News from Heroes and Leaders mod

[asl3d]

Malfunction Japanese MGs

As even these supplies ran out, the use of substitutes like pig-fat as a lubricant only added to the list of woes, jams and misfires. From a technical viewpoint, Japanese MGs not only looked wrong, but performed badly; the Year-11 Type LMG's complicated feed mechanism could not cope with a high ROF and needed oiled rounds to ensure proper spent-round extraction, and to guarantee even a modicum of reliability the power of its 6.5mm cartridge had to be reduced (such that it could not use the squad's normal, rifle, ammunition rifle, except in extremis) with a corresponding deterioration in ballistic performance. The "laboratory" mentality of Japanese (among other) designers relying on oiled rounds ensured that under field conditions these became excellent dirt-collectors to further promote jamming and accelerate component wear. Yet the aging Year-11 Type's replacement, the Type 96, never superseded its predecessor as supply never equalled demand—and it still required non-standard, low-powered cartridges (oiled of course). In addition, the low-power telescopic sight and the bayonet were extravagant "extras" of doubtful utility that Japan's ailing industries could have done without having to produce. The bayonet made the weapon resemble a giant can-opener. The Type 96's solitary improvement over the Year-11 Type was the quick-change barrel. The Type 99 LMG finally dispensed with the need for oiled rounds, but was rather heavy for its role and, despite appearing in 1939, was built in relatively small numbers; by default it was Japan's best LMG—but demanded a new, rimless, non-standard 7.7mm round.

[asl3d]

Japanese heavier MGs

With heavier MGs, the old Year-3 Type (aka "Tashio 3") of 1914 vintage was the root of all subsequent mechanical woes in Japanese MGs; a copy of the Hotchkiss, but rechambered for the small, nontapering 6.5mm round which (unlike the bettershaped French 8mm Lebel round) compounded extraction problems even with oiled rounds, it had a lour ROF (hence the Allies' "Woodpecker" nickname) and the 30,ound strip-feed (as well as the heavy, 122-lb tripod) were bad features. Like the 20mm ATR, at least three men were needed just to move the thing. The 7.7mm version, the Type 92, became the "standard" Japanese MMG—in name at least—with all the Year-3 Type's faults, but with a better long-range performance. To augment this advantage, the Japanese also used a 7.7mm Lewis MG (also styled the Type 92) with, of course, different—incompatible—ammunition to the Type 92 "Woodpecker", and a lighter version of the latter, styled the Type 1, was introduced in 1942 with a changeable barrel but firing the later-pattern 7.7mm rimless cartridge used in the Type 99 LMG. The Type 1, like the Type 92 Woodpecker, only supplemented (rather than replaced) the Year-3 Type. In the HMG category, the 13.2mm Type 93 was a copy of a Hotchkiss AAMG with a 30-round box-magazine. Not surprisingly the Japanese later attempted to copy the US Browning designs to obtain a belt-fed MG; and in due course 7.7mm, 12.7mm and 13.2mm versions appeared (albeit mostly for aircraft use) with a few (officially) available for ground deployment. Consequently, the ever-resourceful Japanese stripped such weapons from wrecked or unserviceable aircraft and improvised mountings for a ground role with, usually, great success. To complete the Japanese quartermaster's nightmare, a host of captured weapons (like the Bren, BAR, Dutch-owned Madsen, Chinese-built Maxim and ZB, and other types) were pressed into service.

[asl3d]

Japanese AT weapons

Compared to the other participants of World War 2, the Japanese were badly equipped with infantry-held AT weapons. Only the emergence (literally) of the Tank Hunter Hero in scenarios set after 1943 partially remedies this major shortcoming. Apart from its weight, the 20mm Type 97 ATR had a savage recoil, poor sights and shoulder-controlled traverse which made it hard to hit moving targets; so, not surprisingly, it was unpopular and rarely used in action. This was probably just as well, given its inability to deal with even the early versions of the Stuart, let alone the Lee/Grant or Sherman tanks.

[asl3d]

Japanese mines

Apart from the ATR and other, improvised, small-calibre weapons used in the AT role, Japan (for want of anything better) relied on a hodge-podge of "hand-held" devices to combat Allied armor-like "Molotov cocktails", the ineffective Type 3 shaped-charge grenade, the somewhat rarer glass cyanide-gas grenades (some improvised from bottles) to incapacitate enemy AFV crews or force them to bail out (which were developed from a rare instance of German cooperation) and the magnetic Type 99 AT mine. More effective were booby-trapped obstacles and the "lunge mine", a large SCW mounted on a long pole and used like a human-powered panzerfaust, which on making contact with a solid object would destroy its user too. Unlike many Japanese AT weapons, this last device could destroy any Allied AFV used in the PTO. Less effective were bombs or artillery shells issued to otherwise unarmed personnel deployed in foxholes or bunkers to await an enemy vehicle driving overhead (for a time the Allies attempted to destroy the formidable Japanese bunkers by crushing them from above with tanks), AT shells stuffed into walls as makeshift AT guns, buried gasoline drums and the human version of the Soviet mine dog. In desperation, Japanese soldiers with or even without weapons would sometimes swarm over Allied AFVs and attempt to block the vision devices, fire into vision slits or climb inside. Not surprisingly, a typical "exchange rate" for tank hunters against AFVs protected by infantry (as at Meiktila in Burma in March 1945) would be about 200 Japanese losses for six or so Allied tanks.

[asl3d]

Japanese mortars

The Japaneses has a significant edge over his opponents only in the light mortar category, which is not surprising, given that the typical Japanese infantry battalion had between 27 and 36 of these weapons—whereas the most generous Allied allocation was 12 (for the British, and then only in the most favored four-company TO&E used by but a few units early in WW2). However, the margin of Japanese light mortar superiority is still more theoretical than real because the effectiveness of such small-calibre weaponry is at best patchy. At ranges between 60 and 200 yards, the Japanese Type 89 mortar actually fired grenades (which were less than perfect), while at ranges between 130 and 711 yards shells were used. The WP round was a grenade while the smoke round was a shell, and Japanese grenades were time-fuzed rather than impact-fazed (and thus had no air-burst capability in the game sense) and required the attachment of a propellant container before firing, both of which slowed down the rate of observed fire. Balanced against its poor features, the Type 89 had an excellent range for its weight compared to its foreign equivalents since Japanese designers had taken pains (including rifling the tube) to give their mortars the heaviest projectile for the lightest propellant charge (only the heavier Polish 46mm and Soviet 50mm types outranged it).

[asl3d]

Larger-calibre Japanese mortars

The larger-calibre Japanese mortars are the more common, "standard", examples; in the case of the 81mm and 90mm weapons, they represent some of the better (and lighter) members of a larger family. Why both 81mm and 90mm calibres were adopted beggars understanding, and only illustrates the poor coordination and haphazard approach of Japanese weapons procurement. The effects on logistics were, needless to say, unfortunate. The 70mm Year-11 Type was a heavy contraption totally unsuited to the PTO's terrain which offered no advantages over the smaller, newer, and longer-ranged French or US 60mm (or even the British 3-inch) mortars; given that the latter was no paragon, it says little for the Japanese weapon. Not included a few Japanese mortars that saw relatively little use: the 81mm Type 99 intended for paratroop or commando-type actions, the Imperial Japan Navy's crudely-made 81mm Type 3 which used baseplates salvaged from 90mm Type 94 or 97 mortars (another instance of non-standardization/cooperation between the Imperial Japan Army and Imperial Japan Navy)

[CHINCHIN]

Thank you for illustrating us in such detail! [&o]

Where do you get so much information from? [X(]

[asl3d]

ORIGINAL: CHINCHIN

Thank you for illustrating us in such detail! [&o]

Where do you get so much information from? [X(]

This first part has been based on several articles published in the Annual (Avalon Hill) and Journal (Multiman Publishing) magazines. When I start to publish the scenarios, all the sources consulted will appear, similar to Partizani and Grossdeutschland.

[asl3d]

Improvised designs of 1945

The improvised designs of 1945 comprising light smoothbore tubes fixed to wooden blocks (these fired just once, using black powder as a propellant and were as inherently user-unfriendly as they were inaccurate). The Japanese also used whatever captured equipment they could find ammunition for, and although the employment of mortars was restricted to non-dense jungle terrain, their comparative lightness, inherent simplicity, ease of operation and of maintenance made them particularly popular with the Japanese troops. Whereas most armies regarded mortars as fairly inaccurate weapons, the Japanese quickly won a reputation for using them with great skill. Their enthusiasm for mortars (perhaps rivaled only by the Soviets) was just as well, given the steadily waning artillery, armor and air support available once Allied numerical and qualitative superiority began to make itself felt, While they are not weapons per se, it should also be mentioned here the trenches, pillboxes and tunnels (as well as of caves for 1944-45 scenarios).

[asl3d]

ORDNANCE

Like most Italian ordnance, Japanese artillery pieces (almost without exception) resembled, or even were, museum exhibits from the Great War and by Western standards long obsolete, being largely horse-drawn or (in the case the heavier guns) towed by slow unarmored tractors. Japan avoided the time and expense of keeping abreast of foreign design by copying first German Krupp and then French Schneider products which, generally, sufficed for use in the Chinese theater. On the positive side, Japanese ordnance of a given calibre was usually lighter, with a similar or better range than its foreign equivalents—although not necessarily by a margin that was tactically very significant. In addition, Japanese fire con-trol equipment (i.e., sights and range-finders) were of good to excellent quality (AA guns excepted) although in most cases no better than Western types. Most sources praise the remarkable little 70mm Type 92 infantry gun in particular, it was easy to move and conceal, and was one of the best weapons of its kind ever made.

[asl3d]

Antiaircraft guns

On the debit side, Japanese ordnance retained obsolete features like trail or "driven" spades (flat metal stakes hammered into the ground to anchor the gun), which slowed down position changes and partly offset the enhanced mobility that the relatively low weight of Japanese artillery promised. Japan was also slow to adopt modem features like muzzle-brakes (to reduce the recoil) or split trails (permitting greater barrel elevation), the latter first appearing on the 105mm Type 14 field gun delivered in 1925. Moreover, copying the French Schneider designs was unfortunate, for their sophisticated recoil system demanded higher manufacturing tolerances and standards of maintenance (especially on the 75mm Type 90 field gun) than Japan could achieve. The light construction of Japanese ordnance compounded matters, leading to recoil malfunctions or other failures when firing at extreme range or near she limits of traverse. The LTA's antiaircraft guns were obsolete by Western standards (with an inferior performance) because it foolishly refused to adopt the Imperial Japan Navy's often better weapons—again a wasteful duplication of effort—and antiaircraft fire control systems were out-dated (though irrelevant in game terms).

[asl3d]

Japanese antitank guns

Japanese guns had lower safety factors than foreign weapons, which partly explains the formers' better performance-to-weight ratios. The 105mm Type 91 field howitzer was crudely finished, while the 75mm Type 88mm gun was "virtually hand-built" from parts that needed extensive machining. Some 70mm Type 92 guns captured by the Americans on Bataan had non-interchangeable small pans, further revealing the patchy quality of Japanese ordnance manufacturing. But perhaps the greatest weakness in Japan's artillery lay in its antitank guns, which lacked any penetrative power. Although versatile (the 37mm Type 94 probably saw more action as an infantry support rather than as an AT weapon), these guns were the typical products of designers who assessed their AT requirements on the basis of their own AFVs. The excellent sights on the 47mm Type 1 gun were no real substitute for inadequate performance or its late combat debut and general rarity. The failure to produce something more powerful was a major blunder, forcing Japanese gunners to attempt deliberate immobilization against the heavier Allied AFVs or the use of suicide tactics "tank hunter" squads. Unlike most foreign AA guns, the Japanese versions were not especially potent AT weapons either. HEAT (a German technological import) is generally scarce and most guns have only a mediocre AP performance, while the high-velocity 120mm and 140mm naval guns are excellent tank-killers but can be deployed only in certain locations, are static, and have no gunshields.

[asl3d]

Shortage of ammunition

As with smaller-calibre munitions, the quality of Japanese projectile design and materials used, as well as the storage and packing, was usually inferior to foreign practice. It is therefore no surprise that Japanese artillery was plagued by duds, instances being noted as early as Layac on Bataan in 1942, and as late as on the Mycbong Peninsula of Burma its January 1945 (where 19 of 21 shells fired on one occasion were duds). Another major handicap was the shortage of ammunition, due to Japanese logistical weaknesses mentioned earlier and the harsh PTO terrain; again, throughout the war there were serious ammunition shortages in all combat areas, even during the early campaigns when raw materials, transportation and stockpiles were relatively plentiful. In addition, Japanese artillery suffered from poor-quality signalling equipment and emphasis was placed on wire rather than radio communication. Radios were, technically speaking, four to six years behind their Western equivalents and were noted for the complexity of their controls and the difficulty netting them in and keeping them on frequency. Although Japanese telephone wire was lighter and easier to lay in the PTO terrain than Allied wire (and one Chindit officer always used Japanese wire in preference), even on Bataan early in the war such wire was so scarce that reliance was made on the civilian telephone network and on an observation balloon to simplify communications. Moreover, the PTO terrain made wire-laying difficult, just as it and the climate interfered with radio communications. Terrain also made the spotting of targets, one's own fire and the detection of enemy batteries difficult.

[asl3d]

Japanese artillery doctrine

Japanese artillery rarely fought in the way reflected by its regimental TO&E, and there was little attempt at controlling the fire of grouped formations beyond two or three adjacent batteries, so that the massing of guns was comparatively rare. Japanese artillery doctrine evolved in China, where heavy preparatory fire was seldom needed, since the mere possession of heavier ordnance was enough to cow Chinese warlords into passivity without the need to actually fire it. The Imperial Japan Army placed great emphasis on using artillery as a direct supporting arm, "shooting-in" attacks under the direct control of local infantry commanders after a short (if any) initial barrage. Heavy pre-arranged fire was seldom required, and the PTO terrain militated against massed artillery deployment on land. The Allied experience was similar (but not identical), and even the British-ablest exponents of massed fire techniques-were usually unable to concentrate their artillery fire in the way they did elsewhere in the world.

[asl3d]

Japanese mobility

The Imperial Japan Army employed massed and lengthy artillery fire for only a few specific assaults, as on Bataan, Corregidor, Singapore, or in the defensive banks on the Irrawaddy line in Burma—or on Okinawa (where much ordnance intended for the Philippines had accumulated by default due to shipping problems). Okinawa was probably the scene for the Imperial Japan Army's heaviest artillery barrages of the war as a result. Given that Allied counter-battery fire even on Bataan (despite numerous handicaps there) was excellent, this was probably a wise decision by the Imperial Japan Army since concentration invited heavy losses, as on Okinawa.
Although the PTO terrain made sophisticated artillery techniques difficult, the Imperial Japan Army did at least deploy units to detect hostile batteries, although vegetation made flash-spotting or sound-ranging very difficult. Thus counter-battery fire was not an outstanding feature of the Imperial Japan Army. What the Imperial Japan Army was noted for was its ability to move guns often and rapidly in very rough terrain, its enthusiasm for using guns as very close-range direct support weapons (despite the horrendous casualties among their crews that this caused), the willingness of gun crews to launch their own banzai charges and, like tank crews, thus sell their lives cheaply, the great skill with which guns were concealed or camouflaged (after some painful lessons learned on Bataan) or quickly moved out of danger into caves, bunkers or back down reverse-slopes, and the sometimes unconventional deployment of guns (like the 5-inch naval guns sited on the second and third stories of a hospital in Manila).

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Killing grounds

Not surprisingly, Japanese troops showed a greater willingness to advance through their supporting fire despite heavy losses than most Western troops (Soviet forces excepted), and commanders would not hesitate to put "friendly" fire down onto Japanese positions regardless of their own casualties therefrom. The Japanese also used their artillery pieces with great cunning and imagination, AT guns usually being cleverly sited in killing grounds (with land sometimes flooded to channel enemy armor onto the guns and/or tank-hunters), and some targets would be deliberately ignored in favor of catching more lucrative victims. The Japanese would often time their artillery fire to land while enemy shells were passing overhead to give the impression that the Allies were themselves victims of "friendly" fire and they often handled guns like snipers; for example, shells would be timed to arrive at meal times when Allied personnel were bunched together, or a few shells would be fired intermittently over a long period (ranging by stealth) to imitate random, nuisance, fire before a heavy barrage was unleashed when a good target presented itself through Allied laxity or when the range to a previously ignored target had finally been found by this method. A few rounds onto unsuspecting targets (before switching fire elsewhere to avoid counter-battery fire) were often more deadly than massed fire that just drove Allied units to seek cover, and suited the Japanese predicament very well in circumstances where the Allies had air and artillery superiority with plentiful ammunition, whereas low Japanese stocks demanded more restrained and astute use.

[asl3d]

JUNGLE WARFARE

The word "jungle" originates from the Sanskrit word jangala (desert or wilderness) and encompasses a whole range of terrain varying in density from region to region. Lighter rainfall tends to produce heavier, denser undergrowth, since the thinner "canopy" of treetops allows more light through (as in coastal Burma, Indo-China or the West Indies); while some of the thickest jungle, with less undergrowth, is found in Malaya, that in Burma and India being thinner. Secondary jungle (land cleared of all growth but then allowed to grow wild again) has undergrowth that is almost impenetrable, and a rate of advance of barely 100 yards in 60-90 minutes through this was about the norm. In comparison, combat, reports state that thick bamboo in the highlands can be penetrated at the rate of about 250 yards in 110 minutes, and on Bataan thick bamboo even deflected .30-cal. MG fire. Even without the enemy to contend with, progress through jungle could be very slow; moving just 600 yards up a clay slope in New Guinea required 17 hours. On Guadalcanal, it was estimated that the average speed of infantry on a jungle trail was a mere one mph; if off the trail, using machetes and bayonets to Cut through the undergrowth, a rate of half that speed considered fast. Such movement rates, moreover, apply only to healthy personnel, and whereas troops unencumbered with sick or wounded personnel could cover anything between four and 15 miles per day (depending on the exact nature of the terrain and weather), a similar journey with less healthy personnel could take nine times as long. The use of native guides (employed by both sides whenever possible) could reduce travel times. dramatically; with their superior local knowledge of obstacles or short-cuts, Papuan guides in New Guinea, for instance, could shorten a 36-hour journey to as little as 45 minutes!

[asl3d]

Navigational problems

The absence of landmarks or accurate maps made it easy to, literally, walk around in circles, and the Japanese were as prone to this as their enemies. Due to false economics, many British maps were printed in only two colors, whereas their Japanese copies used more for greater clarity and detail; it was difficult to determine where the jungle ended and paddy fields began on the former, or to establish which streams were seasonal and which were not. (This ambiguity led to a serious water shortage at Indaw in Burma, for instance, resulting in its loss to the Japanese.) Navigational problems were also compounded by the limited visibility in the jungle which masked otherwise prominent features; at its worst in New Guinea, the mist sometimes made it difficult to see even one's own hand, let alone an enemy five yards away. In Malaya, visibility could be as little as a yard or at most 25 yards, increasing only in hilly terrain to 50-100 yards. In Burma, visibility around Kohima was about five yards; on Bataan, about ten. Apart from the vegetation blocking vision, the absence of natural light also proved a problem, and in one particularly vivid description a veteran talks of the "state of semi-twilight", "the nearest to night fighting that troops will get during daylight". Reconnaissance patrols hiking through dark, rough jungle frequently over-estimated the distance they had travelled, leading to many problems in calculating march time for larger combat formations.

[asl3d]

Immunity

The jungle was made all the snore unpleasant (not to say terrible ) by its natural hazards, which the gloom or total darkness aggravated. Even Pacific beachheads had inanimate dangers like razor-sharp coral or rocks and potentially lethal five lb coconuts falling 60 feet to the ground, while elsewhere there were cactus hedges, deadly thorns or other plants to inflict lacerations, along with flash-floods, swamps and falling trees (an average of one falling within earshot every 36 hours; at Cape Gloucester the US Marines lost 100 men to falling trees). There was also parasitic growth to which humans as well as plants were vulnerable, turning an insect bite or a scratch into something potentially lethal. A British officer in Malaya observed that although cuts or bites rarely became infected initially—when new to the jungle—this immunity did not last long. Troops also had to contend with a whole host of unfriendly creatures: amoebas carrying dysentery, ferocious ants, killer-bees, spiders, typhus-carrying mites, malarial mosquitoes, snakes (including Burma's hamadryad, which chases and attacks humans) and leeches that attempt to enter any orifice and ae able to draw a pint of blood in one feed. Larger horrors include crocodiles, tigers, the aggressive and unpredictable Malayan water-buffalo, and wild elephants.

[asl3d]

Diseases

Mite, jungle or scrub typhus was then incurable and generally fatal, while malaria was a major scourge, even with medicines. Quinine, for example, was scarce; in late 1940 an embargo on supplies to Japan left her with only small stocks, and from January 1942 only front-line Japanese personnel on Bataan received doses (while on Luzon the invaders had but a month's supply). By March 1942 there were thus 13000 Japanese non-battle casualties of Bataan, while US troops there also suffered from a quinine shortage and stocks had run out by 29 March, so that 600 men per day were contracting malaria with a 7-10% fatality rate. Because Java (which soon fell to Japan) was the main quinine source, the Allies also experienced shortages in New Guinea and in Burma; before anti-malarial discipline was enhanced, the annual infection rate reached 84% of army strength in 1943 (even higher among combat troops). For every man wounded by the Japanese, 121 were laid low by disease. During the New Guinea rainy season sickness rates reached 10% of total strength per week! The Allies introduced quinine substitutes like Ambrine and Mepacrine, which was just as well since experience showed that quinine, by suppressing the symptoms of malaria, actually helped spread the disease if a carrier became a blood donor. Mepacrine turned the skin yellow and the Japanese spread rumors about other unpleasant side-effects, but Allied measures to enforce its intake, plus strict rules about clothing, reduced the malarial sickness rate to just one per 1000 in 1945, while the ratio of wounded-to-sick men fell to 1-to-20 in 1944 and to 1:6 in 1945 among British units in Burma. Even so, the XIV Army there had 20000 malaria cases between July and November 1944, compared to just 49 men killed in action. And of the 88500 men on strength, no less than 47000 became sick and required evacuation. During the fighting on the Tiddim Road the British 9th Brigade lost only nine men KIA and 85 wounded to the Japanese, but 507 from sickness.