ORIGINAL: golden delicious
Thoughts on winning:
Jeremy had two strategies which emerged at the start of the scenario. One was a direct drive, with forces from Quebec moving toward New York City and from Mobile towards Chicago, and the second was an indirect approach, with both bodies being swung around to the west for a game-winning linkup in the Plains.
Both are viable strategies. The problem is that Jeremy didn't finally commit himself to either strategy until around turn 25 when it became apparent that the direct approach had failed, and in committing to a long game in the western part of the map he was then running contrary to the strategic decision he made right at the start of the match to front-load his power by taking three sealift boosts. [It turns out Jeremy's strategy was the indirect one from the start so this could be rephrased as not getting on with it quickly enough]
This is true - in reality with a complex shifting fronts strategy like this I should have recognized that the highest supply possible was actually critical. Instead of deciding to take two hits to my supply for more sea lift I might have considered the second hit to Replacements or gone with lower sea lift. Here it turns out that the very thing I was trying to accomplish with my high sea lift (a local advantage in units in the west for a short window of opportunity) was being sabotaged by the very low supply rate.
On top of this, Jeremy did not do enough to co-ordinate his offensives across the map. From turns 8 to 14 I was able to concentrate my power in the northeast whilst withdrawing in the south, then from turns 15 to 29 I was able to focus on the southeast while delaying Jeremy with relatively light forces in the west. It was only from turn 30 that Jeremy started to put real pressure on in the west, at which point the situation in the southeast had improved to the point where I would shortly be withdrawing substantial forces. The only point at which I felt a dilemma about where to focus (besides in the initial turns when the Axis offensives are still developing) was in the space 35-40 when Axis forces were bearing down on me in the West at the same time as I was heavily engaged in Ontario.
This is very true and really a major Achilles Heel in the strategy. It tends to take the pressure off the Allies from one front to the next.
Jeremy was also, to my mind, too precious about the supply state of his troops. Around turn 30 he notes having a large number of panzer divisions getting up to full supply in his rear areas. Where were these troops five turns earlier when both of us were fighting on a shoestring in the west with a wide open flank? Had these units been committed at 50% supply when the situation was critical, Jeremy could have conquered Oklahoma for free, and potentially achieved that linkup in the West.
They where the spear heads conquering the South.If they had not been there you would not have been there either and instead we would have been fighting with much of these armies in the west. This was not as decisive as I wanted it to be and could have gone off so much better with a higher supply rate but this part of the plan did at least partially work. I was launching diversionary attacks in Virginia with Infantry and you where pilling up a strong double line including armoured reserves out there even as the Panzers had left and shifted to the West (resupplying once they arrived in the western theatre).
I don't think 50% supply is very reasonable. There is a major time sink as you move the Panzers to a fixed rail head well behind the line and get them stopped with an HQ beside them. You get pretty much no supply until you do that but once you meet all these checks even with this low supply I would be getting 22% a turn. I could have committed them 5 turns earlier but at 1% supply - for 50% supply it is closer to two turns earlier and now it is less clear it was worth it. As it was I was struggling desperately to shift you and having to constantly deal with your counter attacks as you aim to kill them. Attacking with much weaker Panzers would just mean you find it that much easier to kill them. No point in making that easy for you.
Again, ten turns later, Jeremy responds to the faltering defence of Kansas by pulling everything back to Oklahoma to resupply. In general, because of this need for units to be at full supply, Jeremy tended to develop his offensives piecemeal, rather than committing a decisive amount of force at the outset.
This was a problem but really I could not wait You where only going to be tricked in Virginia for so long before you started to figure this out and your defences where only going to get better. I could not wait for everything to be ready and had to commit forces as I had them for the initial offensive.
This happened in Ontario, too, where I was allowed to discover for myself over a period of several turns that, yes, Jeremy really did mean business up here. If he'd waited to develop this front until he had the forces for it, he could have surprised and routed the tiny forces I had available and broken through past Duluth while I was still scrambling to mobilise a defence.
Now here sort of agree with you. This is a sort of special case as here there was hope for full on surprise. Though I could never actually be sure that you had not seen this coming.
Finally, Jeremy showed a marked tendency to tolerate quiet fronts. It's strongly in the Allied player's interest to systematically shut down one section of the line after another into solid fortified lines. This happened progressively in this match: Maine and Upstate New York, then Buffalo and Detroit, then Kentucky, then Virginia, then Ontario. It's striking looking at the situation around turns 25-30, where Jeremy is grinding forward in extreme terrain against the flower of my army, whilst weeds are growing around the exceedingly light screen I had guarding the north bank of the Cumberland in the west Kentucky plains. I think a lot could have been gained from switching the emphasis of his offensive to this sector the moment that I abandoned the good terrain I had been holding in the Tennessee bend. But this sector was already "locked down"- in Jeremy's mind, it essentially did not exist. I achieved good results later in the match by going after one such fortified sector.
I disagree. This is the offensive into the endless desert situation - you don't do it unless there is a reasonable objective. There is nothing there except one good defensive chunk of terrain after another. If your strategy is to cross the Ohio then sure attack here - but if it is not then you have chosen to fight in poor terrain for no real benefit. As it was by turn 25 I am already leaving for the West - my infantry are pushing up against the flower of your army because I want you to keep it here. The attack toward Baltimore is not expected to succeed - it is expected to hold as many of your Armoured Divisions out here as possible for as long as possible and it does that.
You say the Allies benefit from locked down fronts and while that is true the Axis can't just jump from front to front searching for the Allied weakness. The Allies are faster on a unit by unit basis , have massive rail lift and better supply.
The Axis needs to pick where the battles will be fought and be willing to let the unimportant areas go static.
This was a hard fought game. I was on the back foot through to turn 24, and not truly confident of winning (despite some bravado) until almost turn 40. Had Jeremy committed full-bloodedly to one of his two strategies from the outset- either more vigorously prosecuting his drives to the northeast or ensuring that he got into the west much earlier- the outcome could very well have been different. Further, the concept of a grand encirclement via the Plains, forcing the Allies on to the offensive while the Axis win on points is an excellent one, and if carried out vigorously with a lower sealift option could be decisive. Even as it stood, his overall strategic dilemma would not necessarily have precluded victory had he been more prepared to push units to their limit when the situation was mobile as out in the west, or challenge me where I was not expecting it, such as on the fortified line in western Kentucky.
Here I agree - Though I think the real problem was that the idea on a drive that clears out the south and then shifts to the West is actually flawed. It creates dead periods that allow the Allies to more effectively recover. Balance this with the fact that the drive to the North West was just inherently unworkable and there is a real problem. In reality a better strategy would have been to be weaker in the South but also starting on persecuting the West from very early on - back that with a drive that cuts the rail line through Canada but focuses on attacks in the North East and the Allies never get a respite.
My plan should never have been to clear the south and go to the west. It should have been that I will finish in the south right about the same time as I arrive at Lake Michigan and finally cut the Allies off and even that has some issues since it still means a period of respite as the Axis shift to the far west and head for California.
That said while I don't think the Axis ought to make plans that involve giving the Allies a respite there is one exception to that. At some point the Axis player will need to swap out the Panzers. A plan that see's a shift that coincides with that swap is not to bad at all since the new Panzers come back from Europe in any case.
So with this plan if one was anticipating getting to Lake Michigan and clearing the south by turn 55 or so then one could start withdrawing the Panzers to coincide with the offensive ending in the South, Northeast or the West. Instead of shifting the units they would just bring in the new ones and send them toward their new objectives in the far West.
