The distortion of truth (and how this leads to games of lower quality)

[mogami]

Hi, In order to stop the Japanese advance the allies need to bring suffiecent mass in a supplied state into contact.

15th Army
2 Divisions.

25th Army
4 Divisions

16th Army
2 Divisions
1 Bde

14th Army
4 Divisions
1 Bde

Other large formations at hand
3 Mixed Bde
1 Bde.

Total force for expansion and capture of SRA
12 Divisions
6 Bde

There are of course a large number of SNLF but they are not suited for sustained land combat.

Allied forces on Map 7 Dec 1941 exceed Japanese forces. How ever they are of course dispersed and in many cases distant from area.

This demonstrates the advantage Japan had from it's central location in relation to the action.

The allied need to prepare defense in areas on the rim.

If the Japanese player decides to move a large part of his forces to open a new "front" (South or Central Pacific) In the manner often seen employed in PacWar the balance of power in the CBI/SRA can change.

The allies have units in abundence. What they don't have is time. If the Japanese grant them time the results will change.

If the Japanese do not alter the historic opening plans (except perhaps to reinforce them) then the Japanese will be near impossible to stop. There is not enough time for units to move into positions in front of the Japanese advance and moving into Japanese air space is very dangerous.

The forces employed by the Japanese Armies in the different missions are almost the bare minimum. If the allies are given time to introduce new formations into areas the Japanese will have to direct reinforcments to counter if they wish to continue to advance. This is why it is important for the Japanese to always be ready to transport units as they complete tasks. The 38th Division should have transports arriving at Hong Kong the day after the 38th Division concludes it's operation. (On day one I sent IJN MSW to Hong Kong to clear mines. I send enough transport to move the 38th Division to Canton 1 hex away. As soon as the MSW clear the mines and Hong Kong Secure the 38th begins loading on transport for movement to Balikapan. (Another 16th Army Division is already enroute. By the time these unit arrive in area 16th Army will need to have secured forward airfields for fighters to provide CAP to transports and bombers to keep enemy surface TF's at bay)

The SRA operations are not suited to Ad Hoc planning. Every unit has multiple tasks to complete and movements to undertake upon completion of each mission. 25th Army has to detach 2 Divisions to reinforce 15th Army. and 1 to 16th Army. It is from 14th Army that the units for future operations in new "front" must come. But first 14th Army has to clear PI.

Because of player knowledge of what is to come the allies are capable of inflicting a surprise reverse at many points during the operation. It only takes a slight lapse on the Japanese part to be caught and punished. At the same time if the operation is well planned the Japanese can destroy every Allied unit that stays in the SRA.

[2ndACR]

TJ,
Paulus at the time was highly regarded by the General Staff. No pre- war plan lasts long in combat. During GW1 my unit was told to expect up to 60% casualties during combat. We were wrong. But that is what the Army calculated our casualty count at. Why else move several field hospitals into the region.If Hitler had allowed his generals to run the war and kept his nose out of it, who knows what could have happened.
What if Singapore did not just surrender and actually fought? What if Australia moves a couple of divisions into the SRA?


No leadership in the area, do not even know how to respond to that. Do you hold all of the division CO's in that low of regard? They are leaders you know. Give them a mission and the means to do it and they will try to execute. Just because Halsey, Nimitz, Spruance, Smith are not there does not mean that someone else can not do the job. Even without all of the means at hand to do a job, most military commanders will have contingency plans. I am not saying it could be done, but the means to do so was there or on the way to try. Since it was not done in history, does not mean that we the players should not have the ability to try.

[Mr.Frag]

No leadership in the area, do not even know how to respond to that. Do you hold all of the division CO's in that low of regard?

TJ holds everyone on the planet in low regard

And he STILL refuses to list a single problem with UV

[2ndACR]

Hi Frag,

So I have gathered. I admit UV has some quirks and all, but I still Like the game itself. Once you learn the quirks, some work to your advantage. I may not be the most experienced UV player, not enough time in the day, but I find the AI tricky at times. Once had the AI start to invade Lunga, moved to intercept him and two turns later he invaded PM.

Not going to let him escape that are you.

[Tristanjohn]

TJ,
Paulus at the time was highly regarded by the General Staff. No pre- war plan lasts long in combat. During GW1 my unit was told to expect up to 60% casualties during combat. We were wrong. But that is what the Army calculated our casualty count at. Why else move several field hospitals into the region.If Hitler had allowed his generals to run the war and kept his nose out of it, who knows what could have happened.
What if Singapore did not just surrender and actually fought? What if Australia moves a couple of divisions into the SRA?

I used Paulus to illustrate a simple point to TIMJOT. If you fail to see that point then there's nothing much left to discuss, I suppose.

No leadership in the area, do not even know how to respond to that. Do you hold all of the division CO's in that low of regard? They are leaders you know. Give them a mission and the means to do it and they will try to execute. Just because Halsey, Nimitz, Spruance, Smith are not there does not mean that someone else can not do the job. Even without all of the means at hand to do a job, most military commanders will have contingency plans. I am not saying it could be done, but the means to do so was there or on the way to try. Since it was not done in history, does not mean that we the players should not have the ability to try.

That's not bad. I agree there might well have been any number of junior commanders in theatre able to handle the responsibility had this "greatness" been thrust upon them, as they say. But in general our country at least went to war with bad doctrine, obsolete equipment to an extent, mediocre to poor training in some areas and a combine of military services which were run fairly close along the lines of some decrepit and crooked labor union in terms of "seniority of service" determining who would command who what when where why and how. That last little item stayed with our military throughout the war, of course; neither was the United States the only country so feebly run in this regard as the practice is common enough worldwide and runs back to the age of noblemen and kings.

The point is, though, that at the start of hostilities even though America's potentiality for war was huge we didn't bring much to the table for the game's first hand and the sad result of that folly can be read in any public library on the cheap. If you wish to pose some good potential for U.S. command prospects in SE Asia or wherever in 1941-42 based on your confidence of whatever then I don't think I'd argue with you strongly about it. I don't really see that as a pivotal issue one way or the other, though, just something I threw in afterthought fashion while ticking off some other pertinent and immediate concerns to TIMJOT with re to his rather fantastic notions about the SRA in general.

Now that you mention it, and given the sort of flag-waving feelings I harbor for our military, I'd guess that yes, there must have been any number of competent professional soldiers of junior rank who, had they been called on out of the blue, would have done a bang-up job whatever the assignment.



In fact now I'm sure of it! [indent]Go MGM!






[/indent]

[Peter Weir]

Well, as you've said you're reading (have almost finished?) Volume V of Morison how about if we turn that around and have you tell me what was and what was not of historical nature with regard to naval surface actions around Guadacanal as these happened in the Scenario #14 test?

Think of it as a kind of homework, Peter.

Really. You've the account before you and maps and track charts and whatnot to work with. This should all be apparent.

All right all bones up and raring to have at it!

As I understand it from the Morsion account there were a couple of task forces west of guadacnal south and north of Savo Island with another smaller force much farther to the east assignde toprotect that part of the chnannel.

Not sure what else I should say except our navy got its rear end kicked royally and then some by the Japanense admiral called mikawa, mostly from what I read due to a lot of mistkaes on our side plus there excellent torpedoes. The eastern force never got into it plus a couple of destroyers on our side. All the time the usn commander Turner sat off Guadacnaal unloading, and in the meantime Fletcher had retreated with the airfcraft carriers that had been standing guard earlier that day.

What I don't understand is how you comparte this to what happened in the test. I believ eyou see a similarity to what happened but in the test the Japs were able to get in and hit a couple of transports you had at guadacanal and you seemed to lose less there in the test than our navy did actually.

Now Ive probably butchered that so go easy with me the first tim eplease. I do want to see how you explain this in terms of what the game does that you don't like so much.

[Chiteng]

No Peter,

The minimalists simply choose to try and ignore both Savo Island
and Tassaforanga as 'ungameable' situations, and statistical artifacts.
Thus they choose to simply ignore that the battles ever happened.

You will get no joy here, talking about those battles. They dont exist
in the minds of minimalists.

[Mike Scholl]

This is getting tiresome.

Yes, on Dec 8th 1941 any and every man would have ultimately failed in the Philipines. As for the rest....

The Facts:

1,000,000 ship tons supplies and equipment had been allocated and in the process of delivery for the defence of the Philipines.

$10,000,000 for the construction of airfields in the PI had been allocated and and construction was well underway when war broke out.

$ 390,000 and the troops and equipment for an advance early warning system covering all the PI had been allocated and in the process of deployment when war broke out.

$269,000,000 for the equiping and training of the Philipine army had been granted and enough material was in route to completely outfit all 10 Philipine army divisions by April 42

A delivery shedule of Bombers to the PI had been worked out with the projected number of 272 B-17s by March 42. As well as 400+ P-40s by that same date.

In short, Yes if war had been delayed a few months there was sufficient means and forces availible in the "forseeable" future to make a difference in the defence of the Philipines.

This is all absolutely true, and allowing for the inevitable snafu's would have
certainly have arrived in the Phillippine Islands by June of 1942. If enough of
the equipment for the troops of the Phillippine Militia Divisions had arrived by
April/May, they might even have learned to use it proficiently by mid-summer.
What it also proves is the point about MacArthur I have tried to make several
times---until all these Goodies had arrived, been distributed, and the troops
trained to use them effectively; his position was vulnerable to a Japanese attack
and his only viable response a reversion to the "hold out as long as possible"
strategy of WPO 5. This is called "Contingency Planning", all good military staffs
do it all the time. His refusal to impliment such stockpiling of Bataan as would
have made this possible on the grounds that it would be "defeatist and bad for
morale" is right up there with the clowns in the French Command who sent their
troops out to face the Germans in 1914 wearing bright red pantaloons because
"Red pants ARE France!"

No one could have held the Phillippines given the circumstances of December
1941..., But only an incompetent would have HAD to lead his troops into Bataan
and immediately put them on half-rations. While leaving enough supply to the enemy to meet his needs for a year. This is called "stupidly short-sighted and
deluded." And he EARNED the nickname "Dougout Doug" for MORAL cowardice,
not the physical variety. A Bradley, an Eisenhower, a Stillwell, or a Patton
would still have lost in the end---but they would have been "on the ground in
Bataan regularly" seeing and sharing the plight of their troops. MacArthur
couldn't face them because he knew most of their suffering was HIS fault---
so he "hid out" on Corregadore.

[Mike_B20]

Chiteng, I've seen plenty of results in UV that recreate the Tassafronga experience.
The "Long Lance" attack in UV is deadly and can wreck an entire taskforce, not just a few cruisers as at Tassafronga.
It just happened to me in a PBEM game. All my ships except one in a 15 ship taskforce were torpedoed.

As for Savo Island...that encounter helped create the myth of Japanese superiority in night fighting. The Allies had a poor plan and deployment and the crews were dead tired, having been on station for days in a high state of readiness.
In most other Solomons engagements the Allies proved superior at night fighting thanks to their radar and radar controlled gunnery.
The overrall ships sunk tally after the Solomons campaign favoured the Allies.

The Savo Island battle can be recreated as well in UV by creating four small non mutually supporting surface taskforces representing the picket destroyers and the two Allied cruiser squadrons as well as the transport taskforce.
You will likely see the three smaller Allied surface taskforces ripped apart and maybe the IJN cruisers then proceeding to attack the transports.

I'd like to see morale and fatigue ratings for ships.
Perhaps with the ability to set a state of readiness to more easily recreate the factor of fatigue in an engagement like Savo Island.

[Chiteng]

Chiteng, I've seen plenty of results in UV that recreate the Tassafronga experience.
The "Long Lance" attack in UV is deadly and can wreck an entire taskforce, not just a few cruisers as at Tassafronga.
It just happened to me in a PBEM game. All my ships except one in a 15 ship taskforce were torpedoed.

As for Savo Island...that encounter helped create the myth of Japanese superiority in night fighting. The Allies had a poor plan and deployment and the crews were dead tired, having been on station for days in a high state of readiness.
In most other Solomons engagements the Allies proved superior at night fighting thanks to their radar and radar controlled gunnery.
The overrall ships sunk tally after the Solomons campaign favoured the Allies.

The Savo Island battle can be recreated as well in UV by creating four small non mutually supporting surface taskforces representing the picket destroyers and the two Allied cruiser squadrons as well as the transport taskforce.
You will likely see the three smaller Allied surface taskforces ripped apart and maybe the IJN cruisers then proceeding to attack the transports.

Uhmm no. The actual tactics that WERE used cannot be replicated.
IE Japs firing torps at the enemy while the enemy doesnt even know they
are there. The Japs remain unspotted until after they start using their guns.
That does NOT happen in UV.
The option to simply fire all the torps and run away also doesnt exist.
I am really NOT interested in UV quick fix of that problem.

I would howver be GREATLY pleased to see a realistic naval surface model.

I also mentioned Tass, which you didnt comment on.

[Mr.Frag]

Guys, lets stay on topic here ... this thread is about Tj's whining. If you want to discuss something of meaning, take to to a thread worthy of it

[mogami]

Uhmm no. The actual tactics that WERE used cannot be replicated.
IE Japs firing torps at the enemy while the enemy doesnt even know they
are there. The Japs remain unspotted until after they start using their guns.
That does NOT happen in UV.
The option to simply fire all the torps and run away also doesnt exist.
I am really NOT interested in UV quick fix of that problem.

I would howver be GREATLY pleased to see a realistic naval surface model.

I also mentioned Tass, which you didnt comment on.

Hi, Does it really matter? If the IJN is allowed to fire torpedos without the USN being allowed to return fire it has the same result. This is allowed in UV. Japanese surprise (Or USN surprise) Allows one side to fire torpedos without return fire before battle begins. It's the same net result.
(If the Japanese commnader then decides to run away it's up to him but I've had really small IJN TF's clobber much larger USN TF's with this)

[Peter Weir]

I don't know what it si with you guys but I want to see what TJ has to say on this battle of Savo and how it relates to the test he had with Mogami before.

Mr. Frag your remark doesn't help at all and if you addressed me in that way I'd not be real about it. You've got someone who can explain his throughts pretty well with TJ so why not shut up and listen? If your thinkings better then his express it and let others read that and do what they want with it and judge as they see fit for what it's worth but stop this constantbaiting. Seems to me yoiu whine way more than Tj and in fact I havent seem him write anything of that kind yet. You sound lie it here tho.

Chiteng, I don't know about the minimalist theory you have but I have to agree with mogami that at this scale the game seems to do a pretty good job at times of modelling hsitory in naval actions. I think you can only expect so much from a game designer and I say the game's a lot of fun to play for the most part. If any of us live so long we might even find out more about that stuff when Tj makes an appearance. That assumes of course he and MrFrag don't kncok each others' teeth out at the door.

[Chiteng]

I don't know what it si with you guys but I want to see what TJ has to say on this battle of Savo and how it relates to the test he had with Mogami before.

Mr. Frag your remark doesn't help at all and if you addressed me in that way I'd not be real about it. You've got someone who can explain his throughts pretty well with TJ so why not shut up and listen? If your thinkings better then his express it and let others read that and do what they want with it and judge as they see fit for what it's worth but stop this constantbaiting. Seems to me yoiu whine way more than Tj and in fact I havent seem him write anything of that kind yet. You sound lie it here tho.

Chiteng, I don't know about the minimalist theory you have but I have to agree with mogami that at this scale the game seems to do a pretty good job at times of modelling hsitory in naval actions. I think you can only expect so much from a game designer and I say the game's a lot of fun to play for the most part. If any of us live so long we might even find out more about that stuff when Tj makes an appearance. That assumes of course he and MrFrag don't kncok each others' teeth out at the door.

Actually, the ability of say 8 Fubuki class Jap destroyers to sneak up, on a superior allied task force, Unload their torps, RELOAD, and fire again, then LEAVE,
w/o facing the big guns of the USN, doesnt exist. It never happens.

Minimalist is a comment, not a theory. Minimalism is when know events or
combat parameters are ignored, in the pursuit of a statistical model.

Pilot experience does matter, we endlessly debate how much. The minimalists
simply want it reduced to no impact. Because it isnt easily quantifiable.
Same effect with Tass and Savo.
The battles DID happen, and I dont really care if certain people feel it upsets
their statistical model. Create a valid model then.

[Peter Weir]

That's fine then. Thx for the explanation Chiteng. I guess what I meantis that Mogami only wanted to explain his idea that the game doe model Japanese capabilities in the game in the given scale pretty good andf gave an example of hopw this amounts to the same thing in the end. I can understand you wanting more detail. So do I when it come to that.

[Mr.Frag]

Peter, might I point out here that the title for this thread started by TJ is "The distortion of truth (and how this leads to games of lower quality)".

We all sit here waiting for him to post this "distortion" of "truth" so that we my all learn from his great wisdom of how this has "led" to UV (or WitP) being of "lower quality".

Matter of fact, I'm waiting for him to post anything at all that has anything even remotely to do with UV and/or WitP.

Anyone who throws a game to invent some evidence to point out something yet cannot even explain what they are trying to point out, you really have to wonder. If and when TJ puts forward even a single facet of the game that is poorly modelled or simply even doesn't work well, I'll let it go.

[Nikademus]

A simple way to test the ideas revolving around the SRA would be to play a "Dec 8th" game where the Japanese do not attack PH but simply declare war.

That way the US has an intact navy and just for argument's sake, is ordered to plan and implement a relief operation of the Philippines.

[Chiteng]

Ahh come on guys. TJ just wants his opinion considered in the design.
We ALL do. So get down off the horses and try to get him to calm down.

Dont start firing at the same banners your flying. It simply makes you look silly.

Nik,

Rainbow Orange it is. lets do it!

[pasternakski]

Uhmm no. The actual tactics that WERE used cannot be replicated.
IE Japs firing torps at the enemy while the enemy doesnt even know they
are there. The Japs remain unspotted until after they start using their guns.
That does NOT happen in UV.
The option to simply fire all the torps and run away also doesnt exist.

These are all conclusory statements without support. I have often seen Japanese surface forces decisively win night engagements by launching a devastating Long Lance attack and escaping without damage. I suggest that you have merely not played enough or played on sophisticated enough a level that the Japanese night surface combat advantages that are built into the game system become visible to you.

Mike_B20 is right on it like fur on a weasel.

"Minimalism is when know events or combat parameters are ignored, in the pursuit of a statistical model."

Where did this nonsense definition come from? "Minimalist art" is representation of the artist's vision through sparse brush strokes. I know of no other credited use of the term or any similar one. Please explain.

[Nikademus]

oh and no air attacks on Clarke Field or Singapore on Dec 8th to prevent suprise.