OT:German imports from Spain/Turkey?

[Zorch]

This thread brings a new meaning to deja vu...[:)]

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I don't think it's fanciful at all that the Wehrmacht could have blitzed through Spain or Turkey.

warspite1

Well if you care to support that comment, let's hope you do more than rely on the rules of an old board game [X(] [;)].

Just compare the conditions of the respective armed forces in 1940.

The Spanish look good on paper, but it's essentially a WW1 era army. Any modern trappings (be it guns, tanks or aircraft) originate from Germany or Italy.

It's worth noting that the Republic lasted until April '39, and the equipment of the Popular Army can be described as chaotic at best.

The Turkish position is even worse.

In short, neither is remotely ready for anything approaching a modern war in 1940.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I suppose it's important to define what we mean by invasion regarding Spain - is it a coerced "invitation" to deal with Gibraltar or an outright invasion? That changes the dynamic substantially.

warspite1

It's a blitz through Spain. As per real life, Spain says no to Germany's offer (although the person proposing the strategy believes that Franco could have had his mind changed....) and Hitler decides to invade the country, and the regime that German blood was spilled to install, just the previous year.

Simples

Well, there's some sense in that - no telling how Franco would have reacted to a fait acompli. The internal ramifications for Franco's regime would be interesting.

In the broad terms, can German forces in 1940 beat Franco's forces? The response there is yes.

What comes after is likely to be very muddy, and not of much benefit to Germany in the long run.

The move doesn't make the most sense in strategic or diplomatic terms, but that wasn't a requirement for the OKW.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Just compare the conditions of the respective armed forces in 1940.

The Spanish look good on paper, but it's essentially a WW1 era army. Any modern trappings (be it guns, tanks or aircraft) originate from Germany or Italy.

It's worth noting that the Republic lasted until April '39, and the equipment of the Popular Army can be described as chaotic at best.

The Turkish position is even worse.

In short, neither is remotely ready for anything approaching a modern war in 1940.

In the broad terms, can German forces in 1940 beat Franco's forces? The response there is yes.

What comes after is likely to be very muddy, and not of much benefit to Germany in the long run.

The move doesn't make the most sense in strategic or diplomatic terms, but that wasn't a requirement for the OKW.

warspite1

I don't think there is any doubt in the slightest that the Germans would beat a Spanish army that was largely an infantry force, devoid of armour and trucks, a small, obsolete navy devoid of oil and an air force with a hotch potch of aircraft from many nations that have been cannibalised to keep flying. The Turks would likely be more of a handful, but I suspect would not last too much longer on their own.

However, that is not the point. The point is, a 'blitz' through Spain and Turkey is what is required in order that Barbarossa can still happen in the summer of 1942. Ultimate victory by the Germans is not in doubt. The cost in terms of the political, military, economic and time cost very much is.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Just compare the conditions of the respective armed forces in 1940.

The Spanish look good on paper, but it's essentially a WW1 era army. Any modern trappings (be it guns, tanks or aircraft) originate from Germany or Italy.

It's worth noting that the Republic lasted until April '39, and the equipment of the Popular Army can be described as chaotic at best.

The Turkish position is even worse.

In short, neither is remotely ready for anything approaching a modern war in 1940.

In the broad terms, can German forces in 1940 beat Franco's forces? The response there is yes.

What comes after is likely to be very muddy, and not of much benefit to Germany in the long run.

The move doesn't make the most sense in strategic or diplomatic terms, but that wasn't a requirement for the OKW.

warspite1

I don't think there is any doubt in the slightest that the Germans would beat a Spanish army that was largely an infantry force, devoid of armour and trucks, a small, obsolete navy devoid of oil and an air force with a hotch potch of aircraft from many nations that have been cannibalised to keep flying. The Turks would likely be more of a handful, but I suspect would not last too much longer on their own.

I'd disagree here - neither Turkey nor Spain were ready for modern war, but Franco's forces had some inclination of it's nature. Something on the scale of the Catalonia Offensive seems beyond the capability of 1939-40 Turkey.

However, that is not the point. The point is, a 'blitz' through Spain and Turkey is what is required in order that Barbarossa can still happen in the summer of 1942. Ultimate victory by the Germans is not in doubt. The cost in terms of the political, military, economic and time cost very much is.

It's certainly wouldn't be the biggest strategic mistake...but not by much.

There are considerable strategic benefits for Germany around control of Gibraltar and Iberia in general, most significantly in access to the Med but access to the Atlantic as well.

How much that's offset by the reaction of the Spanish population depends on quite a lot of things, primarily how any German intervention is cast. My understanding is that the Nationalist leadership was a collection of various political groups with fairly limited overlap. I'm not sure how practical it would be for Germany to orchestrate a change of leadership to replace Franco with a far more pro-German candidate.

[Orm]

The political cost for this operation seems very high to me. Not only declaring war Spain to consider here. There is also the question of Vichy France. Had AH, and Germany, planned for Spain, and Gibraltar, before they begun peace talks with France then passage for an Army going into Spain would, in my humble opinion, not been any real issue for Vichy France. But since they did not, I suspect the Vichy leadership would have strongly objected.

So how would the world react to Germany entering a treaty with France, and break it before the ink dried up. And then, without any cause, advance into Spain. UK might very well have won the war by this, even if it cost them Gibraltar.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: Orm

The political cost for this operation seems very high to me. Not only declaring war Spain to consider here. There is also the question of Vichy France. Had AH, and Germany, planned for Spain, and Gibraltar, before they begun peace talks with France then passage for an Army going into Spain would, in my humble opinion, not been any real issue for Vichy France. But since they did not, I suspect the Vichy leadership would have strongly objected.

So how would the world react to Germany entering a treaty with France, and break it before the ink dried up. And then, without any cause, advance into Spain. UK might very well have won the war by this, even if it cost them Gibraltar.

I don't think Vichy objections would rank high in terms of obstacles at all, nor the wider diplomatic consequences. After all, it would not be the first time a treaty had been cast aside (Munich et al).

Spain doesn't seem a theatre through which the British can win the war to me (if they can at all win it before Soviet and American entry). In the aftermath of the Fall of France, the UK has a lot of theatres screaming for troops and I'd wonder at the Spanish ability to hold out for any length of time given the carnage of the civil war.

What does Britain even have to send in 1940-41? From hazy memory it wasn't until 1943 that the UK was in the positon to feel comfortable with campaigns on continental Europe (and with the arrival of the Americans at that!).

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I don't think Vichy objections would rank high in terms of obstacles at all, nor the wider diplomatic consequences.

warspite1

I think Vichy considerations weighed very, very heavily. But before all that, there is the rather key question of whether Hitler could have taken the massive leap that is declaring war on Spain. Of course he didn’t take that route in real life and its pretty much impossible, to me at any rate, that there are circumstances in which he would have been persuaded to do so.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Spain doesn't seem a theatre through which the British can win the war to me (if they can at all win it before Soviet and American entry). In the aftermath of the Fall of France, the UK has a lot of theatres screaming for troops and I'd wonder at the Spanish ability to hold out for any length of time given the carnage of the civil war.

What does Britain even have to send in 1940-41? From hazy memory it wasn't until 1943 that the UK was in the positon to feel comfortable with campaigns on continental Europe (and with the arrival of the Americans at that!).

warspite1

Suspending disbelief and assuming Hitler does attack Spain, there is no British win as such in Spain. Gibraltar would fall too. But again this I think misses the point. Lebensraum is Hitlers raison d’etre, its his Holy Grail. The ‘blitz’ through Spain and Turkey is being suggested as the way Germany could have beaten the Soviets in 1942.

But what this completely ignores is the costs of doing so. The taking of Gibraltar, the surrender of Malta - even the loss of Suez - doesn’t actually change much. There is only one war that matters. What this ...ahem... ‘blitz’ through Spain and Turkey does is to cost Germany in ways she just can’t afford. Germany would be in a worse position attempting a 1942 Barbarossa - and that assumes things have gone as well as can be expected in Spain and Turkey and North Africa.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I don't think Vichy objections would rank high in terms of obstacles at all, nor the wider diplomatic consequences.

warspite1

I think Vichy considerations weighed very, very heavily. But before all that, there is the rather key question of whether Hitler could have taken the massive leap that is declaring war on Spain. Of course he didn’t take that route in real life and its pretty much impossible, to me at any rate, that there are circumstances in which he would have been persuaded to do so.

I don't think so - continental France is effectively controlled by the Germans. The overseas territories and much of the military is splintering off to the Vichy Regime or joining the Free French.

The only sizeable asset, the elements of the Marine Nationale loyal to the Vichy regime have just been mauled by the British at Mers-el-Kebir so they're not exactly on good terms with the British (and the Vichy regime did in fact bomb Gibraltar in retaliation.)

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Spain doesn't seem a theatre through which the British can win the war to me (if they can at all win it before Soviet and American entry). In the aftermath of the Fall of France, the UK has a lot of theatres screaming for troops and I'd wonder at the Spanish ability to hold out for any length of time given the carnage of the civil war.

What does Britain even have to send in 1940-41? From hazy memory it wasn't until 1943 that the UK was in the positon to feel comfortable with campaigns on continental Europe (and with the arrival of the Americans at that!).

Suspending disbelief and assuming Hitler does attack Spain, there is no British win as such in Spain. Gibraltar would fall too. But again this I think misses the point. Lebensraum is Hitlers raison d’etre, its his Holy Grail. The ‘blitz’ through Spain and Turkey is being suggested as the way Germany could have beaten the Soviets in 1942.

We'll need to disagree here.

Gibraltar changes the nature of the war in the Med in a pretty fundamental way, Malta and North Africa will look quite different as a result.

I'm not sure that leads to the Axis taking Suez by default, but if it does, that gives the Italian Navy a free hand in the Med. Combined with a German attack on Turkey, and subsequent seizure of the Bosporus, I do see a lot of possibility for an Regia Marina operations in the Black Sea being able to seriously undermine Soviet strength in this area.

I do see the line of thought as to how it would help defeat the Soviet Union, but not hugely convinced it would provide sufficient benefits for the costs involved. It's a lot of hoops to give the Italian's a free hand in the Black Sea.

But what this completely ignores is the costs of doing so. The taking of Gibraltar, the surrender of Malta - even the loss of Suez - doesn’t actually change much. There is only one war that matters. What this ...ahem... ‘blitz’ through Spain and Turkey does is to cost Germany in ways she just can’t afford. Germany would be in a worse position attempting a 1942 Barbarossa - and that assumes things have gone as well as can be expected in Spain and Turkey and North Africa.

I suppose it's relative - it's an interesting thought exercise as to how important the disasters of June 1941 were on rapidly reforming the Red Army. 1942 would see a Red Army substantially better equipped and trained, but the organisational and leadership problems remaining. Second Kharkov writ large?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I don't think so - continental France is effectively controlled by the Germans. The overseas territories and much of the military is splintering off to the Vichy Regime or joining the Free French.

warspite1

We will agree to disagree. I think you've totally underestimated the problems of Vichy, Spain and Italy and why Hitler was so keen not to upset Vichy. Plus even if you ignore all this (which I don't believe you can) then you've just created yet more occupation duties for the Germans. Wow, the numbers available for Barbarossa are dwindling rapidly.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

We'll need to disagree here.

Gibraltar changes the nature of the war in the Med in a pretty fundamental way, Malta and North Africa will look quite different as a result.

warspite1

Indeed we will. The loss of Gibraltar (and Malta will succumb shortly thereafter) is simply not the game changer that you seem to believe. Indeed there is an argument that not having to supply Malta actually massively helps the RN and RAF given the colossal losses suffered trying to keep the island in the war.

The British always assumed the Med would be closed if Italy joined the war (in practice it was only really closed to through traffic once the Germans came to play). The problems with taking Suez remains. Not to mention all the other problems that will almost certainly arise from an invasion of Spain.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I suppose it's relative - it's an interesting thought exercise as to how important the disasters of June 1941 were on rapidly reforming the Red Army. 1942 would see a Red Army substantially better equipped and trained, but the organisational and leadership problems remaining. Second Kharkov writ large?

warspite1

But let's he kind to the Germans and assume the Soviets are in no better position in 1942.

The problem is that the Germans will be definitely worse off. You have occupation needs in:

France
Spain
Spanish Morocco
Morocco

You have the losses from taking Spain and Gib, you have the losses from taking Turkey, you have roughly the same number of Germans, now even less concentrated, from Finland to Turkey - and I would like to see an answer on the Turkish logistical nightmare

You have Stalin's reaction to the Germans taking the Straits and moving into Turkey - you really believe he will do nothing about this? I don't think he would necessarily threaten war, but I think we can assume that Soviet supplies under the NS pact are suddenly cut-off - and that means oil.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I don't think so - continental France is effectively controlled by the Germans. The overseas territories and much of the military is splintering off to the Vichy Regime or joining the Free French.

warspite1

We will agree to disagree. I think you've totally underestimated the problems of Vichy, Spain and Italy and why Hitler was so keen not to upset Vichy. Plus even if you ignore all this (which I don't believe you can) then you've just created yet more occupation duties for the Germans. Wow, the numbers available for Barbarossa are dwindling rapidly.

I wouldn't have ever described Hitler as "keen" in regards to upsetting Vichy. The diplomatic relationship between the two was not remotely traditional and even if it had been, the terms of Compiègne were such that good relations were likely unattainable without major revisions on the terms from the Germans.

The importance of the French fleet has (at least in my view) tended to be overblown. I've always seen the German approach as a pragmatic decision on asset denial than anything resembling a realistic attempt to rebuild their naval strength at the expense of the rump French regime.

As for the occupation duties, that depends on how any Spanish adventure is handled. Is this a full-on war on conquest, or a replacement of Franco, or a fait acompli (a la Austria?). That determines how much (if any?) occupation forces are needed. Given the civil war and German involvement in it, Spain seems a much more likely candidate for changing the top leadership of the Nationalist movement to be more pro-German rather than requiring occupation forces.

Worth remembering that German troops only occupied selected regions of France before Case Anton. I could see Spain being a similar case where strategic areas in the North-West and South are under German control, in the event of an occupation being necessary.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

We'll need to disagree here.

Gibraltar changes the nature of the war in the Med in a pretty fundamental way, Malta and North Africa will look quite different as a result.

warspite1

Indeed we will. The loss of Gibraltar (and Malta will succumb shortly thereafter) is simply not the game changer that you seem to believe. Indeed there is an argument that not having to supply Malta actually massively helps the RN and RAF given the colossal losses suffered trying to keep the island in the war.

The British always assumed the Med would be closed if Italy joined the war (in practice it was only really closed to through traffic once the Germans came to play). The problems with taking Suez remains. Not to mention all the other problems that will almost certainly arise from an invasion of Spain.

I think the ramifications of Gibraltar in German hands play out far more in the Atlantic than they do in the Med.

The British logistical tail to Egypt is already pretty long, but now there's potentially German naval units operating from Spain as a matter of routine. At the very least there's now a lot more ocean that needs covered during the critical 1940-41.

No Gibraltar (and therefore no Malta?) makes the Axis logistical position that bit more straightforward and threatens the British position that much more. German heavy units in the Atlantic can then move to reinforce the Med, or for the Italian fleet to redeploy to the Atlantic. That alone has massive ramifications on RN deployments for convoy escorts etc.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I suppose it's relative - it's an interesting thought exercise as to how important the disasters of June 1941 were on rapidly reforming the Red Army. 1942 would see a Red Army substantially better equipped and trained, but the organisational and leadership problems remaining. Second Kharkov writ large?

warspite1

But let's he kind to the Germans and assume the Soviets are in no better position in 1942.

The problem is that the Germans will be definitely worse off. You have occupation needs in:

France
Spain
Spanish Morocco
Morocco

You have the losses from taking Spain and Gib, you have the losses from taking Turkey, you have roughly the same number of Germans, now even less concentrated, from Finland to Turkey - and I would like to see an answer on the Turkish logistical nightmare

What makes you think there will be occupation needs in Morocco? The Germans were content to leave the French colonies in the hands of the Vichy regime, and it was a source of no end of awkwardness for the Allies.

That's presupposing the Germans need to go down the route of a full military occupation however. I wonder if that would be at all likely given that there would likely be one (or more) of the factions in the Nationalist camp that would form a pro-German government as a means to power, and Franco was at the head of a collection of very unlikely political groups.

Far more likely however that Franco is just removed from the picture by his opponents within the Nationalist camp (with some encouragement from the Germans). There's options in terms of both the radicals within the Falange movement. I can't claim to know enough of Spanish politics of this period to say much about the other movements.

The "Turkish logistical nightmare" based on a German campaign in Central Anatolia. There's no need for the Germans to campaign in Central Anatolia. They don't even need to go past Ankara. The major Turkish population and industrial centres are in the West, the geography of the Bosporus and Dardanelles are such that the Axis can cross under air cover alone while the Turkish Navy and Air Force is not sufficiently prepared to offer sustained resistance.

Once the Aegean region of Turkey is in German hands, there's no need for further advances into Turkey. The benefit of any Turkish campaign is in free movement of naval assets from the Med into the Black Sea to pressure Soviet Russia, not from a grand overland campaign.

The additional scope of the war cuts both ways - the British now have additional commitments to respond appropriately to German entry into Spain. Turkey will need substantial investment to modernize its armed forces which needs to come from somewhere (if not a stiffening of British or Soviet troops) and the Soviet Union needs to reinforce the regions around the Black Sea.

I think the problem is that a lot of the ramifications can't neatly be accounted for in terms of commitments of manpower. Nor can you simplify it as having 100,000 men less on the Eastern Front, but complete freedom to conduct naval operations in the Black Sea...

You have Stalin's reaction to the Germans taking the Straits and moving into Turkey - you really believe he will do nothing about this? I don't think he would necessarily threaten war, but I think we can assume that Soviet supplies under the NS pact are suddenly cut-off - and that means oil.

Well, from what I've read on June '41, Stalin was mortally afraid of any provocation of Germany as the prelude to war - even after the invasion. His behaviour then doesn't lead me to think he'd be willing to sanction Germany.

A repudiation of the ML pact seems to fall quite firmly in this category, and I would suspect that Stalin would be pragmatic enough to exchange Turkey for an extra six months of time to build the Red Army.

[Evoken]

There is no way you are invading Turkey with 100k troops there M_M. Turkey has 41 Infantry , 3 Cavalry Divisions with 1.3m active standing army , with really rough terrain that you need to pass through constantly. If Germans thought they could have invaded Turkey as easily as you stated , they would have. It opens a direct path to Middle east and Caucasian oil , a backdoor to Africa front.

Operation would require an entire army group that would suffer casualties at least comparable to Soviet campaign if not worse. Thats not a luxury Germans can afford. Istanbul would likely be another Stalingrad for Germans.

Anyways thats enough alt-history for me today , peace

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I wouldn't have ever described Hitler as "keen" in regards to upsetting Vichy. The diplomatic relationship between the two was not remotely traditional and even if it had been, the terms of Compiègne were such that good relations were likely unattainable without major revisions on the terms from the Germans.

The importance of the French fleet has (at least in my view) tended to be overblown. I've always seen the German approach as a pragmatic decision on asset denial than anything resembling a realistic attempt to rebuild their naval strength at the expense of the rump French regime.

As for the occupation duties, that depends on how any Spanish adventure is handled. Is this a full-on war on conquest, or a replacement of Franco, or a fait acompli (a la Austria?). That determines how much (if any?) occupation forces are needed. Given the civil war and German involvement in it, Spain seems a much more likely candidate for changing the top leadership of the Nationalist movement to be more pro-German rather than requiring occupation forces.

Worth remembering that German troops only occupied selected regions of France before Case Anton. I could see Spain being a similar case where strategic areas in the North-West and South are under German control, in the event of an occupation being necessary.

warspite1

I don't think you are giving sufficient thinking to why Vichy was set up, and why Hitler was keen not to rock the boat. There is absolutely NOTHING traditional about the relationship - and that entirely misses the point to suggest it's important.

The French fleet in hindsight was overblown for the same reason that your idea that the Atlantic is the main issue is overblown. Regardless of the number of ships, regardless of the access to what seaways, oil is oil.

Franco had more sense than to join the Axis. Hitler could not give him what he needed - and there is no suggestion that Hitler would have invaded. It is a HUGE leap into the unknown to go along with an invasion for the purposes of this scenario. The impact of any invasion will be unpleasant for both sides.....

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

What makes you think there will be occupation needs in Morocco? The Germans were content to leave the French colonies in the hands of the Vichy regime, and it was a source of no end of awkwardness for the Allies.

That's presupposing the Germans need to go down the route of a full military occupation however. I wonder if that would be at all likely given that there would likely be one (or more) of the factions in the Nationalist camp that would form a pro-German government as a means to power, and Franco was at the head of a collection of very unlikely political groups.

Far more likely however that Franco is just removed from the picture by his opponents within the Nationalist camp (with some encouragement from the Germans). There's options in terms of both the radicals within the Falange movement. I can't claim to know enough of Spanish politics of this period to say much about the other movements.

The "Turkish logistical nightmare" based on a German campaign in Central Anatolia. There's no need for the Germans to campaign in Central Anatolia. They don't even need to go past Ankara. The major Turkish population and industrial centres are in the West, the geography of the Bosporus and Dardanelles are such that the Axis can cross under air cover alone while the Turkish Navy and Air Force is not sufficiently prepared to offer sustained resistance.

Once the Aegean region of Turkey is in German hands, there's no need for further advances into Turkey. The benefit of any Turkish campaign is in free movement of naval assets from the Med into the Black Sea to pressure Soviet Russia, not from a grand overland campaign.

The additional scope of the war cuts both ways - the British now have additional commitments to respond appropriately to German entry into Spain. Turkey will need substantial investment to modernize its armed forces which needs to come from somewhere (if not a stiffening of British or Soviet troops) and the Soviet Union needs to reinforce the regions around the Black Sea.

I think the problem is that a lot of the ramifications can't neatly be accounted for in terms of commitments of manpower. Nor can you simplify it as having 100,000 men less on the Eastern Front, but complete freedom to conduct naval operations in the Black Sea...

warspite1

I think we are so far removed from what we think likely in Spain. I really don't understand your logic.

As for Turkey, ditto. I will ignore the 100,000 men comment as this simply bears no relation to anything, much less a 'blitz' through Turkey. IF the Germans aren't going to use Turkey to attack the Caucasus then why invade in the first place? And if they are not going to secure their Chromium resources then where do they get replaced from. And a Turkey not beaten? What are they going to be doing?

It simply makes no sense whatsoever.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Well, from what I've read on June '41, Stalin was mortally afraid of any provocation of Germany as the prelude to war - even after the invasion. His behaviour then doesn't lead me to think he'd be willing to sanction Germany.

A repudiation of the ML pact seems to fall quite firmly in this category, and I would suspect that Stalin would be pragmatic enough to exchange Turkey for an extra six months of time to build the Red Army.

warspite1

And this is one of the problems with this type of what-if. Stalin did adopt a policy of extreme caution with Germany. But this is different. Turkey was not up for discussion, the Straits were not up for discussion. Such a development is likely to change Stalin's thinking dramatically - it's a real game changer.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: Evoken

There is no way you are invading Turkey with 100k troops there M_M. Turkey has 41 Infantry , 3 Cavalry Divisions with 1.3m active standing army , with really rough terrain that you need to pass through constantly. If Germans thought they could have invaded Turkey as easily as you stated , they would have. It opens a direct path to Middle east and Caucasian oil , a backdoor to Africa front.

Operation would require an entire army group that would suffer casualties at least comparable to Soviet campaign if not worse. Thats not a luxury Germans can afford. Istanbul would likely be another Stalingrad for Germans.

Anyways thats enough alt-history for me today , peace

You may want to peruse Chapter 2 of Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War

Your 1.3 million many army looks good on paper, but the messages referenced in pages 38-39 suggests that this was a lofty ambition rather than anything approaching realistic.

The further comments on the condition of transport capabilities reinforces that notion - an armed force in the middle of transitioning from "caravans to baggage trains" is not that of a force prepared for a modern war or even remotely close to it.

There's no doubt that the Germans could have taken Thrace - you've grossly over-estimated the combat ability of the Turkish military in the early 1940's.

There is no need for a German overland campaign to the Middle East - that's an armchair fantasy. The advantage of German seizure of the western regions of Turkey is in facilitating the movement of shipping (and more importantly) supplies into the Black Sea to support operations in the wider Black Sea region.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

What makes you think there will be occupation needs in Morocco? The Germans were content to leave the French colonies in the hands of the Vichy regime, and it was a source of no end of awkwardness for the Allies.

That's presupposing the Germans need to go down the route of a full military occupation however. I wonder if that would be at all likely given that there would likely be one (or more) of the factions in the Nationalist camp that would form a pro-German government as a means to power, and Franco was at the head of a collection of very unlikely political groups.

Far more likely however that Franco is just removed from the picture by his opponents within the Nationalist camp (with some encouragement from the Germans). There's options in terms of both the radicals within the Falange movement. I can't claim to know enough of Spanish politics of this period to say much about the other movements.

The "Turkish logistical nightmare" based on a German campaign in Central Anatolia. There's no need for the Germans to campaign in Central Anatolia. They don't even need to go past Ankara. The major Turkish population and industrial centres are in the West, the geography of the Bosporus and Dardanelles are such that the Axis can cross under air cover alone while the Turkish Navy and Air Force is not sufficiently prepared to offer sustained resistance.

Once the Aegean region of Turkey is in German hands, there's no need for further advances into Turkey. The benefit of any Turkish campaign is in free movement of naval assets from the Med into the Black Sea to pressure Soviet Russia, not from a grand overland campaign.

The additional scope of the war cuts both ways - the British now have additional commitments to respond appropriately to German entry into Spain. Turkey will need substantial investment to modernize its armed forces which needs to come from somewhere (if not a stiffening of British or Soviet troops) and the Soviet Union needs to reinforce the regions around the Black Sea.

I think the problem is that a lot of the ramifications can't neatly be accounted for in terms of commitments of manpower. Nor can you simplify it as having 100,000 men less on the Eastern Front, but complete freedom to conduct naval operations in the Black Sea...

warspite1

I think we are so far removed from what we think likely in Spain. I really don't understand your logic.

As for Turkey, ditto. I will ignore the 100,000 men comment as this simply bears no relation to anything, much less a 'blitz' through Turkey. IF the Germans aren't going to use Turkey to attack the Caucasus then why invade in the first place? And if they are not going to secure their Chromium resources then where do they get replaced from. And a Turkey not beaten? What are they going to be doing?

It simply makes no sense whatsoever.

See above comment regarding the grand overland campaign being a pipedream.

What Turkey facilitates is increased naval involvement in the Black Sea, both in terms of supplies and naval operations.

Considering the impact that fairly small Axis naval involvement in the Black Sea had, I think that's actually quite an important strategic consideration (even more so given the fairly weak state of Soviet naval forces in the region).

Now, do I think that the trade-off's required to bring it about are worthwhile? Probably not, but certainly feels like a realistic consideration.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Well, from what I've read on June '41, Stalin was mortally afraid of any provocation of Germany as the prelude to war - even after the invasion. His behaviour then doesn't lead me to think he'd be willing to sanction Germany.

A repudiation of the ML pact seems to fall quite firmly in this category, and I would suspect that Stalin would be pragmatic enough to exchange Turkey for an extra six months of time to build the Red Army.

warspite1

And this is one of the problems with this type of what-if. Stalin did adopt a policy of extreme caution with Germany. But this is different. Turkey was not up for discussion, the Straits were not up for discussion. Such a development is likely to change Stalin's thinking dramatically - it's a real game changer.

Stalin is not going to lift a finger in the event of a German invasion of Turkey.

Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and France.

Given the list above, I doubt that it will be Turkey that causes a complete volte face, if it all it was likely. Stalin's Road to Damascus moment was on June 21st 1941, and he was recovering for quite some time.

[rustysi]

I love it when these two get into 'debate mode'.[:D]

And the subject of this thread has certainly taken a turn, which is fine.[:)]

But to me, this pretty much covers it all...

Lebensraum is Hitlers raison d’etre, its his Holy Grail.

And he was not going to deviate from it at all. Just read his book. He states it time and time again.

[mattj78]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I don't think so - continental France is effectively controlled by the Germans. The overseas territories and much of the military is splintering off to the Vichy Regime or joining the Free French.

warspite1

We will agree to disagree. I think you've totally underestimated the problems of Vichy, Spain and Italy and why Hitler was so keen not to upset Vichy. Plus even if you ignore all this (which I don't believe you can) then you've just created yet more occupation duties for the Germans. Wow, the numbers available for Barbarossa are dwindling rapidly.

100% agree there is just so many issues it does not make any sense politically and strategically all it does is hurts the axis turkey played both sides very well Spain did to but went out of its way to help the axis