OT:German imports from Spain/Turkey?

[castor troy]

ORIGINAL: DesertWolf101

I'm scratching my head here with this discussion.

You really do? While this forum was a great place with lots of knowledge for a decade it has turned into a HOI4 forum remake some time ago. Funnily there seem to always be the same participants on one side vs literally the rest. [:D]

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Silly?????

I am not the one proposing that Germany invades Turkey in order to claim a small portion of Western Turkey and then relying on the Turks to give in.

Once again, and for the third time:

- The Germans invaded Crete because they were worried about Ploesti. Why is Ploesti being attacked from Turkey not an issue? This is the bulk of Germany's oil!!!!
- Where do the Germans get their Chromium from?
- How do the Germans replace the men that are no longer on the Eastern Front? They didn't have enough men as it is - and now you want less. This is in addition to all the occupation troops you've cost the Germans in Vichy and Spain and North Africa.

- Axis strategy doesn't revolve around Ploesti alone, and the Turkish infrastructure issue raised earlier cuts both ways when it comes to conducting a strategic bombing operation.

- Pages 53/54 may be of interest. I would post the direct reference, but my Turkish is non-existent. Worth having a look at some of the other sections in this paper, particularly around the perception of Germany within the wider economic and military context and the legacy of 1914-18 between the two powers. Begs the question if an invasion would even have been required.

- More troops is not always better, and it can't be reduced to a simple comparison with numbers. The biggest challenge for the Germans in the East was logistics. How does Case Blue play out if the Axis are able to get supplies in bulk to Novorossiysk and Rostov?

ORIGINAL: DesertWolf101

I'm scratching my head here with this discussion. Instead of pondering whether the Germans would be foolish enough to add to their huge number of enemies by invading Turkey (with all the serious additional economic, military, and political problems that would entail for the Reich), a far more interesting (and far less implausible) hypothetical would be to consider what would have happened if Turkey had joined the German cause before Barbarossa. Unlike Franco, there is really very little indication that this was plausible as the Turks were determined to stay neutral, but some interesting scenarios emerge if we suspend some disbelief and assume the Germans were able to build up on the Treaty of Friendship with Turkey into an alliance of sorts.

Some interesting discussion in this PhD paper. Chapter 2 covers much of it.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe




The Red Fleet with its slow ships could be used as mobile batteries to bombard things on land that don't move and thus are even slower. Especially during the long winter nights when there is little daylight for any air search to find these ships and then get the information to the airbase, get the strike into the air, and attack - with the Red Army fighters defending the fleet. That is, if the searching aircraft are not shot down before reporting the position of said fleet.

I mean, the Red Army used biplanes to bomb at night to great effect, how would a sudden naval bombardment be greeted by the defenders?

Just because someone or something did not do something does not mean that they did not think of it. Just because someone or some people do not think that other people will not do something does not mean that they will not do it. Think of the Pearl Harbor raid, think of the Kamikazi aircraft . . .

Just because it does not make sense to you does not mean that it does not make sense to someone else - especially if they have a different cultural mindset.

warspite1

What does that mean? I am basing what the Soviet Black Sea Fleet would likely have done based on the way they were used. That is nothing to do with making sense - it's historical fact. If you believe that the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was in a condition to conduct fleet manoeuvres on the high sea against an Italian Fleet then fine you think that. Whatever floats your boat.

If you can not comprehend what that means when I am not capable of explaining it to you.

Just because something was not done historically does not mean that it could not nor would not have been done.

warspite1

First sentence - no idea what that means

Second sentence - er right... thanks. I kind of knew that but thanks anyway.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

- Axis strategy doesn't revolve around Ploesti alone, and the Turkish infrastructure issue raised earlier cuts both ways when it comes to conducting a strategic bombing operation.

warspite1

Strategy doesn't revolve around Ploesti?

And you said my comment was silly. What Turkish infrastructure would the Germans be gagging to bomb - and why are the Germans now conducting a strategic bombing campaign against Turkey?

You know the importance of Ploesti yes? What % of its oil did Germany get from Romania? It's real simple. No Romanian oil, no war. How difficult is that?

Does their strategy revolve around Ploesti? Well take Romanian oil out of the equation and..... yes, I think it fair to say the security of Ploesti is pretty high in the High Command's thinking.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Begs the question if an invasion would even have been required.

warspite1

Erm....

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

- More troops is not always better, and it can't be reduced to a simple comparison with numbers. The biggest challenge for the Germans in the East was logistics. How does Case Blue play out if the Axis are able to get supplies in bulk to Novorossiysk and Rostov?

warspite1

Okay. So the Germans lost against the Soviet Union. So what did they just have too many troops?

It would be nice to get some answers to the earlier posts. At the moment you seem to be saying that not only are less troops better - but less oil makes ships go further, less escort ships delivers more Axis soldiers to North Africa.

How does Case Blue play out? Well the Germans have insufficient troops, tanks and guns to achieve all the task set for them. That doesn't change, and the weak, largely Axis satellite units, strung out along the Don and Volga rivers are destroyed.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

- Axis strategy doesn't revolve around Ploesti alone, and the Turkish infrastructure issue raised earlier cuts both ways when it comes to conducting a strategic bombing operation.

warspite1

Strategy doesn't revolve around Ploesti????

And you said my comment was silly. What Turkish infrastructure would the Germans be gagging to bomb????

Let me repeat - the Turkish infrastructure issue raised earlier cuts both ways when it comes to conducting a strategic bombing operation. Poor quality roads are poor quality roads, regardless if the traffic is a panzer or a truck carrying 20 500lb bombers for the USAAF.

You know the importance of Ploesti yes? Please tell me you know about Ploesti. It's real simple. No Romanian oil, no war. How difficult is that?

That's demonstrably not the case. The synthetic oil plants provided much of the heavy lifting for the German war effort.

If things were as simple as you suggest then VE-Day would have been in August '44.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Let me repeat - the Turkish infrastructure issue raised earlier cuts both ways when it comes to conducting a strategic bombing operation. Poor quality roads are poor quality roads, regardless if the traffic is a panzer or a truck carrying 20 500lb bombers for the USAAF.

warspite1

Well my guess is that they weren't going to be flying swarms of Lancaster bombers from Crete's massive numbers of airfield in 1941, with fuel delivered by ship to Crete's huge dockyard facilities.

Kind of got Hitler worried though didn't it. Same way he would be worried - and veto - your Turkish adventure.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

- More troops is not always better, and it can't be reduced to a simple comparison with numbers. The biggest challenge for the Germans in the East was logistics. How does Case Blue play out if the Axis are able to get supplies in bulk to Novorossiysk and Rostov?

warspite1

Okay. So the Germans lost against the Soviet Union. So what did they just have too many troops?

In a sense, yes. Too many troops, too far forward moving over roads and railways of poor quality.

It would be nice to get some answers to the earlier posts. At the moment you seem to be saying that not only are less troops better - but less oil makes ships go further, less escort ships delivers more Axis soldiers to North Africa.

How does Case Blue play out? Well the Germans have insufficient troops, tanks and guns to achieve all the task set for them. That doesn't change, and the weak, largely Axis satellite units, strung out along the Don and Volga rivers are destroyed.

I would have hoped that the value of a smaller number of well-supplied troops over a larger number of troops with inadequate supply would be obvious. The pressure on Axis rail traffic is extreme - the advantage of lessening that burden has ramifications far beyond the simple number of troops.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

That's demonstrably not the case. The synthetic oil plants provided much of the heavy lifting for the German war effort.

warspite1

I'd love to see the numbers for that - in particular (but not limited to) how much of Germany's oil needs were catered for by synthetic's at the launch of Barbarossa.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

That's demonstrably not the case. The synthetic oil plants provided much of the heavy lifting for the German war effort.

warspite1

I'd love to see the numbers for that - in particular (but not limited to) how much of Germany's oil needs were catered for by synthetic's at the launch of Barbarossa.

Here you are.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

- More troops is not always better, and it can't be reduced to a simple comparison with numbers. The biggest challenge for the Germans in the East was logistics. How does Case Blue play out if the Axis are able to get supplies in bulk to Novorossiysk and Rostov?

warspite1

Okay. So the Germans lost against the Soviet Union. So what did they just have too many troops?

In a sense, yes. Too many troops, too far forward moving over roads and railways of poor quality.

It would be nice to get some answers to the earlier posts. At the moment you seem to be saying that not only are less troops better - but less oil makes ships go further, less escort ships delivers more Axis soldiers to North Africa.

How does Case Blue play out? Well the Germans have insufficient troops, tanks and guns to achieve all the task set for them. That doesn't change, and the weak, largely Axis satellite units, strung out along the Don and Volga rivers are destroyed.

I would have hoped that the value of a smaller number of well-supplied troops over a larger number of troops with inadequate supply would be obvious. The pressure on Axis rail traffic is extreme - the advantage of lessening that burden has ramifications far beyond the simple number of troops.

warspite1

Well those comments took the conversation down. Insufficiently supplied troops (for the task in hand) aren't hugely useful are they. But then insufficient numbers of troops (for the task in hand) aren't hugely useful either.

That is such a simplistic comment you've made. Listen. You aren't invading Turkey with 100,000 troops. THAT is ridiculous.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

That's demonstrably not the case. The synthetic oil plants provided much of the heavy lifting for the German war effort.

warspite1

I'd love to see the numbers for that - in particular (but not limited to) how much of Germany's oil needs were catered for by synthetic's at the launch of Barbarossa.

Here you are.

warspite1

So how does that show that the loss of Ploesti and Romanian oil would not bring about a collapse, for all intents and purposes, of the German war machine?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: warspite1


warspite1

I'd love to see the numbers for that - in particular (but not limited to) how much of Germany's oil needs were catered for by synthetic's at the launch of Barbarossa.

Here you are.

warspite1

So how does that show that the loss of Ploesti and Romanian oil would not bring about a collapse, for all intents and purposes, of the German war machine?

warspite1

May 1941 (just before Barbarossa) - Schell (responsible for the vehicle industry) suggested a partial demotorisation of the army due to a chronic shortage of oil

It is acknowledged that the Luftwaffe suffered from lack of pilot training due to shortage of fuel

In November 1941, while Barbarossa is in course, Opel closed its largest truck factory because of a lack of petrol. Why? There was so little petrol available they couldn't check the oil pumps in the trucks coming off the assembly line.

Just three quick examples. And you say the loss of Ploesti would not even be noticed?

[mind_messing]

When talking to you there are two discussions - one is the one we're actually having digitally, and the other seems to be the one going on in your head.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

And you say the loss of Ploesti would not even be noticed?

Please highlight where I said that. At no point did I say "the loss of Ploesti would not even be noticed"

In post #104, you stated:

"You know the importance of Ploesti yes? What % of its oil did Germany get from Romania? It's real simple. No Romanian oil, no war. How difficult is that?"

My response, (post #107) was:

That's demonstrably not the case. The synthetic oil plants provided much of the heavy lifting for the German war effort.

Your claim, which is "No Romanian oil, no war." is not quite as simple as you seem to think, was demonstrably not the case for the following reasons:

1. Synthetic oil made up a significant part of German oil production.
2. The loss of Ploesti did not bring about a complete collapse of the German war machine. In fact, 279 days passed (or nine months) between the fall of Ploesti (taking 1st August 1944) and May 8th.

Does the absence of Ploesti production impact German operations? Absolutely.

Does no oil = no war? Demonstrably not.

To repeat, At no point did I say "the loss of Ploesti would not even be noticed". It would be helpful to have a conversation about what was actually said rather than what you think was said.

[Zorch]

Time for some numbers...please peruse https://defense.info/re-thinking-strate ... l-and-war/ for data about Germany oil production and usage. Also see https://www.ww2-weapons.com/military-ex ... Production



Note: I make no claims regarding the accuracy of the figures contained therein.

[RangerJoe]

You also need to look at the quality and type of the fuels produced. Diesel, mogas, and avgas are all different and should not be used in an engine not designed for its use.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

When talking to you there are two discussions - one is the one we're actually having digitally, and the other seems to be the one going on in your head.

My response, (post #107) was:

That's demonstrably not the case. The synthetic oil plants provided much of the heavy lifting for the German war effort.

Your claim, which is "No Romanian oil, no war." is not quite as simple as you seem to think, was demonstrably not the case for the following reasons:

1. Synthetic oil made up a significant part of German oil production.
2. The loss of Ploesti did not bring about a complete collapse of the German war machine. In fact, 279 days passed (or nine months) between the fall of Ploesti (taking 1st August 1944) and May 8th.

Does the absence of Ploesti production impact German operations? Absolutely.

Does no oil = no war? Demonstrably not.

To repeat, At no point did I say "the loss of Ploesti would not even be noticed". It would be helpful to have a conversation about what was actually said rather than what you think was said.

warspite1

I am not having any conversations in my head. Why would I? I am trying to have a sensible grown up discussion with you – not play stupid games. But as usual, you have made yourself look rather silly with increasingly off the wall ideas, you’ve backed yourself into a corner, refused to answer my reasonable questions, and so have tried to deflect with “[discussions] going on in [my] head. Nice.

You added, “To repeat, at no point did I say "the loss of Ploesti would not even be noticed". It would be helpful to have a conversation about what was actually said rather than what you think was said”.

Nice word play there M_M but I’m afraid as usual you are twisting things. So let’s stop the stupid games and for the avoidance of doubt, let’s just be completely clear on who is saying what here. No you didn't say the loss of the oil wouldn't be noticed, but you have effectively implied this as you believe you've demonstrated that the war continued without it. You have also said that Romanian oil is not of sufficient importance that Hitler would base his strategy around it.

I have said, no Romanian oil – no war. For the avoidance of doubt I am not saying Romanian oil is Germany’s only source of oil, but I AM saying that it makes up such a proportion of German requirements that one can safely say “No Romanian oil, no war”.

To which, you said:

“That is demonstrably not the case”.

You then provided a source (that you believe supported your case?) and sought to support your comment with:

1. “Synthetic oil made up a significant part of German oil production”
2. “The loss of the Ploesti did not bring about a complete collapse of the German war machine”

So who is it having conversations in their head and who is it that has understood the actual situation? I’ll come to your second point at the end. I will comment on your first point first, although sorry, this point, about synthetic oil production, doesn’t actually demonstrate anything.

In 1939 Romanian oil made up 60% of Germany’s oil requirement. This is the year that Germany decided to invade Poland. 60%. Now, take that 60% out of Germany’s hands. Let’s say that again. Let’s remove 60% of Germany’s oil supply.

Yes, synthetic oil production rose as the war went on, but (if we use Zorch’s chart) in the last meaningful year – 1943 - synthetic production was never more than just over 50% of consumption. So we are still talking about the removal of just under 50% of Germany’s oil consumption.

But despite these pretty serious numbers, what you are saying is that I am wrong to say no Romanian oil, no war?? You said:

Does the absence of Ploesti production impact German operations? Absolutely.

Does no oil = no war? Demonstrably not.

By way of further background, you do know that in 1940 Germany required 60,000 tons of oil per month from the Soviet Union just to maintain its own stocks? You know that right? And that is WITH Romanian oil. So WITH Romanian oil the Germans need Soviet help just to keep oil reserves where they are (for your benefit we shall ignore that your ridiculous invasion of Turkey threatens those Soviet oils supplies, and just go with the Stalin does nothing about the straits approach).

If you believe war was possible, just what sort of war do you envisage Germany fighting? (You appear to have left Italy out of this, and as Italy relied 100% on German/Romanian oil, I can see why you’ve done that……best keep that one out of sight, out of mind eh?).

Have a look at Zorch’s graph. What do you notice? Yes, synthetic production was increasing as the war went on, BUT look at the % of mostly Romanian oil within that number. Despite this, you believe that war is still possible, and that operations would be simply ‘impacted’ with no Romanian oil available to Germany?

Okay, so let me ask you this. Can you tell me what sort of impact that would have had then? Instead of using words like demonstrably without any meaning, why not actually support that comment with some evidence.

As per my quotes above we know that WITH Romanian oil, the largest German truck factory was closed for a time, the air force was not able to train its pilots to the extent necessary, we know that naval operations were curtailed and stocks had to be built up for many operations that did take place. So please, remove the Romanian oil and tell me what Barbarossa would look like – how many panzer divisions, or indeed any motorised units would be supportable? What the defence of the Reich would look like? What the raids into the Atlantic would look like? How would troops in North Africa be supplied? How would Weserubung have happened? What the impact on industry would be? I say again, 60% (or at best by 1943 just under 50%).

Remember in this fantasy world of yours, you now have the Germans invading Spain and Turkey too – so what would those operations have done to those oil stocks? The Germans would have spent a lot on both operations but Spain had no oil to plunder and you’ve said Germany wouldn’t need to conquer Turkey so there is no oil to be gained there. You also have the Italian navy sailing off into the Atlantic and the Black Sea (while also somehow protecting convoys to North Africa). So just where is all this oil coming from? Remember, these are additional operations to the real life ones that have been ‘impacted’ by the loss of 60% of their oil (and 100% of Italy’s). But let’s ignore your fantasy invasions and just go with the historical.

Saying you have ‘demonstrably’ shown something doesn’t mean you actually have. So instead of insulting me, why not actually provide some evidence. Let’s see those questions answered.

Oh and by the way, coming to your second point now. In order to try and further support your comment you bizarrely pointed to 1944 and beyond as ‘evidence’ that the Germans could survive, and continue the war, without Romanian oil (note the Italians are out of the war by then so fortunately you don’t need to explain that one…..). You said:

The loss of Ploesti did not bring about a complete collapse of the German war machine. In fact, 279 days passed (or nine months) between the fall of Ploesti (taking 1st August 1944) and May 8th.

Again, have a look at Zorch’s chart. What do you notice about 1944? How many naval operations were being conducted in 1944? How many German aircraft were in the skies? How many panzer divisions were roaming freely across the Steppe? How many panzer divisions were involved in ‘The Bulge’ – oh and did even that small number of divisions have sufficient fuel? That was a rhetorical question.

You see, saying that German oil usage in 1944 could withstand the loss of Ploesti to prove that German military operations in 1941/42 would be able to continue (but with some ‘impact’) is simply embarrassing. The two situations bear no relation to one another.

For all intents and purposes, and by any sensible measure, no Romanian oil = no war.

[fcooke]

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

You also need to look at the quality and type of the fuels produced. Diesel, mogas, and avgas are all different and should not be used in an engine not designed for its use.

This is very true. Many moons ago I was travelling in the former Yugoslavia. On a bus from Split to Dubrovnic. Driver stops to refuel. The station is out of diesel so he fills the diesel powered bus with petrol instead. Half an hour later I smell smoke and walk up to the driver holding my nose as I don't know the language. He laughs at me. 5 minutes later the rear of the bus is on fire and we get off the bus. So while in AE all fuel is the same, not so in real life. Japan and Germany could not produce high octane fuel and this impacted aircraft performance. And the IJN resorted to using unrefined petroleum for their ships. My newest car wants 93 Octane, so that is what it gets.

[mind_messing]

Nice word play there M_M but I’m afraid as usual you are twisting things. So let’s stop the stupid games and for the avoidance of doubt, let’s just be completely clear on who is saying what here.

It would be helpful if you used the quote function warspite. It helps illustrate what was actually said.

No you didn't say the loss of the oil wouldn't be noticed

Then why did you make this claim in post #114?

but you have effectively implied this as you believe you've demonstrated that the war continued without it.

I'm not quite sure what you're getting at here. When did the war end in Europe?

You have also said that Romanian oil is not of sufficient importance that Hitler would base his strategy around it.

No, that's not what I said. I suggest you revisit post #102. I think we can both agree that there were other Axis strategic considerations other than Ploesti.

But let’s ignore your fantasy invasions and just go with the historical.

As for evidence, let's draw on the USSBS. It has some issues given its nature and the environment in which it was written, but I think that seems to be beneficial to your argument as it will get a clear hearing.

For fantasy, you're indulging in a fair few flights yourself regarding Ploesti. Specifically:

1. The Allies forces are going to have the full benefit of hindsight in attacking the oil plants as a priority over other targets.
2. Allied attacks are going to be able to destroy 100% of oil production at Ploesti.

Wrt #1, the use of Allied air power in Europe was geared towards supporting ground operations. Attacks on POL targets only came after the attacks on priority Luftwaffe targets, V-weapon sites and ground support for thee invasion of Normandy (both in terms of direct support and the wider campaign against transportation infrastucture).

All this is based on a 1944 bomber strength, which simply didn't exist in 1941.

On #2, from the reports here the best case scenario for the Allies is to reduce production to approx 25%. I am sceptical of the RAF's ability to generate the required results, in daylight (as night attacks definitely will not) via bases in Turkey with bombing techniques as they are.

The points to note from the USSBS above regarding the attacks on oil:
- The short time frame between attacks beginning in May '44 and the Soviet occupation in August.
- Fuel consumption exceeds production in May 1944.

Okay, so let me ask you this. Can you tell me what sort of impact that would have had then?

The link above has a chapter on the campaigns against oil centres, which covers this. German mechanized forces, to be blunt, stop operating. The landsers might plod along with their horse-drawn transport, but the mobile fire brigades cease to exist.

You see, saying that German oil usage in 1944 could withstand the loss of Ploesti to prove that German military operations in 1941/42 would be able to continue (but with some ‘impact’) is simply embarrassing.

Again, please point out where that was said. I refer you back to post #107

For all intents and purposes, and by any sensible measure, no Romanian oil = no war.

What do you define as any sensible measure?