Weapon R&R and production

[Brady]

P. 152:

"Japans well concived subsidy programs of the 1930's created a healty growing shipbuilding industry"

" At no time during the war did the Navy not occupy at least 30% of the Comercial shipbuilding capacity"

" All told comercial yards launched a total of 738,747 tons of war ship's during the war years, 50% more thant he navy yards produced"

" Warships were 5 to 6 times more time consuming than Merchant ships to produce"

" 2 million tons of comercial shiping are estimated to of been lost due this practice"

"Japanese yards actualy launched 393,118 tons in 1942,...But production skyrocket to 1,097,103 tons the next year and peaked at an impresive 1,603,430 tons in 1944."

" their were, howaever, some other factors worthy of partial credit for the unexpectedly high wartime productivity of Japans shipyards. Heading the list was the standardization of various merchant ship designes. With an ey towards the obvious advanatages of compontet interchanabality, simpler construction, and increased efficiency through repation."

" The standard designs included 5 freightors types, rangng from 530 tons to 6,400 tons, three tankerts, from 1,000 tons to ,10,000 tons and a 5,400 ton ore carier, all nine crused at 10Knots or more, (the large Tanker could steam efficently at over 16 knot's), all could do at maximum 3 knots better."

" later in 44 the standard desings were reworked for better spead and larger engines"

It should be noted that these ships were by comparsion structuraly inferiour to prewar designs often having single bottoms as aposed to the double bottoms of prewar designs, 3 out of every four wartime tons launched were of a standard design. The engines were also troublesome, the degree of which depended on the Ship type, some were worse than other's. Howeaver most of these ships were used int he private sector, the Navy and the Army used the Better prewar ships for their own use as much as posable.

Tanker production was given top priourity during the war, from a low of 55,000 tons in 1942 the tanker tonage produced jumped to 930,000 over the next two years, furthermore the yards converted over 400,000 tons of cargo vesals to tanker use at the same time. Tanker production remained virtualy uneffected whenever material shortages manifasted themself's since other production was stoped in leu of continuing tanker production.

[Brady]

It should also be noted that in an effort to maintain the maximum number of ships at sea during the first two years of the war all maintance was for the most part stoped except in case of emergancy, so by the time late 44 came around many ships were in dier nead of servicing, this obviously having more to do with how they were used and abused rather than any designe faults inhearent in their design's.


A note on woden Hulled ship's: A signafagant percentage of the Japanese merchant fleat tonagae was made up of this type of ship (aprox 14%), these ships were again of standaradised types, ranging from 100 tons to 250tons, they were buitl throught the empire. In 1943 54,710 tons were launched, in 1944 254,420tons were launched. Launching's out side of Japan contrubited another 100,000 to 200,000 tons anaualy to the beformentioned figures. for an aggragate of aprox 354 to 454,000 tons of woden shiping in 44 alone.

So are these ships represented in WiTP?

[Mike Scholl]

From:

The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II by Mark P. Parillo Naval Institute Press ISBN #: 1-55750-677-9


p.xiii " When the war began the merchant fleat was relatively new and efficient"

p.16 "private yards undertook the bulk of the navy's construction programs....in the mid 1930's warship construction divirted much production capacity from merchant ship building...in the last full 5 fiscal years before the war comercial yards built an average of 400,000 tons of warships anualy."

It is estimated that hundereds of thousands of tons of comercial shiping could of been compleated in leu of this due to the fact that comercial ships are much easer to buld than Military one's.

p.37 Prewar japanese estimates put the nations prewar shiping neads at 5.9 millon tons, the civilian ecenomy would nead 3 million tons, the army would require 2.3 million tons for the first 6 months but only 1.1 their after, the navy would require 1.8 million tons throught the war.
Providing Japanese estimates of the nations shiping neads were accurate , adaquate shiping existed for all these roles.At the time of pearl harbor the merchant fleat amounted to 6.4 Million tons, this was in adation to aprox. 12 million tons of wodden vessals."

While you are correct that Japan had increased her production of Merchant
shipping by about 500% during the Thirties, which substantially lowered the
average age of the shipping, I'd have to question the validity of the claims
that Japan started the war with adequate shipping. In 1941 almost 40% of
Japanese cargo was carried in foriegn bottoms. The figures you quote for
Japan's own shipping are accurate enough---but she needed over 10,000,000
tons to meet her needs in the last year of "peace". So she was "short" even
then.

The figures you quote for what the Army and Navy would have to have to
begin the war also seem accurate. But the 4.1 million tons of shipping would
be taken from the civilian usage at the same time that most of the "foriegn
bottoms" were lost to he as well (she managed to sieze slightly over a million
tons in the first months of the war). And neither the Army or the Navy ever
"returned" any of the "borrowed" ships during the war---but instead continued
to demand even more shipping as the war went on.

And while I'm sure you're right that Japanese Yards could have built more
merchant shipping if they hadn't been building ships for the Navy---I don't think
the Japanese Navy could in any way be described as "over-sized" for the task
facing it. Someone had to build those ships for the navy, and with the possible
exception of the Yamato's, those ships were needed (and for that matter given
the shortage of "escorts" quite a few more would have been usefull).

And while the ships themselves may have been relatively new and effecient,
Japanese shipbuilding was not. Even under the pressures of the war it was
taking them between 18 and 24 months to complete all but the smallest ships;
this while the US was building larger vessels in a month or less. And it was used
most ineffeciently as well, averaging less than 75 miles a day in service and
often sailing empty. It seems the game will give the players the opportunity
to "improve" on the effeciency---which alone should improve their supply
abilities over their historical performance.

[Brady]

"I'd have to question the validity of the claims
that Japan started the war with adequate shipping"

Now acording to the book these were figures generated by the Japanese themselfs, but studies done by the US pointed to a greater nead being nessessary to maintain their ecenomy, the Japanese felt that had enogh shiping on hand but estimates made during the war by the US said otherwise, the primary concern by all parties in Japan (Army, Navy, Civilain) was the tanker issue, while the building of merchantmen in general was defentaly steeped up Tankers as sighted above were realy given the top priourity and built in substantial number's. End the end howeaver as we all know the buildings did not meat the atration of the sinkings, and when the Philipines were lost everything changed in this regard (tankers). Throught the war the increased production did increase the number of ships in civilian use for example, the Military controled aprox. 70% of the tankers during the beging of the war but by 1943 50% of the tankers were back in civilian hands.


p.59 " The 1930's witnesed marked ecenomic as well as military improvements in Japans marine industries. Annual shipbuilding tonnage surpased the 100,000 ton leval in 1934 and reached 442,382 tons three years later. In fact by 1937 the shipyards were employing 3.1 percent of the Japanese labor force and supplying over 5 percent of the nations privatly produced capatol goods. Japan by then had over one hundered ways, a third of them longer than 500 ft, with a yearly construction capacity of 900,000 ton's. These facilitys accounted for 10% of ship construction world wide in 1937 twice that of the US"

p.60 "The enginering know how in Japanese yards was expanding. Probably the most eloquent testimonial to this was the willing of the Soviets, the British and others to place orders, including some warships at Japanese yards."

p. 166 "Their can be no question that standardarazation stimulated tonage production beyond what would have otherwise been acheaved. The standard 6,600 ton cargo vessal, for example, averaged ninety days from keel laying tooutfiting in 1942. But during the course of the war, Japanese yards turned out 121 of these vessals, and so the delevery times droped impresively. One yard even managed to finish one in 36 dyas."

[Mike Scholl]

If, as you maintain, the Japanese had adequate shipping of their own; then
why were they paying for the use of over 3,500,000 tons of "foriegn bottoms"
during 1941? Imports were DECREASING due to Allied embargos during the year,
yet the Japanese (whose economic resources were already stretched) had to
hire foriegn ships to move cargo. And this is basically BEFORE the Army and the
Navy grabbed up over 4 million tons for war use. The book you quote certainly
sounds interesting, but some of it's "facts" just don't seem to match up to
reality very well.

One of the things that might account for the descrepancies is the point
you made about the figures being based on Japanese "estimates" of what they
would need. Since ALL their pre-war "estimates" proved to be on the woefully
short side (wrong about how many pilots they would need, about how many
aircraft, about how much oil, about how many escorts, etc.) you could be
quoting a book who's author is quoting original documents---and still be WAY
OFF in reality! The Japanese High Command/Government had a capacity for
self-delusion they seemed to exercise freely and often.

[Tanaka]

Hi, While we are still in Alpha so the final amounts of oil/resource/fule/supply that Japan needs to move have not been finalized. I have not yet ever had a problem having enough shipping.

I send 1/3 of the total to Shanghai and never use it for any purpose (This is the Japanese civilian shipping)(750,000 load points)

There are 3 types of transports

AP These are troop ships (prewar liners and such) and AK. AK are the cargo ships that move supply and resource. Tk tankers move oil and fuel.

The danger is mainly with tankers. There are under 100 tankers at start. (2 sizes 9k and 16k)

The IJN can always use oil centers to fuel, but if oil stops moving to the heavy industry centers they stop producing supply. Without supply.....well you know what happens. (Heavy industry needs both oil and resource to produce the points that run the rest of the Japanese industry as well as fuel and supply)

So it's not really AK or AP that Japan really will need. It is tankers and then only if the allies can sink enough of them. But I will not be able to give accurate accounts untill Beta after all industry and resource/oil are finalized.

Will there be any way for the Japanese to build more tankers than it had historically or are we stuck with only the originals?

[Brady]

I dont realy maintain personaly that they did historicaly have enough shiping considering how they used it, but that initialy the Japanese flet they did have enough, since the use of the shiping was to be largely tempoary, but most of the shiping was never realy returned in suficient quantaty to realy make up for anything and further demands were made during the war which despite contined production did not make up for lost shiping in the private sector, the realy interesting thing is if you look at the forces available and how you as a gamer would deploy them, much better use could and will be made of Japanese shipping resources in a WiTP scenario by players left to manage this aspect of the game.
Their is a good solid base of shiping in raw tonnage, a great base of reliable well designed and capable merchant hull's who's efficenty is second to non, and their is a good private shipbuilding base to continue to produce tonage during the war. Depending on how WiTP models any of this could drasticaly effect how this all works and raises many question's. Most of the best yards in Japan, the most efficient were taken up production wise by Navy order's, just changne one of them to produce Merchant hulls could have a big impact on availabe tonage in the game, that is if were are allowed to actualy build more Hull's than existed. Their is a lot of potential hear for a gammer in the grand stratagy of this all, and I am very intrigued by the prospect of it all.

p.74 "withen three weeks of the incedent that precipated open war with china in July 1937, the imperial Army had already drafted 450,000 tons of merchantmen. The army continued to do divert shiping from the private sector, and eventually commandered over 600,000 tons as well. Thus, the military had drafted about 1.5 million tons from the merchant fleat by 1941, but the magority of these vessels were small, shallow draft craft for convershion to auxillary gunboats and coastal transport's. The many riverine campagines in china asorbed little besides merchantmen of neglable value as ocean freihters, all that changed however when the campagine switched to the deep pacific."


" The drafting of nearly 4 million tons of merchantmen left under 2.5 million tons, only 1/3rd of all of Japans transport capacity, to suport private industry. Even this dismal picture is worse than it apears, because 840,000 tons of the shiping left under civilian controle were pasanger vessels ill-suited for cargo transport.some studdies rated the remaing merchant fleet as the equilvent of 1,600,000 tons or even lower, an entirely insuficent ammount by anyones reckoning. Freighter tonage in civilan hands is a better index of the maritime transport capacity available for industrail suport, and this figure never toped 2 million tons. Indeed it was plunging toward the 1-million mark by Novembere 1943."


Another interesting and as yet to be comented on aspect, is the Woden huled shiping, which as mentioned represed a very large part of the Japanese merchant fleat, some of which was sidelined do to a lack of small diseal engine's which powered them, somthing taht could be further tweaked in the game considering how many yards all over the empire were building them.

[Brady]

The posabailtys are stagering if you think of it, increasing the ship building of merchant hull's would translate into greater resources availbe in the home islands and thus potentialy increase the production capacity of Aircraft factories, or more Ships, at larger yards, ect, but if were restricted in how many types or units we can produce, ie keeping it restrained to historical levals then I realy think a big part of the games potential is wasted to a degree hear.

I would like to be able to compleatly micro manage all of this, change production at certain yards to build certain ships and types of ship's, to keep making Subchases of a certain class beyond the nymber actual built if I want ect.

[Mr.Frag]

Brady, for what you want to be possible, we'd really need to start WitP back in the '20s or earlier.

Currently, there are 2 BB's that are not available to Japan when the war starts and about 5 CL's for various reasons. Apart from various conversions and completions in the CV/CVL/CVE catagory, Japan pretty much starts the war with her entire navy already in play.

There are lots of smaller ships that come into play during the war, but apart from that, there is nothing else.

Just to understand, heres some plan dates for various classes:

BB's
Yamato 1937 (not in the game at start)
All other BB's are 1916 or earlier designs that were upgraded from time to time.

(Just for humor sake, it appears that the Kongo was built in the UK in 1911)

CA's
Tone class 1934
Mogami class 1931
Takao class 1927
Myoko class 1923
Aoba class 1923
Furutaka class 1923

As you can see from the dates, while there were lots of refits and upgrades performed, one simply did not dispose of a capital ship. It is amazing that the Yamato and Musashi were even built by Japan as they must have consumed a huge proportion of the country's steel production to do so.

(my dates may be off somewhat, tough to find good info on Japan's stuff)

[Brady]

All I am sugesting is that the Ship yards be able to switch from producing Naval units and be able to produce Merchant unit's, eschinaly seting aside a naval prodject in favor of Merchant hulls if the player chuses, since :

P.153: " Since the navy utilized only the Nations most productive shipyards, the damage done to merchant ship production y this extensive warship construction goes beyond the simple tabulation of yard capacity diverted. The navy's use of hte Kawasaki yard at kobe and the Mitsubishi yards at Nagasasaki and Yokohama illustrates the point. They were not only the three of the 5 largest shipyards in Japan but also three of the most efficient. They acomplished nearly one third of the nations shipbuilding effort during the war, with only 1/7th of the countrys way length and 1/4th of the total floar space and employies. Between 1937 and 1943 the Navy assigned to these three yards three cruzer's, one battleship (Musashi), and 9 CV's. By 1941 these yards were launching Merchantmen at just 29% of their 1937 rate. Even though most of these heavy Naval units had left the ways by 1943, the yards were producing merchant ships at half the national average."

Merchant ships were way easer to produce as we have seen from above the standaradised merchant types could be quickly produced and the effort to finish anyone of the Naval untis would of resulted in a substantial freeing of resources to that end, not to mention the fact that Civilan yards built almost all the sub's and the Lighter Naval units as well produced during the war.

In short again all I am sugesting is that as the player we be allowed to run how Japan uses it's Shipbuilding resources to the extent that we can produce whatever units we want and the Civilain yards providing their of course large enough to do so, the substantial production results acheaved in 44 could be brought about earler in say 43 or perhaps even in 42 as a result of altering this production. I am not advocating building more large naval units as they would consume to much in the way of resources, I could see building more DE, and Merchant hulls though.

[Brady]

p. 227:

" Yamato and Musashi and their sister ship the converted carier shinano. With armor 16 inches thick and a launch weight second in the world only to the Queen Mary, each of these warship's absorbed mountains of of preschious materails, shipyard capacity, and engenering skill. Total displacement of the three behemoths topped 200,000 tons, which was equilvent of 235 coast defense vessels, or or fully 66 more than Japan built during the whole war."

So queying the production of the Musahsi and the Shinano would yeild Big Divadinds should be allowed to redirect the resources into more DE or Merchant hull's.

[TIMJOT]

p. 227:

So queying the production of the Musahsi and the Shinano would yeild Big Divadinds should be allowed to redirect the resources into more DE or Merchant hull's.

The Shinano yes, but the Musashi was nearly complete when war broke out. You would need to go back to 1938 to gain any dividends for cancelling the Musashi.

[Brady]

Well she was compleated in Aug. of 42( Conways), so thats a lot of time and work non the less, if the game starts in Dec (?) of 41, given the Choice some playes may elect to quey it, depends on how much you would save by doing so.


This all realy depends on how this winds up being treated, how much power the players realy have in determing the outcome of the Empires production and the use and production of her Mercnat fleat, and the Navy, key to all this seams to be wheather or not the playes can increase production of certain types beyond what were actualy produced, wheather that is allowed and acheaved by, the queying of ships or the realocation of resources/production to that end or both.

For example as a player I might decide to (if given the tools to do so), stop all existing Production of All Navy Combatants unless their say 90% compleat. then realocate those production resources initialy to Tanker's & DE's.

ANother Question I have is wheather or not the Woden Hulled shipbuilding industry is in anyway represented in WiTP.

[TIMJOT]

Well she was compleated in Aug. of 42( Conways), so thats a lot of time and work non the less, if the game starts in Dec (?) of 41, given the Choice some playes may elect to quey it, depends on how much you would save by doing so.
.

Not really a lot of time in Battleship years. She was laid down in 1938 and was probably close to 90% complete in Dec 41. I am guessing It would have taken longer to scrap her than complete her at that stage.

[pry]

So queying the production of the Musahsi and the Shinano would yeild Big Divadinds should be allowed to redirect the resources into more DE or Merchant hull's.

Brady, I understand where you are coming from and what you want to see happen. As I understand production it is done in a generic manner by assigning points that count towards completion of each vessel. I will assume that these points are a representation of all factors, steel, manpower, gun production and what not.

In terms of resources points expended you would gain next to nothing by delaying Musashi she is essentially complete, major construction was completed and she was launched November 1 1940. The major expenditures of resources like steel and manpower are finished and now she is sitting alongside a dock fitting out, placing the guns radars furniture Etc.

So on December 7, 1941, she is sitting alongside a dock and again assuming her total construction cost is say 1000 points for example then on Dec 7 she is at 950 points. Meanwhile Shinano is still in the graving dock undergoing major hull construction and consuming major amounts of resources (she was not completed to the main deck until June 42) so on Dec 7 she would be at something like 300 points.

In this example you gain next to nothing (50 points) by delaying Musashi but gain a large (700 points) amount of resources that can by diverted to other projects by halting Shinano. The saved 700 points can then be put towards other combatant construction or to merchant construction to speed up their delivery dates from historical dates.

{Edit} Points per turn that would have gone to Shinano for the next 3 years would now go to another project so you could complete say 7 100 point merchants instead of finishing the work on Shinano.

Testers please correct me if my basic premise and understanding are not correct on this.

[Mike Scholl]

Not really a lot of time in Battleship years. She was laid down in 1938 and was probably close to 90% complete in Dec 41. I am guessing It would have taken longer to scrap her than complete her at that stage.

Given the need to "shake down" a large vessel and train her crew, it's more
likely that Musashi was 99% finished when the war began---six months for this
process is not unusual.

[Mike Scholl]

p. 227:

" Yamato and Musashi and their sister ship the converted carier shinano. With armor 16 inches thick and a launch weight second in the world only to the Queen Mary, each of these warship's absorbed mountains of of preschious materails, shipyard capacity, and engenering skill. Total displacement of the three behemoths topped 200,000 tons, which was equilvent of 235 coast defense vessels, or or fully 66 more than Japan built during the whole war."

So queying the production of the Musahsi and the Shinano would yeild Big Divadinds should be allowed to redirect the resources into more DE or Merchant hull's.

If you look at it from the perspective of resources demanded from the time
the decision to build this class was taken, it's even worse in resourse demands.
EVERYTHING about them was new and different. Guns, armor, protection
scheme, hull design, etc. It took a lot of design and manufacturing resources
just to perpare to build them. For the effort overall, the Japanese could have
probably started the war with two more Shokaku's (and their air groups), two
more Tone's, and a number of Akatsuki's built or on their way. For the results
obtained, building the Yamato's was a very poor choice in hindsight.

[TIMJOT]

If you look at it from the perspective of resources demanded from the time
the decision to build this class was taken, it's even worse in resourse demands.
EVERYTHING about them was new and different. Guns, armor, protection
scheme, hull design, etc. It took a lot of design and manufacturing resources
just to perpare to build them. For the effort overall, the Japanese could have
probably started the war with two more Shokaku's (and their air groups), two
more Tone's, and a number of Akatsuki's built or on their way. For the results
obtained, building the Yamato's was a very poor choice in hindsight.

Mike,

I think you maybe underestimating a bit. I would guess 3 to 4 more Shokakus and their airgroups. Plus possibly the additional Tones as well. If the decision had been made back in 1937.

[mogami]

Hi, Yes but having a Yamato on hand can influance when and where the USN will risk a surface battle. (They have to have at least a South Dakota on hand)

The Japanese can not support the CV airgroups (replacement pilots) they begin with.

[Mike Scholl]

Mike,

I think you maybe underestimating a bit. I would guess 3 to 4 more Shokakus and their airgroups. Plus possibly the additional Tones as well. If the decision had been made back in 1937.

You might be right, although I think the decision was made in 1935, I was
allowing for the fact that "airgroups" need constent replenishing to maintain
effectiveness, and that filling two additional ones would call for an increase
in both aircraft production and Carrier Aircrew Training. Plus speeding up the
Akitsuki's would require additional R & D to speed up production of their 3.9"
DP guns and mountings. Ships were generally built in "pairs" at least, so a
pair of Shokaku's, a pair of Tone's, and a sped-up run of 6-8 Akitsuki's seemed
reasonable. I'm basing this in good measure on "it feels about right" from 25
years of studying the productiona and economics of the period---I don't have
any "hard" emperical data.