ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
No. I'm the one producing evidence - like wiki articles
warspite1
Okay let’s deal with this another way because you are not getting it. We’ll take the Wiki article first because that, in terms of your credibility, is clearly the most damaging. I mean we can agree/disagree on what may or may not have happened and that is fine and all part of the fun of debate. But what is more concerning is how you see ‘evidence’. Case in point – you produced this Wiki excerpt. You’ve produced this one paragraph from one Wiki article and produced this as ‘evidence’ of what Japan would definitely not do – even though the circumstances changed! That is the height of narrow minded, limited thinking.
Furthermore, within the Japanese high command there was a disagreement over what to do about the Soviet threat to the north of their Manchurian territories. The tipping point came just after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in late June 1941. With the Soviets tied down, the high command concluded that a "strike south" would solve Japan's problems with the United States, most notably the increasing American concerns about Japan's moves in China, and the possibility of a crippling oil embargo on Japan.
What is this saying? It is reflecting what happened in real life, it is saying that because of Barbarossa, any concerns Japan had about going south were swept away because there was no threat from the Soviet Union. Since posting you have metaphorically been jumping up and down in a state of high excitement at the sentence in bold. Because what you have decided, without bothering to actually think about things, is that this MUST mean, it HAS to mean, that no Barbarossa means no invasion of the FIC, which means no embargo, which means no NEI requirement – I’m the winner, I’m the winner!!
But what you haven’t done is to give that comment any…. well, any thought really. Which is all a bit disappointing. And I’m not being unkind here. You have evidenced just how little you understand by the constant back and forth on the NEI invasion. It’s like you’re listening to the last thing that is said to you and simply disagreeing with whatever that was. Remember at the heart of all this is that we know that Japan took the disastrous decision to go to war with Britain and the US. We know why the Japanese felt it was their best course of action. In deciding to change that decision in this alternate scenario you need to make a good case. You want Japan to make a different decision because you think it helps Germany. But sorry, that is not good enough. The Japanese are not working for the Germans no matter how much you believe it so.
Japan has a number of problems. She won’t quit China. I know you struggle with the whole FIC thing but please, its not that difficult. The Japanese invade FIC (in limited fashion) in September 1940. This led the US – already embargoing certain key goods from sale to Japan – to adding even more materials including iron and steel scrap. The embargo of strategic materials was hurting Japan, but the US stopped short of oil
for the moment. But Japan knows that Roosevelt can turn the screw at any time by adding oil to that ever growing list…. We know in real life it was Japan’s second move on the FIC that led to the oil embargo, but the point is, it doesn’t have to be that.
By that I mean with the German victories growing and a real threat that the UK (and later the USSR) will be defeated, they may realise a more urgent need to have the Japanese neutered. This thinking would comes into even sharper focus if the Germans take the Middle East and there is then a pincer threat to India. As was pointed out right at the very start of this debate, one of the many problems with debates like this is that proponents of an alternate path allow whole manner of better outcomes for the Axis, but then don't allow the Allies any room to manoeuvre over what they did in real life. It just makes the whole exercise pointless.
Like Germany with Britain, France and the USSR, Japan has a bit of a lead over the US (or at least she thinks she has) because Japan cheated on the Naval Treaty’s and the US didn’t build its full quota. The IJN started mobilising a full year before the oil embargo. But since the end of the 1930’s the US have taken the gloves off. They will also be reinforcing the PI from 1941. Roosevelt is starting to gear up (at least he has a brain and a realistic vision unlike many of his countrymen doing their best ostrich impression).
So Japan is involved in a war in China that is hugely expensive and, like all wars, costly in resources. This is a war that is not coming to a conclusion any time soon, they are hampered materially with an ever growing list of embargoed items that their military need, and the US are building up for war and negating any lead the Japanese currently have.
So? Well, we know what the Japanese did because Barbarossa took place – ohhh thanks Wiki! – but in your scenario, 1941 Barbarossa doesn’t take place. But Japan still has choices to make. Now you've hummed and ahhhed about what decision Japan will take and depending on what was last said to you, you’ve changed your mind on the NEI. But your latest change of direction (I feel like a weather vane in a storm) is that there is no invasion of the NEI.
And so according to you it is sensible that Japan won’t do anything (I mean don't get me wrong, even this nonsense is more sensible than the 'let's attack NEI alone from bases we don't have' routine. but it still doesn't make sense).
Apparently, despite the fact that its obvious the Soviets are only concerned with what is happening in Europe, the Japanese won't have the brain capacity to deduce that the lack of any Soviet threat is unlikely to the point of almost nil chance. But regardless, and quite unfathomably, that is Japan’s policy in your scenario. She knows all the problems she faces (outlined above) but according to you she will gamble that the embargo won’t be critical until June 1942 (even though Japan doesn’t know with any certainty there will be a 1942 Barbarossa or that Germany will win), she will gamble that the US, ever more concerned with Axis victories, won’t apply an oil embargo, she will gamble that Japan is still in a position to take advantage of UK/US/NEI ‘weakness/unpreparedness’ when she does need to do something because her reserves position has become so dire and she will gamble that she still has an edge over the USN despite the announcements made by the US in 1940 around construction.
In other words by doing nothing she
will gamble that all these things (which spell disaster for Japan) won't happen, but she
won't gamble that the Soviets wouldn't attack even though they only have eyes on what Germany are doing because they are being hemmed in from Petsamo to the Caucasus.....[8|]
Yes I know you have a nice warm feeling about the Wiki article – but now take off your blinkers and try and actually put yourself in Japan’s shoes in autumn 1940…. Just play the numbers game. Why would the Japanese set so much store by Soviet intentions given everything going on, while completely ignoring her own economy and her own military? Given the arguments for and and against, do you
really believe you have enough to make Japan not take her historical route?