The question to ask about The Italians

[warspite1]

So where are we in debating this Med-First scenario?

I think we need to bring the focus back to Spain as this is where Hitler’s revised campaign all kicks off.

Those pesky islanders

But first we need to understand what exactly the Germans have planned in Northern France and why? This is vital as we can't know what response the British could reasonably be prepared to make without this. The British can reasonably expect an invasion is coming after France falls.

BUT

Sorry but it is not enough to plonk a few army divisions, some Luftwaffe units and some barges in and along the Channel coast and expect the British to assume, forever, that an invasion is imminent. That won't wash - but more importantly from the German perspective, simply leaving the UK alone makes absolutely no sense whatsover, none at all. So what does that genius Goering come up with as he pushes the claims for his Luftwaffe to be the service that wins the war?.....

German rationale

I think it is clear that Hitler, taking the decision to invade his nominal ally, is really pushing the limits of plausibility, but we've gone with it - perhaps Hitler became so convinced that a Med first was the way to go, he got into one of his major strops when the ungrateful Franco refused to play ball.

Vichy

Petain and Vichy are not unhappy with this development - after all they are likely to lose territory if Franco comes in as a willing participant.

Italy

UP844 has raised some excellent points as to why such a move is problematical for Italy and I think we will assume that there is no participation from Italy (Germany don't need it - any help would be a Mussolini vanity project like BoB and the Eastern Front). We can rightly conclude I think that having a German puppet in charge of Spain is NOT good for Italy but what can he do? Mussolini will do nothing - but like with the catalyst for the attack on Greece, he is probably seething at this move. In a bad mood already, and not helped by a Gonorrhoea inspired episode, he tells Graziani to get moving with the attack on Egypt or he's going to get a red hot poker placed where the pain will be considerable.....

The Germans

It would also be good to get an idea of the size of force the Germans would consider necessary. What we can know (because of Felix) is what the Germans considered necessary for the assault on The Rock – have you seen the number of artillery regiments?! (but that comes later). Ahead of that is the need to defeat and then subdue the Spanish.

We also need a consensus on a reasonable timing of the Spanish operation. I’ve given my personal thoughts on this and that the attack - at its most ludicrously optimistic (for the Germans) – can’t be before mid-August (and that is pushing it but agreed in the interests of give and take – does anyone have any data on the state of the panzer forces at the end of Case Red?).

In terms of start date I think anything earlier is moving too far from reality. One only needs to see the quotes from such as Warlimont and Manstein to know that the Germans simply had no idea what to do after France.

Warlimont refers to a “Morass of uncertainty”, and headquarters planning became “woolly, aimless and paralytic”

Manstein famously said “When the head of a state or a war machine has to ask himself “what next?” after his military operations have far exceeded his expectations…one cannot help wondering whether such a thing as a war plan ever existed on the German side”.

Thoughts?


I believe the book I'm waiting on won’t be here until toward the end of September, which is annoying, but there is plenty to be discussed in the meantime. In particular I continue to get snippets of info on the French-Spanish rail line. As I think we've already established, there was one line into Spain but the gauges were different so everything coming from France required loading, unloading in France and loading again (at Irun) after being transported, before it could make it’s onward journey. The line ran through San Sebastian on the coast and then southwest to Burgos and south to Madrid. The road through the mountains to Roncesvalles (northeast of Pamplona) was too narrow and twisty for tanks so everything, according to this source (the German ambassador to Spain), would have to go via San Sebastian.

Interestingly perhaps, much of the rail tracks between Bordeaux and San Sebastian are on the coast and so open to night bombardment from the RN.

So with all rail links going through Madrid, the Spanish have a focus for defence – not only because Madrid is the capital, but also because of its importance as a transport hub.

[warspite1]

The Spanish

I'd be interested to know what various games have as the Spanish starting line up in the summer of 1940. I will post what I can find in terms of an OOB. We've discussed the obvious limitations of taking any game data, but this can hopefully give us a feel for how many men, in how many divisions (and other formations) the Spanish can field.

[RangerJoe]

Spanish order of battle but not the actual strengths:

http://www.niehorster.org/080_spain/__spain.html

Army:

10 infantry divisions in Spain plus 1 cavalry division, 5 armoured regiments, 44 artillery regiments, 6 anti-aircraft regiments, 3 bicycle infantry regiments, infantry regiments at naval bases, plus a couple of engineer regiments and other units.
http://www.niehorster.org/080_spain/40_army/__army.html

The Spanish Air Force:

This includes the numbers and types of aircraft. The important thing would be the trained pilots, especially if they got into Hurricanes and Spitfires - or even P-40s . . .
http://www.niehorster.org/080_spain/40_ ... force.html

[RangerJoe]

The panzer divisions would need about a six week maintenance cycle to overhaul transmissions, check the rest of the power train and replace anything needed replacing, replace worn track, check the wear on the main gun tubes and replace if necessary, train replacements, and so on. Remember that a lot of this would be depot level maintenance, they can do only so many at a time, and spare parts may not be on hand. This is not including any quarterly type service that is needed.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: UP844

Mussolini was NOT persuaded to join Barbarossa: he decided to take part in the Crusade against Bolshevism as soon as he became aware of Hitler's intention to attack the USSR

It definitely wasn't his idea. So...he didn't just do his own thing. For whatever reason, he could see the merit in plans formulated by Germany.

warspite1

Can I ask where you get your facts from? You have got so many wrong during this debate its staggering.

As has been pointed out to you already, the idea of putting Italian troops on the Eastern Front came from Mussolini. Indeed Hitler did not want the Italians help and actually scaled back the troop numbers Mussolini suggested (the initial Italian force was approx a corps).

It was only when things started going horribly wrong and Hitler was desperate that he asked for more troops (what became 8th Army).

So yes, it was Mussolini's idea.

No. Barbarossa was not Mussolini's idea.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: UP844

@ Curtis Lemay:

I think you are missing a point: over 75,000 Italian "volunteers"(*), including a great number of Fascist Party leading figures, fought with Franco in a war depicted as a "Crusade to free the Very Catholic Spain from the Godless and Atheist Bolsheviks". The 180° turn from "Francisco Franco, brother in arms and saviour of the Faith" to "Francisco Franco, enemy of the Empire" would have, as a minimum, affected the morale and effectiveness of any troops sent to Spain, even though they were limited to a garrison role.

(*) as in "Congratulations! You have just voluntereed to join the fight in Spain!"

This did not occur for France (and the fight was very brief, anyway); as for Poland, Italy never declared war on it, as has it already disappeared in 1940.

As regards to Austria-Hungary, it was a sort of "natural enemy": Italy fought three wars of Independence (in 1848-49, 1859 and 1866) against Austria-Hungary, and at the start of WW1 some north-eastern regions still belonged to the Austrian Empire (this was the main reason Italy entered WW1).

Let's see... Italy is perfectly ok with going to war with Catholic countries (Austria-Hungary, France), joining wars that have already conquered Catholic countries (Poland), joining protestant countries in wars (Germany), and is not being asked to attack Spain, just occupy it. Clearly this isn't the middle ages any more.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

No. They didn't have to do anything that urgently. Because what they did didn't solve China at all.

warspite1

Yes, yes they did.

China was solved by the Japanese in WWII?!! I must have missed that.

No - not at all. There is no point going further with this because it is just the same back and forth. So we should progress Europe instead.

It's just opinion in the end, yours vs. mine and Wikipedia's.

[Curtis Lemay]

I want to go back to the supply capacity of rail lines, since that continues to be questioned (I don't recall just where at the moment).

Recall that I said a 36 division CCF force in Korea needed only one train per day - from SPI's Korea wargame notes.

Now add that SPI's Campaign for North Africa game had this note: Rommel needed 60,000 tons of supply per month in 1942. I don't know for sure if that included the Italians or just the Germans, so I'll assume only the Germans. That would be two panzer divisions and two motorized divisions (plus a few minor units, but for this purpose, I'll assume just the four divisions). So, assuming an Army Group is 32 divisions, I'll multiply that by eight (never mind that that will be 16 panzer and 16 motorized - no foot infantry) to a total of 480,000 tons per month.

This article gives the cargo capacity of 1940 era trains as 4440 tons each (60 cars per):

http://www.quorumcorp.net/Downloads/Pap ... erview.pdf

So, that works out to 108 trains per month or about 3.5 trains per day.

This article on route capacity:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Route_capacity

Gives an upper limit for freight trains as 15 per HOUR. It is inescapable that a single rail line has incredible freight capacity. Whatever force the Germans put into Spain or Turkey, one rail line will be far more than sufficient to supply it.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay



It definitely wasn't his idea. So...he didn't just do his own thing. For whatever reason, he could see the merit in plans formulated by Germany.

warspite1

Can I ask where you get your facts from? You have got so many wrong during this debate its staggering.

As has been pointed out to you already, the idea of putting Italian troops on the Eastern Front came from Mussolini. Indeed Hitler did not want the Italians help and actually scaled back the troop numbers Mussolini suggested (the initial Italian force was approx a corps).

It was only when things started going horribly wrong and Hitler was desperate that he asked for more troops (what became 8th Army).

So yes, it was Mussolini's idea.

No. Barbarossa was not Mussolini's idea.

warspite1

Well that response certainly brought the thread down. Well done Curtis Lemay. Well done [8|].

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

No. They didn't have to do anything that urgently. Because what they did didn't solve China at all.

warspite1

Yes, yes they did.

China was solved by the Japanese in WWII?!! I must have missed that.

warspite1

And. Again. Well done Curtis Lemay. Well done indeed [8|].

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

It's just opinion in the end, yours vs. mine.

warspite1

Exactly, and that is why you using the Wiki article as some sort of proof to try and evidence what Japan apparently couldn't do in a completely different scenario is so completely unfathomable.

[RangerJoe]

Maybe we should either create or edit a Wikipedia article to state that a certain someone has their head up their rectal oriface. That then is proof that it is there. [:D]

[UP844]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

This article gives the cargo capacity of 1940 era trains as 4440 tons each (60 cars per):

http://www.quorumcorp.net/Downloads/Pap ... erview.pdf

The article is perfectly correct, but it has a not-so-small flaw: it refers to US railroads. For the 1940s, it assume a 180,000 lbs gross capacity per boxcar: this implies an axle load equal to 45,000 lbs/axle. Current (2020) allowed axle loads in Europe range from 22.5 to 25 metric tons (49,600 to 55,100 lbs) per axle; in the 1940s 15 metric tons per axle would be a realistic assumption, especially outside Germany, France and Britain. Moreovere, 2-axle railcars were the norm in that age.

So, the average railcar would have been able to carry approximately 20 metric tons (44,000 lbs)

Forget 60-car trains: this is a short train in US practice, but European railways do not have the very long sidings of US railways. The theoretical current standard for freight trains is 750 meters (~2,500 feet) and was about half this size in the 1940s. On the other hand, few locomotives would have been able to haul a 60-car trains, especially on steep and winding mountain lines (even though the Spanish Railways had some of the most powerful steam locomotives in Europe).

The maximum size for a freight train should have been 25-30 cars, carrying 500-600 tons (550 to 660 short tons).

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

So, that works out to 108 trains per month or about 3.5 trains per day.

480,000 tons per month @ 660 tons per train means 24 trains per day, not 3.5 (and another 24 trains coming back), i.e. 48 trains per day. I seriously doubt a single line mountain railroad could absorb such traffic.

[UP844]

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

So all of this discussion does not answer the question of how to actually help improve the Italian military achieve Little Bennies objectives.
I don't think that the Germans could have provided enough of their own equipment for the Italians as they were also providing some to other countries plus had their own equipment deficits.

As far as I know, the Germans provided Italy with:
- a sizable number of aircraft (100 Ju87s, 100 Me-109 in 1943 and others in 1944-45 to the Republican Air Force, a few Me-110, Ju88 and Do217);
- some radar and sonar sets for Regia Marina units;
- some 75mm Pak 97/38 to the mountain divisions in Russia (the only guns that could destroy a T-34);
- a few (most sources say 12) PzIIINs in 1943, which they promptly re-captured, as they were assigned to the Black Shirts "M" Armored Division ("M" stands for Mussolini and, despite the wishful thinking of some hierarch, it was not the equivalent of an SS Panzer Division).

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

Some German engineering assistance and possibly retooling some Italian factories to produce some German equipment that the Italians needed could have helped, such as more powerful tank engines.

This could have been done and was actually done for aircraft engines: Alfa Romero built the DB601 and DB605, which turned the mediocre Macchi 200 fighter into the much better Macchi 202 and 205, respectively.

I will investigate the issue, but I think the Italian industry was uncooperative on this subject.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Italy...............is not being asked to attack Spain, just occupy it.

warspite1

Well yes, because there is such a massive difference isn’t there? I mean in the former the invaders are fighting and killing in order to overthrow a country’s leaders and install a regime freindly to their own, while the occupiers are fighting and killing in order to maintain that regime against the will of the people. I mean yes, its completely different isn’t it?

[Aurelian]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_o ... t_in_Spain

During the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s the railway network was extensively damaged. Immediately after the war Francoist Spain nationalized the broad gauge network, and in 1941 RENFE was formed. Narrow gauge lines were nationalized in the 1950s, later being grouped to form FEVE.

It took many years for the railway system to recover from the war; during the 1950s it was common to see intercity express trains hauled by 100-year-old steam locomotives on poor worn-out track.

https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/ ... ystem-1939 is a map of the major rail lines in Europe in 1939. Only 1 major line crosses into Spain.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/ ... ystem-1939 is a map of the major rail lines in Europe in 1939. Only 1 major line crosses into Spain.

warspite1

That is strange. The line showing is not the one mentioned in the books I've read (this refers to the line on the coast that runs from Irun to San Sebastian and then onto Burgos and Madrid - and this does not cross into Spain as the gauges are different). There is no line to the east of this that crosses from France - this is supported by the SPI map that Curtis Lemay provided. I think the link above is incorrect.

[TulliusDetritus]

That rail line is the one you mention, simply a rather bad quality map. So backwardness would sort of complicate German operations, yes, of course. This does not invalidate Lemay's point. To think a devastated and backward state could pull an efficient and successful defence and then a 1808 in 1940 is errr a *wishful tinking* which I don't buy for a second.

It's simply not worth it. Remember the Roman Empire maps? An odd thing when you look at the British Isles. Scotland is out of the empire. When the legions could have captured the area in two or three evenings. Or much bigger Ireland for that matter.

Simply not worth it: when utter poverty and backwardness are a good shield.A bit like Spain in this what if imo.

[RangerJoe]

The trains would cross from Vichy France into Spain, I don't think that the map with major rail lines is incorrect.

The Spanish defense would probably not be successful but it would be costly.

[TulliusDetritus]

The map is more or less correct. The rail line should be *west* (or Basque country) of the franco- spanish border, not south (the map), via the mountains into Aragon region.