pilots now automatically be assumed to be able to deal effectively with that Japanese pilot in that aircraft at that altitude and under those same conditions (no surprise, etc)?"

Well, on reflection that is a very good question. I don't know that they could be assumed to be able to deal effectively or more effectively based on their prior combat experience. But hasn't that sort of assumption been the general thrust of the widely recognized or assumed phenom that a little bit of combat experience really goes a long way towards improving a pilot? Or are we just wondering about how much EXP gain comes from a particularly impressive experience?

However, your stated conditions as to how it would work are a bit over the top.

Maybe so. So how does one implement it. How much gain from the information vuirus? And how does this in-the-field virus differ from gains realized by rotating veteran Allied pilots into training areas? If they're different, then probably there should be some sort of viral model for Japanese learning as well. Just not one that trickles very strongly into the rear areas where training occurs (because of absence of pilot rotation).

Despite what should have been an existing relative wealth of in-theatre info on the aircraft's capabilties and the existence of Japanese hot shot pilots, these two groups had no answer to the antics of those Japanese plane/pilot combinations when they encountered them.

No, no no! That's precisely my point. Was this typical of engagements between P38s and Oscars I doubt it but do not know for sure. Anyone got data? More importantly, if P38 drivers ran into Oscar pilots that were not so skilled, would they learn the sort of impressive lesson that these guys (may have) learned by ecnountering a very skilled Oscar pilot? I guess what I'm driving at is that if the Oscar pilots weren't so skilled then there's no compelling experience to drive new thinking on how a P38 deals with an Oscar. Until the P38s have encountered this particular phenomenon it may seem like there's no particular problem there to be solved.

What the viral learning model is not is absolute. The lessons are passed on but they still have to be understood, accepted, absorbed and even then, often need to be repeatedly driven home by both the squadron commanders and the enemy before they have a chance of getting through.

Yeah, some sort of delay function needs to be part of the thing.

As to your dollars to doughnuts statement, I wouldn't be too confident on that until you see some figures proving the case (but I don't expect that to stop you).

Fair enough. I tend to have a different POV on the plane vs pilot thing anyhow.. I tend to think of pilot skill being less a "continuous" variable than one with a few strong modes. IMO, an "adequately trained pilot who is comfortable with and knowledgeable about his plane" will usually defeat a "highly experience pilot (who is comfortable and familiar with his plane)" if the merely "asequate" pilot has a vastly superior plane. We can imagine that P38s encountered maneuverable Oscars so maybe ought to have solved some of this problem before the anecdotal incident occurred. Of course, if lots of Oscars didn't know that deflection shooting was easier in a P38 (because one did not have to deal with wing-gun convergence) then maybe it took a while for Oscar pilots to know just how reactive they had to be.

I do know that there are more than enough "embaressing" encounters between P-38 groups and Ki-43s to at least cast doubt on any idea that just flying a P-38 was enough to to ensure an allied pilot emerged victorious.

I'm interested. Tell me more.

The three plane section (Shotai) was not evidence in itself of the Japanese being rigidly inflexible. Lundstrom gives it the same effectiveness as the 2 man element. Wasteful, yes but it was a capable tactical unit that the pre-war Japanese aviators were trained to use. Given their overall situation, were the Japanese to be considered rigidly inflexible because they couldn't pause their offensive operational tempo to start retraining their frontline airgroups in the use of a new tactical formation?

Well, OK. But shouldn't that imply that 30 Zekes fight about as well as 20 F4Fs or something roughly LIKE that?

You have to give full credit to the early war Japanese fighter pilots. They had superb radio discipline.

Yeah. And it's a puzzler to me too. Kido Butai flew with radios and good discipline in 1941-1942. 25th AF did not do so well. What's the deal? Better maintenance techs on Japanese CVs than for land based units? More frequent trips home thus more access to spare parts or replacements?

[Nikademus]

Odd how posting analysis is "grandstanding" when unattributed claims to have contrary information and the blanket assertion of an agenda-driven analysis is not grandstanding. If we both seem to be grandstanding, at least I've stated quite clearly what I consider relevant, why, where the information comes from, and the results of the analyses. What have you contributed to these threads, I wonder, other than lots of whining about whatever you think my agenda might be?

no you told Drongo that your opinion matches well with Lundstrom. You are incorrect. Lundstrom does not support your statements that the Japanese lacked teamwork and that their basic formation was "manifestly inferior". You also made two misleading and inaccurate statements regarding Japanese radios and the condition of Japanese flight formations. Feel free to recheck the book out of the library and look it up. After that we were all treated too yet another synopsis of your entire POV complete with the AXIS FANBOY myth tag. An unnecessary and unsucessful distraction attempt. You can keep claiming you how much data and source material backs you up. Whether or not the data or the source 'actually' do so is another question entirely. :p

[HMSWarspite]

Since people have asked for more and tighter tests,
this is a 4 x 10 set of test results using the current WitP Alpha.

Situation -
2 bases in adjacent locations to minimise additional fatigue and "operational" losses on an attacker so as to give a better balanced test. No radar.

2 squadrons of F4Fs (24 each) vs 2 squadrons of A6M2s (set to 24 each).

Both side's squadrons have identical leaders (60 leadership and 60 skill), squadron experience (60) and experience spread (ie both range from 50 to 70 experience with the majority being 55-65 - no hot shot pilots present). Both side's squadrons have 99 morale and 15 fatigue. Both sides tended to end the day of combat with a squadron average of around 10 fatigue, regardless of who attacked who.

Engagement conditions - weather always clear, altitude for all is 10,000 ft. % are set so that 36 a/c will engage 36 a/c, one side defending against the other sweeping. Test is restarted from scratch after every combat.

Results (all losses show shot down only, no damaged):

1) A6M2s defend
Losses:
Jap US
1 for 7
0 for 5
4 for 7
3 for 7
0 for 2
1 for 0
5 for 3
1 for 1
1 for 3
2 for 5
*******
18 for 40
*******

2) A6M2s defend
Losses:
Jap US
5 for 7
6 for 4
4 for 4
2 for 5
2 for 4
6 for 4
2 for 6
7 for 4
1 for 3
2 for 5
*******
37 for 46
*******

3) F4F-4s Defend
Losses:
Jap US
3 for 2
4 for 2
1 for 7
2 for 5
2 for 4
2 for 5
6 for 1
6 for 2
2 for 0
1 for 3
*******
29 for 31
*******

F4F-4s defend
Losses:
Jap US
3 for 6
3 for 5
2 for 4
2 for 5
1 for 3
4 for 3
3 for 4
3 for 5
2 for 6
2 for 5
*******
25 for 46
*******

Final total
***********
109 A6M2s shot down for 163 F4F-4s = 1.5 : 1 in favour of the A6M2 when no apparent advantage is present for either side.
***********

The points have been made as to the ratios, but the numbers of kills here bother me. Averages for each set of 10 are (IJN/US) 1.8/4, 3.7/4.6, 2.9/3.1, 2.5/4.6, for an overall of 2.7/4.1. The standard deviations are 1.76/1.86.

I have a few issues: I think an average of 4 losses (or 17%) is too high. On 6 occasions, one or more sides lost more than 25%!
2.7 losses might be better (ignoring the ratios here). The fact that the SDs are similar means that the spreads are similar, but the mean is up for the US. +/- 2sd is approx 3.5 in both cases: this means that the distribution of IJN losses are between -0.7 (=0) and c6.2 (actually 7). The US losses distribution is 0.5 to 7.5 (actually 0 to 7 - i.e. somewhat skewed or rounded!).
If you want the same ratio, I would suggest the US losses should be closer to the IJN level (2.7+/-3 or so), and the IJN 1.8+/- 2 or so). It should be rare (unless the loser is totally outclassed in equipment or tactical factors) to lose more than 25%.

My figures all relate to shot down, not damaged/op losses.

The above is subjective, and I am open to having my views demonstrated to be inaccurate. However, any air unit losing more than 5% per day on any regular basis will surely suffer from horrendous moral. 25% means you have only just over 10% chance of lasting a week (amongst equal skill pilots). Even WW1 thought newbies lasted 21 days!

[TIMJOT]

I'm not sure to what event you are referring. In re the events of August I have only discussed combats between 25th AF and the pilots at Guadalcanal, and specifically mentioned that there are two outliers in that data set for 1942 --- one favoring the Japanese and another one favoring the Americans at Guadalcanal.
.

He is refering to the engagement on August 7th when 9 F4Fs of the VF-3 & VF6 flying CAP over the Lunga invasion force, were lost in air to air combat vs. the loss of 2 Zekes of the 1st Tinian. I personally never seen you mention this encounter in your calculations, although you do mention a VMF Bouncing incident in late August it is always with the caveat that it was "Bounced" and it should thus be treated as an aberration.

That being said, I personally dont have a problem with Kill ratios in the range of 1:1 to 1.5:1 and vis versa in mid 42. With vairable chance for occasional outlayers for both sides.

[Nikademus]

He is refering to the engagement on August 7th when 9 F4Fs of the VF-3 & VF6 flying CAP over the Lunga invasion force, were lost in air to air combat vs. the loss of 2 Zekes of the 1st Tinian. I personally never seen you mention this encounter in your calculations, although you do mention a VMF Bouncing incident in late August it is always with the caveat that it was "Bounced" and it should thus be treated as an aberration.

That being said, I personally dont have a problem with Kill ratios in the range of 1:1 to 1.5:1 and vis versa in mid 42. With vairable chance for occasional outlayers for both sides.

It wasn't a singular "bounce" Only the first part of the engagement was, conducted by 5 A6M's and they were VF's

[Nikademus]

The points have been made as to the ratios, but the numbers of kills here bother me. Averages for each set of 10 are (IJN/US) 1.8/4, 3.7/4.6, 2.9/3.1, 2.5/4.6, for an overall of 2.7/4.1. The standard deviations are 1.76/1.86.

I have a few issues: I think an average of 4 losses (or 17%) is too high. On 6 occasions, one or more sides lost more than 25%!
2.7 losses might be better (ignoring the ratios here). The fact that the SDs are similar means that the spreads are similar, but the mean is up for the US. +/- 2sd is approx 3.5 in both cases: this means that the distribution of IJN losses are between -0.7 (=0) and c6.2 (actually 7). The US losses distribution is 0.5 to 7.5 (actually 0 to 7 - i.e. somewhat skewed or rounded!).
If you want the same ratio, I would suggest the US losses should be closer to the IJN level (2.7+/-3 or so), and the IJN 1.8+/- 2 or so). It should be rare (unless the loser is totally outclassed in equipment or tactical factors) to lose more than 25%.

My figures all relate to shot down, not damaged/op losses.

The above is subjective, and I am open to having my views demonstrated to be inaccurate. However, any air unit losing more than 5% per day on any regular basis will surely suffer from horrendous moral. 25% means you have only just over 10% chance of lasting a week (amongst equal skill pilots). Even WW1 thought newbies lasted 21 days!

I'd say your viewpoint is fairly on. I've noticed from the days of UV that air combat results have tended to be a bit on the high side vs the estimated results i've read, particularily from Frank. Odd to read for example that in the biggest single airbattle over G, that only some 3 (possibly 4) G4M's were shot down in total. Given the #'s involved, and the lack of protection of the bomber, you'd expect something bloodier.

As battles get larger, results tend to be bloodier. However the results i got in my last 4 on 4 CV match up were not what i would have considered too far off the edge of expected results.

Ironically.....in a way, the old 2.0 UV did have some good points, frustrating as it was......even with very large CAP's you couldn't expect them to decimate the attacker as with what tended to happen with PacWar. In the end though it was too anemic and you could never formulate a real defense against air attack

But i did like the uncertainly it generated. It made you be alot more careful.

[TIMJOT]

I agree with Warspite, the kill ratios seem close enough at this stage. Lets not quibble over what comes after the decimal, but as Warspite states its the number of aircraft being shot down on both sides that is troublesome IMHO.

[mogami]

Hi, Could the fact that all groups used in the tests are 99 morale produce these high loss rates? The lower a groups morale the more likely it is to abort/break off combat. These high morale units might all be too eager to fight. I don't think any unit in WWII actually had what we call 99 morale. I think good morale would be 70-85 with normal moral 50-65 and low morale below 50 (but I'm just guessing)

I do know it is very hard to maintain morale. In my Scenario 1 test (the long campaign) The airgroups I sent to Malaya had morale below 20 in less then 1 week (and they were winning their air battles)(units recover morale faster in WITP with good leaders. These same groups would go from 16 morale to 64 in 2-3 days of rest)

[TIMJOT]

It wasn't a singular "bounce" Only the first part of the engagement was, conducted by 5 A6M's and they were VF's

Nikademus,

I am a little confused. I know of the VF Vs Zeke battle on August 7th, which was what I was pointing out. Mdiehl aways refers to another incindent in late August between a VMF vs Zekes that was lopsided in favor of the Zekes. Personally I am not familiar with that encounter, perhaps he can give us a little more insite on it.